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Abstract 
The current financial climate has created an unsympathetic environment for companies to 
trade. The economic shift has highlighted the fragility in which companies are financed, 
operate, and how they identify, analyse and attempt to neutralise financial distress. Given that 
the potential options available to a company are dependent on the conclusions drawn from the 
examination of the distress it has become imperative to determine at what point a company is 
in trouble. In conjunction with satisfying this point, effort must also be placed on defining 
“financial distress” and considering how this has had a bearing on the implementation of a 
rescue strategy. The array of problems that companies face do not all need to be fatal, and 
hence not all companies that have problems have to be liquidated. Corporate rescue is a 
variable term. How it is applied depends on a number of factors that range from the identity 
of the company to the philosophy and character of the insolvency practitioner. Currently 
corporate rescue follows a formal mechanism known as administration. This process is 
increasingly coming under challenge from an alternative model that addresses the fact that 
administration can be a lengthy and expensive process. This alternative model known as pre-
packed administration (“pre-packs”) offers to conduct “rescue proceedings” in secret and 
often result in selling the company to members of the existing management. How the pre-
pack model operates and conflicts with many of the UK’s traditional principles such as 
transparency and fairness highlights the tension within the profession as well as a lack of 
legislative guidance on the matter. This thesis aims to consider a number of issues: to assess 
the characteristics evident within the UK’s corporate rescue model and determine whether 
they comply with the theoretical principles of rescue; to examine the relationship between 
corporate rescue theory and government policy and how this has developed within the current 
economic environment; to determine whether the UK’s rescue model, when evaluated in light 
of the efficiency rule, can be classed as a true rescue model; and to ascertain whether pre-
packs offer a viable and legitimate solution to the inadequacies of the current law governing 
corporate rescue. Chapter One will introduce the corporate rescue concept and set out the 
research questions and aims that will be examined in this thesis. The second chapter will take 
a closer look at the fundamental principles and characteristics that are essential to the UK’s 
corporate rescue model and help shed light onto how the rescue regime came to being 
endorsed. Chapter Three is constituted by two parts. The first part sets out to examine how 
rescue is implemented in practice, taking a look at the different philosophical divides in 
iv 
 
corporate rescue and the influence of the Cork report. The second part focuses on the role and 
duties of the insolvency practitioner, in particular the wide discretion afforded to them and 
how they may use this to their advantage. Chapter Four explores the theoretical concepts of 
efficiency and the relationship that this has with the UK’s administration process. The 
penultimate Chapter introduces the alternative “rescue” measure which this thesis will class 
at the pragmatic response to the inadequacies of the current corporate insolvency legislation. 
Finally Chapter Six reflects on the research questions and aims set out in Chapter One and 
highlights any areas that would benefit from further research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................ ii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. v 
Cases .................................................................................................................................... x 
Legislation ......................................................................................................................... xiii 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 
1. Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Understanding Companies ............................................................................................. 8 
3. The Concept of Rescue ................................................................................................ 11 
4. The Emergence of a Corporate Rescue Culture ............................................................ 13 
5. Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 15 
6. The Aims of the Thesis ................................................................................................ 16 
7. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 16 
8. Thesis Structure ........................................................................................................... 17 
 
Chapter 2: Corporate Rescue: Concept, Nature, and Purpose ...................... 20 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 20 
II. Structure ..................................................................................................................... 25 
Part One: Corporate Rescue Concepts and Interpretations ................................................ 26 
1. Background ......................................................................................................... 26 
1.1. Causes of Financial Distress.............................................................................. 28 
1.2. Financial Distress.............................................................................................. 32 
1.3. Determining Insolvency .................................................................................... 35 
1.4. The Tests: Cash Flow and Balance Sheet .......................................................... 37 
1.5. The Relationship between Financial Distress and Corporate Rescue.................. 43 
Part Two: The Development of Corporate Rescue Regime in the UK............................... 44 
2.1. Developments leading up to the Enterprise act 2002 ......................................... 47 
2.2. Freedom of Contract and the Creditor Based Regime ........................................ 49 
2.3. The Cork Report ............................................................................................... 50 
vi 
 
2.4. A Compromise with Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code ............................ 54 
2.5. A Distinction between Rescue and Restoration ................................................. 57 
2.6. The Function of Corporate Rescue: One Interest or Several  ............................. 59 
2.7. Further Interests: Interests, Values and Visions ................................................. 62 
Part Three: The Objective of Corporate Rescue ............................................................... 66 
3.1. What is being Rescued? .................................................................................... 68 
3.2. Enterprise Act 2002 and the Purpose of Administration .................................... 70 
3.3. Routes to Administration: Court Appointment Procedure and out of Court 
Procedure ................................................................................................................ 72 
3.4. Administration .................................................................................................. 74 
3.5. When Rescue Fails – Rescuing Rescue ............................................................. 79 
3.6. Afterthought on Rescue Ideology ...................................................................... 80 
4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 81 
 
Chapter 3: Determining Corporate Rescue Policy and the Role of IPs ....... 83 
    Part I: Corporate Rescue Policy ................................................................................... 83 
1. Development of the Corporate Rescue Culture ............................................................. 83 
2. The Philosophy divide: Proceduralist and Traditionalist ............................................... 86 
2.1. Proceduralists ................................................................................................... 86 
2.2. Traditionalists ................................................................................................... 88 
2.3. Two Distinct Models......................................................................................... 90 
2.4. Creditor Bargain Theory ................................................................................... 91 
2.5. Team Production Theory................................................................................... 92 
2.6. Practical Application ......................................................................................... 93 
3. Early Development: the Birth of the Rescue Culture in the UK .................................... 95 
3.1. Role of Administrative Receivership ................................................................. 96 
3.2. The Eight Principles .......................................................................................... 97 
4. Proposals for Reform: a Change in Policy? ................................................................ 100 
5. The Report by the Review Committee........................................................................ 102 
6. Evaluation of the Enterprise Act 2002 – The Way Forward? ...................................... 105 
7. The Role of Directors in Corporate Rescue ................................................................ 107 
8. Summary ................................................................................................................... 109 
    Part II: Insolvency Practitioners: Function, Conduct and Abuses ........................... 110 
vii 
 
1. Background ............................................................................................................... 110 
2. Function: Personal Attributes and Qualifications ........................................................ 112 
2.1. Membership: Accountants or Lawyers? .......................................................... 112 
2.2. Qualifications ................................................................................................. 114 
2.3. An Overview of the Rescue Objectives ........................................................... 115 
2.4. Monitoring ...................................................................................................... 120 
3. Opportunity and Professional Fees ............................................................................. 121 
4. Discretion and Secrecy .............................................................................................. 124 
4.1. Availability of Information ............................................................................. 125 
4.2. Management Displacement ............................................................................. 126 
4.3. Protection ....................................................................................................... 128 
4.4. Professional Conduct ...................................................................................... 128 
5. The Code of Ethics .................................................................................................... 129 
6. Fundamental Principles .............................................................................................. 131 
(a) Integrity ........................................................................................................... 131 
(b) Objectivity ....................................................................................................... 131 
(c) Professional Competence and Due Care ........................................................... 132 
(d) Confidentiality ................................................................................................. 134 
(e) Professional Behavior ....................................................................................... 137 
7. The Complaint Procedure .......................................................................................... 138 
8. Threats to the Fundamental Principles ........................................................................ 140 
8.1. Safeguards ...................................................................................................... 142 
9. Judicial Intervention .................................................................................................. 143 
10. Summary ................................................................................................................. 144 
 
Chapter 4: Determining the Existence of a Corporate Rescue Model – an 
Efficiency Approach .................................................................................................. 146 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 146 
2. Overview ................................................................................................................... 147 
3. Establishing the Values .............................................................................................. 148 
3.1. Integral Concepts ............................................................................................ 149 
3.2. Trade-offs between Differing Values .............................................................. 149 
4. Legitimacy: Reasonable Expectations ........................................................................ 152 
viii 
 
5. Determining what Values to Measure? ....................................................................... 154 
6. Transparency ............................................................................................................. 155 
7. Concepts of Efficiency ............................................................................................... 157 
7.1. Pareto Efficiency ............................................................................................ 157 
7.2. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency ................................................................................. 159 
7.3. Technical Efficiency (Transaction Cost Efficiency) ........................................ 161 
7.4 Dynamic Efficiency ......................................................................................... 165 
7.5. Summary: Types of Efficiency ........................................................................ 167 
8. Notion of Efficiency .................................................................................................. 167 
9. Fairness ..................................................................................................................... 169 
10. The Relationship between Corporate Rescue, Efficiency and Fairness ..................... 171 
10.1. Efficient Framework ..................................................................................... 173 
10.2. Substantive Aims and Procedural Goals ........................................................ 174 
10.3. Tensions between Values .............................................................................. 175 
10.4. Fairness ........................................................................................................ 176 
11. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 178 
 
Chapter 5: The Pragmatic Response (The Compromise): Pre-Packs......... 181 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 181 
2. Background: Pre-Packaged Administrations .............................................................. 182 
3. Pre-Packs and Legitimacy .......................................................................................... 185 
4. Insolvency Practitioner’s Discretion and the Objective of Rescue .............................. 188 
4.1. Making the Right Decision – when to Sell? ..................................................... 190 
4.2. Is a Pre-pack really Corporate Rescue? ........................................................... 191 
5. Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16) ............................................................. 195 
5.1. Contents.......................................................................................................... 196 
5.2. Conduct of IP .................................................................................................. 197 
5.3. Guidance ........................................................................................................ 199 
5.4. Legality .......................................................................................................... 200 
6. Revisiting the Five Threats to the Fundamental Principles: a Review of IPs and Pre-
Packs ............................................................................................................................. 201 
6.1. The Self-Interest Threat .................................................................................. 201 
6.2. The Self-Review Threat .................................................................................. 202 
ix 
 
6.3. The Advocacy Threat ...................................................................................... 202 
6.4. The Familiarity Threat .................................................................................... 203 
6.5. The Intimidation Threat .................................................................................. 203 
7. Safeguards to Potential Threats that may occur during a Pre-Pack .............................. 204 
8. Reflections on SIP 16................................................................................................. 205 
9. IP’s and Professional Fees with Pre-Packs ................................................................. 206 
10. Phoenix Pre-Packs (Sales to Connected parties – Management Buyouts) ................. 209 
11. Case study ............................................................................................................... 212 
11.1. Halliwells LLP .............................................................................................. 213 
12. Proposals for Change: an Overview ......................................................................... 217 
12.1. Four Concerns............................................................................................... 218 
12.2. Three Days Notice ........................................................................................ 219 
13. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 220 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion .............................................................................................. 222 
1. Characteristics Evident within the UK’s Corporate Rescue Model ............................. 222 
2. Relationship between Policy and Theory.................................................................... 225 
3. Determining an Efficient Model ................................................................................. 228 
4. The Pragmatic Response ............................................................................................ 229 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
Table of Cases 
 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 K.B. 223 
 
Austinsuite Furniture Ltd, Re [1992] B.C.L.C. 1047 
 
BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK  2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) [2011] EWCA Civ 227 
 
Brady v Brady [1989] A. C. 755 HL 
Bramston v Haut [2012] EWHC 1279 (Ch) 
Brook v Reed [2011] EWCA Civ 331 
Buchler v Talbot [2004] 2 A.C. 298 
Byblos Bank SAL v Al Khudhairy [1987] BCLC 232 
Capital Annuities Ltd, Re [1979] 1 WLR 170 
CE King Ltd, Re [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 297 
Cheyne Finance plc (no 2), Re [2008] 2 All ER 987 
 
Clydesdale Financial Services v Smailes [2009] EWHC 1745 (Ch) [2009] B.C.C. 810 
Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd. v Thomas (1998) 28 ACSR 310 
Debtor (No 17 of 1966), Re [1967] Ch 590, [1967] 1 All ER 668 
DKLL Solicitors v HM Revenue & Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch), [2007] B.C.C. 908 
Douglas Griggs Engineering Ltd., Re [1963] Ch 19 
C Evans and Sons Ltd. v Spritebrand Ltd. and Anor [1985] BCLC 105 (CA) 
Flagstaff Silver Mining Co of Utah, Re (1975) 20 eq 268 
Four Private Investment Funds v Lomas [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 632 
 
Great Northern Copper Co., Re (1869) 20 LT 264 
 
Gregory v Wallace [1998] IRLR 387 (CA) 
Greycaine Ltd., Re [1946] Ch. 269 
Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch) 
IRC v Lawrence and Anor [2001] 1 BCLC 204 (CA) 
xi 
 
Kayley Vending Ltd, Re [2009] EMHC 904 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 578 
Key2law (Surrey) LLP v Gaynor De’Antiquis (Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills intervening) [2011] EWCA Civ. 1567 
Lathia v Dronsfield (1987) BCLC 321 
Lehman Bros International (Europe), Re; four Private Investment Funds v Lomas [2008] 
EWHC 2869 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 632 
Lewis’s of Leicester Ltd, Re [1995] B.C.C. 514 
Lewis v Doran [2005] NSWCA 243; (2005) 219 ALR 555, NSW CA 
London & Manchester Industrial Association, Re (1985) 1 Ch D 466 
Lyric Club, Re (1892) 36 Sol Jo 801 
McAteer v Lismore [2012] NI Ch 7 
Medforth v Blake [1999] B.C.C. 771 
Mills v Birchall [2008] EWCA Civ 385; [2008] B.C.C. 471 
 
Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell and Others [1998] BCC 343 
National Livestock Insurance Co, Re (1858) 26 Beav 153 
Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 25 
Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394 (HL) 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd (In 
Administration) Chancery Division [2010] EWHC 2013 (Ch) 
Rowbotham Baxter Ltd., Re [1990] BCC 113 
Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666, (1966) 40 ALJR 71 
Secretary of State v Tjolle [1998] 1 B.C.L.C., 333 
Solomons and Defty v Cheal, Huggins and Coster [2011] EWHC (ch2543) 
T & D Industries Plc, Re [2000] 1 All E.R. 333 
Transbus International Ltd, Re [2004] 2 All E. R. 911 
Taylor Industrial Flooring Ltd v M & H plant Hire (Manchester) Ltd [1990] BCLC 216, 
BCC 44, CA 
Trident Fashions Limited (No2), Re [2004] 2 BCLC 35 
xii 
 
Tweeds Garages Ltd., Re [1962] Ch 406 
Williams and Anor v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. and Anor [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL) 
West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v. Dodd [1988] 4 BCC 30, [1988] BCLC 250 
Whitaker, Whitaker v Palmer, Re [1901] 1 
Yate Colleries Co., Re [1883] WN 171 
Zegna III Holdings Inc., Re [2009] EWHC 2994 (Ch) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
Table of Legislation 
 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code; Section 364(a); s364(b); s364(c); s364(d)  
Companies Act 1985, Section 425 
Companies Act 1985, Section 417 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 2,  
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 6 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 6(2) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 8 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 9 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 10 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 11 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 12 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 13 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 14 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 15 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 16 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 17 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 18 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 19 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 20 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 21 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 22 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 23 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 24 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 25 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 26 
xiv 
 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 27 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 44(1)(a) 
Insolvency Act 1986, section 72A, 72B-72G;  
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 87 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 122(1)(f) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 144 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 213 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 214  
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 214 (2) (c) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 214(3) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 214 (6) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 214 (7) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 216 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 230(2) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 238 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 239 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 240 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 240(2) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 241 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 245 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 245(4) 
Insolvency Act 1986, section 176A 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 14 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 40(2) 
Insolvency Act 1986, Section 44 (1). 
xv 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 3(1) 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 3(2) 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 4. 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 12 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 13 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 14 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 15 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 16 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 17 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 18 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 19 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 20 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 21 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 22 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 23 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 24 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 25 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 26 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 27 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 28 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 29 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 30 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 31 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 32 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 49 
xvi 
 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 49(2)(b) 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 51 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 52(1) (a) 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 52(1) (b) 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 52(1) (c) 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 52(2)  
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 52(3)  
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 52(4)  
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 74 
 
Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 75 
 
Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para. 3(1)(b) 
Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2097) 
Insolvency Rules 1986, rule 2.33(2) 
Enterprise Act 2002, Sch.16, para.65 
Enterprise Act 2002, Sch.16, para.250 
Insolvency Practitioners regulations 2005 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1. Overview 
Finding solutions to arduous problems is and will remain an endeavour firmly associated with 
legal scholarship. As problems are systematically identified, isolated and sometimes rectified, 
inevitably eradicating some problems leaves the scope for new ones to materialise. It is 
within this evolving environment that a resourceful and pragmatic approach is required to 
ensure that the law remains progressive, whilst at the same time embraces and demonstrates a 
faithful understanding of the underlying principles that are firmly associated with a particular 
area of law. Invariably, tensions between conflicting interests and objectives cause the 
process to be scrutinised; producing a vacuum whereby development is almost entirely reliant 
on, and in some cases limited to, the ability of the participants to agree to compromises. 
Whilst most laws (and amendments) which govern aspects of our lives are discussed at great 
length through various consultations and formally begin life as a White Paper that follows a 
stringent process through Parliament before it officially becomes law, there are others that 
take a more unconventional route. Some are influenced by custom that is dictated by policy 
and motivated by best practice, aiming to create an alternative process to oppose undesirable 
and in most cases inefficient legislation. Whether informal processes should be sanctioned as 
legitimate is a debatable issue and beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus here is to assess 
whether informal models should be recognised even if they endorse principles that are 
contrary to their formal counterparts1.  
 
The temperament of this process can be transposed into any area of law; but it has particular 
relevance to the fast-moving pace of corporate and commercial law, especially so in recent 
years given the financial climate. The financial recession and the impact that this has had on 
the economy have raised many issues. With the occurrence of a second major recession in 
2012 (double dip recession2), and with the economic buoyancy levels not expected to return 
                                                     
1 Any reference to the law in this thesis is as stated at 1st May 2013.  
2 For a overview on the UK’s economy that took place towards the end of 2011 see the discussion held by 
accountants BDO who state that the UK is at a serious risk of a double dip recession 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15621916  (accessed 11th December 2011); for a market view on the 
economy see also a poll carried out by Deloitte, which revealed that CFOs now see a 38% chance of a double 
2 
 
to pre 2008 figures until 2013 at the earliest, questions are raised as to how best to deal with a 
financially troubled company. Whilst recent literature within the area has chosen to focus on 
the collapse of financial institutions such as banks3, insolvency law despite its importance and 
proximity to collectively reducing potential financial risk has lacked extensive input from 
academics. However, given the relationship between a country’s economy and how a 
particular jurisdiction deals with an economic downturn, the literature can only set to increase 
and this in turn will hopefully lead to more opportunities being created to provide more in-
depth research on the subject of corporate rescue and related insolvency issues4.  
 
As far as corporate failure goes, it is an understanding that within a capitalist environment 
that some companies will face financial troubles5. But it must be emphasised that there is a 
clear distinction to be had between issues that have a bearing and are critical to the operations 
of a company and those which are viewed as minor events, something which is merely part of 
the lifecycle of a company competing in a volatile market. Given the wide range of potential 
problems that a company may face, not all financial troubles would lead to a company 
failing.  Even if the problems were considered to be significant this does not automatically 
mean the end for the company; instead they can seek help from outside internal management 
to try to solve the problems before they become irreversible. It is this notion of attempting to 
restrain the failure and in turn rectify the problems that this thesis focuses upon. This 
conception, in its most basic form, will be referred to as corporate rescue. As a perception, 
corporate rescue presents itself as a model designed to help distressed yet salvageable 
companies. It provides the premise that if a company with financial problems seeks 
professional help before the troubles became overwhelming, then with a bit of luck a 
company could be restored to prosperity (which as it will be seen is often not the same thing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
dip, up from 33% in the first quarter of this year (2011), http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GB/uk/news/news-
releases/32c68bcdde2a9210VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm  (accessed 11th December 2011). 
3 Banks are subject to a different insolvency regime which is not being considered in the thesis.  
4 For instance, see L. Manning, ‘Review of the Insolvency and Restructuring Landscape in the UK’, 10(1) 
International Corporate Rescue, (2013) which provides an overview on the increase of retail and corporate 
insolvencies that are happening in the UK and how the measures introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 has 
transformed the options available to insolvency practitioners.  
5 However, the epithet “too big to fail” has come to epitomise one of the most serious challenges for policy 
makers revealed in the current financial crisis. It appears that the general consensus concedes that there is no 
alternative to bailing out big banks and other colossal financial institutions. But, it must be stressed that as 
critical as the issue of size is, it is not the crux of the matter; rather it is the complexity of the company in 
question, see E. Hüpkes, ‘Complexity in Complexity: what to do about the ‘too-big-to-fail’ Problem’, 9 JIBFL, 
(2009), 515; see also R. De Weijs, ‘Too Big to Fail as a game of Chicken with the State: what Insolvency Law 
Theory has to say about TBTF and Vice Versa’, European Business Organization Law Review, (2013), 201. 
3 
 
as a company returning to the same state as it was before the problems occurred) and given a 
second chance to continue to trade6.  
 
Assessing the corporate rescue procedure in the UK is an opportunity to advance knowledge 
within this area and contribute to the understanding of how rescue, in theory and practice has 
developed. It is interesting to note that most research, in general, is conducted with the 
intention of questioning the effectiveness of a particular legal principle and whether the law 
at present is adequate, or whether reform is required to address the outstanding issues. This 
thesis will venture off the conventional path and consider something more pertinent; research 
will be conducted with the intention of discovering the very heart of corporate rescue and 
with it pose the question: does corporate rescue in the UK actually exist?   
 
Considering this question, it is worth commencing with an assessment of what is corporate 
rescue, what role does it have in society and how its usage may be affected by changes in the 
financial climate i.e. a recession7. Company survival is difficult enough to achieve in 
flourishing times when the economy is strong. Achieving this feat when there is a general 
hardship amongst companies makes the odds much higher. Despite this reservation, survival 
remains the key priority. Survival is a multifaceted term that demands a broad approach to be 
taken to determine the substance and extent of the problems and how best, if feasible, these 
can be solved as quickly as possible. Assessing what amounts to survival is a debateable 
issue, and one that will be discussed at length throughout the thesis. But it suffices to mention 
briefly as a preliminary introduction to the subject that the survival term is somewhat blurred 
because there are some commentators who believe that rescue amounts to only company 
rescue (as a whole), whilst others believe it can include business rescue as well 
(reorganisation)8.  
                                                     
6 The origin of this term can be traced back to the influential white paper entitled, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: 
Insolvency – A Second Chance’, DTI, Cm 5234, (July 2001), see http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/compwp.htm 
(accessed 10th July 2010). The contents and importance of this report will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Two. 
7 Governments have been keen to keep up with global, systematic and localised threats as the crisis has 
unfolded, but despite this they have come to realise that even where there were comprehensive and modern 
insolvency regimes in place, they were not fit for the often unique purposes to which they were needed. See N. 
Hood, ‘Making up insolvency law in the recession – the world legislates on the hoof’, 2 Corporate Rescue and 
Insolvency, (2010), 65. It is also accepted that in an era of recession job preservation is a critical factor, 
something which a rescue plan may help to tackle, see P. Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: 
Realties and the need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, ICCLR, (2012), 61, at 61. 
8 Whilst the Enterprise Act 2002 gave a new emphasis to company survival, it did not make this the paramount 
concern (See Productivity and Enterprise White Paper (2001), para 2.15). It therefore follows that if the subject 
matter of what is being rescued is not clear it makes it difficult to assess in real terms, and to reach a general 
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In addition to this debate, there are other factors which need to be considered. As well as 
dealing with the internal working of a company, invariably external factors may have an 
influence on the way in which the rescue strategy is conducted. With this in mind it is worth 
highlighting something of a misconception about the relationship between the economy and 
the impact that this may have on a company. Contrary to popular belief, most companies do 
not experience major financial troubles at the onset of a recession9. The difficulties often 
arise after a recession, when a company has, in order to survive over this period, relied on its 
reserves to stay afloat but may now as this testing time is over face a new problem of 
surviving growth and stability in a competitive market10. With no resources to fund 
expansion, and with post credit-crunch lending being more restrictive, the pattern that 
emerges when examining the recessions that occurred in the 1980s11, 1990s12 alongside the 
most recent occurring in the last few years is that the peak of insolvencies arrives after the 
point when companies are attempting to return to growth. Observing the relationship between 
when a company is distressed and when it has reached the point of failure is a pedantic affair, 
but reviewing these concepts over a thirty year period demonstrates a notable change in 
attitudes and practice, revealing a deliberate move away from the use of liquidation; a 
procedure that was once the chosen option for companies that were in financial hardship. 
Liquidation is essentially a straight forward process that leads to a terminally ill company 
being wound up and its assets sold to satisfy, as far as possible, any debts outstanding. 
However, in most cases, having a choice on how to deal with a company is a luxury rarely 
afforded. In most cases there was no alternative, as it was often the case that the documents 
providing for security over a company’s property demanded in return for finance by financial 
institutions such as banks were drafted to protect their own interests ahead of other creditors. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
consensus amongst academics and practitioners whether survival has been achieved at all. As it will be seen this 
dispute has serious implications on determining what are or what should be the aim or aims of corporate rescue. 
9 A recession is usually defined as a period of general economic decline; specifically two consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP growth. 
10 Contained within the R3’s website, the journal entitled ‘Insolvency Lag: Risks for 2010’, provides “Evidence 
(which) suggests (that) from previous recessions...early recovery is a dangerous time for struggling businesses 
and individuals”, 
https://www.r3.org.uk/uploads/documents/Insolvency%20Lag%20Briefing%20Paper%2026.01.2010.pdf 
(accessed 22nd February 2010). 
11 Ibid. Research compiled suggests that the 1980s recession lasted five quarters – from Q1 1980 to Q1 1981. 
Although there were a greater number of fluctuations than there were in the 1990s recession, the long term trend 
shows insolvencies rising throughout the recession and for a considerable period of time after. Although the 
figures do show some periodic falls, company liquidations never fell back to their pre-recession levels – there 
was a lasting “step up”.  
12 Ibid. Though there were some minor fluctuations, the overall trend shows that liquidations continued to rise 
long after the official end of the recession, peaking at the end of 1992 – over a year after the recession’s official 
end. 
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If a company could not satisfy its debts, it was generally the bank’s right to place the 
company into receivership whereby it would be given priority to be reimbursed, irrespective 
of whether this led to other creditors receiving nothing or resulted in the liquidation of the 
company13.  
 
This outcome led some commentators and practitioners to question the fairness of such a 
process, especially for those companies that had the potential to be rejuvenated. In the early 
1980s the government was increasingly becoming aware of the inadequacies of the law 
governing corporate insolvency and showed a desire to scrutinise the current legislation and 
investigate the possibility as to whether an alternative procedure could be proposed. A highly 
influential select committee, known as The Cork Committee was charged with looking into 
the matter, observed and noted that in some circumstances a company should be given a 
“second chance”, that is, a viable business should be allowed to continue to operate; this laid 
the foundations for what would become known as the “rescue culture”14. It should be noted 
that the concept of rescue has been known in the UK for some time but has rarely been used 
because of the preference for receivership. Despite some major concerns regarding the 
intricacies of receivership, changing the habits of those who practice in this field will 
inevitably take time. In addition to facing some resistance to change within the profession, it 
is often the case that reformative measures are constrained by limited administrative 
resources and the demand on legislative bodies means that not all reform can occur speedily. 
It therefore should come as no surprise that the Cork Report took some time to be compiled 
and subsequently not all of its recommendations were enacted in the Insolvency Acts of 1985 
and 1986. However, notwithstanding that some sections were omitted, its recommendation 
for the creation of a new procedure called the administration process which had the 
responsibility of not introducing, but promoting corporate rescue as a real alternative to 
liquidation for financially distressed companies, was followed through. Since the inclusion of 
this process, the procedure has gone on to become one of the integral elements of corporate 
insolvency15.  
                                                     
13 A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 
2003), at 49. For an interesting analysis that challenges the much repeated proposition that secured claimants 
‘stand outside’ liquidation, see R. Mokal, ‘What Liquidation Does For Secured Creditors, And What It Does For 
You’, 71(5) Modern Law Review, (2008), 699-733. For a discussion on funding liquidations, see J. Armour and 
A. Walters, ‘Funding Liquidation: A Functional View’, Law Quarterly Review, (2006), 295. 
14 The Cork Report (Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee), Cmnd. 8558, (1982). 
15 Despite this presumption, a question that will be later considered is whether since the Cork Report has the 
rescue culture continued to prosper and influence or has the influence steadily declined? 
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In spite of the optimism that the Cork Report seemed to offer, it was not until the Enterprise 
Act 2002 that effectively, but not completely, eradicated receivership16. Whilst receiverships 
may still continue to be of relevance depending on the time that the charge relied upon by a 
secured creditor was made17 it was hoped that the administration process would in time 
become the preferred model, notwithstanding some reservations about whether it could 
effectively accommodate the wide ranging financial, legal and social needs of companies in a 
volatile economic climate. Exactly what these needs are will be examined later, but the 
question considered here is whether the insolvency legislation that governs corporate rescue 
adequately fulfils this role. Or to put it another way, have the theoretical characteristics 
contained within the UK’s formal corporate rescue model become redundant in its ability to 
provide a working framework that can efficiently produce viable rescue strategies that could 
be entered into in order to save a financially distressed company?18  
 
The question of whether corporate rescue can be delivered within its legislative framework 
depends on determining what amounts to a successful rescue. The issue rests with 
establishing the different ways in which success can be measured with divergences often 
depending on what question is asked and when the question is asked19. Early attempts to 
provide an insight into the level of success achieved may have the disadvantage of making 
data appear optimistic. Such an action could potentially leave the rescue attempt looking 
rather pessimistic causing unnecessary concerns amongst management and creditors in 
addition to complicating matters with an already distressed company. It follows that if the 
intended objective is to simply dispose of a wasteful company that has no chance of 
continuing to operate successfully, then liquidation should follow. If a distressed company 
shows signs of profit potential, and that with some professional assistance in its financial and 
operational affairs it could in the near future begin to trade successfully again, the assigned 
                                                     
16 The Enterprise Act 2002 barred the right to appoint administrative receivers in any security created after 15 
September 2003 (subject to certain specific exceptions). Any attempt to do so takes effect as a power to appoint 
an administrator. 
17 Note that there is a list of exceptions contained within sections 72B-72F of the IA 1986 (inserted by the EA 
2002, s.250 (1)), which allows for certain specialised companies to be subjected to an administrative receiver 
even under debentures executed after the commencement of the EA 2002.  
18 Whilst many professionals and a variety of institutions, such as INSOL International, UNICITRAL, and The 
World Bank have spent much of the pre-recession decade pressing for progress and reform to facilitate 
restructuring of distressed, yet salvageable companies, the change required was hindered by the good economic 
health of the respective countries. It now appears as the global crisis has unfolded, insolvency systems that were 
inadequate have now taken rash emergency measures to try and address the fallacy of the law.  See N. Hood, 
‘Making up Insolvency Law in the Recession – the World Legislates on the Hoof’, 2 Corporate Rescue and 
Insolvency, (2010), 65. 
19 A. Belcher, ‘The Economic Implications of Attempting to Rescue Companies’ in H. Rajak (ed.), Insolvency 
Law Theory and Practice, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), at 237. 
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administrator who is instructed to review the company’s affairs would be inclined to 
implement actions that would strive to rescue the ailing company. The distinction sounds 
simple, and in a sense it is. But in practice doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of 
the corporate rescue regime. The concerns rest on the critical difference between actual 
successful rescues that help return companies to health and mere attempts which are fruitless. 
Reflecting on the current legislation in place, what is the likelihood that a company can be 
rescued? Delicately put, procedural developments often lag behind current trends evident 
within practice. It is therefore a real concern that the existing legal framework lacks the 
ability and there is a lack of confidence in it to meet all challenges that may confront a 
troubled company. Given the lack of initiative from the government to impose measures to 
address these shortcomings, one must ask whether it can rightfully be said that an effective 
corporate rescue model actually exists in the UK.  
 
To determine whether a corporate rescue model has been effective, the core values and its 
intended aim must be analysed. The principles of corporate rescue in the UK, as noted above, 
were explored and consolidated for the first time in the Cork Report. The report considered 
the merit of a corporate rescue regime and how it would be beneficial to give distressed 
companies an alternative to being wound up. It recognised that there were many factors that 
could contribute to a company suffering hardship and that it was not necessarily improper 
actions carried out by the actors in charge of the company (management) that contributed to 
its position, but rather wider issues that were beyond its control. The report suggested that 
there were wider social implications to be considered besides maximising the wealth of the 
creditors; this in turn prompted a revision of the insolvency procedures and for the first time 
it was questioned whether a company should be saved as a going concern, and efforts to 
promote rescue rather than simply see liquidation as the automatic solution were made. 
Whilst there is the temptation to conduct a cross analysis of the various corporate rescue 
models in different jurisdictions and compare its characteristics in conjunction with the recent 
economic crisis, it must be realised that geographically, it is not technically a global crisis as 
new emerging markets will predominately be unaffected20. This is a deliberate self- imposed 
constraint to narrow the focus of this thesis in order to cover the UK’s creditor- friendly 
                                                     
20 N. Hood, ‘Emerging Markets and the Capital Market Crisis’, 6 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency, (2008), 81. 
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administration procedure along with other dominant rescue strategies such as the pre-packs 
adapted by insolvency practitioners (IPs)21. 
 
With the above in mind this brief introduction aims to establish what the core foundations to 
corporate rescue are, focusing on three main areas: the nature of companies; determining 
insolvency and the concept of rescue.  
 
2. Understanding Companies  
Recent statistical data compiled by the Insolvency Service shows that the majority of 
companies that enter an insolvent state in the United Kingdom fail22. This conclusion poses 
three fundamental questions: why is it the case that so many companies fail? Secondly, is 
there an effective legal mechanism in place to help companies that are in financial distress 
avoid liquidation? And thirdly, is the current legal framework efficient in rescuing a 
financially distressed company? For now the focus will be on the last question, which focuses 
on the procedural identity of corporate rescue. It is essential to understand what is at the heart 
of corporate rescue: what is being rescued? This question should be approached with caution. 
Not all companies should be viewed in the same way and as such should be treated as unique 
entities with their own identities. Each company has a different set of objectives (purpose of 
existence), structure (management) and provide different services. Despite these many 
differences, collectively companies interact in a complex network where their success and 
failure largely depends on the success and failure of other firms. In reference to this thesis 
success will refer to the ability of a company to operate in a competitive market and pay its 
creditors whilst at the same being able to generate a reasonable rate of profit for its 
shareholders.  
 
With these deliberations in mind it is important to consider another aspect, namely that as a 
legal entity companies are multifaceted23. It is helpful when discussing the well-being of 
firms to refer to a company as if it were alive. Whilst a company is not sentient, it can relate 
to attributes that are familiar to functions of a living being. A company can be referred to as 
                                                     
21 When necessary, reference will be made to a system which in theory represents the opposing values, namely 
the more debtor friendly Chapter 11 system evident in the United States of America. 
22 Insolvency Service, http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/insolv.htm (accessed 24th 
February 2010). 
23 Whether a company has social responsibilities is debatable, especially from a contractarians viewpoint, who 
would argue that the sole purpose of a company is to generate profit. However, it could be argued that without 
having some responsibility at least in the loose sense then generating profit would be made more difficult.  
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being alive when it is at operational status, dead when it ceases to exist, with further reference 
being made to its health depending on its financial status. Professionals who are assigned to 
deal with corporate insolvency matters can easily be referred to as doctors who will use their 
technical knowledge and experience to see if they can “operate” on the company and nurse 
the company back to health. But like all surgeries there are a number of factors that need to 
be taken into consideration. With any type of intervention there is a question of timing and 
this is correlated with the level of risk that may be evident. Early intervention reduces the 
extent that the company is exposure to failure, but it of course does not eradicate it entirely. It 
remains that the most serious of cases will carry little chance of success but nevertheless the 
decision to not intervene is likened to the initial examination completed by a medical doctor; 
it has to occur to establish the extent of the problem. Only once this has been determined can 
the necessary course of action be decided. It will therefore come as no surprise that 
determining the extent of a company’s financial problems is not an easy task. For this reason 
it is imperative to: appreciate how individual companies operate; understand the vast array of 
problems that a company may face; what help is available to a company in financial distress, 
and what is the likelihood of this help actually assisting the company back to health? In 
regards to the assistance that a company may expect it is critical to note the role that IPs play 
and what duties they owe to the company and its creditors. As the architects of corporate 
rescue processes they have wide discretion to dictate what is to happen without needing to 
wholly justify the actions taken. Whether the justification is based on commercial judgment 
or influenced by the lucrative nature of rescue proceedings over liquidation remains an issue 
that will be explored later on in this thesis.  
 
 Before these questions can be fully examined it must first of all be made clear that it is 
inevitable that some companies will fail and not all companies can be rescued24. It should 
also be stressed that even if a company was eligible to be rescued, other variables such as 
securing additional finance may prevent the company from doing so. Whilst the issues and 
concerns to prevent rescue are numerous, the end to a company’s existence usually means 
that it has lost the ability to compete against other companies within the same line of 
business. This covers complications such as market pressure, investment shortages, and 
management failings. In addition to these sources special attention should be drawn to two 
technical insolvency tests set out in the Insolvency Act 1986, which state that if a company  
                                                     
24 See R. Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 13. 
10 
 
can neither pay its debts as they fall due and/or its liabilities exceed that of its assets, then the 
company may be classified as insolvent25. These tests provide a legal framework to be 
applied to insolvency that act as benchmarks for creditors to assess whether their investment 
or money owed for services rendered will be recovered. If one of these tests is satisfied then 
the secured creditor(s) who have not received payment may decide in order to protect their 
own interests to put the company into administration. Upon this action taking place it 
removes the focus from the shareholders and ensures that they receive a reasonable rate of 
return and places the attention firmly onto maximising the wealth of the creditors, who the 
administrator will owe a duty towards26. Once a company has entered administration only 
three outcomes are possible: liquidation, straight dissolution or rescue, with the last option 
reserved for only a few. 
 
Before examining corporate rescue in depth it is important to outline a distinction between 
the company and the business. A business plan aimed at turning around a troubled company 
may involve reorganising some aspects central to its operations. The changes implemented 
are often designed to improve the way in which the company conducts its business. This 
streamlining exercise is often associated with efficiency and to achieve this end cutbacks will 
have to be made.  From altering the size of the firm to introducing redundancies the general 
aim is to refocus on identifying what elements of the company are profitable (if any) and 
discarding aspects that are not.  It follows that a company having financial problems will 
rarely have any other option but to change in order to survive.  Determining the extent of the 
changes required will inevitably lead to an audit being carried out across the firm to identity 
the possible ways to cut costs without affecting the core mechanics of the company which are 
essential for the company to exist. The outcome will usually result in a modified, leaner 
company that has been for all intents and purposes recycled. Why this distinction is important 
is because corporate rescue has over the years become associated with two models – pure 
company rescue and business reorganisation. The trouble however is that the terms have 
become interchangeable, causing some confusion as to what the aim of corporate rescue 
should be. It will be seen that most rescues for various reasons often fall into the 
reorganisation category; with the pure rescue concept only being applicable to those rare 
cases where the company largely remains unchanged. It is therefore suggested that as most 
companies which enter an insolvent state have to change to have at least a chance of 
                                                     
25 The Cash Flow and Balance Sheet Tests will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
26 The role and function of administrators will be explored in Chapter Three. 
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surviving, corporate rescue in its purest form does not, and cannot, exist27. It is accepted that 
some commentators will dispute whether the distinction makes any real difference, but the 
fact that the two concepts exist means that that it must have some importance and as such 
they must be fully explored. For instances, in some cases partial rescue (reorganisation) will 
surely serve a greater purpose than liquidation. Likewise, proposing that one of the aims of 
corporate rescue should be to reduce/restrict the potential financial repercussions that a 
distressed company will have on the wider community is a consideration that would not look 
out of place in most insolvency models. But whilst these considerations appear integral to a 
sound rescue model, they do not define it nor do they shed light on what rescue should 
fundamentally be seen to do. It is a matter of perception often dictated by public policy that 
classifies what rescue is. This invariably means that a corporate rescue model should evolve 
and remain relevant to the environment in which it operates. Failing this then there is every 
chance that an alternative rescue mechanism will develop that caters to occupy the void - the 
legal vacuum for which the insolvency legislation does not provide. Applying this hypothesis 
to the UK, questions have arisen that enquires into the uncertainties created from the current 
legal framework as set out within the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002. The 
debate considers whether because of the current legal inadequacies in providing clear 
provisions to aid a distressed company a new approach has been adopted by IPs that 
addresses these matters. The critical aspect of this approach is that not only does it operate 
outside the mainstream principles of administration, it is by its very nature an informal 
process not endorsed within the current insolvency law. This solution (pragmatic response) 
that appears to be gaining wider support will be referred to as pre-packed administrations 
(“pre-packs”)28.  
 
3. The Concept of Rescue  
The rescue culture is a concept born out of the ideology that calculated risk should be 
encouraged and if failure occurs then there should be a system in place to help minimise the 
                                                     
27 A recent decision delivered by Mr Justice Norris has offered some assistance on this matter. In his 
deliberations he considers the first objective (“rescuing the company as a going concern”) and whether this had 
been achieved. He concludes that it does not seem to be so. He highlighted the distinction between the company 
and its business, and in this case how the terms have been confused. A much slimmed-down version of the 
business of the company has been sold as a going concern: but the company cannot be rescued as a going 
concern because it has creditors of some £400,000, fees and expenses of administration of some £68,000 and 
virtually no assets. Therefore he noted that this administration has achieved nothing. See Solomons and Defty v 
Cheal, Huggins and Coster [2011] EWHC 2543 (Ch), in particular para 14. 
28 The term will be explored in Chapter Five, but it suffices to mention that it involves a pre-arranged sale of all 
or part of a distressed business or assets of the company, which will be executed immediately, or shortly after 
the appointment of an administrator.  
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adverse effects that it may have on affected parties. Whilst the law strived to address the 
changes that had occurred in society, the pace of these changes became too great and 
gradually rendered the law less effective in fulfilling its objectives. Part of the issue rests with 
the terminology adopted; to what extent do the management of a company understand the 
fundamental signs of distress  and how has the concept of rescue  been interpreted by IPs and 
related professionals?29 In addition, it is important to understand the public’s perception of 
insolvency and the stigma associated with a company in financial distress. The idea of giving 
a company a second chance is still viewed with some suspicion in the UK, unlike in the 
United States of America where it is encouraged and even sought after30. It appears that the 
unwillingness to be associated with failure is so inherent in the UK that it has the potential to 
hinder any plans that are designed to help a company recover. Instead of understanding and 
accepting financial distress as something that is natural in the lifespan of a company, it is 
often viewed as something that could and should have been prevented.  
 
Whilst some reform was introduced in the Enterprise Act 2002 to enhance the importance of 
rescue, the chance for the UK’s administration model to be tested did not really occur due to 
the economy remaining steadfast throughout the turn of the millennium up until about 
2007/2008. This changed somewhat towards the end of 2011, and it has now become clearer 
that the current insolvency legislation has in some cases not been correctly used or at least not 
to its full potential. In essence, it is not understood whether the UK’s corporate rescue model 
is equipped to accommodate these changes in commercial markets.  It is only through 
actively measuring and assessing a particular model that allows for enough data to be 
compiled that a true picture can be revealed as to whether the law accommodates the realities 
that occur in practice. Within an area of law as complex as corporate insolvency, it is prone to 
being susceptible to many variables that are often beyond its control. A change to the 
economic climate poses a constant challenge to a model. These potential disputes only aim to 
highlight faults, lacunas, and ultimately to determine whether a better model can be adopted 
that deals with the issues in hand.  
 
 
                                                     
29 For further discussions on the importance of insolvency practitioners and how directors are expected to act in 
a way that contributes to the success of the company see A. Keay, ‘Office-holders and the Duty of Directors to 
Promote the Success of the Company’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2010), 129. 
30 See L. Qi, ‘Managerial Models during the Corporate Reorganisation Period and their Governance Effects: The 
UK and US Perspective’, Company Lawyer, (2008), 131. 
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4. The Emergence of a Corporate Rescue Culture 
As noted earlier, corporate rescue within the UK’s legal system can trace its origins back to 
the Review of the Select Committee chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork in 1982. This report 
became highly influential for its substantial coverage of the issue of corporate rescue along 
with the aims and principles that should be promoted and adhered to by corporate rescue. The 
principles set out by the Cork Report reflected and embraced the customs and workings of the 
business world at the time and helped to address the lack of insolvency procedures that were 
in place to deal with failing companies. Therefore it should be noted that the Cork Report was 
a visionary piece with one of its aims to lay the foundations for making corporate rescue a 
real alternative to liquidation, and, hence, a working policy to be considered for legislation 
rather than just an idea embedded in theory. The Report was received with wide acclaim, 
with many of its recommendations entering legislation by way of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
The administration process became the mechanism that facilitates corporate rescue, with an 
emphasis on preserving companies as a going concern where possible and to protect the 
interests of the public and employees alike. A marked contrast to the administration process 
is Chapter 11 which is the United States primary version of corporate rescue and is contained 
within the American Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978. This rescue model differs from the UK’s 
model as it permits the management of the debtor company to remain in control of the 
company and whilst under the protection of the Act to formulate a restructuring plan for the 
company, despite it being a possibility that the management was the source of the financial 
problems. The Insolvency Act 1986 differed fundamentally from the US approach in that 
some of the main aims of the Act were to: operate as deterrence against any wrongdoings of 
directors; raise awareness of the various options open to companies in financial distress; 
promote good practice. All of these factors were designed to ensure professional standards 
were enhanced and that technical knowledge was increased amongst management to 
highlight when intervention should be sought. Collectively it was hoped that overall this 
effort should contribute to the efficient implementation of corporate rescue proceedings and 
raise the profile of the rescue culture.  
 
There were further reforms in the following years, such as the Insolvency Act 1994, the 
Insolvency Act 2000, and in more recent years the Enterprise Act 2002. The provisions in the 
latter Act were fundamental in that it aimed to address some shortcomings of the 1986 Act 
namely to make the insolvency procedure more accountable and transparent by: removing 
receivership; abolishing the preference for Crown debts; and attempting to implement a legal 
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model that correlated more with the happenings of the business and financial world in the 
face of commercial realities, rather than being a model confined to theory alone. For these 
reasons the Act’s full potential is yet to be realised, and for the purposes of this thesis these 
benchmarks for change will be revisited for direction and inspiration.  
 
It must be understood that rescue should not be perceived as a mechanism that offers an 
absolute solution to a distressed company, but more often than not a partial response that 
temporarily relieves financial pressures. It may offer a solution to a problem, but whether that 
amounts to a temporary or a permanent one is difficult to conclude with the lack of research 
and cooperation from professionals within the field. With this in mind the questions remain 
numerous, including: whether temporary rescue is something that should be sought if it offers 
some respite from the full onset of distress; should there be a limit on the amount of times a 
company can be rescued; or is this irrelevant, despite the legislation inferring that a company 
should have the option to be able to continue as a going concern at the point of redemption? 
Some would say that the availability of rescue has to be assessed subjectively, with no 
reference being made to a company’s history. However, it is only by looking at its past that it 
can be clearly determined whether a rescue plan is likely to work. This however prompts 
further questions as to whether rescues which are followed by subsequent rescues can be 
regarded as rescues? Are they not merely temporary measures that did not fully address the 
original problems? Whilst it is accepted that further problems may be unrelated to the first 
incident it has to be asked, if a company is continually having financial problems: should it 
not be terminated as it is clearly not a viable company? The questions are of course numerous 
without having a specific case to dissect but it demonstrates the complex nature of 
companies. It is therefore paramount to make clear that whilst early intervention is often cited 
as providing rescue strategies with the best chance of being successful, rescue does not 
equate to restoration, nor does it offer immunity from further distress in the future.  
It will be seen that defining corporate rescue is problematic, especially since there are debates 
as to what it is and entails. Despite these difficulties a well-received attempt at offering some 
guidance on this matter is that it involves a major intervention to prevent eventual failure31. It 
will be appreciated that this definition does not offer an absolute insight into the practicalities 
                                                     
31 A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 12; A. Belcher, ‘The Economic 
Implications of Attempting to Rescue Companies’, in H. Rajak (ed.), Insolvency Law: Theory and Practice, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993); see also D. Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), Ch1; M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, 
Journal of Business Law, (1997), at 491; R. Harmer, ‘Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim’, 
1 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, (1997), 139, at 143-8. 
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of applying this in reality.  For instance, what amounts to a “major intervention”?32 Whilst it 
may intend to cover all bases it fails to assert with any clarity when and if intervention should 
take place? Exactly when can it be labelled satisfactorily as a mechanism that efficiently 
pursues the goal of rescue? Ultimately this begs the question what is “eventual failure”? 
When is failure classed as irresolvable failure? Does this just include the immediate 
foreseeable future or all issues that may be reasonably envisioned?  
 
With this in mind it is suggested that a non-tangible, evolving framework is required that 
reflects and adopts contemporary issues; not just financial ones, but also cultural 
developments that have taken place in society. It is submitted that a Darwinian approach 
should be adopted which is based on economic considerations, whereby uncompetitive 
companies are allowed to die and in turn they are replaced by stronger rivals33. There has to 
be some casualties when it comes to dealing with distress, otherwise no company would ever 
fail, and this cannot be allowed to happen – a displacement exercise marked by success and 
dictated by the public interest to maintain wealth maximisation must take place34.  
 
5. Research Questions 
This thesis endeavours to examine the developments in corporate rescue and the existing 
provisions made for rescue. As a result of the foregoing, this thesis poses the following 
questions: 
 Have the characteristics contained within the UK’s corporate rescue model become 
redundant so far as their ability to provide a framework that can efficiently produce a 
viable rescue package that could save a company?  
 Does the corporate rescue model evident in the UK fulfil and reflect the aims set out 
in the government’s policy? 
 Can the model referred to as corporate rescue in the UK be accurately described as 
corporate rescue? 
                                                     
32 In particular how does this differ from a normal managerial response to corporate trouble? See V. Finch, 
‘Corporate rescue Processes: the search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, J.B.L., (2010), 502, at 504. 
See also P. Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realties and the need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, 
ICCLR, (2012), 61, at 62. 
33 Similarly the approach has also been referred to as ‘bankruptcy Darwinism’ whereby only the fittest 
companies will survive financial problems. See K. Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests into Account in 
Bankruptcy: An Essay’, 72 Washington University Law Quarterly, (1994), 1031, at 1035. 
34 For example see J. Girgis, ‘Corporate Restructuring, the Evolution of Corporate Assets and the Public 
Interest’, 22(1) International Insolvency Review, (2013), pp 29-54. 
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 Is there a legal vacuum whereby the realities evident in practice are not 
accommodated for within the law on corporate rescue?  
 What has been the response in practice to the corporate model that government has 
introduced? 
 
6. The Aims of the Thesis  
The purpose of this thesis as already stated is to determine whether the administration process 
is sufficiently efficient to meet its aims, and secondly, question whether the endorsement of 
an alternative “corporate rescue model”, namely pre-packs is a legitimate and natural 
successor to the formal administration process35. In considering these aims, it will determine 
whether the increased usage of this alternative procedure has shifted the focus away from 
formal legal processes and in turn marked a clear move away from complying with the 
current legislation that governs corporate rescue. Ultimately the examination of the processes 
will reveal whether due to the fundamental lack of compliance, this has led to a procedure 
that is or is not fully compatible with the principles and ideology that governs corporate 
rescue in the UK. In conjunction with the research questions a theoretical framework can be 
developed and employed, which produces four aims:   
 
 To assess the characteristics evident within the UK’s corporate rescue model and 
determine whether they comply with the theoretical principles of rescue. 
 To examine the relationship between corporate rescue theory and government policy 
and how this has developed within the current economic environment. 
 To determine whether the UK’s rescue model, when evaluated in light of the 
efficiency rule, can be classed as a true rescue model. 
 To ascertain whether pre-packaged administrations offer a viable and legitimate 
solution to the inadequacies of the current law governing corporate rescue.  
 
7. Methodology 
Addressing the aims brings interesting questions as to how the research is to be conducted. 
This thesis aims to incorporate and adopt a trans-disciplinary approach. The entire thesis will 
                                                     
35 The concepts will be discussed in greater detail in the next few chapters, but it suffices to mention that the 
term will be closely associated with fairness, and the premise that if something is not fair, it cannot be efficient. 
See A. Keay and H. Zhang, ‘Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and Director’s Duty to Creditors’, 32 
Melbourne University Law Review, (2008), 141, at 164. 
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involve principally a doctrinal study adopting a desk-based approach to an examination of 
aspects of corporate rescue. As a matter of necessity the thesis will draw on the findings of 
some empirical studies that touch upon the area of corporate rescue, as well as some of the 
theoretical arguments that have been mounted in the area.  The sources drawn upon will be 
cases, government reports (white papers, consultations, and committee reports), books, 
journal literature and relevant electronic sources such as websites for various organisations. 
 
8. Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2: Corporate Rescue: Concept, Nature, and Purpose  
The core traditional principles and terms within corporate rescue will be explored and 
analysed in this chapter. It will also draw upon emerging concepts within the field. It will be 
clear from the research that terms such as “financial distress” and “insolvency” are tentative 
terms that sometimes add confusion rather than help a troubled company address its 
problems. Exploring the theory of rescue and noting the key factors that are considered to be 
integral to a rescue model involves a closer examination of the historical practices of the 
jurisdiction in question. Whilst the focus will firmly be on the UK’s rescue regime a 
comparison will be made with the US model to explain how “path dependency” can influence 
differences, even if the reason for those differences no longer exist. It is through this 
understanding that it is explained why embracing change is sometimes a difficult process to 
achieve and why occasionally this may give rise to alternative models being sought. The 
objectives of corporate rescue will be considered in order to allow us to determine by whom 
and how a rescue process may be influenced. Ultimately, this chapter aims to provide an 
overview of the characteristics that are essential to the UK’s corporate rescue model.   
 
Chapter 3: Determining Corporate Rescue Policy and the Role of Insolvency 
Practitioners   
Chapter Two sets out the theoretical principles of rescue.  It is constituted by two parts. 
 
Part I: Corporate Rescue Policy 
This part of Chapter 3 seeks to draw attention towards how corporate rescue is implemented 
in practice. To begin an overview is required, exploring the philosophical aspect of rescue, in 
particular examining the divide that exists between proceduralist and traditionalist views in 
relation to the issue of - for whose interests should corporate rescue serve? This has important 
implications as it determines the overall flavour of the rescue model that a country will 
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possess such as following a creditor bargain theory or a team production theory. Following 
this, attention will be directed to discovering the early development of the rescue culture in 
the UK, making reference to the Cork Report and how this has shaped the rescue regime that 
the UK has today. In conjunction with this the Report by the Review Committee (‘A Second 
Chance’) and the Enterprise Act 2002 will be reviewed to provide an indicator as to the 
direction the rescue culture has taken and whether the key policy factors have changed over 
time.  
 
Part II: Insolvency Practitioners: Function, Conduct and Abuses 
The role of the IP is critical to the wider understanding of how rescue procedures are 
implemented. They administer the process and determine the fate of the distressed company. 
The IP’s function will be examined and will involve an examination as to how the IP’s role 
has developed in the UK and the core skills, knowledge and professional qualifications that 
are required to be an IP. An emphasis will be placed on the self regulation of the profession 
and the role of the Recognised Professional Bodies (RPB). The main concern regarding the 
role of IPs is the apparent secrecy that surrounds their decision making process. There are 
requirements which dictate that they should record their “thinking” but in practice this is 
rarely comprehensively completed nor is it often successfully challenged, which raises 
serious questions regarding the transparency and accountability of the process. Whilst there 
are codes of conduct such as the Code of Ethics setting out five fundamental principles that 
should be adhered to when implementing their functions in addition to safeguards in place to 
help the IP to avoid conflicts with any of the five principles, any challenge to the non 
compliance of these measures often fail. The complaint procedure and the relationship 
between the court and the IP indicate that there is a lack of regulation within this area. The 
lack of action taken by the RPBs when abuse has been found also tarnishes the reputation of 
the process. Overall it will be examined whether this procedure allows IPs to manipulate the 
process for personal financial benefit.  
 
Chapter 4: Determining the Existence of a Corporate Rescue model within the UK 
when assessed in light of an Efficiency framework 
This chapter will examine the theoretical concepts of efficiency; why efficiency is considered 
more important than other notions; and the relationship that efficiency has with the notion of 
fairness. In turn the research undertaken in Chapter Two and Three will be scrutinised to 
assess whether the aim of rescue as stated in Schedule B(1), para 3(1)(a) of the Insolvency 
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Act 1986 has been correctly applied or whether the current law is inadequate in dealing with 
a financially distressed company in the current economic environment. An aim is to discover 
whether a correlation exists between inefficient legislation and an alternative rescue model 
emerging. The role that IPs have taken and how they may have contributed to this informal 
process will also feature. It will be suggested that the parameters dictated within the notion of 
efficiency has forced the concepts of corporate rescue to evolve and ultimately adapt 
according to the changing wants and needs of the business market. 
 
Chapter 5: Pre-Packaged Administration: The Pragmatic Response (The Compromise) 
The rescue model endorsed originally in the Cork Report, the Insolvency Act 1986, and 
Enterprise Act 2002 has given way to a new breed of rescue, namely pre-packed 
administration. The embracing of this informal process takes the direction of corporate rescue 
away from the foundational principles set out in the administration process. To understand 
this process the background to its origins will be observed and how the courts have 
approached the legitimacy question. The role of IPs and the discretion that they are afforded 
when considering a rescue strategy is critical to the understanding of how pre-packs operate. 
Focus will turn to Statement of Insolvency Practice (SIP) 16 and how this has demonstrated 
that the process needs to become more regulated. Whilst in some respects this falls short of 
offering assistance, it does codify what is best practice and offers a new guidance even if it is 
clear that the courts will refrain from interfering with “commercial judgements” made by IPs 
who they consider are best placed to make such decisions. Reference will again be made to 
the fundamental principles and safeguards examined in Chapter Three and how this has an 
impact on the pre-pack process, specifically how IPs make fair and accountable decisions. A 
few case studies will be explored to see how pre-packs work in practice as well as reflecting 
on the undesirable aspects such as professional fees of IPs and management buy-outs. 
Finally, proposals for change to the system will also be explored. Overall it will be 
established whether the lack of formality given to pre-packs has meant that the UK no longer 
has a corporate rescue model that is reflective of its principles as set out in its legislation. 
This chapter aims to understand more about this “pragmatic response” to rescue and whether 
it should be embraced or rejected as a serious, legitimate answer to helping distressed 
companies.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
A summary of the research conducted and any areas that would benefit from further research. 
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 Chapter 2 
Corporate Rescue: Concept, Nature, and Purpose 
 
 
I. Introduction  
The way in which a financially distressed company is approached has changed over the years, 
in part because of fundamental shifts in the law and in financial markets. Examining the 
methods that have been employed to address these concerns involves a close exploration of 
the traditional and emerging principles that are evident within the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
corporate rescue model. To achieve this end a number of issues will become apparent, 
namely the discovery that financial distress is a tentative term that often causes confusion and 
complicates matters as opposed to offering much needed clarity. Accepting that financial 
distress is something that cannot be fixed but rather takes on a form that seems to evolve, 
choosing to reflect the diverse and complex nature of the wider economic market, it should be 
stressed that distress and corporate death are not synonymous1. A company is unique; 
therefore distress will affect each company in different ways causing the value of the 
company to be depreciated in dissimilar fashions. It therefore follows that any attempt to 
apply or adopt a universal solution to distress would be a fruitless exercise. Each troubled 
company should be assessed on its own individual merits, even if this results in a break-away 
from what is considered normal practice.  
 
Given the diverse nature of financial distress in conjunction with the tension that exists 
amongst creditors a picture emerges regarding the difficulty of dealing with a company that 
can be saved from liquidation. The benefits to be gained from a rescue process are often 
overlooked with commentators preferring to be pessimistic in relation to some aspects. To 
criticise a model is easier than to suggest reform measures that could aid the process, but this 
would be to ignore the fact that corporate rescue is anything but a straightforward procedure. 
With this in mind a comprehensive overview of the characteristics that make up the corporate 
rescue model in the UK are essential to the wider understanding of this subject.  
 
                                                            
1 K. Wruck, ‘Financial distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Efficiency’, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics, (1990), 419, at 420. 
21 
 
From extracting this information the rationale of what corporate rescue should aspire to do 
will be deduced. The rescue model has been designed to encompass a range of possibilities, 
but it cannot cater for every scenario. This is not the same as suggesting that there are 
shortcomings that should have been addressed, but rather acknowledging that there is a gulf 
between what the insolvency legislation says on the one hand and what practice deems to be 
necessary on the other. This thesis amongst other things will explore whether a “meeting of 
the minds” between the pragmatists and the theorists will occur, or whether the disparities 
will continue. Taking the opinion that the latter option is more likely, it will firstly be 
examined whether the administration procedure embraced in the UK coincides with the 
theoretical principles of rescue.  
 
To explore this submission it will be necessary to separate this chapter into three distinct 
sections. The concepts involved within the process will be explored to shed light on the 
terminological difficulties that exist, particularly the point in time when a company is deemed 
insolvent; the difference between insolvent and in distress, and the various interpretations of 
rescue – is this company or business rescue - pure (keeping the company intact) or a 
reorganisation (saving only fragments of the company)? The second stage proposes to take a 
look at the nature of rescue; particularly the administration procedure and it is distinguishable 
from other models such as Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The last section questions 
the objective of rescue, examining the reasons behind why a company should be rescued and 
taking a closer look at the administration process.  
 
As noted, corporate rescue has a complex personality. The principles of a corporate rescue 
model are based on an interdisciplinary2 compliance between many formal and informal 
interpretations3; a reflection of how the corporate rescue idea has evolved through custom and 
contract law to produce an end product which contains a mixture of statutory and judiciary 
input.  It is this collaboration between various practices that provides a testament to the 
breadth and depth of corporate insolvency and in turn enhances the company’s reputation as a 
complex legal entity. In truth it would be difficult to imagine an insolvency framework that 
contained aims which were isolated from the principles inherent in the jurisdiction’s legal 
system. It is therefore paramount that the legal procedures adopted by a particular jurisdiction 
                                                            
2 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
3 A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 87. 
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reflect and sit in harmony with the general overall thrust of existing legislation; unless of 
course the aim is one of reform.  
 
Considering this, it begs the question: does the current insolvency framework provide 
adequate solutions for the contemporary issues that currently face companies? To answer this 
question a greater understanding of corporate rescue is required. The rescue concept presents 
itself as a complex legal mechanism which derives its identity from a mixture of inherent and 
external influences, including cultural impressions as well as economic pressures, voluntarily 
or not. Considering the various factors that can come into play, it will be of little surprise that 
developing a single idea as to what rescue should achieve has prompted much debate 
amongst academics. Apart from the difficulty in reaching agreement as to what “success” 
constitutes in the context of rescue, legal rules endure because they are efficient in their 
means4. If this submission is correct any legal procedure subjected to the efficiency test faces 
assessment whereby it must provide a plausible explanation as to why it should be, or 
deserves to be, recognised as the leading authority for the purpose it was designed5. Should it 
fail, attention must be drawn to alternative measures which address the issues. This in turn 
would be subjected to the same treatment to determine whether this provides the more 
adequate solution. Applying this to a company suffering financial distress, would it be better 
served if it entered the formal administration process or the informal alternative, pre-
packaged administration (pre-packs)? 
 
Part of the answer rests with identifying the various elements to efficiency and the different 
notions that they present. Critically there are some commentators who have suggested that 
efficiency cannot exclusively provide for any goals in the law itself6. Whilst this proposition 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Four it suffices to mention that this thesis argues 
to the contrary. In addition the research will demonstrate a necessity to review other factors 
such as fairness in conjunction with efficiency as these other notions are equally as important 
in providing justifications for why the law is as it is. Given the nature of corporate rescue the 
                                                            
4 F. Easterbrook, ‘Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?’, 27 Journal of Financial Economics, (1990), 411, at 411. 
5 Notions of efficiency will be explored in Chapter Four. 
6 R. Mokal, ‘Review Article on Fairness and Efficiency’, 66 Modern Law Review, (2003), 3. 
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focus will be on economic efficiency7, but other factors such as path dependency will also 
form part of the critical analysis8.  
 
The path dependency theory will be used to explain the process of how certain rescue models 
are selected. However, to suggest that there is a choice in these matters is to misunderstand 
the theory. The premise is not based on a voluntary preference towards a particular trait or 
character evident within a rescue model but is often the result of following the historical 
development of a legal system that has been dictated over time. In other words there is a 
considerable lack of choice for the legislators to direct a rescue process in a way that is 
different from what has developed within the legal parameters of a particular jurisdiction. It is 
the case that implementing change will be difficult to achieve as the dependency to rely on 
traditional principles runs so deep within a legal framework that the differences between 
rescue processes will remain even if the reasons for those differences no longer exist9. Hence 
corporate insolvency regimes such as the ones evident in the UK and the US demonstrate 
how similar concepts can be interpreted differently and choosing one model over the other in 
these situations is prevented by a sense of belonging to one system as opposed to another10. 
 
It is however important to note another issue. If a jurisdiction is obliged to embrace a 
traditional approach to corporate rescue, would considering an alternative means that did not 
necessarily fit within existing practice be acceptable? Is it possible that this transition could 
be viewed as a rebellious act against the status quo or would it be demonstrating a willingness 
to adopt a practical response which would properly address the prevailing issues in 
commercial markets? An example of attempting to adjust to these changes has been the 
endorsement of the pre-packaged administration process which has gathered momentum in 
recent years by offering a less stringent approach for interested purchasers to buy a distressed 
                                                            
7 M. J. White, ‘The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision’, 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives, (1989), 129, at 139. 
8 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’, 56 ICLQ, (2007), 515, at 
533. 
9 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’, 56 ICLQ, (2007), 515, at 
533. 
10 Further reading on ‘path dependency’ see R. J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: 
When Do Institutions Matters?’, 74 Washington University Law Quarterly, (1996), 327; M. J. Roe, ‘Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics’, 109 Harvard Law Review, (1996), 641. For example the UK’s insolvency 
regime has traditionally followed principles that have made it more inclined to embrace a creditor orientated 
approach, something which was noted in the highly influential Cork Report, and which made it distinguishable 
from other models like the United States Chapter 11 which follows a more debtor friendly approach. 
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company, without risking the value of the company disintegrating11. But even with these 
apparent advantages, would adopting this informal process go against everything that has 
been formulated in the past and render the formal administration procedure obsolete?  
 
The prominence of the pre-packs can perhaps be explained by the lack of synchronisation 
between legislation and its practical application, which leads to one asking whether corporate 
insolvency legislation is simply one or more cycles behind current economic developments? 
If this is the case then the issue concerns itself with the restrictive parameters of the legal 
framework rather than the task of gathering the required support needed to implement 
change. That said the matter is rather more complicated than a mere theoretical dispute over 
how best to deal with a distressed company. The issues surrounding the legitimacy of pre-
packs has been one of the most contentious matter that has resulted in much literature and has 
been the source for many heated debates regarding whether it can be seen as a genuine rescue 
process. Unfortunately any attempt to address these matters has suffered a setback as it was 
recently announced that the Government has scrapped any proposed consultation, concluding 
that that no changes will be made for the time being12. The Government was not convinced 
that the benefit of new legislative controls presently outweighed the overall benefit to 
businesses13. This has ensured that the tension between academics and insolvency 
professionals is to remain for some time creating a perfect opportunity to research the formal 
and informal rescue processes that currently exist in the UK14. 
 
                                                            
11 Statistics compiled by the Insolvency Service will show that pre-packs now account for half of 
administrations, see The Insolvency Service, 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/201005/index.htm (assessed 20th January 2011). 
12 For example see, The Insolvency Service, 2011 Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation, (May 
2012), at 9. It was as recent as June 2011 that the Insolvency Service (IS) led a short consultation on reforming 
the rules concerning pre-packed insolvency sales with the intention of implementing any potential new laws by 
October of the same year. However the statutory instrument outlining the proposed changes was removed from 
the IS website and the body announced in August 2012 that the planned regulatory changes would be delayed 
until April 2013 at the earliest. The changes drafted would have seen creditors given three days' notice if a 
company was to be sold to a connected party. Insolvency practitioners do not currently have to give notice of a 
pre-packaged sale to unsecured creditors although permission of secured creditors – for example, banks – is 
required. 
13 The Hon. Ed Davey, Minister for employment relations, consumer and postal affairs, said that the 
Government had listened to the views of "interested parties" and decided that it was better for small businesses 
not to impose further regulatory requirements on them. He said the Government was not prepared to introduce 
changes only applicable to larger firms. As much of the concern was related to small businesses, he did not 
consider that measures should be introduced just for businesses other than micro-businesses. It is for these 
reason that he announced that the Government would not be seeking to introduce new legislative controls on 
pre-packs. 
14 It will be noted that the commentary will not consider whether a model is right or wrong (morally or legally), 
the thesis will adopt a technical argument and assess whether Administration and pre-packs are so 
fundamentally different that they cannot co-exist as rescue models within the UK’s insolvency framework. 
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II. Structure of the Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the key principles and concepts that 
have contributed to the UK’s corporate rescue regime. It is critical to the greater 
understanding of corporate rescue to firstly understand how insolvency laws have evolved 
over time and why certain aspects have remained whilst others have been discarded. 
Essentially a closer examination is required to determine the correlation, if any, between the 
policy decisions that have been made and the rescue model applied in practice and to see 
whether they sit in harmony or in conflict with each other.   
 
The chapter will commence with an overview of the key concepts with an examination into 
the importance of how certain terms are interpreted and how this is critical to the greater 
understanding of corporate rescue. Defining financial distress is paramount to the successful 
application of a rescue model that heavily relies on management providing IPs with the 
correct information to allow them to intervene at the optimum time.  The completeness of the 
information provided and any conflicts of interest between interested parties play a crucial 
role in establishing whether a distressed company can be rescued. The two legal tests for 
establishing insolvency - the Cash Flow and Balance Sheet tests - will form a focal point for 
this section. Distinctively the second stage will closely look at the nature of corporate rescue; 
focusing on the strategic development of rescue and observing the historical circumstances 
that have influenced the model, particularly how administration grew out of receivership 
which is essentially a creditor-orientated procedure and noting the findings of the Cork 
Report which set the foundations for the rescue regime that exists today. A brief historical 
overview of the fundamental differences between the UK and US insolvency laws will 
encapsulate the distinct identities of administration and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code respectively, highlighting the tentative aspects of the models, such as who is in control 
of the company when the rescue/reorganisation process has been initiated. The divergence 
between the UK and US will show the complexity of corporate rescue and implicate a 
reliance on a wide range of circumstances. The third stage will look at the objectives of 
rescue. Cultural influences, the interests of society and the promotion of calculated risk as a 
means of encouraging entrepreneurial activity will be explored as a means of discovering the 
factors that have contributed to the UK’s corporate rescue model. Discovering the parameters 
of the current insolvency legislation will assist in determining whether the rescue model in 
the UK is adequate in dealing with the needs of a distressed company. If the model is found 
26 
 
to be wanting, can this be construed to mean that the UK lacks a formal rescue procedure? 
Ultimately it will be asked whether the alternative informal pre-pack model was inevitable. 
 
Part One: Corporate Rescue Concepts and Interpretations 
1. Background 
There are a number of different rescue models endorsed around the world that despite each 
having their own unique corporate rescue identity, share similar concepts and principles. To 
appreciate the foundations of corporate rescue it must firstly be understood how a legal 
system deals with a financially distressed company. Predominately the substance of a rescue 
model is highly dependent on the historical legal development that has occurred in a 
respective country15. It is therefore often the case that the direction taken by legislative bodies 
is nothing more than a mere echo that reflects old custom and practices that have existed for 
decades. This occurrence may be observed in the corporate insolvency and rescue regimes in 
both the UK and US; each being a product of their environment shaped by different 
circumstances. The intrinsic character of both models will be discussed with the greater focus 
being on the UK’s administration procedure.  
 
As a starting point it is critical to grasp what causes a company to become distressed and at 
what point does a company become insolvent? A key consideration when examining this is to 
be aware of the various parties that interact with a company, including creditors, 
shareholders, directors and managers of the company, employees, suppliers and customers. In 
addition it should also be noted the vital relationship between that of the insolvency 
practitioner (IP) and a rescue package, something which will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter Three.  
 
The purpose of corporate insolvency has many aspects, most designed to create opportunities 
for action rather than laying down consequences for stipulated states of affairs16. It is a 
system that is heavily reliant on the participation of those actors who operate within the circle 
of a distressed company’s ambit to identify when action is required and what recourse is best 
suited given the circumstances. Rescue models endeavour to be associated with promoting a 
positive and proactive role, as well as a corrective and a punitive role. A system must be seen 
                                                            
15 This of cause has not prevented some commentators from drawing conclusions, see H. Hansmann and R. 
Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, in J. Gordan and M. Roe, (eds), Convergence and 
Persistence in Corporate Governance, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), at 33. 
16 V. Finch, ‘Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles’, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 125. 
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to be accessible in providing readily available technical knowledge to those in charge of a 
company to inform and encourage them to seek help when distress has been identified and 
provide a level of confidence that the law will not penalise them merely for doing so. 
 
However, identifying when a company is financially distressed is not a straight forward 
process, with part of the difficulty resting with how the initial assessment of the financial 
state of a company is conducted. The evaluation of a company’s solvency state relies on 
somewhat rough benchmarks often referred to as the cash flow and balance sheet tests. The 
tests are not intended to be accurate mechanisms employed to determine the exact financial 
situation of a struggling company but used as a statutory rule to determine whether a 
company is insolvent for certain legal purposes. In some cases they have presented an over 
simplistic view of how distress is calculated when in fact the circumstances should be viewed 
in a wider context “constituted out of an assemblage of calculative technologies, expert 
claims and modes of judgment”17.  
 
Given the nature of how the point of insolvency is determined there is considerable room for 
discretion to be applied by the person who administers the affairs of the troubled company. 
This role can be assigned to a number of people who satisfy the requirements, but it is 
normally the case that a qualified accountant who is a trained insolvency practitioner (IP) will 
deal with the matter. To avoid any doubt, it should be noted that in the UK it is accountants 
rather than legal professionals who generally deal with insolvency related issues and this has 
influenced the way in which distress and insolvency are determined18. Often cited as being in 
the best position to make a sound decision, an IP may use his or her commercial judgment 
and have at his or her disposal, amongst other things, various data compiled from things such 
as accounting spreadsheets. Such is the reliance on IPs and familiarity in the way in which 
they conduct their affairs, the courts have demonstrated a willingness to leave insolvency 
related decisions in the hands of the IP and have refrained from interfering in the opinions 
that are formed.  
 
                                                            
17 P. Miller and M. Power, ‘Calculating Corporate Failure’, in Y. Dezalay and D. Sugarman (eds.), Professional 
Competition and Professional Power: Lawyers, Accountants and the Social Construction of Markets, (London: 
Routledge, 1995), at 51. 
18 The negotiation process is not founded by legal pointers, but rather a process reliant on financial data subject 
to interpretation; it is purely the aftermath that is determined by insolvency legislation, see V. Finch, Corporate 
Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 126. 
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Once IPs have been instructed to act in the best interests of the distressed company they must 
decide what realistically can be done with the company. Despite the fact that IPs are held in 
such high esteem by the court and are given a wide berth to conduct their duties, obtaining 
the necessary information to allow them to do their job has always been problematic in some 
cases. Distress and insolvency are terms that are susceptible to wide interpretation. By 
allowing IP’s to conduct their duties with discretion it has left a “legal space” where a 
company’s financial status can be negotiated19. An IP may for instance successfully secure 
data relating to the financial situation of a company but in doing so he must keep an open 
mind accepting that accurate reports may be difficult to obtain due to the ease of 
manufacturing data to suit the required needs20. Given this difficulty, the eventual decision is 
based on opinion - does the IP “think” a company can survive as a going concern? Whilst this 
may occasionally result in errors, there is no real alternative. Audits and consultancy form an 
integral part of assessing the liquidity of a company and dominate the created market for 
insolvency administration and the extra-legal market for corporate rescue, and this method of 
deduction is here to stay21. That said, whilst financial measures are often adopted to assess 
corporate failure it will be seen that it is also a legal test that has received much attention 
from the judiciary and academics alike. However, before this analysis takes place it is 
necessary to provide an overview that examines the reasons why a company may become 
distressed.  
 
1.1. Causes of Financial Distress  
Before examining the terms distress and insolvency it is worth commencing with a brief 
introduction into what may cause a company to be subjected to financial hardship. The task 
of identifying events that have had an effect on a company’s well-being is a troublesome 
affair as some companies can for a period of time be technically insolvent but not be in a 
position of financial distress; the alternative is also possible whereby a company can be 
technically in financial distress but not insolvent. Evidentially, distinguishing between the 
two positions is difficult but critical to how the troubled company is to be approached. 
Distress describes a moment of despair, an indicator that the company is having some 
                                                            
19 P. Miller and M. Power, ‘Calculating Corporate Failure’, in Y. Dezalay and D. Sugarman (eds.), Professional 
Competition and Professional Power: Lawyers, Accountants and the Social Construction of Markets, (London: 
Routledge, 1995), at 58. 
20 The agglomeration of financial data can be perceived as a weakness of accountants especially when assessing 
the health of a company, see F. Clarke, G. Dean and K. Oliver, Corporate Collapse: Regulatory, Accounting 
and Ethical Failure, (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), ch17.  
21 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 125. 
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problems. Insolvency is more of an absolute term used to describe an end result, and is a 
reflection of what has happened to the company. 
 
Identifying causes of failure are essential for any attempt to rescue a company22. The 
difficulties should be categorised and systematically analysed to ensure that all the problems 
are properly accounted for as no rescue strategy will be able to prevail unless they are 
remedied. A detailed description of the internal and external factors that may contribute to the 
failure of a company is not at the heart of this thesis23, but it suffices to mention what the 
most often cited causes of failure are attributed to.  
 
It is generally understood that the most common cause of distress is acts committed (or 
omissions) by the management of the company24. Whilst it is understood that the 
management of the company cannot control all eventualities that may take place, such as 
prolonged strikes and business competition from a major group, it is nevertheless a necessity 
that a company is expected to take risks to stay competitive and, as a result, successful. The 
difficulty in taking risks that may not have necessarily reaped any immediate rewards is for 
the management to realise and accept that the financial difficulties that may be evident 
require an honest reflection and should not be merely dismissed as  just a blip in a business 
plan but something that could become very serious. How this assessment is undertaken 
depends entirely on the management, but a word of warning should be noted as prolonging 
                                                            
22 Whilst good accounting systems will provide for accurate cash flow forecasts and project projections, 
including checks against theft and fraud, there appears to be a lack of commitment to the provision of good 
quality accounting information, see J. Day and P. Taylor, ‘Financial Distress in Small Firms: The Role played 
by Debt Covenants and other Monitoring Devices’, Insolvency Lawyer, (2001), 97. 
23 On corporate failure see C. F. Pratten, ‘Corporate Failure’, (Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 
London, 1991); C. Campbell and B. Underdown, Corporate Insolvency in Practice: An Analytical Approach, 
(London: Chapman, 1991); H. D. Platt, Why Companies Fail: Strategies for Detecting, Avoiding, and Profiting 
from Bankruptcy, (Lexington: Lexington Books, Mass, 1985); J. Argenti, Corporate Collapse: The Causes and 
Symptoms, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1976); On high gearing see R. Hamilton, B. Halcroft, K. Pond and Z. Liew, 
‘Back from the Dead: Survival Potential in Administrative Receiverships’, 13 Insolvency Legal & Practice, 
(1997), at 78, 80; On over expansion see J. Stein, ‘Rescue Operations in Business Crises’, in K. J. Hopt and G. 
Teubner (eds.), Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liabilities: Legal, Economic, and Sociological Analyses 
on Corporate Social Responsibility, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1985); On mismanagement see V. Finch, ‘Company 
Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’, 55 Modern Law Review, (1992), 179, at 210; On Charging 
Markets and Economic Conditions see K. Dyson and S. Wilks, ‘The Character and Economic Content of 
Industrial Crisis’, in Dyson and Wilks (eds.), Industrial Crisis: A Comparative Study of the State and Industry, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). 
24 See a joint Smith Institute and R3 report on a summary of a roundtable debate and events at the Labour Party 
and Conservative Party Conferences (July and October 2009). The events focused on whether the existing 
insolvency regime was fit for purpose. The events looked at whether there was a case for reform and amongst 
other things stated that poor management is one of the primary causes of business failure, at 
http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/Press,%20Policy%20and%20Press/Smith%20Institute
_Bankrupt%20Britain.pdf  (accessed 4th September 2012); see also J. Lingard, Corporate rescue and 
Insolvencies, 2nd edn, (London: Butterworths, 1989), at 3, para 1.12. 
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the waiting game, hoping the situation improves will reduce the chances for an administrator 
to do anything about it25.  
 
With this in mind it is imperative to understand how a company should operate. As a 
benchmark a successful company requires “competent management, a suitably motivated 
workforce and worthwhile products”26 to survive in a competitive environment. Any element 
that affects any of these can negate a company’s ability to generate profit. Whilst products 
may become obsolete and workforces cause disruption to productivity, measures can be taken 
to rectify these problems with relative ease if the management of a company is competent. 
However, if it is the management that is responsible for the demise of the company then any 
rectification becomes much more difficult27. The issues may become amplified depending on 
the size of the workforce, the experience and qualifications held by management28, the extent 
of the problem and how quickly the distress has been identified. If management lacks the 
ability to deal with the issues and are not prudent enough to seek specialist help, it may 
continue to make poor strategies or preserve its control over the company by using superior 
information to make poor decisions29. Ultimately, management is in a position to make or 
break a company; the managers are the ones that run the company and make the key 
decisions on how that company should operate30.  
 
The vast number of reasons why a company may experience troubles can be broken down 
into five critical areas that if not monitored would affect the financial stability of the 
                                                            
25 Unfortunately the chance has often been and gone before an administrator can do anything, see S. Frith and S. 
Davies, ‘Clearing up the Mess: Applying the Basic Principle of Insolvency Law – A Review of Cases Decided 
in 2008 on the Theme of Administrators – Part 1’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2009), 117, at 117. 
26 J. Lingard, Corporate Rescue and Insolvencies, 2nd edn, (London: Butterworths, 1989), at 1. 
27 ComRes conducted an online survey in May 2010 of R3 members in the UK.  The survey was sent to 2082 
IPs, of whom 329 responded.  This means that approximately one in six of those eligible to take part did 
so. Their findings revealed that ‘Incompetence or bad management’ of company directors causes 56% of 
corporate failures, while nearly 40% of businesses could have been saved if professional advice had been sought 
earlier, according to a poll of insolvency experts carried out by insolvency trade body R3, see 
https://www.r3.org.uk/newsandpress/default.asp?page=1&i=525&id=446#PressArchiveStory (assessed 20th 
October 2010); See C. Campbell and B. Underdown, Corporate Insolvency in Practice: An Analytical 
Approach, (London: Chapman, 1991); J. Argenti, Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms, (London: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976). 
28 Most English Company Directors are in fact untrained and unqualified, see V. Finch, ‘Company Directors: 
Who Cares about skill and Care?’, 55 Modern Law Review, (1992), at 79. Recent reports suggest that the 
situation has not improved, see Smith Institute and R3 report, (July and October 2009), at 
http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/Press,%20Policy%20and%20Press/Smith%20Institute
_Bankrupt%20Britain.pdf  (accessed 4th September 2012). 
29 K. H. Wruck, ‘Financial Distress, Reorganisation and Organisational Efficiency’, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics, (1990), 419, at 424. 
30 In some firms that management will be stakeholders in the company as well. 
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company, and potentially lead to financial distress. The five31 elements are not, it is 
submitted, exhaustive. Rather they are indicators of the core issues that may prevail. The first 
element covers issues regarding efficient production, a reference to the way in which the 
products are made. Sub categories cover whether the product has been made within a 
specified time-frame and at a competitive value. Any disruption to the set targets will 
invariably mean that the products are being made at a loss which will affect the profits of the 
company. Following on from this the second element requires skilful marketing (products 
that will be readily absorbed into the market). If there is no market for the product produced 
then the company will simply not be able to generate any turnover, and will operate its 
business at a loss. In conjunction with this, the third element should prevent obsolete products 
by insisting on stringent financial controls to show the outcome is profitable. But predicting 
markets and what will “catch on” involves risk assessments based on probabilities; there is 
always a risk that the market turns against the company. The fourth element covering the 
diversification of products aims to spread the financial risk of one product failing by having 
an interest in another profitable enterprise. But this is not always possible especially if the 
reason for the failure is something that has affected the market as a whole. To have the luxury 
of having an interest in products over a wide range of markets is a rare trait for many 
companies. The final element encourages a contingency plan (business plan for disaster 
management, and specifically one involving a financial climate change). This however is 
entirely dependent on the extent of the distress and whether the company can be salvaged. 
 
The general list provides a clear message: – spread risk and adapt quickly to hostile 
conditions or risk being susceptible to harsh economic conditions either by way of 
consequence or subsequently through unforeseen influences, which may eventually lead to 
the company being unable to remain solvent. Consequential results are controllable through 
risk management and prudent analysis of company information; subsequent risks are rare, 
and ones that often affect the wider market as a whole rather than an individual business, 
such as a change in the financial climate on a global scale. It is the change in an economy that 
poses a continuous threat to all businesses. The change in the economic settings may be 
sudden and with little warning, such as the Government imposing exchange controls, hire 
purchase controls, tariff barriers or materially changing tax policies. The natural answer to 
this would be for the management to adapt quickly to the situation, but if it is on an 
                                                            
31 J. Lingard, Corporate Rescue and Insolvencies, 2nd edn, (London: Butterworths, 1989), at 1. 
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unprecedented level with a lack of real experience from the managers in dealing with such an 
occurrence then this will prove a difficult task that may lead to the company being exposed to 
financial troubles far greater than it should have been. If it is the case that the company 
cannot survive such exposure then inevitably the company will fail. However there is a 
possibility for a company to be rescued as long as the signs of financial distress can be 
recognised and management is willing to admit to its mistakes32; its importance will also be 
determined by its ability to provide a timeframe where a rescue attempt would potentially 
prove more successful33.  
 
1.2. Financial Distress 
As noted above there is a clear distinction between when a company is in financial distress 
and when a company is insolvent. Financial distress is a variable term that can be applied to a 
number of situations. It may apply to describe a recent internal or external event, or it may be 
part of a series of ongoing problems that have not been resolved. Distressed companies are 
those that require a major rethink in the way a firm’s operations or structures are performed34. 
Such action will normally involve the reorganisation of the company’s operations35. Distress 
normally arises in terms of default, when the company has failed to make a significant 
payment of principal or interest to the creditor36. Substantiating distress may also be achieved 
through assessing calculations based on a company’s accounts, which can provide a 
breakdown of a company’s financial profile, producing ratios to predict a range of events, 
                                                            
32 It should also be noted that “Regardless of the economic circumstance, no business will survive with poor 
management in place. I have seen a good workforce let down and sometimes laid off due to management 
which do not admit and correct their mistakes.”, see R3 press release by R3’s President Steven Law: ‘Bad 
management to blame for nearly 60% of corporate insolvencies’, (9th July 2010), (assessed 20th October 2010) 
https://www.r3.org.uk/newsandpress/default.asp?page=1&i=525&id=446#PressArchiveStory  
33 Determining when a rescue strategy has been a success will often depend on when the question is asked. The 
timeframe is therefore open to scrutiny. See A. Belcher, ‘The Economic Implications of Attempting to Rescue 
Companies’ in H. Rajak (ed.), Insolvency Law Theory and Practice, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), at 237. 
34 C. Foster, Financial statement Analysis, 2nd edn, (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1986), at 61. See also 
J. Day and P. Taylor, ‘ Financial Distress in Small firms: The Role Played by Debt Covenants and Other 
Monitoring Devices’, Insolvency Lawyer, (2001), 97. A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1997), at 12; A, Belcher, ‘The Economic Implications of Attempting to Rescue Companies’, in H. 
Rajak (ed.), Insolvency Law: Theory and Practice, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993). See also D. Brown, 
Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), ch1; M. Hunter, ‘The 
Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business Law, (1997), at 491; R. Harmer, ‘Comparison 
of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, (1997), 139, at 143-8. 
35 C. Foster, Financial Statement Analysis, 2nd edn, (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J, 1986), at 61; A. 
Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), ch. 3; See also V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency 
Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 122 where the SPI Eighth Survey revealed that 
71 per cent of businesses in its sample of formal insolvency cases experienced a break up sale of assets.  
36 See V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), at 
146. A technical distinction has been made by Belcher between “default proper” and “technical default”, with 
the former referring to not a failure to comply with payment and interest obligations but rather a core principle 
in that the company has dipped below a certain level of net worth. 
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including long term solvency plans,37 and the general financial well-being of a company38.To 
address issues that arise generally leads to negotiations with at least one of the company’s 
creditors. But depending on the provisions agreed within the contracts between the company 
and the creditors for dealing with debt default, providing a mutual outcome may be very 
difficult. Whilst this attempt at defining financial distress aims to bring some clarity, it will 
be of no surprise to learn that it has found no universal consensus39.  
 
Despite the differences some confusion is often caused because the word insolvent is often 
used as a synonym for financial distress40. A company in the UK may be classified as 
insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts41; this will mean that the distressed company has 
satisfied either the cash flow or balance sheet test (this is examined in the next section). There 
may be some room to distinguish the two and argue that it is only with the cash flow test 
where a company is unable to meet its current cash obligations. Examples of this includes 
unpaid debts to suppliers and employees, actual or potential damages from litigation and 
missed principal or interest payments42.These can all be correctly referred to as signs of 
financial distress as there will usually be a clear breach of contract. This should be compared 
to a company that has outstanding liabilities that are greater than the value of assets, and as 
such it is not possible to discharge the liabilities. Whilst this may render a company legally 
insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts43, unlike the cash flow test it will usually be the case 
that the creditors’ claims are paid to date and so no breach of contract will arise44. Given the 
                                                            
37 See A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 40. 
38 A companies profile may be determined by a number of ‘effectiveness ratios’ which charter the profitability 
with the given resources; specifically liquidity ratios determine the ability to pay debts within deadlines, 
solvency ratios consider the firm’s capital structure and its ability to meet long term financial commitments, see 
A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 40. On further reading regarding ratios 
and how they are use to predict insolvency see A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1997), ch 40; E. I. Altman, ‘Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Failure’, 23 
Journal of Finance, (1968), at 589; J. Pesse and D. Wood, ‘Issues in Assessing MDA Models of Corporate 
Failure: A Research Note’, British Accounting Review, (1992), 24, at 33; R. Taffler, ‘Forecasting Company 
Failure in the UK Using Discriminant Analysis and Financial Ratio Data’, Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 
Series A, (1982), 342.  
39 For a spectrum of potential indicators of distress see R. Morris, ‘Early Warning Indicators of Corporate 
Failure’, (Ashgate/ICCA, London, 1997); J. Day and P. Taylor, ‘Financial Distress in Small Firms: The Role 
Played by Debt Covenants and Other Monitoring Devices’, Insolvency Lawyer, (2001), at 97. 
40 K. H. Wruck, ‘Financial Distress, Reorganisation and Organisational Efficiency’, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics, (1990), 419, at 421. 
41 See A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, 2nd edn, (Bristol: Jordans, 2008), ch. 2. 
42 K. H. Wruck, ‘Financial Distress, Reorganisation and Organisational Efficiency’, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics, (1990), 419, at 421. 
43 R. M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 110; J. 
Boyle, J. Birds, E. Ferran and C. Villiers, Boyle and Birds’ Company Law, 4th edn, (Bristol: Jordans, 2000), at 
638-40. 
44 See E. I. Altman, Corporate Financial Distress, (New York: Wiley, 1983). 
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difficulties in determining the legal point of insolvency, this matter has now received some 
much needed attention in the case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK45. 
The significance of this case is realised in the clarity that it has brought in helping to define 
when a company was unable to pay its debts for the purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986 
s.123 (2). The case held that this provision was satisfied when a company whose assets and 
liabilities, including contingent and future liabilities, were such that it had reached the “point 
of no return”46. 
 
In an attempt to encompass these technical assessments, the law has provided two tests to 
determine the point of insolvency. It should be noted that the mere consequence of a 
company entering an insolvent state does not necessarily trigger any legal consequences. If 
any wrongs have been committed it will depend on the present legal position of the company. 
For instance, wrongful trading will only become apparent after the initiation of formal 
proceedings of winding up. For anything short of this it is still possible for civil and criminal 
actions to be taken against certain individuals if for example during an investigation into the 
possibility of implementing a rescue plan wrongdoing is identified47. Despite initial thoughts 
that taking such action may damage potential rescue plans this consequential action may even 
go as far as easing the financial distress, particularly if wrongful or fraudulent trading is 
evident. But this would only prove beneficial if the funds could be restored, or if it could be 
proven that the cause of distress had been identified and resolved. Nevertheless the 
contribution that the confidence factor has in a rescue package cannot be understated; in 
essence it is perhaps the single most important factor that enables a company to take the 
necessary proactive steps to secure the necessary funds to finance its recovery plan. With this 
in mind it is imperative that these proactive steps are taken at the right time, which brings us 
to the next section on how insolvency is determined from a legal perspective.  
 
 
                                                            
45 2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2011] EWCA Civ 227. 
46 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2011] 
EWCA Civ 227, paras 48-49. Within the judgment the term “point of no return” receives much attention. The 
concept originates from Professor R. Goode who used the description as a way of providing some guidance on 
assessing the ability of a company to pay its debts. However, the court conceded that it will invariably be the 
case that the court would have to form its own view to whether the company had reached that point, see para 61. 
It should also be noted that the Cork Report as its own term for the “point of no return” referring to the point 
when the “shutters should be put up”, see paras 54, 58, 80. 
47 Whilst acts like wrongful trading can only be determined at the point of insolvency, others such as a breach of 
directors duties will suffice. See Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 2, or section 6 if the 
company went into liquidation or administration.  
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1.3. Determining Insolvency  
As noted above, to determine whether a company is in financial trouble or on the verge of 
becoming insolvent the law provides, as a guideline two tests that if satisfied amounts to 
sufficient evidence for insolvency proceedings to be initiated. These tests are known as “cash 
flow” insolvency (commercial solvency) and “balance sheet” insolvency48. The two tests are 
very similar in the sense that they will usually be both passed or failed. It has been noted that: 
 
There is a close link between cash flow insolvency and balance sheet insolvency in that 
where a company is a going concern and its business can be sold as such with its assets in use 
in the business, those assets will usually have a substantially higher value than if disposed of 
on a break-up basis, divorced from their previous business activity. So a company which is 
“commercially solvent has a much greater chance of satisfying the balance sheet test of 
insolvency than one which is unable to pay its debts as they fall due”49.  
 
Theoretically a company should have the necessary financial controls in place which would 
notify the management of any concerns before these tests could potentially be satisfied; but in 
practice this is not always the case due to imperfect information (misleading or incomplete), 
conflicts of interests and incompetence. The real problem therefore is determining which data 
to rely on after the point of distress – version (A) which shows resistance and signs of 
recovery, or version (B) which shows a permanent decline? As both scenarios may 
sufficiently be demonstrated based on the interpretation of data, one conclusion must 
nevertheless be chosen as the more convincing. This clearly presents a position where 
positive action to intervene in a distressed company is reliant on nothing more than a well 
educated prediction. The tests employed to determine insolvency should therefore be treated 
as guidelines since the meanings and the way that they may be applied, is in dispute50. For 
these reasons, calculating whether a corporate rescue procedure is a viable option can be 
time-consuming and very expensive, not to mention having the potential to direct attention to 
the management and the decisions that they have made. Although management does not 
                                                            
48 Alternatively they have been also referred to as commercial insolvency and absolute insolvency respectively, 
see R. M. Goode, The Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 
114 and Ch 4 generally. 
49 Ibid, at 115. 
50 As was noted by Nicholls L. J. in Byblos Bank S.A.L. v. Al-Khudairy (1986) 2 B.C.C. 99, 549 at 99, 563, 
where he observed that only three decisions had been found relevant to the point he had to decide; See also R. 
Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 113. However 
some assistance has been provided in some recent case law, see Re Cheyne Finance plc (no 2) [2008] 2 All ER 
987. 
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necessarily have to be the one which can raise the issue of insolvency51, it is clear from the 
data interpretation exercise that this can lead to honest disagreement about the course of 
action that is to be taken. This in turn may contribute to a delay in taking proactive steps to 
address the dire state of a company’s finances if it is later proven to be the case that the 
company’s state of affairs were not improving and  actually showed signs of sliding into 
further trouble. 
 
If one of the legal tests is satisfied and it becomes apparent that the company is insolvent, 
then this may cause some creditors to take action against the company to recover the money 
that they are owed. In an attempt to prevent a raid on the company’s assets, a company upon 
entering administration, is granted a moratorium whereby actions against the company are 
stayed. This allows the company a “breathing space”, that is, time to properly assess the 
situation and decide on the best course of action to be taken without worrying about the 
creditors pulling the company apart. That said, despite the intentions of a moratorium it does 
not always prevent creditors from taking enforcement action for payment; it is a question of 
swiftness, with the fastest party gaining an advantage, something which may hinder a rescue 
attempt if the item (asset) “grabbed” with the intention to be sold to realise funds happens to 
be critical to the operations of the company52.  
 
To maximise the benefits obtained from an administration process it must be initiated at the 
first available opportunity. The process covers a number of key actions, amongst the list 
include: a winding up order made on creditors’ petitions53; action against directors in the form 
of wrongful and fraudulent trading54; transactions carried out at undervalue or a preference55; 
and an administration order56 against a company are a few but to name. The insolvency tests 
are used in legal proceedings as a way of determining the extent of the financial troubles 
within a distressed company. Despite the extent that these tests are integrated within 
insolvency related issues there is a question as to why there is a need for two tests? As 
previously noted the two tests do overlap so would it not be practical to combine them? Or 
                                                            
51 See L. Qi, ‘Managerial Models during the Corporate Reorganisation Period and their Governance Effects: The 
UK and US Perspective’, Company Lawyer, (2008), 131. 
52 For example if certain core machines in a manufacturing company had to be sold. This may impact the 
production rate or even the ability to produce its product.  
53 Insolvency Act 1986, s.122(1) (f). 
54 Insolvency Act 1986, ss.214(6) and 216(7). 
55 Insolvency Act 1986, ss.213 and 214 respectively.  
56 Insolvency Act 1986, s.8.  
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are the distinctions justified? These are questions that have not received much attention; 
merely accepted as a natural consequence from adopting principles based on corporate 
insolvency’s approach prior to the Insolvency Act 198557. Further analysis is now required.  
 
1.4. The Tests: Cash Flow and Balance Sheet58  
1.4.1. Cash Flow Insolvency 
A company may be cash flow insolvent if it cannot pay its debts as they fall due59. This is the 
main ground upon which companies are liquidated. The fact that a company’s assets exceed 
its liabilities is an irrelevant matter; if it cannot pay a debt as it falls due then there is no 
reason why a creditor should have to wait until the company can realise assets, some of 
which may not be in a readily liquidated form. But readily liquidatable assets may be taken 
into account. In respect to its statutory definition, the full legal definition of inability to pay 
debts is found within section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The most important are: 
(1) A company is deemed unable to pay its debts- 
     (a) if a creditor (by assignment or otherwise) to whom the company is indebted in a 
sum exceeding £750 then due has served on the company, by leaving it at the 
company’s registered office, a written demand (in the prescribed form) requiring 
the company to pay the sum so due and the company has for 3 weeks thereafter 
neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable 
satisfaction of the creditor, or 
(b) if, in England and Wales, execution or process issued on a judgment, decree or 
order of any court in favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied 
in whole or in part, or 
(e) If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay 
its debts as they fall due. 
Whenever this can be established, it will be deemed by the court that the company is 
insolvent, and the onus is then on the company to prove that it can pay its debts as they fall 
                                                            
57 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 111. 
58 It should be noted that there is in fact a third test which concerns itself with banks. Regulatory insolvency is 
not something that will be examined in this thesis due to its special relationship with banks which for all sense 
and purposes are not treated in the same as an ordinary company. 
59 Insolvency Act 1986, s.122(1) (f). 
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due60. The apparent ease in which the test can be followed is partially betrayed by the 
vagueness of what is meant by the term “debts”. Further issues covering how are these debts 
paid and what can be included in the payment of these debts adds another dimension to the 
process. Given the wording of the provision there is also a question regarding the flexibility 
in making payments and whether there is a level of tolerance to be applied to payments 
made? It appears that these questions can only be applied on an individual basis and the 
potential merits discussed in accordance with the interested parties in that particular case. A 
general application does not seem to apply. 
 
Section (e) quite simply covers any company that is unable to meet current demands61, 
irrespective of whether the company had assets which, if realised, would enable it to 
discharge its liabilities in full. Inability to pay debts also covers scenarios whereby an invoice 
has been sent to the company, and if the amount has not been disputed but does not get paid 
within a specified time then this can amount to evidence of a company unable to pay its 
debts62. In addition to this it was the case until recently that prospective debt could not be 
taken into consideration63, however this has now changed64. Whilst only the courts usually 
consider this matter, IPs may also take this into account as part of a broader measure to 
realise the full potential of a distressed company. The process does not need to be exact; 
rather it is a technique aimed to introduce flexibility when attempting to determine the 
solvent/insolvent state of a company.  
 
Establishing whether a company can pay its debts, the courts must consider the current 
revenue of the company along with any possible monies that may be realised from selling 
assets. However, there is a condition placed on this valuation process in that the monies must 
be realised in a short time frame65. Whilst this may limit some actions to pursuing money, the 
company is not limited to its own cash that happens to be on hand in determining whether it 
has the ability to pay its debts. A company can rely upon money which might be obtained 
from the sale of assets or upon loan money where the loan was granted because of the amount 
                                                            
60 See L. Doyle, and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, (Bristol: Jordans, 2007), at 
150. 
61 Re Capital Annuities Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 170. 
62 Taylor Industrial Flooring Ltd v M & H plant Hire (Manchester) Ltd [1990] BCLC 216, BCC 44, CA. 
63 Re London & Manchester Industrial Association (1985) 1 Ch D 466 at 472. 
64 Re Cheyne Finance plc (no 2) [2008] 2 All ER 987. 
65 Re Capital Annuities Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 170, at 182, 188. 
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of the company’s assets66. Where the sale of a major asset is certain, the realisation of these 
funds will be considered and taken into account67. But if it is a mere hope or an expectation 
that future funds may be realised then this will not be taken into account unless the hope or 
expectation was realistic68. 
 
Establishing whether a company is cash flow insolvent is a question of fact. If a company has 
a large amount of outstanding debts and unsatisfied judgments then this may be something 
that the court may take as evidence that establishes that a company cannot pay its due debts69, 
when all of the company’s assets have been considered70. If the company itself or its 
solicitors have admitted that they are unable to pay then this is also evidence71, along with the 
absence of assets on which execution can be levied72. A company found to be unable to meet 
its debts as they fall due is considered insolvent for the purpose of winding up, and this 
permits an administration order or winding up order to be made73.  
 
1.4.2. Balance Sheet Insolvency  
The alternative test for determining insolvency is the balance sheet (or asset) test which is 
satisfied if the company has total liabilities that exceed the value of its assets, therefore 
rendering the debtor with insufficient assets to discharge his liabilities74. The logic behind this 
is to emphasise that it is not sufficient for a company to realise its assets to satisfy its 
liabilities, if the ultimate liabilities would not be satisfied upon the realisation of the 
company’s assets. The term “liabilities” has a much broader meaning than “debts”75 and is 
defined for the purposes of winding up in r 13.12(4) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. Rule 
12.12(4) states that it is immaterial whether the liability is present or future, whether it is 
certain or contingent, or whether the amount is fixed or liquidated, or is being capable of 
being ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion. A court may only take into account 
the assets of the company held at that time; so assets which are expected to be received in the 
                                                            
66 Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666, (1966) 40 ALJR 71; Lewis v Doran [2005] NSWCA 243; (2005) 219 
ALR 555, NSW CA. 
67 Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (1998) 28 ACSR 310, at 319. 
68 Byblos Bank SAL v Al Khudhairy [1987] BCLC 232. 
69 Re Tweeds Garages Ltd [1962] Ch 406. 
70 Re Lyric Club (1892) 36 Sol Jo 801. 
71 Re Great Northern Copper Co (1869) 20 LT 264. 
72 Re Flagstaff Silver Mining Co of Utah (1975) 20 eq. 268; Re Yate Colleries Co [1883] WN 171; Re Douglas 
Griggs Engineering Ltd [1963] Ch 19. 
73 The administration process will be discussed in due course. 
74 Insolvency Act 1986, s.123 (2) 
75 Re Debtor (No 17 of 1966) [1967] Ch 590, [1967] 1 All ER 668. 
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future by the company or funds that it has on loan are both excluded from being taken into 
account76.  
 
The problem however with determining insolvency using the balance sheet test is the 
question surrounding the valuation of assets. For corporate rescue to prevail the valuation of 
assets is absolutely critical. The disparity between estimates can be startling; an example to 
emphasise is where there are valuations of works of art by a leading auction house and the 
actual sale price at auction realised as a reflection on how difficult it is to give an accurate 
valuation of assets not having an established market price77. Market rates, timing of the sale 
and available buyers78 are all factors which contribute to the uncertainty of a definite figure; 
not to mention the difficulty in valuing some liabilities79, notably unqualified existing 
liabilities and contingent liabilities80. It follows that it is particularly difficult to determine and 
assess the valuation of the items in question when the Act does not make clear whether it 
should be made on the basis of a “going concern” or as a “break up” sale81. It is understood 
that whilst the court may take into account contingent and prospective liabilities as 
determined in the Cheyne Finance Plc case82, it cannot take into account contingent and 
prospective assets83.  
  
Exactly how the courts should determine whether a company can pay its debts has received 
much attention, particularly in the Cheyne and BNY cases. The two cases considered the 
scope of section 123(2) was to cover situations where, although it could not be said that a 
company was currently unable to pay its debts as they fell due, it was, in practical terms, clear 
that it would not be able to meet its future or contingent liabilities84. The ultimate aim is 
therefore to discover whether a company has reached the point of no return85 or in respect of 
which the shutters should be “put up”, notwithstanding that this is imprecise, judgement-
                                                            
76 Re National Livestock Insurance Co (1858) 26 Beav 153; 53 ER 855; Byblos Bank SAL v Al-Khudiary (1986) 
2 BCC 99, 549 at 99, 562-99, 563. 
77 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 115. 
78 Some particular difficulties may arise where specialist buyers cannot be determined, or there is no established 
market value for that commodity, see V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 123. 
79 See A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) 
80 R. M. Goode, The Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 
134-137. 
81 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 123. 
82 Re Cheyne Finance Plc (In Receivership) [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch), at para 27. 
83 Byblos Bank SAL v Al-Khudhairy (1986) 2 BCC 99, 549, CA. 
84 For example see Re Cheyne Finance Plc (In Receivership) [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch), para 58; BNY Corporate 
Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil Division), paras 110, 117. 
85 Re Cheyne Finance Plc (In Receivership) [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch), [2008] Bus. L.R. 1562. 
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based and fact-specific86. Whilst the process can appear to be relatively “mechanical”, the 
court is keen to stress that this “asset-based” approach has been around for some time, but has 
only recently attracted attention87. The process is sensitive to data interpretation and part of 
the exercise is to decide whether the audits that have taken place were said to convey a true 
and fair view of the company's position in the opinion of its directors. The test is therefore 
whether the directors truly believed in the facts and figures obtained and if this was the case 
then it should have real force and provide adequate justification in supporting the actions 
taken as honest, informed, and reasonable. However, in most cases the collected data would 
be historic, normally conservative, based on accounting convention and would rarely 
represent the only true and fair view. The court on this basis would have to complete its own 
investigations and form its own view as to whether the company had reached the point of no 
return88. Given the difficulties associated with compiling the relevant information it would be 
necessary in some cases to consider whether to depart from the recorded position and take 
into account other factors. These include substantial assets, the period over which its 
liabilities had to be met and the potential for significant change in the differences between the 
value of assets and liabilities.  
 
Putting these considerations to one side, it should be noted that the balance sheet test can only 
be used with wrongful trading89, but cash flow and balance sheet can be used for satisfying 
the grounds for a winding up90, administration91 or the avoidance of transactions at an 
undervalue92, preferences93 and certain floating charges94. In effect the balance sheet method 
is one of the tests that would be used to assess whether any potential action should be taken to 
disqualify directors95 and also the point of identifying insolvent liquidation to see whether 
                                                            
86 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil Division), para. 58. 
For a summary of the BNY judgment see C. Cooke, ‘Balance Sheet Insolvency: A Commercial Approach’, 8(3) 
Int. C. R., (2011), 228-230. Further assistance on the inability to pay debts see D. Henderson, ‘Inability to Pay 
Debts: Where are we now?’, 24(4) Insolvency Intelligence, (2011), 54-59; B. Jones, ‘Past the Point of no 
Return’, 4(2) C. R. & I., (2011), 43-44. 
87 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil Division), para. 58. 
88 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc Court of Appeal (Civil Division), para. 61. 
89 The reason or this exclusiveness lies with the fact that there is no reason to impose liability of the delinquent 
directors to contribute to the assets of the company except where the assets are insufficient to meet the liabilities 
and the expenses of winding up.  
90 It should be stressed that there are other ways in assessing the inability to pay debts outside the use of 
insolvency; see R. M. Goode, The Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011), at 116. 
91 Insolvency Act 1986, s.8(1)(a). 
92 Insolvency Act 1986, s.238, 240(2). 
93 Insolvency Act 1986, s.239, 240(2). 
94 Insolvency Act 1986, s.245, 245(4). 
95 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986 s.6(2). 
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there are to be any orders made against directors for wrongful trading96. However, this has not 
been made an easy task with additional conflicting pointers set out in other statutes besides 
that of the Insolvency Act 1986. The Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 for the 
purposes of disqualifying a director states that the test is whether the company’s assets are 
insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities together with the expenses of 
winding up, when it goes into liquidation, when an administration order is made, or an 
administrative receiver is appointed97. Furthermore the Employment Rights Act 1996 states 
that the point of insolvency, for purposes concerning employee rights to payment from the 
National Insurance Fund on an employer’s insolvency and the employee’s job termination, 
the employer is deemed insolvent when a winding up order or administration order has been 
made; a resolution for voluntary winding up has been passed with respect to the company; a 
receiver or manager has been appointed; possession has been taken by holders of debentures 
secured by floating charges; or any property that is the subject of a charge and a voluntary 
arrangement has been approved under Part I of the Insolvency Act 198698.  
 
It has been observed that defining insolvency is a task largely dependent upon the context in 
which it is being used. Given the wide berth that insolvency has been afforded this has had 
the unfortunate effect in surrounding the term with uncertainty, leaving its meaning, at best, 
vague and imprecise99. Another aspect that has not cleared up matters and certainly not 
something that cannot be ignored is that the “unable to pay debt” concept is a state of 
insolvency, not an absolute definition100. It is in the finer detail that the clinical image of 
corporate insolvency law is betrayed by a lack of a coherent path that brings consistency with 
the terms and approach dictated. In some respects it should not come as a surprise as the 
origins of failure and finding ways to control this within a legal framework has never enjoyed 
a smooth ride. It is an understanding that determining insolvency cannot be strictly bound by 
a legal definition; other values must be observed and applied where necessary to create a 
more accurate reading of the company’s health status to allow a more informed decision be 
                                                            
96 Insolvency Act 1986, s.214. 
97 CDDA 1986, s.6(2). 
98 See R. M. Goode, The Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 
118; see also V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge, CUP, 2002), at 
124;  
99 D. Milman, ‘Test of Commercial Insolvency Rejected’, 4 Co Law, (1983), 231, at 232. 
100 R. M. Goode, The Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 
109-111. 
43 
 
made regarding what assistance the distressed company requires101. However even if a 
consensus was reached on how best to analyse the failure, determining when a company is in 
fact insolvent on a given day poses another troublesome matter102.  
 
1.5. The Relationship between Financial Distress and Corporate Rescue 
It remains questionable whether the study of corporate insolvency law contributes to the 
understanding and avoidance of failure. The interpretation of financial distress in a legal 
context could be said to be irrelevant103. An examination focusing on the legal input will 
ignore the wider variables that have influenced this area of law. But if the general nature of 
corporate insolvency proceedings were observed, this could enhance the knowledge to be 
gained in the context of corporate rescue. Whilst the insolvency legislation may provide for a 
framework of codes and terms to be followed, giving rise to a general acceptance on how 
companies should be monitored, operated and audited, it also gives incentives and deterrents 
for certain actions. But whilst the rules exist, total compliance does not always occur and 
these principles cannot be expected to be followed rigidly by those who are not equipped to 
read legal documents such as the managers who run the company104. It is partly for this 
reason that difficulties exist with managers of companies failing to recognise when help is 
required. Whilst there are rules and tests in place to offer guidance and assistance it is often 
the knowledge that the law will be lenient with those who assist in promoting a proactive 
response, provided that they are not at fault for the demise of the company. But despite the 
initiative that the insolvency legislation provides, failure of companies is inevitable and 
whilst it could be suggested that there is no conclusive proof that rescue prevents eventual 
failure, there is perhaps a case to be made for a temporary measure that relieves the problems 
but only on the understanding that temporary measures do not amount to corporate rescue in 
the real sense. With this in mind, it is now time to explore the nature of corporate rescue. 
 
 
                                                            
101 Depending on the type of business and the extent of the financial problems, different remedies will be sought 
for various problems. If the financial distress is isolated to one particular business, rather than an industry this 
will affect how the IP deals with his attempt at rescuing the company, if he should choose this course of action. 
102 K. Chiah, ‘Voidable Preference’, 12 New Zealand Universities Law Review, (1986), 1, at 6. 
103 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge, CUP, 2002), at 140. 
104 This is probably more accurate in describing managers of smaller companies. For further reading see V. 
Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge, CUP, 2002), at 140; for a 
discussion on the limit that corporate insolvency law has on the efficiency of corporate management see ‘The 
Fourth Annual Leonard Sainer Lecture – The Rt Hon. Lord Hoffmann’, reprinted in (1997) 18 Co. Law. 194; 
see also V. Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill and Care?’, 55 Modern Law Review, (1992), 
179. 
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Part Two 
2. The Development of Corporate Rescue Regime in the UK  
Corporate law concerns itself with many issues regarding the welfare of a company. Of 
particular interest to this thesis is the law relating to the insolvency of companies. When a 
company becomes insolvent many questions may arise. Amongst them all, the most 
imperative question is, is the company capable of being rehabilitated or at least got into a 
better shape before liquidation?105 In terms of evaluating the insolvency of companies, the 
process is relatively modern when compared with laws regulating the relationship between 
individual creditors and debtors. How these laws have developed in dealing with a person or 
a company who has been unable to pay his debts will vary according to the cultures and 
customs in question. The law relating to both personal and corporate insolvency are very 
distinctive and can be found in the Insolvency Act 1986106. The two different spheres have 
however not always coexisted in one statute and have developed at a different pace, subjected 
to different influences107.  
 
The origins of insolvency law derived from continental Europe, with UK’s law adapting 
principles from statutes and ideas from Europe108. It is appropriate to refer to the UK’s 
insolvency law as a combination of many other insolvency models giving it a truly European 
flavour109. It is part of its unique heritage that by adopting segments of other insolvency 
models and interpreting the rules and customs according to the needs of the jurisdiction it has 
created something of a model based on best practice. In this sense the model adopted does not 
follow a conventional pattern based on a single legal jurisdiction. It therefore raises the 
question whether this adopted corporate rescue system is reflective of what is required from 
such a model or has it become “path dependent”, and unable to change from its inherent 
culture? 
                                                            
105 See R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 9. 
106 A consolidated version of the Insolvency Act 1986 may be viewed through the Insolvency Service website at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/ (accessed 30th September 2012). 
107 Personal insolvency law will not be discussed due to the focus on companies. But it is worth noting out of 
interest that the law regulating the insolvency of individuals may trace its roots to the earliest days of common 
law, when there were no collective procedures for the administration of an insolvents estate and a disappointed 
creditor could seize the effects of his debtor and, at a later date, his person also. For further reading see E. 
Cooke, An Enquiry into the State of Law of Debtor and Creditor in England, (London: Butterworth, 1829).  
108 For a fuller review on the early years of bankruptcy see A. Keay, ‘Balancing Interests in Bankruptcy Law’, 
CLWR, (2001), 206, pp 221-226; E. Welbourne, ‘Bankruptcy Before the Era of Victorian Reform’, Cambridge 
Historical Journal, (1932), 51; R. Weisberg, ‘Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of 
Voidable Preference’, 39 Stanford Law Review, (1986), 3; V. M. Lester, Victorian Insolvency, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). 
109 With this in mind a distinction is drawn between English insolvency law and Scottish. The latter is not 
covered within this thesis. 
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The circumstances that dictate the makeup of the UK’s insolvency law can trace its roots 
back to the 14th century where it was common practice for banks to deal with the economic 
fallout of financial crises. A key moment came in the form of a general crisis in banking 
involving most of the leading houses in Florence suffering from an overextension of credit110. 
Because of the lending agreements with these banks in England, the failure of the Bardi Bank 
in 1345 sent ripples to the heart of the financial stability of England111. It could be seen as one 
of the first examples of a financial failure occurring in another country affecting the stability 
of another; this certainly provided a “wake-up call” for legislation in relation to those who 
caused such a crisis. It was not until the reign of Henry the VIII112 that the 1542 Statute of 
Bankrupts was enacted in England. There is a general agreement that the Act was based on 
the practice adopted in Italy113, which itself was derived from Roman law origins.  
 
It was not until the late 18th century that the UK began to create its own mark based on the 
needs that were now apparent with its business and financial links throughout the British 
Empire. The birth of corporate insolvency law goes back no further than 1844, when 
Parliament enacted the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, the first general Act to provide the 
incorporation of a company as a distinct legal entity, albeit with unlimited liability for its 
members. This Act was later followed by the Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act 1848 
and 1849, distributing general winding up jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery, a 
jurisdiction overlapping that of the Bankruptcy Court until the passing of the Joint stock 
Companies Act 1856 and Joint Companied Winding-Up (Amendment) Act 1857 which left 
the Court of chancery with exclusive jurisdiction and thus formally separated Bankruptcy and 
winding up procedure114.  
 
It follows that initially corporate insolvency had aligned its identity with bankruptcy law and 
did not assume a distinct status until the initiation of limited liability for members of a 
company with the enactment of the Limited Liability Act 1855. Equally important was the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Act 1861 which abolished the distinction between traders and 
non traders; providing the foundation for a uniformed insolvency system to emerge. The first 
                                                            
110 N. Davies, Europe: A History, (London: Pimlico Press, 1997), at 401. 
111 Le Cannu et al., ‘Entreprises en Difficulté’ (Paris: Joly Editions, 1994), para.2027. 
112 (1509 – 1547). 
113 The etymology of bankruptcy is said to be from the Italian “banca rota ” (broken bench), the punishment 
meted out to the insolvent trader, whose bench in the marketplace was ceremonially broken to deny the trader 
the ability to continue exercising his craft. 
114 L.C.B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997). 
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piece of legislation that can be described as containing the first modern company law statute 
was the Companies Act 1862, which amongst things contained the first detailed winding up 
provisions, including a provision of pari passu distribution115. Other notable provisions in the 
following years include section 10 of the Judicature Act 1875 which aligned rules as proof of 
debt in company liquidation with those applicable to bankruptcies116; section 4-6 of the 
Companies Act 1883 established categories of preferential debt for winding up and 
bankruptcy; Preferential Payments In Bankruptcy Acts 1888 and 1879, with the last Act 
establishing that claims secured by floating charge were subordinated to preferential debts117. 
Moving our attention to developments in the twentieth century the Bankruptcy Act 1914 
aimed to consolidate the law on insolvency. The Act was however highly technical and 
completely out of touch with the needs and concerns of the time. Nevertheless, despite the 
law having many shortcomings it was not until pressure mounted in the form of the European 
Economic Community Draft Bankruptcy Convention in 1970 that law reform began to look 
likely. With Britain’s entry to the EEC it meant that they would have to adhere to the Treaty 
of Rome, which in turn meant respecting and complying with the associated Treaties. With 
Britain’s insolvency laws contrary to that of the Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention, it 
brought considerable problems in the attempt to universalise the law, highlighting in 
particular the social and economic changes that have taken place in Britain but were not 
reflected in its legislation. Further advisory committees were instructed with the purpose to 
determine whether the laws could be harmonised, and the acceptability for the Convention to 
be applied in Britain118. It reported back many concerns, especially those that surrounded the 
unfairness of floating charges on other creditors in the company. Whilst reform occurred, the 
1976 Insolvency Act is largely remembered as a wasted attempt at dealing with the issues in 
question. With the inadequacies of the law still remaining this led to the appointment by the 
Secretary of State for Trade of the Insolvency Law Review Committee in 1977 to: 
(i) To review the law and practice relating to insolvency, bankruptcy, liquidation and 
receiverships in England and Wales, and to consider what reforms are necessary and 
desirable; 
                                                            
115 Companies Act 1862, s. 133(2). Note that this was confined to voluntary winding up. 
116 The scope of this section has proved controversial and it was not until 1901 that it was finally established by 
the Court of appeal that the bankruptcy priority rules were carried over into winding up; see Re Whitaker, 
Whitaker v Palmer [1901] 1 Ch.9. 
117 Considered in Buchler v Talbot [2004] 2 A.C. 298. 
118 Departmental Advisory Committee, chaired by Kenneth Cork, F.C.A, hence its popular title, ‘Cork Mark I’, 
as the author was a member of the committee, (1973-6). 
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(ii) To examine the possibility of formulating a comprehensive insolvency system, and 
the extent to which any existing systems might, with advantage, be harmonised and 
integrated; 
(iii)To suggest possible less formal procedures as alternatives to bankruptcy and company 
winding-up proceedings in appropriate circumstances; and 
(iv) To make recommendations. 
Subsection three highlighted a general concern to develop an alternative measure to 
liquidation; something which later paved the way for what was to become the emergence of 
the corporate rescue culture in the UK. Eventual reform came in the form of the Insolvency 
Act 1985, which when it came into force was replaced by the Insolvency Act 1986 – a 
consolidating enactment which repealed and re-enacted the Insolvency Act 1985 and the 
Insolvency provisions of the Companies Act 1985. The 1986 Act, whilst it is largely based on 
the findings that materialised from the highly influential Cork Report five years earlier119, it 
did not endorse all of the principles. The 1986 Act represented an attempt to address the 
flaws regarding corporate insolvency law up until that point and introduced a new procedure 
called administration, as a concept that could properly address rescue strategies aimed to 
prevent companies’ needless entering liquidation.  
 
2.1 Developments leading up to the Enterprise Act 2002 
In the new millennia further reform occurred with the Insolvency Act 2000, which brought in 
new provisions on voluntary arrangements and moratoria and amended the Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 on the disqualification of directors. Despite these steps taken to 
amend and clarify corporate insolvency laws, the focus has remained very much on 
addressing isolated provisions when there was a growing concern that the unfairness 
associated with the existing law was going unaddressed.  
 
A significant aspect of the old law was the long established institution of administrative 
receivership.  This practice was not designed to be a collective procedure, but rather a debt 
enforcement remedy available to a creditor holding a floating charge which, with any fixed 
charge, covers the whole or substantially the whole debtors’ company property. This was an 
extremely powerful tool that could be utilised by one creditor to appoint a receiver to take 
control of the company and its assets, largely displacing directors, and to continue trading as 
                                                            
119 The Cork Report (Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice), Cmnd 8558, 1982. 
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deemed agent of the company, sell off business/individual assets or hive them down to a new 
debt free company which could be sold off120. Given the ability of the receiver to dissect and 
deal with the company as he or she wished, there were particular concerns over the way in 
which a creditor could “select” a receiver and how the appointment seemed to be precipitate 
at almost no notice. Since the receiver owes his or her duty to the appointing creditor and not 
the general body of creditors there is a lack of incentive to keep the cost of the process down 
and to ensure that the assets are realised at the best price. In addition to these concerns there 
was also the ability for the creditor to block administration – a collective procedure designed 
for the benefit of creditors generally, by appointing a receiver before an administration order 
is made. This preventive measure was one of the critical reasons that were instrumental to the 
demise of the rescue culture after it was promoted in the 1990s121. 
 
Additionally, alternative measures such as the Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVA’s) 
which were introduced in the 1986 Act proved to be ineffective as a rescue mechanism as the 
initiation of the procedure did not trigger a moratorium. This combined with the concerns 
mentioned above marked the start of a shift in opinion and a decision was taken in principle 
that all insolvency proceedings should be collective in character122. To achieve this end, the 
Enterprise Act 2002 prohibited the appointment of an administrative receiver by a floating 
charge holder123. The 2002 Act did however allow for such a holder to appoint an 
administrator, but this was on the acceptance that the making of distributions to the charge is 
not a legitimate objective if it is reasonably practical that the other aims of rescue (rescue of a 
company as a going concern and achieving a better result for creditors as a whole upon 
immediate winding up) is achievable124. The abolition of this option, along with the 
introduction of the prescribed part to allow a certain percentage of funds to be reserved for 
unsecured creditors (the “prescribed part”) and the removable of Crown preference helped to 
reignite the rescue culture. 
                                                            
120 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 14. 
121 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), Ch 6, 
7 and 9; L. Gullifer, ‘The Reforms of the Enterprise Act 2000 and the Floating Charge as a Security Device’, in 
Wolf-Georg Ringe, Levine Gullifer and Philippe Théry (eds), Current Issues in European Financial and 
Insolvency Law: perspectives from France and the UK, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
122 There are a number of studies that support this view: P. Aghian, O. Hart and J. Moore, ‘A Proposal for 
Bankruptcy Reform in the UK’, 9 I. L & P., (1993), at 103; and ‘Insolvency Reform in the UK: A Reused 
Proposal’, 11 I. L. & P., (1995), at 103. For government input see ‘Second Chance Report’, ‘Productivity and 
Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance’, DTI, Cm 5234, (July 2001), see 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/compwp.htm (accessed 10th July 2010); ‘A Review of Company Rescue and 
Business Reconstruction Mechanisms’, Report of the Review Group, Insolvency Service, DTI, (2000). 
123 This applies to floating charges created on or before September 15 2003. 
124 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 15. 
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2.2. Freedom of contract and the Creditor Based Regime 
The background to corporate insolvency law demonstrates that corporate rescue has 
developed at a steady pace with traditional values embedded in English contract law forming 
the basis for the type of corporate rescue system in the UK125. The UK system has basically 
been regarded as creditor based and this stance is exemplified by three key features126; the 
first being the entitlement of a creditor. Since the creditor has an outstanding amount that has 
not been repaid by the debtor, the creditor on the failure of the debtor to fulfil his contractual 
duties is entitled to take steps to retrieve his due amount by way of a winding up or a 
bankruptcy order, notwithstanding the adverse consequences that this may have on the 
creditor. This has somewhat been amended by the Insolvency Act 1986 where a moratorium 
can be obtained to permit the debtor to have more time to save the company, through a 
number of avenues such as raising further funds, selling assets or reaching an agreement with 
the creditors. The second feature is the entitlement of the secured creditor to enforce his 
security irrespective of the consequences to others, considering nothing but his own interests. 
This has been slightly weakened with the Insolvency Act 1986 and weakened further by the 
Enterprise Act 2002, but nevertheless it remains one of the critical factors that an IP must 
consider. The final feature, which the courts often consider is the pari passu principle, which 
permits the equal distribution of the debtor’s wealth amongst the unsecured creditors. This is 
not an absolute principle and is subjected to the availability of funds. If such funds exist then 
it is possible that the liquidator, administrator or receiver may make a prescribed part of the 
company’s net property available for the satisfaction of unsecured creditors127.  
 
With these three features in mind, it is important to emphasise and grasp the importance of 
the relationship between contractual obligations and the expectations it is capable of 
producing. The concept of reasonable and legitimate expectations128 is the substance that 
fuses the principles together. It is within this line of thinking that enables us to consider what 
provisions we would reasonably wish to see in a contract if we drafted it129. The concept is 
                                                            
125 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 19. 
126 G. Lightman, ‘Attitudes and Values: Developments in Insolvency Law: Part 1’, Insolvency Intelligence, 
(2001), 57, at 58. 
127 See Insolvency Act 1986 (‘Prescribed Part’) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2097). This effectively ‘top slices’ a 
certain part of the net proceeds (net property) from the realisation of the property covered by floating charges 
for unsecured creditors. For a comprehensive overview of the section see L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency 
Legislation: annotations and Commentary, (Bristol: Jordans, 2007), at 218. 
128 See A. Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-
Protection of Creditors’, 66 Modern Law Review, (2003), 665, at 679. 
129 L. Mitchell, ‘The Fairness Rights of Bondholders’, 65 New York University Law Review, (1990), at 1225. 
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crucial as it has a bearing on the efficiency of the agreement and the terms it produces. It also 
has the effect of creating a consensual obligation that brings an element of fairness to all 
parties concerned. It is suggested that the principles of corporate rescue and the model 
endorsed in the UK fail to meet such expectations, partially because a creditor oriented 
system cannot truly be expected to take into consideration all of the parties concerned, in 
particular the debtor. However there is room for scope in suggesting that because insolvency 
has occurred the debtor foregoes that right, in that the company may enter administration 
which will to an extent protect any action occurring until the company’s financial status has 
been assessed. 
 
2.3. The Cork Report 
The official title given to the Cork Report is the Report of the Review Committee on 
Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd. 8558, 1982). This Report contributed more to the area 
of insolvency law and practice than any other that has been formulated since. The report, 
which devoted a chapter to administration130, drew particular attention to the change in 
attitudes that had occurred. The Committee sought to define the characteristics of a good 
modern insolvency law131, by looking at the existing procedures in place and seeing how they 
could be amended to address the fallacies in the law. The Report drew attention to these 
problems and proposed a procedure by which the court could appoint an administrator to 
manage the company, with the same powers as a receiver and manager. The Report was keen 
to promote the idea that the grant of an administration order would have the effect of freezing 
the enforcement of rights against the company, whether secured creditors or otherwise, thus 
facilitating the simple regime of voluntary arrangements proposed in the report. It must be 
noted that the Cork Report does not set out the aims of a corporate rescue model. Rather it is 
necessary to take a holistic approach whereby all the aims contained within the passage 
should be reviewed as a whole and once they have been collectively understood, it reflects, 
between the lines its ideology, what has been described as the rescue culture132, a philosophy 
of restoring companies to profitability and avoiding liquidation133. Whilst there are a few 
options provided within the report to achieving this end, the focus in this thesis is on 
                                                            
130 Insolvency Law and Practice, Chapter 9. 
131 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee Cmnd. 8558 (London: HMSO, 1982), 
para.198.  
132 The phrase has now passed into English jurisprudence. See the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Powdrill v. Watson [1995] 2 A. C. 394 at 442, 445, 446. 
133 Paragraphs 191-8; 203-4; 232; 235; 238-9; See also R. M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 
4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 57-59. 
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administration134. It must be stressed that despite the introduction of the rescue culture, many 
companies still end up in liquidation. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this potential 
shortcoming rescue proceedings have played a vital role even if it was just to increase the 
value received on the sale of assets before the company entered liquidation.  
 
The Report recognised the pessimistic approach of the law towards rehabilitation and 
accepted that liquidation should not be the only option135. It found that when compared with 
other systems the UK’s position was unfavourable as others had procedures that promoted 
rescue136. As such one of the aims to emerge from the discussions was how to develop a 
corporate insolvency system that embraced a rescue culture. To this end a group of objectives 
were created, which gave the new system a sense of direction as well as allowing the 
flexibility to add further if required137. The objectives set out in the report are intentionally 
vague to capture an array of situations, yet contain enough substance to protect specified 
interests. The objectives are set out below; once listed, closer attention will be paid to 
dissecting the nature and purpose of each. The aims are: 
(a) To underpin the credit system and cope with its casualties; 
(b) To diagnose and treat an imminent insolvency at an early, rather than a late, stage; 
(c) To prevent conflicts between individual creditors; 
(d) To realise the assets of the insolvent which should properly be taken to satisfy debts 
with the minimum of delay and expense; 
(e) To distribute the proceeds of realisations amongst creditors fairly and equitably, 
returning any surplus to the debtor138; 
(f) To ensure that the processes of realisation and distribution are administrated honestly 
and competently; 
(g) To ascertain the causes of the insolvent’s failure and, if conduct merits criticism or 
punishment, to decide what measures, if any, require to be taken; to establish an 
investigative process sufficiently full and competent to discourage undesirable 
                                                            
134 The other options been CVA under Part 1 of the IA 1986; s. 425 of the Companies Act 1985; and the contract 
–based “workout” an arrangement concluded outside any statutory framework, such as the “London Approach”. 
135 See D. Milman, ‘Moratoria on Enforcement Rights: Revisiting Corporate Rescue’, Conveyancer and 
Property Law, (2004), 89, at 91. 
136 See USA, Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 
137 It will also be noted how these objectives may come into conflict with each other, see S. Frisby, ‘In Search of 
a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’, Modern Law Review, (2004). 
138 On the importance of fairness to creditors given the mandatory, collective nature of proceedings, see also 
para 232.  
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conduct by creditors and debtors; to encourage settlement of debts; to uphold business 
standards and commercial morality; and to sustain confidence in insolvency law by 
effectively uncovering assets concealed from creditors, ascertaining the validity of 
creditors’ claims and exposing the circumstances attending failure139; 
(h) To recognise and safeguard the interests not merely of insolvents and their creditors 
but those of society and other groups in society who are affected by the insolvency, 
for instance not only the interests of directors, shareholders and employees but also 
those of suppliers, those whose livelihoods depend on the enterprise of the 
community140; 
(i) To preserve viable commercial enterprises capable of contributing usefully to national 
economic life141; 
(j) To offer a framework of insolvency law commanding respect and observance, et 
sufficiently flexible to cope with change, and which is also: 
(i) Seen to produce practical solutions to commercial and financial problems 
(ii) Simple and easily understood 
(iii) Free from anomalies and inconsistencies 
(iv) Capable of being administered efficiently and economically 
(v) To ensure due recognition and respect abroad for English insolvency 
proceedings.  
An important aspect to derive from these objectives is the importance of preserving viable 
economic enterprises which contribute to the economic prosperity of the country. Conversely 
it also recognises the intertwined relationship that failure has on a community; the so called 
“ripple effect” that will financially unsettle people and companies beyond the distressed 
company142. Paragraph (h) and (i) when combined together illustrate the significance of 
preserving communities that are dependent on a core company by implying that is not just 
about saving companies which are economically viable, but also the possibility the company 
enjoying economic success at a later stage if it is in the interests of the community143. The 
objectives collectively recognise that the law cannot exist in ignorance of the wider 
                                                            
139 See para 198(h) and amplification in paras 235 and 238. 
140 See para 198(i) and amplification in paras 203-4. 
141 See para 198(j) and amplification in para 204.  
142 Cork Report, para. 204. 
143 See M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business Law, (1999), 491, at 
497-9; and on the social costs see B. G. Carruthers and T. C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of 
Corporate Bankruptcy in England and the United States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp 69-70. 
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implications; it must endeavour to do its best to consider all eventualities in the interest of 
maintaining wealth in what would otherwise become deprived areas (jobs and local wealth). 
 
Taking account of these wider issues, corporate rescue must strive to bridge the divergences 
between theory and application. Achieving this aim however involves understanding that 
corporate rescue was embraced in a politico-legal dimension, thereby providing a trans-
disciplinary flavour to the concept144. Whilst this approach may assist in greater knowledge 
being obtained about how rescue operates and increase awareness in how corporate 
insolvency is integrated in everyday life, it can invariably lead to and cause confusion145. A 
clear example of this can be found with the approach the court took146 in Powdrill v 
Watson147, which stated: 
 
...the rescue culture which seeks to preserve viable businesses was and is fundamental to 
much of the Act of 1986. Its significance in the present case is that, given the importance 
attached to receivers and administrators being able to continue and run a business, it is 
unlikely that Parliament would have intended to produce a regime as to employees’ rights 
which render any attempt at such rescue either extremely hazardous or impossible148. 
 
Amid this tension between providing a stable insolvency system for a rescue strategy to occur 
against the reputation that insolvency receives in the UK, political forces have been keen to 
promote a rescue model based loosely on that of the United States (Chapter 11). The aim for 
adopting the characteristics of another model would be to eradicate the stigma that is 
associated with insolvency in the UK and replace it with a confident system that encourages 
risk taking for the promotion of enterprise149. The importance of sustaining the attitude of 
                                                            
144 See Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company rescue and Business reconstruction Mechanisms, Report by 
the Review Group’, (DTI, 2000), (IS 2000), at 12-23. 
145 The failure to formulate a limited number of core principles to which others may be treated as subservient 
has in some ways caused confusion regarding the direction in which the law should take, see The Justice Report, 
‘Insolvency Law: An Agenda for Reform’, (London, 1994).  
146 And notably the British Banks Association endorsed corporate rescue in their 1997 paper, ‘Banks and 
Business Working together’, (London, 1997), para 3 which states that: ‘Banks have long supported a rescue 
culture and thousands of customers are in business today because of the support of their bank through difficult 
times’. Whether this statement remains accurate after the financial troubles that were manifested by the 
Northern Rock episode in 2009 remains to be seen.  
147 [1995] 2 AC 394. 
148 [1995] 2 AC 394, at 442; quoted in V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2002), at 191; and M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business 
Law, (1999), 491, at 511. 
149 Peter Mandelson then the Trade Secretary in 1998 went to great lengths to discuss with the hope of 
reassessing business perception on failure and move it towards risk taking; see M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and 
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taking risk and encouraging unsuccessful entrepreneurs to try again has been an imperative 
stance that the government has been eager to promote150, and something which the Enterprise 
Act 2002 seeks to strengthen. In essence the new regime was about providing the necessary 
framework to permit “a culture in which companies that can be rescued, are rescued”151. The 
reality of the situation however means that the problem is not the law, or even the means to 
implement change, but the inherent attitude that failure is something that could and should be 
avoided152. This attitude has been critical to presenting the type of corporate insolvency 
model that has developed in the UK. Little distinction has been made between a company that 
has become distressed due to extrinsic events that were not foreseen (“honest failure”)153 and 
cases where the failure was the result of poor management decisions154. Depending on how 
the difference has been interpreted creates either a management displacement rescue regime 
or one that permits the management to remain in control of the company. The latter will now 
be explored. 
 
2.4. A Comparison with Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
The research conducted within the historical overview section above notes that different 
perspectives on bankruptcy exists, and it is perhaps nowhere better demonstrated than 
observing the corporate insolvency laws that exist on both sides of the Atlantic. The US 
approach could be best described as endorsing an optimistic view, characterised as 
recognising that failure does not need to rule out future successes of incumbent 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Functions of a Corporate Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business Law, (1999), 49, at 519; see also a comment by 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Melanie Johnson who stated that ‘the 
insolvency reforms will help address the fear of failure that is a significant barrier to enterprise and help prevent 
companies in difficulty from going under unnecessarily. Together, the reforms will help make the UK become a 
better place to do business...’, HC Deb. April 10, 2002, col.111; see also V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), pp.127-34, 284-86; A. Keay, ‘Balancing Interests in 
Bankruptcy Law’, CLWR, (2001), at 225. 
150 Patricia Hewitt, the Trade and Industry Secretary, House of Commons Debate, second reading of the 
Enterprise Bill, April 10th, (2002), col. 44. 
151 Insolvency Service (IS), ‘An Update on the Corporate Insolvency Proposals’, (January 14, 2002), see 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/enterprisebill/index.htm (accessed 9th 
February 2010), at 1. The IS have made the objective of the EA, particularly the purpose of the administration 
process as “to facilitate the rescue of viable companies and, if this is not reasonably practical, a better return to 
the creditors”; see J. Alexander, ‘The Enterprise Act 2002’, 3 Insolvency Law & Practice, (2003), para.2.7. 
152 See B. G. Carruthers and T. C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy in 
England and the United States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), at 246.  
153 This term shows a gradual move away from old ideology to a more open and forgiving commercial system 
that would encourage fairness and reduce the penalties for hard strapped companies, see HM Treasury Press 
release, 8th June 2001 as presented by the then Chancellor Gordon Brown; see also the second reading of the 
Enterprise Bill, where the Trade and Industry Secretary, Patricia Hewitt stated that the aim of reform was to 
‘strengthen the foundations of an enterprise economy by...establishing an insolvency regime that will encourage 
honest but unsuccessful entrepreneurs to try again’, HC Deb. (April 10, 2002), col.44. 
154 See N. Martin, ‘Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences’, American Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Review, (2003), 367, at 374. 
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management155. Bankruptcy law constitutes a way for creditors to sort out their claims 
collectively by liquidation of the debtor’s assets or by reaching agreements with regards to an 
outcome. There are various options that a failed company can take. This thesis is interested in 
the most well known of the reorganisation provisions, namely Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code for it represents the preferred mode for US public corporations156. The 
proceedings are usually initiated by management, but can also be initiated by creditors as 
well157. The advantage to be gained from voluntary bankruptcy petition (initiated by 
management as opposed to creditors) is that it appears to favour reorganisation, despite 
incumbent management remaining in post as well as sustaining the value for the company. 
What the US model acknowledges is the value of human capital – management should stay in 
place if their value adds to the firm. Assessing positive valuations on human capital is a 
difficult process but the Chapter 11 model at least gives the option of whether to keep it or 
not.  
 
Observing the UK’s rescue regime it has remained more favourable towards the treatment of 
insolvents, at the expense of perhaps the treatment of true economic delinquents158. Who 
exactly are the true economic delinquents entirely depends on the model being researched 
and when and who is asked. Unlike the “Debtor in Possession” (DIP) model evident in the 
US which allows for the existing management to remain in control of the ailing company 
during the reorganisation period, the UK with its management displacing model opts for an 
external administrator – an IP often appointed by a secured creditor with security over the 
whole of the assets of the company159. It would appear that the UK by adopting a creditor 
driven regime has provided a highly unsympathetic stance against the notion of corporate 
rescue.  
 
This is further emphasised in the divergence between how the two systems treat failure, with 
the element of penalty becoming associated with the UK’s insolvency regime. This has not 
only been fundamental in contributing to the creditor friendly type of rescue model that we 
                                                            
155 M. Brouwer, ‘Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy Law’, European Journal of Law & 
Economics, (2006), 5, at 11. 
156 S. Gilson, Creating Value through Corporate Re-structuring; Case studies in Bankruptcy, Buyouts and 
Breakups, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2001), at 23. 
157 Petitions filed by management made bankruptcy proceedings voluntary. Involuntary bankruptcy petitions 
filed by creditors are overwhelmingly chapter 7 (liquidation) petitions, see S. Block-Leib, ‘Why Creditors file so 
few Involuntary Petitions and why the Number is not too small’, 57 Brooklyn Law Review, (1991). 
158 M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of Rescue Culture’, JBL, (1999), 491, at 498. 
159 See Insolvency Act 1986, para 64.  
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have today, but it has also ensured that failure would be classed as something undesirable by 
the general public which in turn has had the effect of ensuring that management displacement 
was the only option160. Despite the apparent friction between the two models as to which is 
the preferable notion neither is able to produce a clear and more convincing argument. 
Notwithstanding this stalemate, what is clear is that some of the mutual characteristics that 
they share can be viewed as embracing an equal understanding in that they are both dedicated 
to saving viable companies; preserving jobs, satisfying creditor’s claims and to produce a 
return for its owners161. Essentially assessing which model offers the best outcome is 
impossible to certify as there are some commentators who will suggest that it is inevitable 
that the UK will eventually come to resemble the US162, whilst others, will suggest, equally 
robustly, that the US model will tilt towards the British system given the increasing influence 
that creditors are enjoying in Chapter 11 by means of provisions in DIP financing 
agreements163.  
 
Whether any alteration or morphing of legal systems will occur is academic. That said if the 
US was to adapt the UK’s model it would involve a change in attitude. The traditional 
principles in the UK dictate that debts must be paid; insolvency is morally wrong and culprits 
should be punished164; that on the failure of the debtor to satisfy its contractual obligation, in 
order to make sure the debt is paid, the company should be wound up165. In addition the US 
would have to consider the meaning of certain concepts.  In the UK there has been much 
debate surrounding the two mechanisms of rescuing and liquidating, with some 
commentators suggesting that these are in conflict with the goal of keeping businesses in 
operation166, stating that this has been highlighted as a separate goal to that of insolvency 
                                                            
160 For further reading on the history of Insolvency law in England see P. Omar, ‘The Mutual influence of 
French and English Commercial Laws in Insolvency’, International Company and Commercial Law Review, 
(2008), 136, at 136. 
161 See E. Warren, ‘In Bankruptcy policymaking in an Imperfect World’, 92 Mich L Rev., (1993), 336, 354-5; 
and for a UK perspective see Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394, 442. 
162 See J. Armour, B.R. Cheffins and D.A. Skeel Jr., ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of 
Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’, 55 V and L Rev., (2002), at 1699. 
163 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’, 56 ICLQ, (2007), 515, at 
516. 
164 As previously noted there is a presumption in the UK that when a company becomes insolvent it is due to the 
failure of the management and those who were last in control, see R. Goode, Principles Of Corporate 
Insolvency Law, 3rd edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at 328. 
165 The DIP regime has been likened to leaving ‘an alcoholic in control of a pub’, see G. Moss, ‘Chapter 11: An 
English Lawyer’s Critique’, 11 Insolvency Intelligence, (1998), 17, pp 18-19. 
166 The aim of rescuing a distressed company and keeping a company in operation should be seen as two distinct 
paths which do not necessarily lead to the same outcome. The question entirely depends on substance – the 
extent that the company survives intact from a rescue strategy. Substantial changes to a company’s operations 
invariably means the company will also change, but this will not reflect rescue in the true sense of the word. 
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law167. But on the other hand the Cork Report has always advocated that rescue is part of 
insolvency.   
 
2.5. A Distinction between Rescue and Restoration 
Rescue procedures go beyond the normal managerial responses to financial distress and may 
take on the appearance as a formal or informal process.  In any meaningful discussion 
involving corporate rescue a distinction must be drawn between two different objectives - 
rescuing the company and rescuing the business168. Both should not be viewed as alternative 
options that can be selected on preference. The primary option of administration, which is set 
out in the next section is to rescue the company as a going concern169. The term has received 
much attention and has been held to mean “the survival of the company itself together with 
all or part of its undertakings as a going concern, an outcome which was incapable of being 
achieved through...hiving down the company’s business into a new company”170. Further 
guidance has indicated that it should be construed to mean “the company and as much of its 
business as possible”171, with any proposal resulting in nothing more than a “shell” company 
not constituting rescue172. Determining whether this threshold has been achieved depends 
largely on what constitutes a successful rescue. Whilst this question may be self-defeating 
given the array of interested parties with different objectives, measuring success depends on 
who is asked, with creditors and employees likely to have conflicting interests.  
 
The main objective of corporate rescue is illustrated as a process that is associated with a 
company that can be said to have substantially remained intact, with the emphasis on the 
continuity of its practices, employees and management remaining in charge173. Whilst it is 
accepted that there may be some changes, these will be minimal and the emphasis is on the 
                                                            
167 T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1996), chapter 9; D. G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies, 
(1986), at 127. 
168 R. Robinson, ‘Proposals, Proceedings and Preferential Status’, Recovery, (2002), 25, at 78. 
169 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, s.3(1) (a). 
170 See Harman J in Re Rowbotham Baxter Ltd [1990] BCC 113 at 115E-F. 
171 See DTI’s Explanatory Notes, (1999), para 647. 
172 See DTI’s Explanatory Notes, (1999), para 649. 
173 There is some disagreement with what extent of a company has to remain intact. For instance Frisby suggests 
that many ‘pure’ rescues are far more complex but states that the emphasis is that the entity remains functional, 
see S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Corporate Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’, Modern Law Review, 
(2004). This however should be contrasted with the wording employed in Re Rowbotham Baxter Ltd [1990] 
BCC 113 at 115E-F, which finds support in para 647 of the DTI’s explanatory notes which indicates that 
rescuing a company as a going concern “is intended to mean the company and as much as the business as 
possible”, which appears to be much more than just the functionality of the company as suggested by Frisby. 
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continuation of the corporate identity and a return to its former state. This will be described 
as close to “pure rescue” that can be achieved. 
 
On the other hand a major change may occur to the company that results in the company 
being reorganised. This will result in a change to the company’s form and once the proposed 
change has been implemented it cannot be said to resemble its former state. This may be 
referred to as corporate recycling or restructuring as it does not fulfil any of the attributes 
associated with “pure” rescue and it has been described as a process which is not corporate 
rescue at all174.  
 
Both objectives require different strategies, for instance saving a “corporate shell” may not be 
the better option for creditors who could get a better result if the business were to be sold175. 
Conversely, a company may be liquidated, but steps can still be taken to retain the business 
by selling it to bidders and it continuing (even if only in a reduced form) to employ workers 
and contribute to the economy176. These factors of satisfying secured creditors, taking 
measures to preserve employment and satisfying some unsecured creditors to enable business 
to continue should not be ignored177.  
 
Pure rescue is exceptionally rare178, but it is the term that best describes the primary objective 
of administration. Whilst full restoration to its former state might pose some interesting 
questions, particularly if the distress was as a result of bad management, it is accepted that in 
some cases their removal may result in a different outcome for the company179. But this 
presumption is open to the possibility that another management group would not act in the 
same way. The act of removing management would therefore only work if it could be shown 
that the incompetence was so fundamental to the troubles of the company.  
 
                                                            
174 Finding commentators to agree or even suggest that this is the case is troublesome, but see S. Frisby, ‘In 
Search of a Corporate Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’, Modern Law Review, (2004), who whilst 
implies that this may be the case, quickly provides evidence to the contrary, but only because little evidence 
currently exists to suggest strongly otherwise. 
175 V. Finch, ‘Re-invigorating Corporate Rescue’, Journal of Business Law, (2003), 527, at 531. 
176 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), at 188 
177 N. Davis, ‘The Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom’, 2 Insolvency Litigation and Practice, (1997), 3, 4. 
178 See S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, 2007), which reveals that only a few cases that are pursued through administration will 
lead to corporate rescue. Most are in fact Business rescues.  
179 This belief is held strongly amongst creditors, see G. Moss, ‘Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or 
Liquidation? Comparisons of Trends in National Law – England’, 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 
(1997), 115. 
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It is unfortunate, but by the time the administrator is appointed pure rescue remains a distant 
possibility at best, unless the company had acted speedily to instruct an external expert when 
any signs of distress were perceived. Restructuring the business will often ensure that the 
company survives in some form or another180. It will be appreciated that a company that goes 
through a company rescue will more than likely have to change, even if this is partial, which 
most of them are181. There are many outcomes to a corporate rescue182. But not all of them 
would be classed as adhering to a true corporate rescue model as some companies are 
modified and changed into another entity by means of reorganisation, refinancing, or a 
takeover183.  Establishing the correct circumstances in which the terms can be used is a 
troublesome affair184; nevertheless analysing the divisions is necessary if corporate rescue is 
to be fully understood and appreciated. With the efficiency of a process becoming as 
important as the result it produces, attention turns to exploring the function of corporate 
rescue.  
 
2.6. The Function of Corporate Rescue: One Interest or Several? 
To answer this question attention should be drawn to the literature produced in the United 
States where, unlike the UK, scholars they have debated the philosophy of the law of 
bankruptcy for some time. Whilst it is not surprising given the way in which the UK’s law 
has developed that the focus has not been on its identity, the UK is now beginning to see the 
need to gain a greater understanding about insolvency, its impact and the complex policy 
issues that surround regulating failure. The literature on this matter is quite extensive, but it 
suffices to restrict the examination and focus on the more prominent views. The likes of 
Professors Baird, Jackson and Scott will be referred to as those whose theories suggest that it 
is not for insolvency law to concern itself with employment protection or with the wider 
                                                            
180 R3’s Ninth Survey of Business Recovery (2001) suggests that nearly one in five businesses survive 
insolvency and continue in business in one form or another. 
181 A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 23; R. Harmer, ‘Comparison of Trends 
in National Law: The Pacific Rim’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, (1997), 1, 139. 
182 A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), at 24-34; D. Brown, Corporate Rescue: 
Insolvency Law in Practice, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,1996), chapter 1; R3’s Ninth Survey of Business 
Recovery (2001) which suggests that nearly one in five businesses survive insolvency and continue to operate in 
one form or another. 
183 For further details on corporate control see J. Franks and C. Mayer, ‘Capital Markets and Corporate Control: 
A Study of France, Germany and the UK’, 10 Economic Policy, (1990), at 191-231; C. Bradley, ‘Corporate 
Control: Markets and Rules’, 53 Modern Law Review, (1990), at 170; J. Fairburn and J. Kay (eds.), Introduction 
to Mergers and Merger Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
184 It is accepted that the majority of corporate rescues are not full company survivals, which brings into 
question the efficiency of the UK’s corporate rescue regime as a rescue model. For a flavour on the change that 
has occurred see M. Phillips and J. Goldring, ‘Rescue and Reconstruction’, 15 Insolvency Intelligence, (2002), 
75, at 76. 
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community interests. The function of insolvency law, according to them, has one overriding 
goal: to allocate the common pool of assets in such a way as to maximise benefits for 
creditors as a whole185. Any threat to this goal, particularly if an individual creditor wished to 
take unilateral action which would interfere with the interest of other creditors is considered a 
harmful act and so as a protective measure insolvency law should impose a collective 
procedure to protect all the interests186. For a collective procedure to exist two principles must 
be observed. First, there must be rigid adherence to the absolute priority rule, i.e. that 
shareholders receive nothing until creditors have been paid in full187. Secondly, insolvency 
law must respect the pre-insolvency ordering of entitlements. In regards to corporate rescue 
the principles are of direct relevance, especially the consideration of the latter whereby it is 
the function of insolvency law to translate pre-insolvency assets and liabilities into an 
insolvency forum with minimal dislocation188. The justification for the principles rest with the 
knowledge of protective rights, in that the redistribution of rights on insolvency would create 
an incentive for individual creditors to opt for insolvency proceedings even if this was not in 
the interest of the other creditors. In addition there needs to be assurance that certain actions 
will occur when a company becomes insolvent. In particular that secured creditors and their 
pre-insolvency entitlements would not be reduced and distributed amongst the unsecured 
creditors189.   
 
It is worth mentioning that the normative debates on insolvency philosophy and policy tend 
to be contested between two schools of thought that can be characterised as “Proceduralist” 
and “Traditionalist”190. The importance of these concepts is realised in its ability to elicit and 
dominate normative insolvency debates by often posing the questions: what is the legitimate 
                                                            
185 See T.H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy and the Creditors’ Bargain’, 91 Yale Law Journal, (1982), 
at 857; T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law; D.G. Baird and T.H. Jackson, ‘Corporate 
Reorganisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of 
Secured Creditors,’, 51 Chicago Law Review, (1984), at 97; T.H. Jackson and R.E. Scott, ‘On the Nature of 
Bankruptcy: An essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’, 75 Virginia Law Rev., (1989), at 155.  
186 See R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 58. 
187 D.G. Baird and T.H. Jackson, ‘Bargaining after the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule’, 55 
University of Chicago Law Review, (1988), at 738. 
188 T. H. Jackson, ‘Translating assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum’, 14 Journal of Legal Studies, 
(1985), at 73.  
189 Whilst some commentators have argued that the only concern that insolvency proceedings should have is to 
maximise returns to creditors and it is not the function of insolvency law to alter relative pre-insolvency 
entitlements, see E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 University of Chicago Law Review, (1987), at 775. This of 
course is now subjected to the ‘Prescribed Part’ scheme, see above.  
190 D. G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization’, 15 Journal of Legal studies, (1986), 127, at 
133. See also R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011). 
These concepts will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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province of insolvency law and whose interests should insolvency law serve? The questions 
intend to stimulate discussions on who should benefit from a distressed company. Assessing 
this will usually go hand in hand with determining how efficient a rescue process is. This will 
depend on what agenda is to be satisfied, with one method used to measure its capacity to 
ensure that capital flows to those locations where it will be put to best wealth-creating use191. 
Again, whether the results realised and the methods used are capable of reaching agreement it 
remains to be seen; different parties will inevitably wish to pursue different goals. Legalists 
will hope to see processes that respect the procedural and substantive rights of affected 
parties. Political scientists may incline to emphasise the need for rescue processes to be 
shaped by representative institutions. In the face of all such different expectations regarding 
rescue, it is difficult to produce an “uncontentious yardstick for quality”192. 
 
Turning attention to the literature in the US, there are commentators who claim that 
implementing reorganisations save firms that ought to have been shut down and that the 
direct costs of these often lengthy proceedings are high193. It is suggested that the alternative 
to this is to accept that market based insolvency procedures are more efficient and that 
financially distressed firms should be “auctioned” in the open market instead of being 
reorganized194. The aim is therefore to achieve maximum valuation, by obtaining the highest 
value for the assets. This premise however rests on one fundamental issue - can one trust the 
markets?195 Various reports have concluded different findings, but as relevant to the 
circumstances that match our current economic climate it may be suggested that valuations 
                                                            
191 For example see D. G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies, 
(1986), 127. The preservation of viable businesses will be a more important concern in such a philosophy than 
saving the company per se. 
192 V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: the search for Quality and Capacity to resolve’, Journal of Business 
Law, (2010), 502, at 505. 
193 See M.J. White, ‘The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision’, 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives, (1989), 129-
151; and M.J. White, ‘Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 reorganizations and Out-Of-
Court Debt Restructurings, 10(2) The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, (1994), 268-295 for an 
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E. S. Hotchkiss, ‘Post-Bankruptcy performance and Management Turnover’, 50 Journal of Finance, (1995), 3-
21. 
194 See D. G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies, (1986), 127-
147. M. Bradley and M. Rosenzweig, ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’, The Yale Law Journal, (1992), 101, 
1043-1095. T.H. Jackson, The Logic and Limit of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
Massachusetts, USA, 1986). 
195 S. Sundgren, ‘Does a Reorganization Law improve the Efficiency of the Insolvency Law? The Finnish 
Experience’, European Journal of Law & Economics, (1998), 177, at 177. 
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are particularly low during periods of time when an industry or the whole economy suffers 
from financial distress196.  
 
As it will be seen, recent reform in the UK’s corporate insolvency law has made the 
predominant objective to rescue, where possible, the company as a going concern. Whilst the 
legal duties invested in the IP is to consider the interests of the creditors as a whole, to limit 
this scope to just creditors and not the wider community runs the risk of over-simplifying the 
nature and purpose of the insolvency law proceedings197. A question that arises is can 
theoretical models influence how policy-makers think? Unfortunately answering this question 
will prove problematic as there has been a lack of research in providing a link between 
justifying the policy taken and the theory upon which it is based198. Despite this limitation it 
suffices to conclude that whilst the protection of the interests of existing creditors is rightfully 
a primary function, it should by no means be viewed as the sole function of corporate rescue. 
 
2.7. Further Influences: Interests, Values and Visions 
Accepting that there are other interests beside that of creditors which should be observed, 
attention is then turned to determining whether these should qualify at the expense of others? 
To what extent these influences are felt is entirely dependent on the design of the rescue 
model. Legal systems will often attempt to interlink a number of distinct influences to 
produce a result which is more reflective of the competing needs that companies in 
administration require. But ultimately the UK’s corporate rescue regime allows the IP to 
determine what should be considered, thereby leaving the selection process susceptible to the 
prejudices of the IP with no general application applying across the profession. The extent of 
an IP’s discretion and function within the role is something that will be considered in the next 
chapter; for now what remains is an examination of these influences. 
 
2.7.1. Cultural Influence – Social Network Adapting to the Circumstances or Social 
Evolution? 
The repercussions of a company in distress are felt beyond the boundaries of the company 
itself. It is therefore essential to adopt a model that incorporates shared values as part of the 
                                                            
196 A. Schleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach’, The 
67 Journal of Finance, (1992), 1343-1366. 
197 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 University of Chicago Law Review, (1987), at 800. 
198 See E. Warren and J. Westbrook, ‘Searching for Reorganization Realities’, 72 Washington University Law 
Quarterly, (1994), at 1257.  
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legal framework. The importance of this is to be understood in the relationship between the 
way in which the law operates in implementing the principle of collective maximisation of 
returns for creditors and how this directly relates to its social and economic policy199. In 
essence it is a combination of law and practice that dictates the boundaries and what is 
considered as a priority; it is therefore inevitable that some social factors will materialise, 
embedded in the foundations of the given jurisdictions’ legal system. Applying this notion it 
is plausible to suggest that by introducing alien concepts within an established legal system 
brings doubt as to whether the focus can be shifted. It has previously been discussed that 
most models are “path dependent” and introducing change is something that may be contrary 
to the very foundations of a given legal system. Some principles are so integrated into a legal 
model that it is almost impossible to extract this without attacking the entire concept. 
Applying this to the UK’s insolvency system, whilst the regime has concerns regarding the 
effect of insolvency, the focus rests on the belief that “society has no interest in the 
preservation or rehabilitation of the company as such, though it may have a legitimate 
concern in the preservation of the commercial enterprise”200. This act of preservation 
recognises that in some circumstances a priority could be given to other interested parties, 
such as employees whereby they are ranked above other unsecured creditors, simply because 
their wages is the only source of income201. Whilst this demonstrates some legal flexibility to 
be responsive to the wider issues, this should be read as an exception since secured creditors 
will, and expect to, take the first bite of the cherry and it is circumstantial whether any 
remains for the other creditors202. This is not to imply that social norms should be considered 
on the same level as the rights of secured creditors, but rather it is expressing the fact that the 
interests belonging to secured creditors should not be viewed in isolation or in a vacuum.  
 
Given the impracticalities in pursuing corporate rescue as opposed to business rescue, the 
focus has firmly shifted onto the rehabilitation process – a procedure designed to tweak the 
working of a business by providing for the reorganisation of it in order to somehow allow it 
to continue to operate as a going concern. It will be seen that the rehabilitation mechanism, 
due to its invasive nature, will inevitably interfere with pre-existing entitlements. The extent 
                                                            
199 J. M. Garrido, ‘The Distributional Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects’, 4 I. I. R., (1995), at 25. 
200 Report of the (Cork) Review Select Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, para. 193. 
201 R. Goode, ‘Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law’, 4th edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at 250. It 
has also been said that they deserve this special protection, see V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, 2nd edn, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009), Ch 17. 
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of this interference is in constant conflict with the legislation’s goal in protecting the 
creditor’s substantive rights, however enforcement of such rights are temporarily suspended 
when the company enters administration203. This action thereby provides a blanket of 
protection and a much needed breathing space for negotiations and a rescue package to be 
deployed if possible. But the suspension of rights and the extent of flexibility that can be 
negotiated around these rights to include socially driven considerations is a point that remains 
controversial and in essence dependent on the views of the IP who has been assigned the role. 
If the IP wished to consider and justify the inclusion of these wider social norms  he or she 
would have to do so on the basis that it enhanced the chances of the primary goal in saving 
the company; whether this would be allowing social constructed norms “in through the back 
door” remains to be debated.   
 
With these difficulties it begs the question whether the socially inclined issues should be dealt 
with outside the field of corporate insolvency as a separate function, or is it to be suggested 
that the UK is ready for a socio-economic driven corporate rescue model? The question 
warrants some further analysis. For something to be socially accepted its views must be 
reflected in the inherent nature of a particular subject. As already noted any measures taken 
that conflict with the norm will result in a fundamental shift in the way in which they operate 
and are governed; causing a movement away from routine decision making processes204. Of 
course the obstacle remains, that despite the willingness that may be shown in adopting those 
views the enactment of the new approach is ultimately a matter for the views of the judiciary 
and the views of the IP’s205. In essence any inroads into the development of this issue may be 
hindered by the legislators’ lack of commercial awareness and hence ability to recognise that 
legal reform is required. Conversely, it must also be recognised that in order for these 
considerations to have a chance to become part of the legislation the connected parties who 
participate in a distressed company must acknowledge its effect and pay heed to the rules206. 
Acceptance of these rules along with any incentives for furthering self interest207 will 
influence not only the outcome, but also the way in which that objective is to be achieved. 
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Those interested parties wanting to have an input will be very concerned to protect their 
interests against others; in this sense this rule is described as having a non-mechanical 
working208, choosing to work on an evolving basis to meet the interests of the actors who 
have an investment in the result. However, as identified above, it will be seen that as there are 
many interests to satisfy, and this inevitably means that there will be competition as to which 
are chosen and who will miss out. It is therefore inevitable that those who are able to exert 
the most influence will be able to do so at the expense of the weaker party by undermining 
what it can demand209 and signifying the lack of importance that the party has in the 
insolvency process; whereby its “capabilities as shapers of action” is limited210. Addressing 
this matter can only be overcome if it is acknowledged that besides the maximisation of 
creditors’ returns, it is possible that by additionally protecting the interests of local 
communities then this could enhance the creditors’ interests overall211. To target a specified 
group or a network that would allow some survival of the business to operate within a 
community would prove not only beneficial in the long term for the local economy but would 
protect the workforce. A procedure like this, given the extent of change required would be 
more associated with rehabilitation rather than rescue since the bare minimum of the original 
identity would remain intact.  
 
Essentially, whilst these interests can be considered they are often seen as taking precedence 
at the expense of the interests of the secured creditors. An alternative to this would be to 
suggest that if these parties wished to be protected and their interests fell outside the common 
pool, then they should look at pursuing their claim outside the insolvency proceedings and 
not be concerned with creating new special entitlements within insolvency law212. It seems 
that by maintaining this division it ignores the wider concerns and the realisation that some of 
the problems that face the creditors outside the common pool only happen because of the 
initiation of the insolvency proceedings in the first place213.  
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Part Three 
3. The Objective of Corporate Rescue 
It will be appreciated that the objectives of a corporate insolvency system must contain 
provisions for a comprehensive corporate rescue model. In addition to the objectives set out 
by the Cork Report in Section Two, the administration procedure sets out a list of objectives 
that should be pursued where a company is in financial distress. The three objectives are 
designed to put an emphasis on the rescue of the company as a going concern, failing which, 
the second objective may be reviewed to see if a better result can be achieved for the 
company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound up214. If 
neither the first nor the second objective is achievable then the objective of realising property 
in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors will be 
pursued.  
 
Whilst these objectives must be followed by an IP the main outcome following 
administration is a fundamental shift in the way in which the company is managed, financed 
and staffed, which invariably means that change will occur215. The type of change that can be 
expected is dependable on the financial position of the troubled company. If the company is 
in a bad shape then the provisions to be agreed are often drastic and depending on the scheme 
to be implemented, it will also be time consuming and expensive216. These are important 
factors and it will be explored in the next chapter that the length of time it takes to resolve the 
distress (if this is possible) and the expenses incurred by the IP will have a bearing on the 
success of a rescue strategy, particularly as this cost has to be satisfied before creditors are 
paid out.  
 
As noted above, most rescues are in fact business rescues. Circumstances as they are often 
mean that the only way in which the distressed company will generate immediate cash flow is 
the sale of profitable parts of the business, or even selling subsidiaries of the company. This 
restructuring process is not “pure rescue”, which would only qualify if, after such disposals, 
the rump of the group remains viable and can be profitable – in essence the core business 
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must be identified and saved217. As such company rescues will remain rare and will become 
more difficult to achieve as the choices to be made by IPs become more strenuous in times of 
a recession. Corporate rescue is a process concerned with efficiency and of discarding 
unsuccessful businesses, which can be applied to any size of corporation; the only viable test 
is, is it worth saving as a going concern? If not the resources should be directed to more 
worthy uses218, but if the main objective is not achieved then the other options are not 
concerned with rescuing the company but rather saving the business. 
 
Determining what the objectives of rescue are is not the same as speculating what they should 
be. One of the aims of this thesis is to determine whether or not there is a sufficient linkage 
between the theoretical cornerstones of corporate rescue and what occurs in practice to 
conclude whether the UK has an efficient corporate rescue model. Whilst this notion will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Four, what needs to be discussed here is the premise that 
administration has become the new liquidation process. Corporate rescue involves much 
more than satisfying a number of tests, if there is/are no buyer(s) for the business, irrespective 
of whether it is potentially profitable the company will fail without further funding. The 
company has to remain attractive and relevant to the market it operates in. IPs may have the 
skills required to conduct a rescue strategy but they cannot make the company anything more 
(as a whole) than what it was when they were initially introduced. 
 
The conduct of IPs and how they go about fulfilling the objectives will be explored in the 
next chapter where it will be submitted that insolvency proceedings provide a profitable 
business venture for accountants/IPs and so rescue packages are an ideal instrument which 
can be exploited to the benefit and needs of the IP when assessing the best course of action to 
be taken with a particular company in financial distress. For this reason it will be of no 
surprise that transparency is a critical problem in rescue packages, a problem that has 
contributed to rescue packages being branded as mistrusted mechanisms that seems to benefit 
the selected few219.  
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It is imperative to keep in mind the objectives set out within the Cork Report220, and how they 
paved the way for what was two major strands of corporate insolvency law reform: namely 
those of providing a regulatory framework to prevent commercial malpractice or the abuse of 
insolvency procedures themselves221, and of providing a formal legal procedure for business 
rescue222. Before the report considered the wider implications of corporate insolvency there 
were no explicit statements in regards to the purposes of insolvency law.  
 
The question therefore remains: does the Cork Report coupled with the objectives set out in 
Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 present itself as a useful statement of objectives for 
a modern corporate insolvency law? With this in mind, what now needs to be explored in 
more detail is what is at the heart of a company.  
 
3.1. What is being Rescued?  
Various distressed companies may fulfil the criterion which makes them eligible for rescue, 
but ultimately they may not be a viable entity that can realistically expect to be rescued 
within the market in which it operates. Nevertheless, despite this caution rescue is 
conventionally reserved for those companies that can survive if they are given a “second 
chance”223. What qualifies under this heading is based on a fact-gathering exercise whereby 
the entire structure of the company along with its finances and operations are broken down 
into numbers. If there are positives to be gained that can be achieved with a proportionate 
amount of effort in the form of financial assistance and time and this would be more 
beneficial in the long run than taking the swifter response and terminating the company 
immediately, then there is a chance that the company may be saved. It may seem that even 
with all of the relevant information gathered the facts portrayed from this exercise provide 
nothing more than a prediction, but one that is well informed. This nevertheless still leaves 
open the danger of taking a swift approach resulting in the company’s assets or business 
being sold cheaply. There is no denying this is a risk, but as the next chapter will demonstrate 
there is a duty on the IP to secure the best price possible given the circumstances.  
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The act of rescuing a company is an attempt to protect the company from further losses, but a 
rescue package will only be implemented if it is financially sound and efficient to do so. For 
whose benefit a rescue is undertaken can take multiple forms. It may be an attempt to protect 
or minimise the losses for creditors, or to prevent further losses occurring beyond the 
company itself, such as a reduction in the number of employees and the effects it would have 
on the local community224. As mentioned above, due to the nature of insolvency law and its 
perception by the general public, rescue packages are predominately seen as bail outs for 
companies that have only themselves to blame for their financial woes. What must be 
clarified here is the justification for giving companies a second chance, and why should a 
company be given this option? The fact highlighted above is that a company is much more 
than just one business - its actions or inactions cannot be said to affect solely its own 
interests. As a mere economic concern, the corporate rescue mechanism cannot thrive as it 
would be restricted to the analysis of cold financial data without seeing the far-reaching 
consequences that a rescue would have on a particular business and the community in which 
it operates. But by adopting a socio-economic approach it would enable corporate rescue to 
be considered in a broader way, opening the mechanism up to a wider selection of 
possibilities in relation to its objectives, values and visions225. These objectives can be 
realised in their various forms through adopting and incorporating a framework based on 
efficiency. The efficiency principle as it will be seen in Chapter Four is a fundamental 
concept that when combined with social norms, can enhance and help produce a number of 
goals that otherwise would have been neglected in a corporate rescue process226. The 
importance of social concepts cannot be understated as they are the variables that produce the 
parameters in which the law operates. In other words they provide justification for acting, and 
refraining from acting, in a certain way, which is reflective of custom in society. However, 
with competing objectives they are bound to produce a possible “trade off” between social 
compliance and the costs on various parties227. Whilst social aspects enhance the law in a 
beneficial way towards socially acceptable norms, they invariably may demand that creditors 
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make certain concessions in complying with the above, but this cannot be fulfilled due to 
implications of efficiency228.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that a company depends on a particular market in which it 
operates to financially sustain its existence229. A company’s existence relies on the needs/ raw 
materials/goods that enable the company to trade and ultimately conclude business. If the 
sources that enable the company to trade do not exist then it will not make money, and if it 
has no money it cannot pay its debts which will cause a “ripple effect” through the wider 
network in which it operates, causing financial and social problems for a large number of 
people. Rescue therefore aims to reduce the ripples rather than alleviate the full impact of 
where the problems originated; further supporting what seems to be a shift of focus from ex 
post responses to corporate distress, to that involving influencing how the actors of 
companies manage the risks of insolvency ex ante230. It is therefore critical that the internal 
members of a company proactively assist in the survival of the company; early intervention 
helps the prevention or onset of insolvency231 or its worsening. If distress is identified and 
acknowledged at an early enough stage this can aid the rescue process to be swifter and 
potentially more successful, especially when external expertise is requested in the form of 
rescue specialists. We have already seen above the “tests” for determining insolvency, what 
now must be explored is the best time when a company should get help.  
 
3.2. Enterprise Act 2002 and the Purpose of Administration 
The Enterprise Bill was published on 26th March 2002 with the intention of removing 
administrative receivership and substituting the process with a more efficient model that 
would be better suited to rescuing a distressed company232. To ensure that this end was 
realised233, the EA 2002 first of all had to change a number of provisions that governed 
                                                            
228 For administrative efficiency see G. Dal Pont and L. Griggs, ‘A Principled Justification for Business Rescue 
Laws: A Comparative Perspective, Part II’, International Insolvency Review, (1996), 47, at 47. 
229 J. Lingard, Corporate Rescue and Insolvencies, 2nd edn, (London: Butterworths, 1989), at 4. 
230 V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 68 Modern Law Review, (2005), at 713; V. Finch, ‘Corporate 
Rescue in a World of Debt’, Journal of Business Law, (2008), 756, at 575. 
231 Cork Report, Ch. 9. 
232 For further reading on the matter see: M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, Journal of 
Business Law,  (1999), 49; A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997); V. Finch, 
Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002); B. Carruthers and T. 
Halliday, Rescuing Businesses: the Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998). 
233 On administration as a rescue procedure see I. Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments – 
Changes to Administrative Receiverships, Administration Company Voluntary Arrangements – The Insolvency 
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rescue234. Amongst a number of newly appointed provisions it permitted the commencement 
of administration extra judicially235 and turned the focus to those in control of distressed 
companies to think more about insolvency risks before they became unsalvageable236. Under 
the old system, the administration order would prescribe one or more of four statutory 
purposes. The first of these was “the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its 
undertakings as a going concern”237. Whilst this, as it will be seen shortly, shares some 
similarities with what was to become part of the new system, it is fair to say that this option 
was rarely used or considered as the primary purpose of an administration238. The main focus, 
as earlier iterated, was the “better realisation of the company’s assets than would be effected 
on a winding up”, which amounted to the trading of the company’s business until its sale as a 
going concern or the sale of its assets239. 
 
When administrative receivership was reviewed amid concerns regarding the fairness of the 
process, there was a general consensus that the “rescue culture” had been slowly ebbing away 
until it was merely an afterthought. The new system introduced by the EA 2002 ensured that 
“survival” of the company could not be relegated in this way. Whilst the disagreements may 
continue regarding the distinction between company and business rescue, arguing that the 
only the former is truly corporate rescue, the reform was a much needed step in the right 
direction240. The law sets out one purpose of administration with a hierarchy of three 
objectives. Under para 3 of Sch. B1 the administrator is under a mandatory duty to perform 
his or her functions: 
 
(a) with the objective of rescuing a company; or 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Act 2000, The White Paper 2001 and the Enterprise Act 2002’, 5 E. B. O. R, (2004), 119; V. Finch, ‘Re-
invigorating Corporate Rescue’, Journal of Business Law, (2003), 527. 
234 See section 2.1. 
235 Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 2A, 72B-72G. 
236 For an interesting discussion on the rise of pre-packed administrations as a pre-emptive force to be reckoned 
with, see S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to The Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals, (August 2007); V. Finch, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations: Bargains in the 
Shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy Bargains?’, Journal of Business Law, (2006), 568.  
237 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 8(3)(a). 
238 J. Goldring and M. Phillips, ‘Rescue and reconstruction’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2002), 75, at 76. 
239 Ibid. 
240 As noted above, according to the DTI’s Explanatory Notes in para. 647, “rescuing the company” means “the 
company and as much as its business as possible”. Thus, rescuing the company’s business alone will not satisfy 
that objective. 
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(b) where it is not reasonably practicable to rescue the company, with the objective of 
achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be 
likely if the company were wound up (without first being in administration), or 
(c) where it is not reasonably practicable to rescue the company or achieve the result 
mentioned in paragraph (b), with the objective of realising property in order to 
make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.  
 
The purpose of administration should therefore be viewed as a mechanism aimed at rescuing 
the corporate entity. Only when this objective cannot be achieved (not reasonably 
practicable) is the administrator permitted to consider the second objective and seek to 
achieve a better result than would be likely in a winding up, albeit also considering the 
company’s creditors as a whole241. The final objective as stated above which was the primary 
focus of administrative receivership is now only opened to the administrator if none of the 
above objectives are reasonably practicable.  
 
3.3. Routes to Administration: Court Appointment Procedure and out of Court 
Procedure 
It was not enough to just consider the wording of the legislation in order to make the 
administration process efficient; the route to appointing an administrator had to change. The 
old law dictated one way, namely through the presentation of an administration petition and 
making, by the court, an administration order. Whilst this is still permissible, the new regime 
permitted the appointment of administrators without a court order by either a holder of a 
floating charge holder,242 by the company or by its directors243. The duty and functions of the 
administrator will be considered in Chapter Three.  
 
3.3.1. Appointment by the Floating Charge Holder  
As noted above, unless the charge was made before 15th September 2003, the appointment of 
an administrator, rather than an administrative receiver is now the key means by which a 
floating charge holder may enforce its debt244. This entitlement is considered within the 
current law with the objective of “realising property in order to make a distribution to one or 
                                                            
241 This is supported in paragraph 3(2), Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1. 
242 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 paras 12 to 19 
243 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 paras 20 to 32 
244 Enterprise Act 2002, s. 250. 
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more secured or preferential creditors”245 recognised as one of the three objectives of 
administration, albeit the lowest form. Therefore priority would be given, where feasible, to 
rescuing the company, or if not achievable, to realising a better outcome for the company’s 
creditors as a whole than would be achieved in an immediate liquidation246. It is still 
important to realise that before reform occurred, receiverships flowing from a breach of a 
loan agreement secured by a floating charge did lead to a form of rescue. Whilst this is still 
possible if the date in which the agreement was entered is within the allocated timeframe 
there are questions as to the value of this rescue at the expense of the other creditors. 
Nevertheless, a rescue process did exist in a diluted format which satisfied a few creditors 
who were in a strong position.  
 
3.3.2. Floating Charge 
Businesses operate on a credit basis to fund their activities and loans are granted against 
collateral (usually assets), which would be forfeited or sold off if they failed to fulfil their 
contractual obligation to the creditor. This collateral that usually has a higher monetary value 
than the debt owed belongs to the creditors upon failure by the debtor to honour the terms of 
the contact. There are two types of creditors, those that are secured and those that are 
unsecured. One way to be secured is to have a charge over company property; a specific 
example of this is the floating charge. It is a form of security that was recognised by the UK’s 
courts in the 19th century as a way of dealing with the business and financial circumstances at 
the time247. A floating charge will usually give the creditor a priority right over other 
creditors to take over the debtor’s undertaking and run, sell it, dismantle it as he or she thinks 
fit by way of securing repayment of his debt. This concession to the freedom of contract is 
the defining moment where the UK’s law departed from the laws of the USA and Continental 
Europe; the advantage that a floating charger has over other creditors seems to the USA as 
not only unfair but contrary to the idea of capitalism and enterprise, believing such a move 
would hinder progress. Nevertheless, it remained throughout much of the Commonwealth a 
tool of preference, with most creditors seeking a mixture of a fixed and a floating charge (a 
hybrid charge). It is worth pointing out that the creditor holding a floating charge need not 
consider the adverse effects that it may have on the wider community or the employees. 
Whilst in limited situations it may aid the process of rescuing a company as the creditor may 
                                                            
245 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para 3(1)(c).  
246 See R. Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 44. 
247 See R. R. Pennington, ‘The Genesis of the Floating Charge’, 23(6) The Modern Law Review, (1960), 630, at 
640. 
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consider the option to preserve the company and sell it as a going concern (the first viable 
signs of a corporate rescue option), it may also decide to terminate the business affairs and 
initiate insolvency proceedings. With the seemingly unfair advantage that floating charge 
holders possessed, it was only a matter of time before the desire to review the law became 
apparent. The opportunity eventually arose in 1982 with the Cork Report.  
 
3.4. Administration  
Based on the above it is easy to see why administration has been described as a “hybrid 
procedure” combining the exceptional powers of a floating charge receivership with an 
altered set of objectives, based on a collective approach with a rescue-orientated mission248. 
The key aspirations of the new process were to introduce efficiency in the rescue process, 
specifically to encourage early participation by the controlling members of companies to seek 
help and enhance the success of a rescue occurring, as well as to reduce costs associated with 
court appointments. To achieve this end, provisions within the EA requested that the 
administrator must present proposals to creditors within eight weeks of his appointment and 
must convene a creditors’ meeting within ten weeks of the administration’s start249. This 
requirement is intended to bring an element of accountability to the proceedings by making 
the process more transparent250. The timeframe required to obtain all of the relevant 
information is dependent on the relationship that exists between the IP and the directors or 
financial institutions such as banks251, as they will be in the best position to know what is 
going on with the business and report this back to the IP. The difficulty with this managerial 
displacement model is that there are questions as to whether accountants are the correct 
candidates to be running the company252. Administration does appear at odds with what 
appears logical, in the sense that surely the management is in the best position with its 
specialised knowledge to continue the firm’s operations, as opposed to another person/body 
who gains control after an interruption in the affairs253. This of course poses another problem 
                                                            
248 See I. Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue’, 5 European Business Organization Law Review, (2004), 119, at 125. 
249 See para 52 of Sch. B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Para 52 (1) sets out exceptions from these requirements. 
250 Assessing whether or not this has been achieved is something that will be reserved for the next chapter.  
251 That will usually have a qualifying floating charge: see para 14 of Sch. B1. After the EA 2002 there are three 
methods by which a ‘new’ administrator can be appointed: by the court on the application of the company, its 
directors, one or more of the company’s creditors or by a combination of these parties – para 12; out of court on 
the application of the holder of a qualifying floating charge – paras 14-15; and out of court on the application of 
the company or the company’s directors – para 22. 
252 Comparisons with the US DIP model are unavoidable, see D. Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of 
Corporate Reorganisations’, 4 JCLS, (2004), 117, at 146. 
253 See R. Posner, ‘Foreword’ in J. Bhandari and L. Weiss (eds.), Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal 
Perspectives, (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
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highlighted above in that is it a wise decision to leave those in charge who potentially caused 
the problems in the first place. The administration process aims to restore confidence in the 
company by discarding the old management, at least for a period of time. Whilst obtaining 
the relevant information may prove an obstacle, the EA has prompted a culture of supervision 
and monitoring, where readily available information can be assessed quickly and an 
administrator can be appointed on short notice.  This not only attempts to promote efficiency 
but also a wider awareness of the issues involved254. So whilst it is noted that some 
responsibility has been placed on the financial providers to monitor and report any distress, 
the question remains for whom does the administration process cater?  
 
The 2002 Act is explicit in its motives stating that administrators must act in the interests of 
the company’s creditors as a whole255. These different interests or values are the factors 
which makes rescue a sensitive and delicate matter to handle256. But there is a far more 
pressing matter before the interests are to be considered and that is whether on the 
information that has been provided, the company would be best suited for administration or 
liquidation?  The answer to this rests with the IP who must consider whether or not “in his 
opinion the purpose of the administration is reasonably likely to be achieved”257. Applying 
this to the premise that there is an emphasis on the preservation of the business as opposed to 
the preservation of company, if the IP concludes that a sale of assets would achieve a better 
result for creditors than preserving the company there will be little scope for challenging this 
assessment. However a creditor may apply to the court to challenge the decision258, and may 
succeed if the creditor can prove the administrator has acted so unfairly to harm his interests. 
The IP would have to explain why the rescue objective cannot be achieved259. But any 
suggestion made that the courts will usually intervene or second guess “commercial 
judgments made by IPs is far off the mark”260. 
 
                                                            
254 V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue in a World of Debt’, Journal of Business Law, (2008), at 758. 
255 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 3(2) 
256 V. Finch, ‘Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles’, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002, Chapter 6; M. 
Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business Law, (1999), 491; Insolvency 
Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms’, Report of the Review 
Group, Department of Trade and Industry, (2000), pp.12-23. See Enterprise Act 2002, Sch.16, para 65. 
257 Act 1986 Sch.B1 para 18. 
258 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para 74 
259 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para 49(2)(b) 
260 Hansard, HL Deb, vol 638, col 768 (29 July 2002); See also G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue 
– An Anglo-American Evaluation’, 56 ICLQ, (2007), 515, at 530. 
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Needless to say that if the IP is not provided with a full account of the company’s affairs, 
which will allow them to evaluate the prospects of achieving the purpose of the 
administration then they will refrain from making such a statement261. The purpose of this 
process is to assess risk and identify potential risks. It was hoped that by introducing this 
“new” awareness of insolvency risks it would increase proactive steps to be taken before the 
position became terminal. But this in some respects ignores the more technical arrangement 
of finances: what if a shift in the financial climate occurs?262 It would seem that despite the 
intention to increase the monitoring and supervision of companies, there has to be a 
distinction between a perceived risk and an actual risk. It would be uneconomic for any 
company to endeavour to see every risk. The only thing that companies can do is to take the 
steps that they think are necessary to prevent the greater risk as assessed from their reports.  
 
In seeking these anticipatory steps to safeguard their interests, measures from creating and 
gathering in depth information about the companies going concerns has manifested itself into 
a vehicle striving to detect and manage risk early, rather than making its primary mission to 
repay debt. The EA 2002 took a decisive step to introduce new timeframes for action, 
creating incentives to monitor a greater urgency263. The shift in focus has created a new 
direction, more reflective of modern business practice, whereby calculated risk is to be 
encouraged and at the same time actively monitored to minimise the extent of financial 
distress if it occurs, which in turn increases the chances of a successful corporate rescue being 
carried out. This anticipatory, rather than reactive, policy264 has been duly noted to apply to 
the way banks approach funding rescue packages.  
 
This revamp in thinking has done much to making rescue packages possible. While in the 
pre-Enterprise Act regime banks could rely on receiverships and therefore never had to be 
proactive in assessing and reducing risk because they had greater control in receivership and 
the IP owed them duties, the newly adopted regime now means they are, in theory and 
                                                            
261 The Enterprise Act 2002 created new objectives for administration: Para 3(1) – The administrator of a 
company must perform his functions with the objective of (a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or (b) 
achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were 
wound up (without first being in administration), or (c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one 
or more secured or preferential creditors. See L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and 
Commentary, (Bristol: Jordans, 2006), at 1583. 
262 The term will be associated with economic events that happen on a large scale, affecting the economy as a 
whole rather than a systematic attack on individual sectors.  
263 V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 68(5) Modern Law Review, (2005), at 715. 
264 For an overall flavour on the change in insolvency law philosophy see V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of 
Insolvency Law’, 68(5) The Modern Law Review, (2005). 
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depending on priority and who has got it, on the same footing as other secured creditors, so it 
is imperative they act with haste to reduce the distress and increase what they recover. In 
sharp contrast to the position with receivership, the IP is now to consider the interests of the 
company’s creditors as a whole265, whilst at the same time ensuring that the procedures and 
enforcement provisions set down by the new Act delivered on its intention to protect their 
interests when the IP took decisions or made judgments about the company’s prospects. 
These two aims changed the face of corporate rescue proceedings. Firstly, it dictated the 
overriding objective of rescue, and secondly it has changed the way in which investors 
choose to provide funds to companies. Why the latter change is important is worth 
emphasising because it has the potential to set a dangerous precedent. Naturally all 
companies need investment to operate. The next questions would be to ask: how are 
companies funded? Followed by: why is this important? The two questions can be answered 
simultaneously. Finance providers who wished to protect their investment before the 
enactment of the EA found the answer to be straight forward by initiating receivership with 
the floating charge they held giving them priority.  
 
However, post EA it has created a re-think. With the uncertainties causing banks to shift their 
lending practices away from using floating charge securities and more towards lending via 
fixed asset security266. Why this point is imperative to rescue is because it will have a 
profound effect on its overall success. If there is a shift in security away from floating 
charges to fixed assets, there is a diversification of risk on the investment and ergo less of an 
urgency and tendency to monitor companies267. By providing a method in which a creditor 
may protect his investment, there is less concern about securing repayment and so less 
attention dedicated to ensuring the company is in a healthy state268. It would seem that that 
whilst the intention of the EA was to increase transparency and the availability of company 
information through monitoring, it has adversely diminished the process which would have 
allowed rescue to be a more prominent force than it is currently. Continuing with the 
concerns associated with monitoring, it is worth briefly exploring the introduction of the 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR)269, which has now been replaced by the Business 
                                                            
265 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para 3(2). 
266 D. Prentice, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Enterprise Act 2002’, 5 EBOR, (2004), at 153. 
267 See J. Armour and S. Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2001), 20, at 23. 
268 Whilst all investors will pay attention to the company of interest, there would be a variation on how much 
time is dedicated to monitoring a company if their investment is not as strong as say one that is. 
269 See Company Law Review Steering Group (CLSRG), Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, Final Report (London: DTI, 2001) ch 5; DTI, Draft Regulations on the Operating 
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Review (BR) under section 417 of the Companies Act 2006. The importance of this is 
apparent when considered with corporate rescue proceedings as its effect was to further the 
process in which company directors not only manage serious risks but also disclose to 
stakeholders how they manage such risks270. The responsibility for maintaining this internal 
control system is fundamental to the potential success of any rescue procedure. If the system 
does not substantiate in detail the way that particular risks are to be dealt with, or overlooks 
others, then the company will not be equipped with the necessary skills to avert distress. 
However, it is hoped that the BRs271 will have a more positive response, promoting 
transparency to be undertaken when dealing with insolvency risks and rescue. But on 
reflection does it make any difference? Does transparency really prevent or limit failure? Or 
would further research be more inclined to suggest that it has nothing to do with preventive 
methods, but rather accountability, increasing the sale of assets before the inevitable decline 
of the company and finding those parties responsible for the failure? This highlights the 
potential conflicts in the legislation: is administration a measure to prevent liquidation or is 
administration the new liquidation?  
 
Whilst at one time financial distress was permitted to run its course because banks had 
priority, they now may be too hasty in placing the company into administration rather than 
putting trust and confidence into the management of the company, in that they can work 
through the glitch and return the company to a healthy state financially. It would now seem 
that the banks have criteria, not set in stone but rather guidelines that offer something 
approaching a good practice when faced with such a situation. Firstly they should observe 
and detect early warning signs of distress,272 determine the quality of the management and its 
ability to deal with a company in distress,273 and the company’s performance in steering 
through the troubled times. Whilst it may sound like they are taking on responsibility, they 
are in fact taking steps to protect their investment. If success is to be assessed based on these 
proactive steps then success is an indirect product of self-interest. If corporate sustainability 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
and Financial Review and Directors’ Report – A Consultative Document (May 2004). See also L. Roach, ‘The 
Legal Model of the Company and the Company Law Review’, 26 Company Lawyer, (2005), at 98. 
270 V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 68(5) Modern Law Review, (2005), at 717. 
271 This only applies to large quoted companies; see s. 417 Companies Act 1985. 
272 See bank strategies see British Bankers’ Association (BBA), A Statement of Principles: Banks and Micro-
enterprises – Working Together (2008): http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/bba-launches-revised-statement-
of-principles (as of 30th October 2010) 
273 Ibid. 
79 
 
is to prevail as the one true motive for initiating rescue at an early stage is this to be 
considered detrimental for the direction of the corporate rescue?  
 
3.5. When Rescue Fails – Rescuing Rescue 
As previously stated, a company can suffer a second failure as there is nothing to suggest that 
previously rescued companies are more immune to financial distress than a non-rescued 
company. However, it may raise questions as to whether the company should have a third 
chance given that the decision to take that failed second chance did not prove effective274. Of 
particular attention will be the timeframe that has elapsed since the first rescue and what 
measures were taken to address the problems that faced the company. If new problems have 
materialised that were not evident in the first rescue is it correct to label any further attempt 
as a rectification process in conjunction with the first or a separate process unrelated to the 
previous one? Part of the difficulty with assessing this question is clearly the lack of data 
compiled on this subject. Statistics are not recorded by many administrators because firstly 
they are not required to file material and secondly there is little distinction to be had between 
first and second rescues. It would be interesting to quantify whether multiple rescue attempts 
just delay the inevitable process of liquidation. Or can it be simply said, as already 
mentioned, that administration is the new liquidation?275 The question warrants further 
investigation and will be examined towards the end of this thesis.  
 
The importance of which approach is taken reflects on the rights held by various parties 
associated with a company; when a healthy company is operating the directors are seeking to 
benefit the shareholders276, and when the company is distressed the attention will be turned to 
aiding the interests of the creditors277. It therefore can be argued that it is beneficial to offer 
companies a number of different routes to rescue, but on the condition that they work 
                                                            
274 But it must be recognised that the law cannot transform a non-viable business into a viable one, see E. 
Fennell, The Times (Law Section, Times 2), April 2003, at 9.  
275 This will be examined throughout the next chapters.  
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3. The Company Law Review Steering Group took the view that the basic duties of directors will still be to 
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together and not in conflict278. Achieving this goal naturally depends entirely on the 
individuals and the circumstances, and the fact is that reconciling them is not always possible.  
 
3.6. Afterthought on Rescue Ideology 
Despite the number of competing objectives, it is clear that corporate rescue must remain a 
selective mechanism aimed at only sustaining the companies that are economically viable279. 
It has aptly been described as embracing a Darwinian approach whereby a capitalist economy 
will acknowledge that a certain level of corporate failure is both inevitable and necessary to 
the efficient functioning of the market280. This theory of embracing a Darwinian approach can 
be expanded to include a Socio-Economic Darwinian approach, whereby it is accepted that 
rescue is not an automatic right281, but the parameters in which it is judged should perhaps be 
widened to include as the name suggests socio-economic issues. Whilst this may be 
interpreted too widely, it is intended to highlight other issues that should be considered when 
discussing the benefits of rescuing a distressed company. The intended aim is to strengthen 
the result of a rescued company, rather than widen the scope which may weaken the process.  
 
On a final note, if failure is a product that is inevitable and necessary why do we have rescue 
models? The answer to this is simple: not all companies in distress are beyond help. Some 
companies can be rescued and some can be restructured. There is the temptation to suggest 
that no company is too big to fail, but this will depend on the company, what it does and what 
would the consequences be to the wider economy if it was allowed to fail282. Whether the UK 
has a model that is efficient in its purpose will be explored in the next chapters. Like the 
Darwinism approach a model’s strength is to be found in its willingness to adapt and evolve 
to deal with the circumstances in existence. From the research conducted in this chapter it has 
been highlighted that there is a divergence between insolvency legislation and what 
companies require in practice. Invariably it appears that sometimes change has to develop 
outside of the formal process and operate as an alternative to what the legislation dictates if it 
clear that the law is redundant in its purpose. If a rescue model does not effectively rescue 
companies then it cannot be said to be a rescue model at all. 
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4. Conclusion  
The Corporate rescue model in the UK has developed over the years with various notable 
inputs ranging from the Cork Report to the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002. 
It was with the latter Act that aimed to secure the rescue concept as a dominant force within 
insolvency proceedings. It was hoped that the rescue culture that emerged would devise a 
structure which enabled distressed companies to easily seek the intervention that they need to 
remedy the problems that they faced. The difficulty with the legislation is that it assumed that 
the concepts of financial distress and insolvency could be defined with ease. Whilst there is 
case law and annotations within statute books to provide assistance they remain unclear and 
open to interpretation. The flexibility does offer some benefits by allowing a distressed 
company to easily demonstrate the financial state of its affairs, but despite the tests 
formulated the actual point of insolvency has never fully been determined. It has only broadly 
been stated to apply where cash flow is insufficient to cover current obligations, or if the 
company has outstanding liabilities that are greater than the value of assets, and as such it is 
not possible to discharge his liabilities. The asset valuation process has been the source of 
much controversy, partially because it is purely an estimation that can have far reaching 
consequences on a company’s solvency state. The inaccuracy combined with the tension of 
having a model that has a dual accountancy and legal personality has in some ways allowed 
for the UK’s corporate rescue form to be pulled in a number of directions. 
 
The features evident within the UK’s model have been significantly shaped by the Cork 
Report which intended to define the characteristics of a good modern insolvency law. It not 
only highlighted the flaws and recommended amendments, but it more importantly paved the 
way for the rescue culture to emerge. When the majority of the Cork Report’s 
recommendations were enacted by way of the Insolvency Act 1986 this marked a new 
direction in policy – a new philosophy of restoring companies rather than automatically 
putting them into liquidation. However, despite changes in the field corporate rescue 
proceedings are thwarted with inherent conflicts associated with companies that are 
financially distressed. These attitudes have ensured that the model has become “path 
dependent”; it has refrained from endorsing natural change because the differences that make 
it so are echoed in its identity. To accept change would therefore be to acknowledge that it 
was inefficient in producing its desired outcome.  
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The research conducted shows that there is a pattern emerging whereby corporate rescue 
procedures have simply been used as substitutes for liquidation. This was not intentional. The 
intention was to provide a real alternative to liquidating companies, but what seems to have 
been created is a new mechanism that ultimately leads to the former, certainly in effect. The 
creditor friendly orientation of the UK’s system along with the preference for enduring a 
management displacement model has ensured that it would remain distinct from the US’s 
Chapter 11 model. The divergences are many, but a critical aspect is the role that the IP’s 
play in the process. The role and duties will be something that will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
 
This thesis accepts that rescue procedures cannot exist in isolation; whilst creditors’ interests 
as a whole take priority in a rescue process it must also consider the wider consequences that 
occur due to a company being in financial distress. In conjunction with exploring wider 
interests, it should also be noted that the stigma associated with insolvency in the UK does, to 
a degree, hinder potential rescues as well as having the ability to inflate the causes of the 
insolvency to something greater than they should have been. Encouraging entrepreneurs to 
take risks on the scale of American counterparts is still something that needs to be addressed 
in this country. Some measures have been taken in giving a “second chance” to a distressed 
company, but questions still remain as to whether both the company and its business can be 
correctly associated with rescue? It has been suggested that only the former can as the latter is 
more likened to a recycling process. With this in mind it is submitted that the majority of 
distressed companies that do enter administration are not “rescued” in the true sense of the 
word. They are partially rescued companies that have been subjected to a major intervention 
to save them and in return they have been significantly streamlined, reduced in size and 
operate in a small capacity than they did before they sought help. 
 
The new administration process that was introduced in the 1986 Act and reinforced in the 
Enterprise Act 2002 aimed above everything to introduce fairer corporate insolvency laws. 
What remains to be seen is whether due to the current corporate insolvency law and practice 
not synchronising an alternative informal process was developed outside of the main 
insolvency procedures to address the fallacy in the current legislation. It will be seen whether 
the increasingly popular pre-packaged administration process can correctly be referred to as a 
rescue model at all and whether this by proxy makes the formal administration process 
redundant.  
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Chapter 3 
Determining Corporate Rescue Policy and the Role of Insolvency 
Practitioners 
 
 
Part I: Corporate Rescue Policy 
1. Development of the Corporate Rescue Culture 
In the previous chapter the UK’s corporate insolvency laws were analysed to determine what 
essential principles have contributed to the UK’s corporate rescue model. This chapter aims 
to use that information to determine whether a correlation exists between what the theoretical 
principles provide and how a distressed company is dealt with in practice.  
 
It has been a long campaign to reform the insolvency laws in the UK to endorse and promote 
a fairer corporate rescue model1. This gradual push towards change has involved politicians 
actively encouraging a move towards a more US-style philosophy of enterprise that 
traditionally is less censorious of business failures and more dedicated to finding solutions to 
the problems2. Despite the reservations raised in the previous chapter regarding “path 
dependency”3, the distinct cultural and economic nature of the two jurisdictions should not be 
viewed as a deterrent to adopting some aspects of another model. Policy makers and 
governments should actively review their legislation to determine whether it is operating 
                                                            
1 The need to deal with troubled companies has been long endorsed by politicians and legislators as well as the 
judiciary and bankers, see M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business 
Law, (1999), 491; R Harmer, ‘Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim’, Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, (1997), 139, at 143-148. 
2 Peter Mandelson then the Trade Secretary in 1998 went to great lengths to discuss with the hope of reassessing 
business perception on failure and move it towards risk taking; see M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a 
Corporate Rescue Culture’, Journal of Business Law, (1999), 49, at 519; see also a comment by the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Melanie Johnson who stated that “the 
insolvency reforms will help address the fear of failure that is a significant barrier to enterprise and help prevent 
companies in difficulty from going under unnecessarily. Together, the reforms will help make the UK become a 
better place to do business...”, HC Deb. April 10, 2002, col.111; see also V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives and Principles, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), pp.127-34, 284-86; A. Keay, ‘Balancing Interests in 
Bankruptcy Law’, Anglo American Law Review, (2001), at 225. 
3 For further reading on ‘path dependency’ see R. J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: 
When Do Institutions Matters?’, 74 Washington University Law Quarterly, (1996), 327; M. J. Roe, ‘Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics’, 109 Harvard Law Review, (1996), 641. 
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efficiently4; anything deemed to be falling short of the required standard would begin to 
cause concerns and action should be taken to establish how best to rectify any shortcomings5.  
 
In such circumstances the issue(s) may be addressed by exploring different approaches to the 
same question. In this case it was widely considered that the US model, specifically its 
Chapter 11, could offer valuable guidance as to how the UK’s corporate rescue model could 
be improved to be more reflective of the needs that face modern businesses6. This insight has 
gained considerable support and provided the foundations for numerous reports and 
consultation papers7. More recently, the Enterprise Act 2002 has modified and addressed a 
few aspects that were considered to be unfair; notably replacing administrative receivership 
with a new way of initiating the administration procedure and ring fencing a set portion of 
funds for the benefit of unsecured creditors8. But whilst these legal developments have 
occurred at a steady pace, other contemporary factors appear to have been omitted from that 
analysis. Issues concerning the overall effect that insolvent companies have on local 
communities and the economy9, the lack of technical compliance and transparency within the 
formal administration procedure have collectively had the undesirable effect of making the 
law appear out of touch and unresponsive to adopting changes required specifically to help a 
distressed company.    
 
Since the EA 2002 the corporate rescue ideology has been to encourage pre-emptive 
strategies to prevent the onset of financial distress; placing the onus of ensuring that the 
financially distressed company seeks help at the right time firmly on the shoulders of those in 
                                                            
4 This term will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
5 The design of rescue regimes relies heavily on how efficient the corporate insolvency process eliminates those 
firms that are economically inefficient, see generally, A. Belcher, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1997). This will be discussed in more depth in chapter four.  
6 See R. Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 262. 
7 See Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy’, 
(December 1998), Cm.4176, paras 2.12 to 2.14; Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and 
Business Reconstruction Mechanisms’, Interim report (DTI, September 1999); Insolvency Service Report 
(2000); see also HM Treasury Press release, 8th June 2001 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010852/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/ent_chal_index.htm (accessed 7th April 2011). 
8 See Insolvency Act 1986 ss72A, 72B-72G; Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1; Insolvency Act 1986 s.176A; 
Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2097). For further reading see A. Keay, ‘The 
Prescribed Part: Sharing around the Company’s Funds’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2011), 81. 
9 For a socially responsible company, it is important to ensure diversity in the workforce and provide suitable 
conditions for employees; it is also crucial to maximise the positive impact of the companies’ operations 
through support for and involvement in the local communities where it operates; see R. Smerdon, A Practical 
Guide to Corporate Governance, 2nd edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), pp.250-251. 
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charge of the company10. The change marked a philosophical transformation in the way in 
which a troubled company was approached and how its predicament was to be addressed. 
Persistent audits and risk management became key mechanisms to detect any potential 
problems with creditors keen to regularly monitor their investment to know the true financial 
position of the company11. If any concerns were to be raised a company would be expected to 
comply with best practice for furthering the aim of rescue12, and seek intervention from 
outside of the company at the earliest opportunity if internal measures were insufficient in 
dealing with the matter. This shift from “debt collection” to “risk management” encouraged 
those involved in the process to think about insolvency risks in advance of the final crisis13. 
This proactive measure which aimed to manage and restrict the extent of the distress, led to 
further intervention measures from the government to audit how management performed in 
such circumstances and whether directors should be held accountable for any wrongdoing 
committed14. Introducing accountability into the equation altered how financial distress was 
interpreted, in particular increasing awareness amongst management as to what measures 
may be adopted to avert possible dangers.   
 
In conjunction with promoting a better understanding about how the affairs of a financially 
distressed company should be tackled, modern business practices dictate that real alternatives 
to winding up a company should be considered15. Amongst the list of alternative models to 
develop the controversial pre-packed administration procedure (pre-packs) is gaining in 
popularity16. The nature and issues surrounding pre-packs will be discussed later in Chapter 
Five but it is important to make clear that whilst there is no doubt that the idea of rescue is 
entrenched in the UK’s insolvency legislation17, the informal pre-pack procedure represents 
                                                            
10 Identifying distress and ensuring that early intervention is sought has enabled many companies to recover 
successfully, but of course this does not always work so the emphasis will remain on the conduct of directors’ in 
particular asking the question have they been proactive in assessing and responding to the difficulties? See R. 
Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 14. 
11 For further reading see A. Arora, ‘The Corporate Governance Failings in Financial institutions and Directors’ 
Legal Liability’, Company Lawyer, (2011), 3, at 5. 
12 See the Cork Report: Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982), Cmnd 8558, 
Ch 9; see also V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, 
Journal of Business Law, (2010), 502, at 506. 
13 See generally V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), Chapter 6.  
14 See M. Power, ‘The Audit Explosion’, (London, Demos, 1994); A. Walters, ‘Directors’ Disqualification after 
the Insolvency Act 2000 – The New regime’, Insolvency Law, (2001), 86.  
15 L. Hornan, ‘The Changing Face of Insolvency Practice’, International Accountant, (March 2005), 24, at 24.  
16 Pre-packs now account for over a half of administrations, see S. Frisby, ‘Conclusion on Pre-Packs: Part 1’, 
Recovery, (Winter 2009), 30. 
17 See at V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal 
of Business Law, (2010), 502, at 507. 
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an approach that generally operates outside what is contained within the UK’s insolvency 
related legislation and regulations18.  
The intention of this chapter is to evaluate the philosophy that has significantly contributed to 
the UK’s rescue procedure, taking a closer look at the characteristics that have helped define 
corporate insolvency policy and with it to evaluate the path that corporate rescue has taken in 
recent years. 
 
2. The Philosophy Divide: Proceduralist and Traditionalist  
As soon as a company is assessed as being insolvent, or when it is realised by others that the 
company is in financial distress, interested parties will start to compete for what they consider 
to be their rightful financial claim in the debtor company. How best to deal and resolve these 
conflict of interests has been the point of debate in countless academic and practitioners 
articles19. The normative debates on insolvency philosophy and policy have taken numerous 
forms, but there now seems to be some consensus that it consists of two main schools of 
thought, namely proceduralist and traditionalist20. How to distinguish between the two is 
quite straightforward. The divergence between the theories becomes apparent when the 
following question is posed: whose interests should corporate rescue serve?  
 
2.1. Proceduralists 
In the way proceduralists form their opinion, they would say that corporate rescue exists 
primarily for the benefit of creditors. They see the core element of insolvency law as a 
mechanism to maximise the extent of recoveries for parties with non-insolvency legal 
entitlements relating to financially distressed debtors. The basis of this contention rests with 
the comparison of insolvency law satisfying the interests of a debtor’s creditors and 
suggesting that this is very much of the same nature as to how civil procedure vindicates the 
interests of parties with legal entitlement, namely those who seek judicial relief or satisfaction 
via civil litigation21. On the legitimate provenance of insolvency law, proceduralists state that 
it should limit itself to issues arising in insolvency only. It is submitted that the debtors’ 
                                                            
18 It should however be noted that in most cases, even for what is a brief moment, pre-packs enter administration 
to allow the deal to go ahead. Further discussions on this will take place in Chapter Five.   
19 For example see S. E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy 
through the lens of Theory’, Company Lawyer, (2011), 99, at 100. 
20 D. G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies, (1986), at 127, 
133; R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 3rd edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at 41-42. 
21 C. W. Mooney Jr, ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure’, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No.03-27, (2003), at 
43, at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=425120 (accessed 11th October 2011). 
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property or value worth should only be allocated to the holders of claims and interests in the 
property22. In effect they believe in the individual pursuit of claims as opposed to any 
collective measures aimed at distributing wealth over a broader range of interested parties23. 
The issue seems not to be with these other interested parties per se, but the fact that they see 
the insolvency system as a poor vehicle to be used to achieving broader social goals such as 
the preservation of employment and restricting the insolvency effects on the local economy24. 
They insist that the wider issues should be considered outside insolvency proceedings, and 
that the only reason why they should be modified or overridden is if this would maximise 
value for the creditors.  
 
However, these wider interests (interests not concerning the primary issues arising from 
insolvency) can be considered on limited occasions, but only on the condition that these 
stakeholders have enforceable rights against assets outside of the provisions contained within 
the insolvency law25; in other words the rights exist and can be pursued outside the main 
insolvency proceedings. The critical point that the proceduralists argue that taking into 
account extraneous interests (such as those of the employees) may be detrimental to the 
interests of holders of private law legal rights (the right to have contracts performed or to be 
compensated for breaches by the debtor) and this in the insolvent company would be “prima 
facie theft”26 and constitute a “corruption of civil justice”27. Critically they see insolvency law 
being concerned with determining the affairs of those who have a contractual relationship to 
the company, and mot merely fulfilling a role to satisfy a communitarian approach28.  
                                                            
22 C. W. Mooney Jr, ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure’, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No.03-27, (2003), at 
44, at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=425120 (accessed 11th October 2011). 
23 The notion derives from the understanding that a collection of assets is sometimes more valuable together 
than the same assets would be spread to the winds. Therefore the advantage of having a collective system of 
creditors’ collection is to make sure that creditors, in pursuing their individual remedies, do not actually 
decrease the aggregate value of the assets that will be used to pay them. See T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits 
of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), at 14. 
24 S. E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through the lens of 
Theory’, Company Lawyer, (2011), 99, at 100. 
25 T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986). 
26 C. W. Mooney Jr, ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure’, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No.03-27, (2003), at 
28, at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=425120 (accessed 11th October 2011). 
27 C. W. Mooney Jr, ‘A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure’, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No.03-27, (2003), at 
29, at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=425120 (accessed 11th October 2011). 
28 The current political interest in corporate law and governance should not be underestimated. It has been 
suggested that there could be a shift in the division between the private world of the economic actor and the 
public world of societal action through the creation of new regulatory spaces and community-based discursive 
processes, see G. Wilson, ‘Business, State and Community: Responsible Risk Takers, New Labour and the 
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In relation to the analysis of corporate rescue, proceduralists’ prefer to rely on economic 
models and market trends to determine resolutions for distressed companies29, as opposed to 
the use of judicial discretion determined on the basis of case law. The reliance on 
extrapolative formulas is not a precise process and given its dependence on a wide number of 
variables, it means that it has a tendency to employ solutions to problems, which does not 
necessarily correlate with legislation. This raises concerns as to whether such a system can be 
cost effective and efficient? Proceduralists nevertheless proclaim that the model is centred on 
the aim of reducing waste, by controlling investment capital that is reserved for distressed 
companies and allowing the natural failure and liquidation of financially distressed 
companies that are beyond redemption.  
 
This follows the sentiments set out in Chapter Two, which identified customs and concepts 
that have led corporate rescue being compared to an instrument which endorses a Darwinian 
approach. That the process permits (even encourages) uncompetitive companies to fail, and 
stronger competition to take its place. This approach adopts a displacement action, whereby 
distressed yet viable companies take the place of companies that have exhausted all lines of 
potential recovery. The displacement model maintains a continual presence within the 
business world that is never redundant and should be considered as a natural remedy to 
failure as opposed to something that is undesirable. Whilst proceduralists endorse what seems 
to be a corporate answer to nature’s natural selection, they do so with the knowledge that the 
liquidation of distressed companies fulfils a fundamental aim by ensuring that assets are 
liquidated for the benefit of the creditors30. This model attempts to provide the freedom and 
flexibility of a contractarian model while also being attentive to communitarian sentiments. 
Whether this approach is compatible with the UK’s corporate insolvency legislation requires 
further analysis, starting with an examination of the alternative philosophy that promotes a 
wider approach.  
 
2.2. Traditionalists  
Contrary to proceduralists, traditionalists believe that insolvency law is not a tool solely 
reserved for the creditors in which they can pursue their own interests. Broadening the scope 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Governance of Corporate Business’, 27 Journal of Law and Society, (2000), 151, at 152. Whether this “space” 
has emerged is debatable and has been made particularly more difficult given the global financial difficulties.  
29 J. Argenti, ‘Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms’, (London: McGraw-Hill, 1976), at 170. 
30 S. E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through the lens of 
Theory’, Company Lawyer, (2011), 99, at 100. 
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of interest that should be considered in insolvency proceedings, traditionalists believe that 
stakeholders in general who have an economic interest in the company should be included31. 
They believe that there should be a wider distribution of wealth, with equal weight given to 
the interested parties32. However, caution should be applied when referring to the term 
“equal”. This is not intended to mean “equality” in the general sense, but should be read to 
mean that equal respect and concern will be afforded to each claim. Similarly, however equal 
respect and concern does not mean the same thing as equality of treatment of those issues33. 
With this in mind, traditionalists are keen to demonstrate that insolvency law is created to 
take both the economic and non-economic values of all parties affected by financial distress 
into consideration34. Unlike the proceduralists they do not abide by economic models to 
analyse corporate insolvency, but choose to promote and highlight the wider concerns that 
should be considered and that the realised wealth should be distributed accordingly35. It 
follows that what they are most concerned with is providing alternatives to liquidation; 
namely providing solutions to financial distress and addressing the issues regarding the 
preservation of companies36, protection of employment37, furthering the interests of the 
community38 and promoting equity amongst the creditors of the insolvent company39. This in 
other words can be described as seeking to foster distributive justice. 
 
The two philosophies provide alternative means to establishing what should be the priority in 
insolvency. Given the technical nature of insolvency and the way that it addresses the 
interests of creditors and the economy in general, it is of no surprise that the theories present 
different ways in analysing how best to deal with financial distress and this in turn has 
generated difficulties40. The real purpose and legitimate provenance of insolvency has failed 
                                                            
31 D. R. Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’, Tex. L. Rev., (1993), 
554.  
32 See R. J. Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application, (London: OUP, 2005). 
33 For a further discussion on this issue, see R. J. Mokal, ‘Contractarianism, Contractualism and the Law of 
Corporate Insolvency’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, (2007), 51 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1074745 
(accessed 2nd January 2011).  
34 See Korobkin’s ‘Value-Based Account’ on Corporate Insolvency in D. R. Korobkin’s, ‘Value and Rationality 
in Bankruptcy Decision Making’, 33 William and Mary Law Review, (1992), 333, at 335. 
35 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev., (1987), 775, at 777. 
36 D. R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’, 91 Colum. L. Rev., (1993), 717, 745 
37 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’, 92 Mich. L. Re., (1993), 336, 354-355. 
38 K. Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay’, Wash. U. L. Q., (1994), 
1031. However, it should be noted that there is some concern about how this element can come into conflict 
with other interests, see B. S. Schermer, ‘Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the Community 
into Account in Bankruptcy: A Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat’, 72 Wash. U. L. Q., (1994), at 1049. 
39 K. Gross, ‘Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System’, (New Haven, CT: YUP, 1997), 19. 
40 J. Pottow, ‘Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy’, John M. Olin Centre for Law 
& Economics, University of Michigan, (2006), at 943. 
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to create any agreement. This has had an unfortunate affect on the reputation of corporate 
insolvency law, often being cited as a non-stimulating area of law that has little regard for the 
wider social concerns of its actions. This is an unfair conclusion that disregards the tension 
that exists between different parties in an insolvent/distressed company with the realisation 
that not every creditor can be satisfied. The development of corporate insolvency law and 
rescue has somewhat been restricted partly due to a lack of time dedicated to the cause41. But 
even with this in mind the aspect that really needs to evolve is the opinion held by the general 
public that corporate failure is something that can always be avoided. It is inevitable that 
there will always be distressed companies. It seems that given the prevailing thoughts on the 
subject there will always be some disagreement as to how best to deal with them42. 
 
2.3. Two Distinct Models 
Following on, the two theoretical ideologies can be further diluted with one theory dictating 
an “inclusive” approach to be taken with the interests to be considered, whilst the other 
approach is restrictive choosing to exclude certain parties from the proceedings. Despite these 
differences there is some consensus on the direction that corporate rescue should and has 
taken. On a foundational level there has to be a list of rules that interested parties would 
hypothetically agree to be included in a contact that would regulate any contentious matters 
arising in insolvency situations, and be accepted by interested parties as conditions for 
entering such contracts43. Noting the two philosophies, the divergences can be further diluted 
to represent two theories, namely the Creditor’s Bargain Theory (CBT)44 and the Team 
Production Theory (TPT)45. Both theories have had an important role in shaping the way in 
which legislation has developed, but particular emphasis will be given to the CBT, as the UK 
                                                            
41 This is of particular significance in relation to pre-packs. See Chapter Five. 
42 In 1999 Stephen Byers MP, the then Secretary of State for Trade and industry recognised the importance of 
cultural attitudes in attaining the optimum form of business governance for the welfare and prosperity of the 
nation in his key speech, stating: “...shifting British culture onto a more enterprising and less risk-averse track 
will take time. But we must all aspire to change the national mood if we are to create an outward looking, 
confident society, fit to take on the 21st century”, London Business School, (21st July 2009). 
43 S. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 17. 
44 T. H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’, 91 Yale Law Journal, 
(1982), at 857. 
45 L. M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’, UCLAW Law School, Law and 
Econ Research Paper 3-12 (2003). This theoretical theory is by no means the only other beside CBT. Other 
theories which could also be used are the Communitarian Theory which considers a range of constituent 
interests and takes on a more public law focus; and what has come to be referred to as the Multiple Values 
approach, which states that there are other values beside the maximisation of the interests of creditors and 
efficiency that warrant consideration. See generally A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and 
Personal, (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2003), at 26. 
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arguably followed the pattern set out in this model in the period before the Insolvency Act 
198646.  
 
With these theories it is critical to be aware of the tension that exists between these models 
and how the variations between the two have resulted in different policy outcomes. Whilst 
the CBT was considered to be pivotal to corporate insolvency proceedings before the first 
major insolvency law reform in 1986, it is not free from criticism. The “success” of the model 
has somewhat attracted unwanted attention for whilst there are a number of different models, 
CBT constitutes the only sustained attempt at a principled analysis of the law governing 
insolvency47. But that said, the importance of the model is realised in the fact that despite the 
criticism, the development of other models have not been so coherent or focused48. Whether it 
is elegant principles that are sought or it is considered more desirable to have analyses which 
are “dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected”, which can “neither predict outcomes nor even 
articulate all the factors relevant to a policy decision”49, the divisions amongst critics will 
continue to exist.  
 
There has always been an uneasy struggle between the various concerned parties and their 
different interests in a distressed company50. Whilst the IPs and the courts have traditionally 
attempted to address each case on its individual merits, with technical precision conjoined 
with their discretion they have managed (deliberately or not) to disregard interests that were 
not afforded any consideration within the insolvency legislation.  
 
2.4. Creditor Bargain Theory 
The CBT reflects the views endorsed by proceduralists, which states that the existence of 
insolvency law is for the exclusive benefit of the creditors of the insolvent. Whilst the theory 
acknowledges that there may be other interested parties in the insolvent company, the 
interests of the creditors should prevail51. Other interests should only be considered to the 
                                                            
46 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para 3; see also Brady v Brady [1989] A. C. 755 HL. 
47 R. J. Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application, (London: OUP, 2005) at 34.  
48 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’, 92 Michigan LR, (1993), 336, at 338. 
49 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 U Chicago LR, (1987), 775, at 811. 
50 Different parties tend to “see quality through the lens of their own particular preferences”, see C. Radaelli and 
F. De Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), at 39. 
51 The identity of the creditors within the Bargain has been held to be critical to understanding the theory. Whilst 
the bargain is said to be hypothetical, the creditors on the other hand are quite real, see D. Gauthier, Morals by 
Agreement, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), at 9. It is from this premise that lends support to the suggestion 
that an hypothetical bargain would demonstrate, even if indirectly, what concepts would be agreed in the real 
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extent that these members are creditors with legal enforceable rights against assets of the 
company outside insolvency law52. Endorsing and justifying this theory is becoming 
increasingly problematic as it would only consider rights as negotiated pre-insolvency, 
thereby ruling out the employees who in all fairness have contributed in a human resource 
capacity to the company and deserve as much recognition to their claim as the creditors53. 
Any action to distinguish between finance capital and human capital would lead to the failure 
to recognise that both must exist to ensure the continuation of any company54. But as noted in 
Chapter Two, the way the UK’s insolvency law has developed it has meant that when a 
debtor company defaults on payment of its debts as when due and is legally insolvent, the 
shareholders’ interests are usually supplanted by the creditors’ interests. It would seem that 
this understanding is so deeply embedded in the conscience of the legislators and evident in 
their actions that any intervention to the contrary would have to be in exceptional 
circumstances55. 
 
2.5. Team Production Theory 
The TPT on the other hand differs in a fundamental way to CBT, submitting that the 
justification for the existence of a company is to organise team production.  The theory 
dictates that the production effort within a company is the result of contribution from many 
sources, creating one joint effort as opposed to separate inputs belonging to one person56. It 
acknowledges that the creditors are not the only ones that contribute to the positive value of 
the company, nor are they the only ones who take the risk of investment in companies; they 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
world, see J. H. Jackson and R. Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the 
Creditors’ Bargain’, 75 Virginia LR, (1989), 75, at 160. It follows that by integrating actual people into the 
hypothetical bargain this introduces choice which in turn makes outcomes uncertain, R. Posner, ‘The Ethical 
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication’, 8 Hofstra LR, (1980), 487, at 499. 
This means that participates in the CBT are of the same character as those in real life, with different skills 
setting them apart, T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), at 
59. 
52 T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), at 58. 
53 Ibid, see Jackson’s “fish in the lake” example, at 57; see also S. E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and 
Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through the lens of Theory’, Company Lawyer, (2011), 99, at 101. 
54 The human contribution to the company in the form of employees’ wages is given preferential treatment. 
Priority is given to employees under under s. 175, IA 1986. If employees are not retained, employees' wages up 
to £800 and sums due into employees' pensions, are to be paid. 
55 This is another example of the corporate rescue regime being constrained by what is often referred to as “path 
dependency”, a term used to describe how a system may follow and embrace traditional norms even if the 
original reason for doing so has become extinct. For further discussions regarding path dependency see G. 
McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’, 56 ICLQ, (2007), 515, at 533. 
56 A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 62 American 
Economic Review, (1972), at 777. 
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should therefore be given equal weight57. The insolvency law process is dedicated and based 
on a collective basis where the rights of all interested parties are considered58. This theory 
unlike the CBT acknowledges the importance of the human capital contribution to a company 
and on that basis believes it is necessary and fairer to consider the broader interests59.  
 
2.6. Practical Application 
With the theoretical discussion complete, applying these philosophies in practice reveals 
further divergences. The American model of insolvency legislation embraces the argument 
for considering other interests deserving of protection in insolvency60. The premise for this 
statement is to be found within the Bankruptcy Code, which allows, even if quite rare, the 
court to appoint a trustee in place of the “debtor in possession” (DIP) where the management 
commits wrongdoing. This model allows other “interests of the estate”61 to be considered, 
beside that of the creditors. However, this is highly misleading to imply that just because the 
UK does not follow the DIP model it therefore must not wish to consider other interests but 
that of the creditors. Whilst the administrators once appointed are technically the agents of 
the company and must therefore conduct their duties in the best interests of the creditors as a 
whole, they must also consider the possibility of rescuing the company as a going concern62. 
The duty of attempting to save the company whilst clearly of a benefit to the creditors does 
mean that other interests would be considered as part of the process. This change in attitude 
marks a fundamental shift in the priority of interests and objectives in the UK’s insolvency 
law63, with the focus switching from liquidating a company to maximising the value for 
creditors to considering the sale of the company as a going concern which offers a genuine 
measure to enhance the protection of employees64.  
                                                            
57 M. M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty First Century, 
(Washington: Brooking Institute, 1995), at 239. 
58 See generally M. M. Blair and L. A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, 85 Virginia Law 
Review, (1999) 247; L. A. Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’, 75 Southern 
California Law Review, (2002), 1189. 
59 See A. Rahmani, ‘Shareholder Control and its Nemesis’, ICCLR, (2012), 12, at 19. 
60 Bankruptcy provides a way to override the creditors’ pursuit of their own remedies and to make them work 
together. This position reflects the kind of contact that creditors would agree to if they were able to negotiate 
with each other before extending credit. It is interesting to note that this is an application of bargaining in the 
“original position” behind a “veil of ignorance” in J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 136-42, in T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), at 17. 
61 Title 11 of the United States Code s.1104 (b) (2). 
62 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para 3(1). 
63 P. Davies, ‘Employee Claims in Insolvency: Corporate Rescues and Preferential Claims’, 23 I. L. J., (1994), 
141. 
64 S. E. Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through the lens of 
Theory’, Company Lawyer, (2011), 99, at 103. 
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Which model is preferable remains a contentious issue65. It will therefore be of little surprise 
that reaching a universal consensus on the design of an insolvency framework has not yet 
been achieved66. It must however be conceded that any suggestion that this outcome could be 
achieved would be to ignore the unique relationship between a jurisdiction’s identity (noting 
the cultural and historical influences prevalent in the legal framework) and how this usually 
determines the philosophy it endorses67. In practice the decision will have been conceded 
many years ago. 
 
For instance, in very general terms the UK has historically had a creditor friendly insolvency 
system whereas the US has endorsed a debtor friendly model. And as mentioned above, these 
legal systems are heavily reliant on custom and practice and doing things the way “it always 
has been done”68.  
 
The administration procedure and Chapter 11 are both products that have been in 
development for many years and it could if required be possible to trace their origin to a time 
when the circumstances were much different and the basic concepts within their legal 
framework had a slightly different meaning69. Whilst insolvency models have acknowledged 
the need to change and adapt to the environment they operate in, they can only evolve within 
set boundaries; they are as much subject to the mercy of the laws within their respective 
country as they are to the economy in general70. Thus creating a new identity that functions 
differently to the old model would inevitably cause friction as it would often fail to 
                                                            
65 The solution to the financial distress of a company will depend on an array of issues, such as the nature of the 
problems; their severity; and the means available of resolving them. See R. Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 13. 
66 This has already been attempted but was declared impossible to achieve, see UNCITRAL Model law on Cross 
Border Insolvency (1997), which states that the Model Law respects the differences among national procedural 
laws and does not attempt a substantive unification of insolvency law, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html (accessed 12th May 2011). 
67 See “path dependency” as discussed in Chapter Two. 
68 Ibid, see the importance of continuity. 
69 Whilst differences may have evolved over time, the main question appears to be not so much about whether 
bankruptcy law should exist at all but about how much it should do, see T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of 
Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986), at 7. 
70 “Institutions (laws) are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction (…). That institutions affect the performance of economies is hardly 
controversial. That the differential performance of economies over time is fundamentally influenced by the way 
institutions evolve is also not controversial”. See D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), at 3. 
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complement the existing principles and values71. When this situation occurs and the 
legislation provides no remedy an informal (non legislative) alternative will usually surface.  
 
In this particular case some IPs, pre Enterprise Act 2002, considered administration as a tardy 
and expensive process that more often than not hindered any attempt to rescue the company 
as a going concern. To address these issues they took it upon themselves using the discretion 
afforded to them to adapt a more pragmatic solution to the problems faced by financially 
distressed companies72. It will be seen that the IPs in developing alternative “rescue 
processes” such as the pre-packs have demonstrated that they are in fact the principal policy 
makers of corporate rescue. This raises some serious concerns however that as a result the 
current law no longer seems to draw a parallel with the intent of Parliament, rendering the 
rescue culture endorsed in the UK not rescue per se. 
 
3. Early Development: the Birth of the Rescue Culture in the UK 
As stated in Chapter Two, the Cork Report has had a fundamental role in shaping the UK’s 
corporate rescue regime. This report was and remains the most comprehensive research 
project on the subject; with its legacy firmly embedded in the way it helped to change 
attitudes on how an insolvent company should be dealt with. It was clear that alternative 
measures to financial distress, other than liquidation was required. The Report acknowledges 
aspects of communitarianism in stressing not merely that insolvency affects interests in 
society beyond insolvents and their creditors, but that the insolvency process is about 
preserving viable commercial enterprises capable of contributing to the economy73.  
Within this idea of preservation, the Report recognised the importance of the benefits to be 
had both by secured creditors and by the community, if businesses and jobs were conserved. 
These initiatives were repeated nearly twenty years later in a report that examined the 
business reconstruction mechanisms evident in UK insolvency law and noted that 
                                                            
71 “The past influences the present and the future...with any institutional change affecting the nature of path 
dependency”. Ibid, particularly see Chapter 11. 
72 But he must act rationally and reasonably in exercising this discretion. See, e.g. G. Lightman and G. Moss, 
The Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies, 4th edn, (London: Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), 
at 246; R. Mokal and J. Armour, ‘The New UK Rescue Procedure -- the Administrator's Duty to Act 
Rationally’, 1 Int. Corp. Rescue, (2004), 136, 137-138; V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and 
Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.446-449. 
73 See Cork Report, para 198(i) and (j). 
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administrative receivership made a valuable contribution to the rescue culture74. Most 
significantly the process allowed rapid and effective action to prevent further deterioration in 
businesses’ viability, particularly in those cases where fraud was evident or suspected. 
However despite the popularity of this process given the relatively low cost of initiating the 
procedure, the process was considered unfair to unsecured creditors as the appointed 
administrator owed a duty only to the appointing creditor75.  
 
3.1. Role of Administrative Receivership 
In practice the banks were the principal providers of debt finance to smaller firms in the UK 
and at the same time represented the largest group responsible for administrative receivership 
appointments. For the banks whilst appointing receivers marked the best way to secure debt 
owed76; they remained open to suggestions that would increase the support that can be offered 
to a distressed company as long as it still ultimately protects their own commercial interests77. 
However concerns remained by those who were outside this privileged relationship leading to 
fears that the floating charge holder under administrative receiverships had too much power. 
This gave rise to a number of disadvantages with granting power to the floating chargeholder, 
namely78: 
                                                            
74 See Banking Law sub-Committee of the City of London Solicitors Company, Department of Trade and 
Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: A Report by the Review 
Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at 48.  
75 Opinion appears to be divided on the development of the rescue process in the UK. Some state that the 
administrative receivership process was one of the factors that caused an underdevelopment of the rescue culture 
in the UK. Others on the other hand have disagreed suggesting “...the UK, far from lagging behind in 
developing a rescue culture have probably developed a far more satisfactory system than any other in the 
world”, but whilst it does provide a workable corporate insolvency framework they do concede “we accept that 
it may need improvement”. See Insolvency law sub-Committee of the City of London Law Society, ibid at 49. 
76 Receivership, without question offered the most efficient enforcement procedure for banks, see R. Calnan, 
‘The Insolvency White Paper 2001: Substance or Procedure’, 10 JIBFL, (2001), 449, at 450. 
77 The changes that occurred in the Enterprise act 2002 brought new challenges to how banks secured its 
interests. The administrator’s statutory objectives confirmed that the inclusive protection of the banks interests 
was not going to be achievable given the collective creditors voice. The banks had to adapt to the new 
administration process and instead of “debt collecting” when a company has become insolvent, they had to 
ensure that they actively monitored the company’s state of affairs, in other words “manage insolvency risks”. 
See generally V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 68(5) Modern Law Review, (2005), at 715; for 
further regarding banks taking pre-anticipatory steps see J. Franks and O. Sussman, ‘The Cycle of Corporate 
Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium Size UK Companies’, IFA Working Paper 306 
(2000), 3; for an insight into how banks may be induced to shift their lending practices away from floating 
charge securities to mending via fixed asset security see D. Prentice, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Enterprise Act 2002’, 5 EBOR, 153. The conclusion drawn from this is that this may result in a mixture of 
lending arrangements, an act that may spread the risk of investment and reduce the need for monitoring, or at 
least reduce the level required, for further reading on bank monitoring see J. Armour and S. Frisby, ‘Rethinking 
Receivership’, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2001). 
78 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at para. 49. 
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 It can lead to unnecessary business failures, and undermine the rescue culture, 
particularly when the relationship between the floating charge-holder and the business 
breaks down; the floating charge holder may then decide to withdraw support from 
the business and appoint an administrative receiver when an alternative lender might 
have elected to continue such support; 
 In making such decisions the floating charge holder had no incentive to consider the 
interest(s) of any other party; 
 It can be unfair to other creditors, as the floating charge-holder will be taking 
decisions (such as whether to appoint an administrative receiver or to support an 
alternative response to insolvency) which can have a significant impact of the returns 
to the creditors without any requirement that their consent be obtained; 
 It could also be unfair to other creditors that an administrative receiver owes his or her 
duty of care principally to the floating charge-holder and not to creditors in general; 
and that, unlike in other procedures, the cost of administrative receivership will fall on 
unsecured and preferential creditors if there are surplus funds over and above the 
amount needed to discharge the secured creditor’s debt (but if the company is not at 
the time in the course of being wound up, its preferential debts (within the meaning 
given to that expression by section 386 in Part XII) are to be paid out of the assets 
coming into the hands of the receiver in priority to any claims for principal or interest 
in respect of the debentures79); and  
 Because the purpose of the receivership is primarily to ensure repayment of the 
amount due to the secured creditor there is no (or there is insufficient) incentive to 
maximise the value of the debtor company’s estate. 
To address these imbalances it is necessary to make reference to a number of principles, 
which when read together provide a sound overview of what a corporate rescue model should 
aim to achieve.  
 
3.2. The Eight Principles 
These principles cover a broad range of considerations that aim to reflect all aspects of a 
corporate rescue strategy. They include:  
(a) Fairness (as opposed to equality) – is, and is seen to be fair to all parties 
concerned, but recognises that not all claims can be equal;  
                                                            
79 See Insolvency Act 1986, s. 40(2). 
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(b) Adaptability – it can respond quickly to the urgent needs of business and adopt to 
the sensitive nature of the financial market;  
(c) Simplicity – it is a system that can be easily administered;  
(d) Cost – it is accessible to all who need and use it80;  
(e) Efficiency – it achieves intended outcomes – the returns to creditors are 
maximised, and businesses that are viable in the long term are not liquidated81;  
(f) Timeliness – it encourages proactive risk management of companies;  
(g) Transparency – makes the application of the law more assessable;   
(h) Accountability – provides for a dedicated procedure to be utilised for parties 
seeking resolution where any of the above seven principles have been 
contravened82.  
 
It follows that any action taken to dilute these principles would be an act against the spirit of 
making an effective corporate rescue model. By embracing these as a whole there is a strong 
case to be made that they can actively encourage the evolution of corporate rescue. However 
the limitation with applying this method is that whilst these principles are designed to 
persuade practice to reflect modern requirements, it is the case that this often goes beyond 
what is contained within the legislation and so change must rely on influences outside 
Parliament, namely the wide discretion afforded to IPs to shape the law to suit the needs of 
businesses.  
 
Notwithstanding the need for change, an obstacle to reform was that despite the popularity of 
receivership amongst secured creditors and government, it was not an available option for 
companies which had not granted a floating charge to a lender. Part of the solution for those 
                                                            
80 The issue regarding administration expenses should also be including within this sphere. It should be noted 
that when it comes to the treatment of expenses the court must work within the proper confines of the legislation 
and should not interpret it perversely simply to satisfy those administrators who adopt their practices on the 
basis of a very optimistic interpretation of the law, see D. Milman, ‘Judicial Reflections on the Administration 
Process: a 2010 Perspective’, Company Law Newsletter, (2010), 1, at 4. 
81 This will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
82 Accountability in this sense is to be taken in conjunction with the audits expected within a company. Audits 
are now chiefly viewed as a mechanism which has impacted the way in which a corporation is structured. It 
must be designed in such a way that its system may be audited and the data compiled becomes a way of 
reducing risks through the review of control systems. Whilst the purpose was to maximise rescue opportunities, 
it appears to have not only removed the human element out of the process, choosing to discard professional 
judgment or trust in favour of cold statistics, but it also has resulted in audits become dual purposed – measuring 
performance on the one hand and dictating accountability on the other. For an overview on how audits are “an 
emerging principle of social organisation” see M. Power, The Audit Explosion, (London: Demos, 1994); The 
Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, (Oxford: OUP, 1997); The Risk Management of Everything, (London: 
Demos, 2004). 
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who did not have a floating charge was to create a new fairer process; this became known as 
the Administration procedure. This new mechanism however had a limited impact as it was 
regarded, when first developed in the 1986 legislation, as a secondary option to receivership, 
as this alternative was only an option if there was no floating charge owner or if he or she 
chose not to embrace administration receivership83. This criticism must be put into context. 
The issue was not necessarily with the function of receivership per se, but rather with the fact 
that certain creditors could take security and gain an advantage over unsecured creditors84. 
This raises the question as to whether the focus should be on analysing the law of security, 
and not attacking a model that has provided the most effective method of enforcing security85.  
 
Despite the effectiveness of receivership, it often pursued the goals for a few individual 
creditors at the expense of other interested parties86. This unfair practice led to the credibility 
of corporate insolvency law being questioned and those who worked within the profession 
gaining an unsavoury reputation. Administration went some way to addressing the 
imbalances between secured and unsecured creditors, but it quickly became apparent that old 
practices continued with administrative receivers protecting the instructing party and 
disregarding the concerns of the creditors as a whole87. This had the undesirable effect of 
distressed, yet salvageable companies failing unnecessarily. But it should be remembered, 
whether this was desirable or not, corporate insolvency is based on contract law and is more 
concerned with protecting contractual rights than enforcing what is perceived to be right by 
the general body of creditors88.  
 
                                                            
83 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at 41. 
84 The purpose of the proceedings was therefore to provide the maximum prospect for the secured creditor and 
as such the concept of corporate rescue formed no part of the original blueprint, and neither were the appointing 
creditor or the appointee under any duty towards the company. See I. F. Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: 
Recent Developments - Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary 
Arrangements - The Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002, E.B.O.R., (2004), 
120, at 123. 
85 Receivership, without question offered the most efficient enforcement procedure for banks, see R. Calnan, 
‘The Insolvency White Paper 2001: Substance Or Procedure, 10 JIBFL, (2001), 449, at 450 
86 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’, I.C.L.Q. (2007), 515, at 
534. 
87 It was advocated that rescue remedies were a superior alternative to liquidation and administrative 
receivership, evident from the following extract of Sir Kenneth Cork's autobiography: “We sought … to provide 
the means by which an insolvent business could be continued and disposed of as a going concern so as best to 
preserve jobs for employees and preserve the nation's assets”, K. Cork, Cork on Cork (London: Macmillan, 
1988), at 189 
88 See G. Lightman, ‘Attitudes and Values: Developments in Insolvency Law: Part 1’, Insolvency Intelligence, 
(2001), 57, at 58. 
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There is no denying that the administration process is in comparison a far more expensive 
procedure than receivership, which often involves arranging creditor meetings but this factor 
inevitably attracts attention and questions whether it can be an efficient mechanism that 
offers value for money in accordance with maximising recoveries. These concerns formed the 
basis for a review conducted by the Insolvency Service which explored whether on the 
grounds of equity and efficiency insolvency proceedings could become more effective and 
accessible89. 
 
4. Proposals for Reform: a Change in Policy? 
It was widely advocated that reform was necessary to bring a fairer system into play; a 
system that owed a duty of care to all creditors and allowed them all, to some degree, to 
participate in the process. Above all change was directed to help maximise economic value 
by aligning incentives properly and ensuring that companies in distress do not “go to the 
wall” unnecessarily. This proposition was put forward by the Department of Trade and 
Industry in its 2001 influential report entitled ‘Insolvency – A Second Chance’90, which 
amongst other things, aimed to streamline the administration procedure so that it become a 
fully effective procedure in all circumstances91. The report was aware as mentioned above 
that there was too great a tendency to treat administration as a second rate option when 
compared to receivership. The report also documented the fact that further measures were 
required to endorse effective legislation, which aimed at improving the ease and speed in 
which rescue proceedings could be initiated and concluded92. This, as the report recognised, 
was a trend that was on the increase, a hope for many that there was a viable solution other 
than liquidation93.  
 
Essentially the report was thorough with its investigations and had the intention to provide a 
procedure that was as flexible and as cost effective as administrative receivership, whilst at 
                                                            
89 In particular the main focus of the research was to “further the development of the rescue culture”, see 
Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: A 
Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at para 17. 
90 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance’, Insolvency 
Service, (2001). 
91 Ibid, see executive summary.  
92 See generally A. Keay, ‘The Enterprise Act 2002: Pioneering a Brave New World in Insolvency Law in the 
United Kingdom, 11 Insolvency law Journal, (2003), 163, at 175-176. 
93 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance’, Insolvency 
Service, (2001), at para 2.7 
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the same time remedying the major defects of that procedure94.  There is no disputing the 
effectiveness of administrative receivership, but it is not a system that endorsed collective 
rights. Therefore one of the issues that it considered to be paramount was the need to rectify 
the old problem associated with IPs only owing a duty to the floating chargeholders in 
administrative receiverships. This was seen to be an outdated and unfair concept, with only a 
duty to all creditors being seen as a truly reformative measure, allowing unsecured creditors 
the opportunity to participate in the process and to let their voices be heard95. This could be 
considered a big enough step towards satisfying the demands of modern practice, along with 
the equally important steps to ensure that the overall control of the procedure and any 
disputes that arise will be dealt with by the courts who will direct it in a public and 
transparent fashion96. The transparency factor is something that is considered in more depth 
in the next section as it is mainly in reference to how the actors carry out the proceedings. It 
had contributed to the downfall of receivership as it was not a requirement for administrative 
receivers to make clear exactly how the decisions were made. The secrecy only increased 
suspicions, particularly amongst unsecured creditors, regarding the affairs of distressed 
companies, secured creditors and IPs. The process had reached a stage where it did not matter 
what was the eventual result of the company or the outcome this had on the unsecured 
creditors or other stakeholders.  
 
It was necessary for reform to occur so that the option of rescuing distressed companies was 
kept alive. It was important to get the message across that liquidation should be the last 
option and that salvaging financially distressed companies, when possible, should be the 
norm. A change to allow this and ensure receivership was overlooked was if the law removed 
this as an option, and made it mandatory that the creditors’ interests should be considered as a 
whole, rather than just fulfilling the interests of the creditor who had a floating charge97. 
 
Whilst the report dictated ways in which rescue could be achieved, it merely tried to 
readdress the imbalance that has existed for so long between rescue and liquidation.  It is 
worth examining in greater detail the Report by the Review group which scrutinised the 
                                                            
94 Executive summary, para 2.12 
95 Executive summary, para 2.12 
96 Executive summary, para 2.12 
97 The real question is whether administration is better than receivership at saving businesses? This will for 
some time remain a moot point. See R. Calnan, ‘The Insolvency White Paper 2011: Substance or Procedure?’, 
10 JIBFL, (2001), 449, at 450. 
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problems with the Insolvency Act 1986 and why they believed that amendments contained 
within the Enterprise Act 2002 represented the best way forward.  
 
5. The Report by the Review Group: A Review of Company Rescue and Business 
Reconstruction Mechanisms98 
It is interesting to note the foreword of the report, which contains a statement composed by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, stating 
that the aim of the research is:  
 
To review aspects of company insolvency law and practice in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere relating to the opportunities, and the means by which, businesses can resolve short 
to medium term financial difficulties, so as to preserve maximum economic value; and to 
make recommendations99. 
 
The interesting aspect of this aim is the need to identify all the possibilities that can help lead 
to resolving a company’s problems. As long as the economic value is preserved at a 
reasonable rate it does leave scope for the method which is to be applied to reach that goal. It 
poses the question whether retaining the economic value is more important than other factors 
such as ensuring that transparency within the process is employed. The findings of the report 
led it to believe that corporate rescue was not efficient and needed further development to 
address the unbalanced rights that existed between secured and unsecured creditors. Having 
identified the issues, the report conceded that in some cases the rescue of a business through 
administrative receivership could provide a better result than other procedures100. In truth the 
lack of empirical research in this area would make any statement suggesting whether one 
method was better than another open to criticism. But this does not dismiss the fact that 
urgent reform was not necessarily aimed at providing the better option in financial terms, but 
rather making the process fairer and more transparent.  
 
Insolvency law attempts to embark on an ambitious project to somehow merge private rights, 
which supports the freedom of contract, and the collective approach. Whether they can be 
                                                            
98 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000) 
99 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at 5. 
100 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at para 19. 
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merged is open to debate. Corporate insolvency law provides a mechanism to deal with 
situations where the company is having financial trouble. This will usually translate to 
meaning that not all of its contractual or legal obligations have been or can be fulfilled. 
Whilst contracts can be entered to protect interests and be enforced by private parties when 
necessary, there has been a steady wave of support growing to consider other parties which 
may have not be so fortunate to have such security101.  
 
Research compiled on this matter by the Insolvency Service has resulted in a new approach. 
It concludes that the pursuit of individual interests has been shown to increase the likelihood 
that equal distribution of wealth amongst creditors will fail102. It should be appreciated that 
whilst characteristically corporate rescue can be construed as a collective mechanism based 
on one of the fundamental principles, namely pari passu, it is subject to the creation of class 
or classes of preferential creditors103. These classes are reflective of, and responsive to, social 
objectives. The extent that relevant social norms override the more traditional considerations 
is open to debate, but the primary objective of corporate rescue is in no doubt – to facilitate 
the survival of the company and its business in order to maximise the value of the available 
assets104. This in theory should provide the best option for all creditors, but it is subject to the 
possibility that some interests can be enforced outside of such proceedings105. Nevertheless 
the emphasis is strongly on the disposal of inefficient companies that are no longer 
economically viable, and refraining from providing debtors with a permanent blanket of 
protection against creditors. Only a temporary stay can be given for the purposes of 
enhancing a rescue plan by giving a company the necessary and crucial breathing space to 
facilitate a plan106.  
 
                                                            
101 It should be noted despite the perception that most will act only in their own self interests, in general it has 
been observed that people will behave in a cooperative fashion over time even if it appears contrary to their 
short-run interest, see generally R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, 1984).  
102 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at para 23. 
103 Described as a communication issue and who would be preferred within a given situation, see V. Finch, 
‘Corporate rescue: who is interested?’, Journal of Business Law’, (2012), 190, at 205. 
104 As set out in para.3 of IA 1986 Sch.B1 (which include rescuing the company) 
105 These are schemes of arrangement under s.895 of the Companies Act 2006 and Company Voluntary 
Arrangements (CVAs) as provided for in Pt 1 and Sch.A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
106 The moratorium is initially lasts for a maximum period of 28 days and during this time meetings of the 
company and creditors must be held to consider the restructuring proposal. There is room to extend this period 
but the majority of creditors must agree subject to an absolute time limit of two months from the date on which 
the meetings are first held, see Insolvency Act Sch.A1 para 32. See generally G. McCormack, ‘Rescuing small 
Business: Designing an ‘Efficient’ Legal Regime’, JBL, (2009), 299, at 303. 
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But are these aids genuinely helping companies address the issues or is it merely delaying the 
inevitable? It was observed in Chapter Two, how a Darwinian approach has been taken with 
distressed companies. Competitive companies will prevail at the expense of weaker 
competitors. Companies are complex entities whereby legal principles alone cannot govern 
corporate rescue; socio-economic variables must also be considered107. This will be explored 
in the next section in conjunction with the discretion that is afforded to IPs who administer 
corporate rescue to analyse how rescue strategies operate in practice.  
 
The Review Group noted that the use of administration had moved away from the intended 
purpose set out in the Cork report, from filing a gap that existed where no creditor had a 
floating charge, to becoming a mechanism that provided an efficient means of managing the 
affairs of an insolvent company108. In some ways it highlights a willingness to seize 
opportunities that coincide with the reality of what an insolvent company required.  
Essentially it has to be remembered that the people who operate in finance and business are 
opportunists who predominately understand risk, and that salvaging something, which can be 
guaranteed, is better than running the unnecessary risk to gain more at further financial 
expense109. This position was supported by some research contained within the Review 
Group, which shows that a growing preference for administration was evident even when 
there was a floating charge holder who could have invoked his right to opt for an 
administrative receivership110. However this was conditional on the banks approving the 
appointed administrator. This request has ensured that certain individual administrators are 
chosen by floating chargeholders with knowledge of how they tend to operate, which usually 
would mean that they are former receivers who tend to generally act in favour of the banks. It 
would seem that the strongest/ influential creditor(s) will always seek a way to gain an 
                                                            
107 Contained within the meaning of “rescue culture”’ the socio-economic tag is understood to include the 
welfare of the country, the region, the town, the unit. Those entities are made up of persons (human or artificial), 
whose activities, products and services make up our national wealth. The destruction or the disablement of any 
part of those potentially wealth-producing activities may, and often must, impoverish the nation as a whole and 
many, possibly all, of its citizens. See M. Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, Journal of 
Business Law, (1999), at 491, 499. 
108 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at para 70. 
109 Understanding risk involves assessing complex data that requires training, it should not be approached lightly 
and may require external expertise, see M. Sweeney-Baird, ‘The Role of the Non-Executive in Modern 
Corporate Governance’, Company Lawyer, (2006), 67, at 80. In addition it should be noted that even a majority 
decision taken honestly can involve poor strategies that are harmful to companies, see R. Harry, Source Book of 
Company Law, (Bristol: Jordans, 1995), at 530. 
110 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: 
A Report by the Review Group’, Insolvency Service, (2000), at para 71. 
105 
 
advantageous position at the cost of other interested parties and it is perhaps in accepting this 
behaviour that makes it paramount to corporate rescue that reform is implemented.  
 
6. Evaluation of the Enterprise Act 2002 – The Way Forward? 
After many years of debate, deciding which direction corporate insolvency policy should 
take, the efforts finally took shape in the form of the Enterprise Act 2002111. There is no need 
to repeat aspects already mentioned in Chapter Two; instead a few points are worth 
mentioning. The Act allowed for four main options: administration, administrative 
receivership, compulsory liquidation, and voluntary liquidation. The first two options 
potentially allow for the rescue of a company or the business, whilst the latter two options do 
not. The second option, due to the concerns raised above has effectively been terminated as a 
choice, unless the charge was created before the 15th September 2003 or is covered by certain 
exceptions. The prevailing policy therefore represents the favoured way for dealing with a 
distressed company112. The circumstances cover a company that is facing severe cash-flow 
pressure but still has a good business model to preserve; in situations where it has been 
identified that there is a requirement to sell on the business of a technically insolvent 
company; and where the creditors are not willing to agree to an alternative course of action 
(such as restructuring) or agreement is not possible within a manageable timescale113.  
 
It follows that if administration is the tool to be used to rescue a company the role of the IPs 
becomes critical114. It became apparent that for these professionals to implement the 
necessary measures to help a company as a whole, an instrument was required to increase the 
chance of these rescues. To this end a “protective cloak” known as a moratorium, which 
comes into place when an administration commences is granted is absolutely crucial to the 
idea of rescue115. It is a shrewd device that prevents anyone presenting a petition to wind up 
                                                            
111 See generally P. Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the need for a Delicate 
Balancing Act’, International Company and Commercial Law Review, (2012), 61. 
112 See generally I. F. Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments - Changes to Administrative 
Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements - The Insolvency Act 2000, the White 
Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002, E.B.O.R., (2004), 120. S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The 
Enterprise Act 2002’, 67 Modern Law Review, (2004), 247. S. Rajani, The Enterprise Act 2002: Outline of 
Changes to Insolvency Law’, Insolvency Law and Practice, (2003), 160. 
113 See L. Conway, ‘Administration – Corporate Insolvency’, House of Commons, (15/12/08), 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snha-04915.pdf (accessed 11th May 
2011) 
114 See J. Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in regulatory Processes: The Example of UK Financial Service Regulation’, 
Public Law, (2003), 62. 
115 See s.895 of the Companies Act 2006 and Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) as provided for in Pt 1 
and Sch.A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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the company, prevents any creditor from enforcing security over the company’s property or 
to repossess good in the company’s possession under any sale or hire agreement, and no other 
proceedings, execution or legal process may be commenced or continued and no distress 
many be levied against the company or its property116. The moratorium is a clear example of 
how the policy makers have accepted that other interests should be considered, not just the 
creditors and that these other rights should be protected117. The fact remains that the window 
of opportunity to rescue a company is short and efficient methods need to be employed to 
enhance the likelihood of it occurring.  
 
As far as the outcome of administration there are a few options that are worth mentioning. If 
the company is to be rescued then it may: enter into a Company Voluntary Arrangement 
(CVA); a formal scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act; or an informal 
arrangement. Also administration could lead onto the company entering a Creditors’ 
Voluntary Liquidation (CVL), or being dissolved118. As it is to be seen the choice and 
alternatives offer wide scope, each with a very different objective. In some senses 
administration makes rescue a very appealing and credible option, whilst in others, as it will 
be seen in the next section, provides too much discretion to the IPs to conduct the affairs of 
the company as they please. This presents difficulties not only with concerns regarding the 
lack of accountability and transparency within corporate insolvency proceedings but also 
whether the actions sanctioned by the IP are within the boundaries of the law. The result of 
this, and the pressures faced by IPs to maintain value – both for creditors and in some 
respects prospective purchasers trying to restart a business - has partially led to a practice 
known as “pre-packed administration”. This will be discussed in Chapter Five, but there are 
serious concerns whether this can be endorsed as a legitimate option for rescuing a company 
and whether given the characteristics evident within its scope it can be correctly associated 
with rescue when placed within the legal template devised by policy makers in the UK. 
 
 
                                                            
116 See L. Conway, ‘Administration – Corporate Insolvency’, House of Commons, (15/12/08), 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snha-04915.pdf (accessed 11th May 
2011). 
117 See Insolvency Act 1986, paras 3(2), 49, 51-57) 
118 For a discussion on the importance of CVA in the post 2004 rescue culture brew see J. Tribe, ‘Company 
Voluntary Arrangements and Rescue: a New Hope and a Tudor Orthodoxy’, JBL, (2009), 454. For other options 
such as CVL see G. Todd, ‘Administration post Enterprise Act – what are the Options for Exits?’, Insolvency 
Intelligence, (2006), 17. 
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7. The Role of Directors in Corporate Rescue 
It is imperative to understand that whilst IPs administer insolvency procedures and are 
responsible in some respects for interpreting the legislation, the actions of a director 
determine the viability of any rescue attempt119. When a distressed company comes to the 
attention of an IP, the financial state of a company’s affairs is predominately reliant on the 
director’s behaviour after it is verified that the company is in trouble120. There are a number of 
provisions that govern and encourage directors to act in a certain way; either by providing 
professional support to aid the company in distress or insinuating that misbehaviour, which 
contributes to the woes of the company, can attract serious repercussions. If this delicate 
balance is not observed it will be detrimental to promoting an entrepreneurial environment 
where calculated risks are encouraged to increase the number of people starting up 
businesses121. In essence there is a continuous need to inject business growth into the 
economy, whilst at the same time ensuring that there are sufficient safeguards and regulations 
in place to protect creditors and provide a guarantee that an insolvent company is processed 
efficiently to limit the possible damage that it could inflict on the wider community. With an 
emphasis on early intervention and taking pre-emptive measures to avert potential danger122, 
the focus retains an element of acute business awareness with the ability to manage risk 
effectively123. But even if this diversification of risk was successfully negotiated, it is not 
feasible for some industries that must decide to either take further risk or perish124. It is within 
                                                            
119 The board of directors is responsible for forging, reviewing and overseeing the implementation of corporate 
strategy and risk policy. It is imperative that they have the skill and experience to meet the needs of the 
business. However, the recent global financial troubles have revealed a startling lack of management practices, 
defective due diligence and imprudent business judgment. In some cases no strategies to identify and effectively 
deal with risk, see G. Kirkpatrick, ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’, Financial 
Market Trends, (2009), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf (Accessed 12th October 2010)  
120 See R. Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 14. 
121 See generally G. Wilson, ‘Business, State and Community: Responsible Risk Takers, New Labour and the 
Governance of Corporate Business’, 27 Journal of Law and Society, (2000), 151, at 161.   
122 This represents a fundamental philosophical change, moving away form on ex post responses to corporate 
crises to influencing ways which corporate actors manage insolvency risks ex ante, see V. Finch, ‘Corporate 
Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal of Business Law, (2010), 502, 
at 506. 
123 By diversifying risks/interests it can be seen that each debt is only a reflection of a small rather than a large 
exposure with the impact of default felt only slightly, see C. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, structure and 
Operation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), at 3. However some commentators have argued that this idea is not 
sustainable on a general level; see F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, ‘Limited liability and the Corporation’, 
52 University of Chicago Law Review, (1985), 89, at 101. 
124 M. Whincop, ‘Taking the Corporate Contract More Seriously: The Economic Cases Against, and a 
Transaction Cost Rationale For, the Insolvent Trading Provisions’, 5 Griffith Law Review, (1996), at 23. 
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these fundamental decisions that directors are assessed and hence it is critical to investigate 
how they operate in these circumstances125.  
 
Whilst there is a stigma associated with failure, the law in the UK allows directors to 
restructure without generating too much negative publicity126. The understanding is that 
directors will not attract criticism or be subjected to any civil or criminal action, if the 
company were to end up in liquidation, if it can be substantiated that “they took every step 
with a view of minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors as...he ought to have 
taken”127. Exactly what this “every step” means requires further analysis. In terms of how 
influential directors can be on the potential success of any rescue proceedings, there is a 
general expectation that they should not only be able to identify any threats to the company’s 
well-being but also, if required, to take all the necessary  proactive steps to ensure that the 
correct professional help is sought at the earliest opportunity128. This is not to say that 
directors’ are prohibited from attempting to trade the company out of its difficulties; they 
must simply not endeavour to indulge in these actions to any degree if they had assessed the 
situation and concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company was going to 
avoid going into insolvency liquidation129. The difficulty with maintaining this position is that 
even if the director had acted in what would be generally described as diligent and in a 
manner that was consistent with what would be deemed as reasonable, this can only be 
determined by the court after they have deliberated over the actions taken in conjunction with 
                                                            
125 There has been growing public and media concern about directors' performance and the failure of systems of 
governance that rely on directors monitoring each other; See generally, A. Belcher, ‘What makes a Director Fit? 
An Analysis of the Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986’, Edinburgh 
Law Review, (2012). 
126 S. Parbery, ‘Loosen Rules to Save Firms’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), (8 August 2008), at 55. 
The standard expected from directors is expected to be a high one and the courts will no longer refrain from 
making imposing long periods of disqualification. The purpose of these proceedings is not penal, but to ensure 
that the public are protected against those directors of insolvent companies who have shown that they are a 
danger to creditors and others. See G. Lightman, ‘Attitudes and Values: Developments in Insolvency Law: Part 
1’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2001), 57, at 60. 
127 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 214(3). 
128 See J. Armour and S. Frisby’, Rethinking Receiverships’, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2001), at 94. 
However, despite the authors caution due to the lack of qualitative data on this issue The Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s specialised Lending Service Division which focuses on restructuring, rescue and intensive care claim 
that any at one time more than 1000 companies are in the unit’s care and they manage to turnaround 80% of 
businesses back to good health (Financial Times, 31 January 2005, 24) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/410a1b4e-
732f-11d9-86a0-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1NqCCm2n8 (accessed 30th May 2011). 
129 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 214(2)(b). Directors’ must also ensure that a company does not incur more credit 
when it was apparent that the distress was irreparable, see Re Austinsuite Furniture Ltd [1992] B.C.L.C. 1047; 
and Secretary of State v Tjolle [1998] 1 B.C.L.C., 333. 
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the threat posed to see whether the actions were sufficient130. This vagueness131 has caused 
considerable confusion and has caused frustration amongst directors.  They face growing 
concerns in trying to ascertain whether they are operating within the legal boundaries when 
they are trying to save the company, and determining when the correct time to ask for help 
is132. But it should be noted that those who continue to trade without seeking professional 
advice are at risk of being disqualified from acting as a director in the future133. Despite these 
concerns it must be said that whilst the existence of pure rescue is doubted, these principles 
along with some good luck have ensured that UK regime has partially delivered in providing 
a rescue model that fundamentally resembles rehabilitation. 
 
8. Summary 
Historically the corporate rescue policy in the UK has followed a CBT approach, which has 
developed to reflect more of a socio-economic stance. The UK could now be described as 
having a communitarian rescue model, which follows a traditionalist philosophy. The rescue 
idea has evolved from automatically liquidating distressed companies to focusing on the 
preservation of companies. The exact nature of rescue and what it should entail remains in 
dispute. Assistance on the matter can be found within Schedule B1, para 3(1) of the IA 1986, 
but questions are raised as to whether rescue should simply be reserved for the pure rescue of 
companies rather than the preservation of viable businesses. If this is the case then pure 
rescue as company rescue should be defined, is a very rare occurrence and as such would go 
some way in providing some justification to suggest that the idea of rescue is theoretical and 
severely lacks any real ability to be applied or have any practical application. The fact that 
many companies appear to be systematically selected for a rescue strategy only to be 
subjected to a laborious process that leads to liquidation provides further ammunition to 
imply that the notion of rescue is merely a temporary state that reveals its true identity as the 
new liquidation process. The eight principles aimed at promoting the integrity and 
effectiveness of a rescue model provide a steady framework where a proposed rescue model 
                                                            
130 It has also been referred to the ‘moment of truth’ test, see I. Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 4th edn, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), at 859. 
131 A. Keay and M. Murray, ‘Making Company Directors Liable: A Comparative Analysis of Wrongful Trading 
in the United Kingdom and Insolvent Trading in Australia’, 14 International Insolvency Review, (2005), 27, at 
45. 
132 However, there are some commentators who suggest that the test is too easily satisfied as all directors have to 
do to avoid liability is to show that there was some reasonable prospect of the company avoiding liquidation, see 
S. Sharples, ‘Directors Defence for Insolvent Trading Posed’, Lawyers Weekly (Sydney), 21 July 2009, at 6.  
133 Or liable to pay sums by reason of wrongful trading. For further reading see A. Keay, Company Directors’ 
Responsibilities to Creditors, (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
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can be quality checked on its substance and procedure to reveal whether it would be 
compatible with the cultural and economic aspects of the jurisdiction in question. Despite the 
changes contained within the Enterprise Act 2002, such as reiterating the importance on 
taking pre-emptive measures to tackle and counter financial distress, risk management even if 
monitored does not prevent the failure and it is only with the help from insolvency specialists 
that the extent of the situation can be determined. With a new emphasis on IPs to assess the 
situation and to consider the interests of the creditors as a whole,  it is now seen that 
collective proceedings is a deliberate move away from the individual pursuit of interests as 
was seen under receivership.  
 
The amendments in the EA intended to enhance the reputation of insolvency law, but many 
aspects of the old law remained. The actions of directors continue to heavily influence the 
outcome as to whether rescue would be ultimately successful as the extent of the financial 
distress largely depends upon how proactive the management have been in documenting and 
reporting the problems in addition to its ability to provide accurate and updated information 
when required by an IP. This, along with securing finance to aid a rescue attempt, particularly 
the ability to negotiate a debt-subordination scheme, proves critical and will not always be 
successful. Despite these concerns, the main factor that has contributed to the questioning of 
the existence and efficiency of rescue has been the involvement of the IPs and the wide 
discretion that they have been afforded under the relevant codes endorsed by respective 
regulatory bodies and the principles contained with the corporate insolvency legislation.  
 
The increasing difficulty in dealing with a distressed company in light of dire economic 
conditions has contributed to alternative corporate rescue routes being sought. Pre-packed 
administrations despite proving highly controversial seems to have found some acceptance 
within the market as its usage is on the increase. However, before this is explored the role of 
the IP and the duties that they have within a rescue strategy needs to be examined. 
 
Part II 
Insolvency Practitioners: Function, Conduct and Abuses 
1. Background 
The previous section dealt with the policies surrounding corporate rescue, and this section 
will examine the actors that are charged with carrying out insolvency proceedings, and, in 
particular, the corporate rescue process. These professionals, known as Insolvency 
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Practitioners’ (IPs) are the office-bearers in administration who have been assigned the duty 
to decide the best course of action in dealing with a distressed company134. It should be made 
clear that there is a definite distinction to be made between turnaround specialists and IPs 
with the former not being subject to any mandatory regime of training, experience or 
qualification and they do not have to comply with a system of accreditation135. The decision 
made by IPs in relation to the work that they implement can be multi-dimensional. They are 
influenced by a number of factors, including individual and team experience, technical 
knowledge, availability of accurate company audit reports in order to determine the extent of 
the distress, and what action would result in achieving the most beneficial outcome for the 
creditors as a whole136. Beside these personal attributes they are also under an obligation to 
adhere to the hierarchy of objectives set out in legislation for administration. The primary 
focus is on rescuing the company as a going concern, but achieving this is a delicate and 
problematic task given the nature of corporate rescue proceedings and it is inevitable that 
difficult decisions will have to be made, leaving some interested parties dissatisfied with the 
outcome137. It is often the case that unrealistic expectations are placed on the IP to deliver a 
better result than is possible. He or she must disregard any external influences and examine 
each case on its own individual merits, drawing on his or her, and that of his or her team’s 
experience to make sure that informed, financially sound decisions are made138.  
 
This section seeks to examine the role that IPs have played in corporate rescue and to 
demonstrate how they have steadily evolved corporate rescue proceedings into something 
that could be described as non-reflective of the policy values dictated in the previous section. 
It is submitted that a new mechanism has been developed, which is strictly not a corporate 
rescue procedure at all, but a solution adopted as a pragmatic response to address the needs of 
businesses in a weakened economy. This procedure commonly referred to as pre-packed 
                                                            
134 In corporate insolvency, IPs are invariably installed as agents of the company (for confirmation of this with 
regard to administrative receivers and administrators see for example Insolvency Act 1986 s. 44(1)(a) and 
Sch.B1 para 69). Significant modern authorities confirming this position in the case of receivers include Mills v 
Birchall [2008] EWCA Civ 385; [2008] B.C.C. 471. 
135 V. Finch, ‘Doctoring in the Shadows of Insolvency’, Journal of Business Law, (2005), 690, at 696. 
136 See S. Frith and S. Davies, ‘Clearing up the Mess: Applying the Basic Principles of insolvency Law – A 
Review of cases Decided in 2008 on the Theme of Administrations  - Part 1’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2009), 
117, at 117. 
137 But the extent of a decision being unfair, whether one or a class of creditors were satisfied would depend 
entirely on the circumstances. See Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd 
(In Administration) Chancery Division, [2010] EWHC 2013 (Ch), para 41. 
138 For example he must be able to provide valid reasons for his decisions, especially if the company cannot be 
rescued as a going concern or a better than winding up result cannot be achieved, see IA 1986 Sch.B1 para 
49(2)(b). See further V. Finch, ‘Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue’, 25 Legal Studies, (2005), 376. 
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administrations will be discussed in Chapter Five, where it will be argued that pre-packs 
signals the beginning of the end to the existence of corporate rescue in the UK. 
 
2. Function: Personal Attributes and Qualifications 
Prior to the introduction of the rescue culture, there was a level of distrust regarding the 
competence, suitability and effectiveness of liquidators and receivers139. The perception of 
these office holders by the general public was at an all time low and action designed to 
change these attitudes was drastically required140. The first step taken to address these 
concerns was to make it a necessity that IPs should be qualified141 and regulated to reflect 
modern practices142. It was essential that the UK’s corporate insolvency laws were 
overhauled as it became recognised that corporate rescue in the UK may have become 
something of a misnomer, as many companies that were rescued still ended up in 
liquidation143. What was required was a uniformed approach to corporate rescue that could 
hold IPs’ accountable for their actions as well as keeping them informed of best practice and 
developments within the field144.  
 
2.1. Membership: Accountants or Lawyers? 
The overall membership of the authorised IP club is very small, consisting primarily of a 
mixture of accountants and solicitors. Whilst both may take insolvency appointments, in 
reality accountants and the associated firms have a virtual monopoly on such matters145. This 
has had an important impact in the way in which corporate insolvency proceedings had 
developed at the beginning of the 20th century146, and it is worth briefly exploring how this 
has contributed to the current model that exist in the UK today. There has always been some 
stigma associated with insolvency related work, something which solicitors were already 
                                                            
139 Re Greycaine Ltd. [1946] Ch. 269 illustrates this well; a commission of 5% had been drawn by the receiver 
for no more than the receipt and cashing in a cheque for £500,000, in settlement of a war-damage claim.  
140 P. Arnold, C. Cooper and P. Sikka, ‘Insolvency, Market Professionalism and the Commodification of 
Professional Expertise’, (2003) at 7, see http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/critical/html2/8018arnold.html 
(accessed 11th June 2011). 
141 Cork Report, Part2, Chapter 15.  
142 IA 1986, part XIII. 
143 See A. Katz and M. Mumford, ‘Study of Administration Cases’. Report to the Insolvency Service, (October 
2006). 
144 See further V. Finch, ‘Controlling the Insolvency Professionals’, Insolvency Lawyer, (1999), 228. 
145 Around 40% of the UK’s insolvency practitioners operate from major accountancy firms and of these most 
are implicated in major audit failures and have been the subject of DTI inquiries, see P. Sikka and H. Willmott, 
‘Illuminating the State-Profession Relationship: Accountants Acting as Department of Trade and Industry 
Investigators’, 6(4) Critical Perspectives on Accounting, (1995), pp 341 – 369. 
146 C. Napier and C. Noke, ‘Accounting and law: A Historical Overview of an Uneasy Relationship’, in M. 
Bromwich and A. Hopwood, Accounting and the Law, edn, (London: Prentice Hall, 1992), at 34.  
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conscious of, given their ambivalent moral and social position147. Accountants on the other 
hand could not afford to turn down such an opportunity, given the slow growth of business 
despite the introduction of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. Despite this apparent 
reluctance, corporate failure provided a massive fillip to the businesses of some accountants 
and the related professional bodies148. It was not long before the majority of the fees billed by 
accountancy firms were from the fees they charged on these insolvency related cases149. This 
new found respect was partially through the acceptance that accountants were better placed 
and qualified than solicitors to deal with insolvency matters as they were “men of 
business”150 who apparently acted in the public interest151.  
 
Within this understanding it appears that IPs have assumed that his/her primary role as 
accountants is to analyse data, which involves the process of inspecting, cleaning, 
transforming, and modelling data with the goal of highlighting useful information, suggesting 
conclusions, and supporting decision making based on these findings. In other words 
statistical analysis becomes the overriding factor effectively relegating legal considerations to 
afterthought. This approach has had a fundamental impact in helping to shape the 
profession’s work ethics152. However, assessing exactly what should be expected from an IP 
should be approached with caution153. There seems to now be a growing reliance on the IP’s 
creative problem solving skills, and this is particularly evident where there is a regulatory 
void not addressed by legislation154. In cases where the legislation is clear, actions taken by 
an IP such as taking over the day-to-day control and management of the company, as well as 
the continuous task of formulating proposals to rescue the company should not be viewed in a 
negative way but seen as positive obligations designed to help distressed companies155. The 
                                                            
147 W. R. Prest, ‘Introduction’, in W. Prest, Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, edn, (London: 
Croom Holm, 1981). 
148 See P. Arnold, C. Cooper and P. Sikka, ‘Insolvency, Market Professionalism and the Commodification of 
Professional Expertise’, (2003) at 9-12, see http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/critical/html2/8018arnold.html 
(accessed 11th June 2011).  
149 See E. Jones, Accountancy and the British Economy 1840-1980: The Evolution of Ernst and Whinney, 
(London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1981). 
150 Certified Accountants’ Journal, ‘Are lawyers Business Men?’, Certified Accountants’ Journal, (1910), No37, 
105-107, at 105. 
151 W. N. Bubb, ‘The Accountant and the Community’, Accountancy, (1939), 456, at 456. 
152 See J. Flood and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research 
Project 43, (1995), at 6, whereby it is suggested that an IP’s role is dual purpose, with the majority accepting 
that their administrative role is secondary to their primary identification as accountants. 
153 Not all attempted rescues can be expected to succeed, see H. Anderson, ‘Insolvent Insolvencies’, 17(3) 
Insolvency Law and Practice, (2001), at 87. 
154 J. Flood and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research 
Project 43, (1995), at p iii. It is on this premise that pre-packs developed, see Chapter Five. 
155 For example see Insolvency Act 1986, s. 144. 
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intervention by IPs should be seen as not only necessary but a legal requirement to assess 
what has happened, the extent of the distress, whether any wrongdoing has been committed, 
and what can be done to rectify the identified issues. As such the mere presence of IPs should 
not indicate or prompt a reaction from creditors that a rescue strategy can be achieved; they 
are not miracle worker and there are countless documented interviews which suggest that the 
life of an IP is anything but an undemanding job156. That despite the very long hours that the 
work demands, often involving working closely with those affected, they are expected to 
detach themselves from the suffering of those associated with the company. But any notion 
portraying these professionals as irrational, illogical and distant from the “inner experience of 
people”157 is not a truthful account. Decisions involving the wider implications that will 
inevitably have an effect on businesses reliant on the core company and the workforce are 
issues that invariably weigh heavily on IPs’ shoulders and should be considered and not 
ignored even if they are eventually dismissed.  
 
With the responsibility to determine the fate of a company, there are questions raised 
regarding the suitability of these professionals to identify and deal with all of the issues that 
may be presented in a distressed company. Simply being an accountant who only bases 
conclusions on statistical data is no longer enough. Wider issues such as the ability to 
interpret legal provisions and possessing the necessary interpersonal skills to manage the 
affairs of all parties involved demonstrates the need for a high level of skill to be expected of 
the IP and this is demonstrated in the qualifications that are now required of people wanting 
to work in this profession158. 
 
2.2. Qualifications 
The critical qualification that an individual must pass before he/she can carry out any 
insolvency related work is the Joint Examination Insolvency Board (JIEB)159. The JIEB exam 
is a practical exam that tests the knowledge and skills that IPs will rely upon whilst 
                                                            
156 Several interviews with IPs reveals a world of sleepless nights, hard drinking and heart attacks, see J. Flood 
and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research Project 43, 
(London: ACCA, 1995) at 24-25. 
157 R. Hines, ‘Accounting: Filling the Negative Space’, 17 Accounting, Organisations and Society, (1992), at 
313. 
158 However the bulk of those who work within this field remain accountants, see generally see J. Flood and E. 
Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research Project 43, (London: 
ACCA, 1995) 
159 For more information see: http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/qualifying-as-an-insolvency-
practitioner (accessed 8th March 2011). 
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completing his or her work. Whilst the professional paper provides for a comprehensive 
knowledge of insolvency-related matters to be gained, the exam remains technical and there 
are concerns that IPs are not fully prepared for the intensity and the human dimension of the 
tasks ahead.   
 
Additionally it is important to note that the technical aspect of the qualifications should not 
be confused with the professional status that they enjoy as a result of his/her occupation160. 
An IP must not only pass the relevant qualifications, he/she must also be a member of one of 
the professional bodies. Therefore an IP is someone who is licensed and authorised to act in 
relation to an insolvent individual, partnership or company, and is regulated by one of the 
Recognised Professional Bodies (RPB) to ensure that he or she is, in a sense, supervised, and 
acts within the law161.  
 
2.3. An Overview of the Rescue Objectives 
Paragraph 3, Schedule B1162, provides that the objectives that an IP should consider in the 
performance of his/her functions. They are: 
 
 Company rescue (as a going concern) is primary.   
 
 If that is not possible (or if the second objective would clearly be better for the 
creditors as a whole), then the administrator should try to achieve a better result for 
the creditors than would be obtained through an immediate winding-up of the 
company 
 
 Only if neither of these objectives is possible should the administrator realise property 
to make a distribution to secured and/or preferential creditors. 
 
Collectively the changes made by the Enterprise Act 2002 represent a move towards 
embracing Cork’s vision of including early rescue efforts163, and a slight move towards 
                                                            
160 T. Jones, ‘Understanding Management Accountants: the rationality of Social Action’, Critical Perspectives 
in Accountancy, (1992), 225, at 230. 
161 There are seven bodies: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW); Insolvency 
Practitioners Association (IPA); Law Society of England & Wales; Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS); Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA); Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland (ICAI); Law Society of Scotland.  
162 Insolvency Act 1986. 
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Chapter 11 found in the US Bankruptcy Code164. Given the importance of these three 
objectives it is worth exploring them in greater detail to determine how the contents within 
each have been interpreted and what issues, if any, have arisen for each. 
 
2.3.1. Company Rescue: Paragraph 3(1) 
Of the three objectives the meaning behind ‘rescuing the company as a going concern’ 
demonstrates how technical the matter has become. In the process of deciphering this term 
comparisons can be made to the former s. 8(3)(a) which referred to “the survival of the 
company, and the whole or any part of its undertaking, as a going concern”165. It is 
understood that the wording employed in paragraph 3(1)(a) should be construed as having the 
same meaning as that of the former s. 8(3)(a) as interpreted in Re Rowbotham Baxter Ltd166. 
Support for this can also be found in para 647 of the DTI’s Explanatory Notes which 
indicates that the objective of rescuing the company as a going concern “is intended to mean 
the company and as much of its business”167. The threshold of what constitutes “much of its 
business” or what percentage is required to satisfy the test is not entirely clear168. Nor does 
the legislative text make the point of distinguishing company and business rescue; in fact it 
implies that an element of both must be present169. It does however explicitly acknowledge 
that when a company survives intact, but with no subsisting going concern undertaking, this 
would not fall within the scope of para 3(1)(a) since, in line with para 649 of the DTI’s 
Explanatory Notes, a proposal resulting in nothing more than a “shell” company does not 
constitute rescue170. Such an outcome would more than likely fall within the ambit of para 
3(1)(b)171.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
163 Cork Report, para 198. 
164 Chapter 11 is the relevant chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code which provides for reorganisation under the 
bankruptcy legal regime of the US. 
165 Re Rowbotham Baxter Ltd [1990] BCC 113, at 115E-F. 
166 Re Rowbotham Baxter Ltd [1990] BCC 113, at 115E-F. 
167 See L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, (Jordans: Bristol, 2007), at 
622. 
168 However, when considering the prospects of achievement of any of the sub-purposes contained with the three 
objectives it will be critical to provide evidence for the court to assess, mere assertions are insufficient for 
substantiating any claims. See for example Doltable ltd v Lexi Holdings Plc [2005] EWHC 1804 (Ch); [2006] 1 
BCLC 384. 
169 See generally para 3(1)(a)-(c). 
170 L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, (Jordans: Bristol, 2007), at 
623. 
171 For further notes see L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, (Jordans: 
Bristol, 2007), at 621-624 
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Assessing the distinction between company and business rescue is a fine one, but should 
nevertheless be appreciated. The rescue of the company itself will be a rare occurrence. In 
most cases the process is designed to highlight aspects of the company that are not operating 
efficiently. When a distressed company is investigated it will be inevitable that some part of 
the company, hopefully not all, will be discarded to permit the company to attempt to 
continue as a going concern. This streamlining exercise is more associated with business 
rescue, not necessarily rescue as intended by schedule B1, para 3(1), but more reflective of a 
restructuring process.  
 
2.3.2. Better result or the Last Resort: Paragraph 3(1)(b) and Paragraph 3(1)(c) 
This amended sub-paragraph encapsulates the previous duty on IPs whereby the receiver 
primarily owed duties to the appointing charge holder. The effect of para 3(1)(b) and 3(2) is 
that an administrator must perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors 
(i.e. unsecured, secured and preferential creditors) as a whole172. Amongst the creditors he is 
required to perform his functions with the interests of unsecured creditors weighing equally 
with those of preferential and secured creditors. This is a significant step and one by which 
the new legislation has substantially altered the IP’s position as it was (and remains) under 
the general law governing receivership. The new provision makes it compulsory for the 
administrator to consider objectives 3(1)(a) and (b) in all cases, even where the level of 
secured indebtedness exceeds the value of secured assets.  
 
Given the conflict between the interests of secured and unsecured creditors generally where a 
company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts it remains a concern whether in “the 
interests of the company’s creditors as a whole”, in the context of administration, is sufficient 
in itself in providing a workable basis for disgruntled unsecured creditors. The most obvious 
method to mount a challenge would be under para 74, to question the actions or proposed 
conduct of an administrator, and in particular one appointed by a floating charge holder 
whose appointee appears disinclined to pursue either of the objectives in para 3(1)(a) and (b) 
without justification173.   
                                                            
172 Subject to sub-paragraph (4), which provides the administrator the scope to act as he wishes as long as he 
does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors of the company as a whole.  
173 Despite the fact that administration is seen as attractive, see D. Milman, ‘Judicial Reflections in the 
Administrative Process: a 2010 Perspective’, 2 Co. L.N., (2010), 283; it appears that the liberal regime of the EA 
has promoted a tendency to embrace administration as “an exit route from over indebtedness” without any 
correlational entrepreneurial effort, see P. Cranston, ‘Fearful Silence’, 24(2) Insolv. Int., (2011), 32. This 
highlights concerns that the process is still open to abuse, see P. Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: 
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Whilst the IP does not have to provide in great detail his/her intentions he/she is required 
under, r2.33(2)(m) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 to compile a statement of proposals under 
para 49(1) containing a statement of how it is envisaged the purpose of administration will be 
achieved whilst, more specifically, para 49(2)(b) required an explanation to be included 
within the statement as to why the administrator thinks that the objective in para 3(1)(a) or (b) 
cannot be achieved. Support for this can be found in the DTI’s Explanatory Notes from paras 
650 and 651, which envisages the IP reporting to creditors and explaining why the 
achievement of any particular objective was not reasonably practicable174. 
 
Balancing interests and ensuring that the sub-purposes are reasonably practicable to achieve 
that objective are decisions that should be supported by evidence. Ascertaining whether a 
purpose is reasonably practicable will depend on whether the objective can be achieved. If it 
is capable of being achieved, but not reasonable to do so as the impact on the creditors in 
terms of time and costs required to achieve that end then it is incapable of being classed as a 
justifiable course of action175. Whilst in most cases it will be obvious as to what objectives 
can be reasonably achieved, the administrator, to ensure that they increase the number of 
options left available, must perform his or her functions as quickly and efficiently as is 
reasonably practicable176. Primary concerns that need to be considered are: to prevent any 
further reduction of the funds payable to creditors on liquidation; to ensure that the business 
remained intact so it can continue to operate; or to identify and sell off parts of the business at 
a reasonable rate to ensure that the creditors receive a better payment than if it was liquidated 
immediately. The extent that IPs should contemplate the general consequences of the 
insolvency proceedings in the wider community is a matter that is contested. Nevertheless, 
there is a growing consensus that despite the wording of para 3(2) that provides the 
requirement of the administrator to perform his or her functions in the interests of the 
company’s creditors as a whole, socio-economic implications are essential and should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Realities and the Need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, International Company and Commercial Law Review, 
(2012), at 61, 62. 
174 See L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, (Jordans: Bristol, 2007), at 
625. 
175 See generally, L. Doyle and A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, (Jordans: 
Bristol, 2007), at 626. 
176 See the time constricting provisions contained in paras 76 and 77, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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considered even if it appears that this is often regarded as optional and can be disregarded in 
the face of reimbursing creditors177.  
 
Whether this approach sits well with the other statutory obligations is not entirely convincing, 
since the ripple effects of an insolvent company can be felt beyond its premises, and affect, 
especially, the local economy that is reliant on the business it generates. But it must be 
accepted that by securing capital at the expense of these social implications, whilst it may be 
detrimental in one instance, may contribute in general to the revenues, and jobs in other 
companies. It will be seen that the distribution of this available capital by the IP has had a 
profound effect in shaping the way in which insolvency legislation has developed.  
 
Essentially creditors will have competing interests. Just considering the creditors for one 
moment, on the one hand there is the creditor wishing to protect and secure his interest, 
whilst on the other hand there is the creditor wishing to realise her interest. In most cases the 
two cannot function together, and this has had the effect of transforming the law itself178. As 
previously stated in Chapter Two the language and tests that have been adopted to determine 
insolvency are the critical factors that need to be assessed. From determining when a 
company is distressed, the point when a company is insolvent, to the questions surrounding 
whether a company can continue to trade are not easy to define. This responsibility is placed 
into the hands of an IP who should assess each case on its individual merits. However, it is 
more than likely that the assessment will follow a trend, which will confirm a picture of self-
contained practices developed by a common approach179. This supports moves to further 
regulate the profession as new challenges have emerged raising questions regarding the 
assumed objectivity, competence and independence of the IP180. 
 
 
 
                                                            
177 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), at 191, where it is said that “Even before 
it begins to put explicit political pressure and demands upon government, capital enjoys a position of indirect 
control over public affairs”. 
178 B. G. Carruthers and T. C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in 
England and the United States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998). 
179 P. Arnold, C. Cooper and P. Sikka, ‘Insolvency, Market Professionalism and the Commodification of 
Professional Expertise’, (2003) at 6, see http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/critical/html2/8018arnold.html 
(accessed 11th June 2011). 
180 V. Finch, ‘Insolvency Practitioners: The Avenues of Accountability’, 8 Journal of Business Law, (2012), 
645. 
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2.4. Monitoring 
Before the extent of the discretion afforded to IPs is explored it is worth reviewing the 
measures that are in place to monitor the actions that they may take whilst in office. There is 
a considerable lack of research surrounding the work that is carried out by IPs. This is not 
through the want of trying.  Rather the restrictions are due to the current requirements placed 
on IPs to record the decisions made. This has not been further helped by the fact that 
sometimes practitioners may provide a different answer in practice than is dictated by 
theory181. There are obstacles to pursuing a closer examination of IP’s conduct, undoubtedly 
secrecy182 that surrounds much of his/her work. This has invariably led to questions being 
raised concerning the fairness, transparency and general compliance with the legislation and 
relevant regulations183.  
 
The willingness to self-regulate is supported by the profession, demonstrated by the action to 
reject the need for an independent ombudsman to investigate and sanction disciplinary action 
or fines in relation to complaints that are substantiated184. The RPBs want to privately deal 
with the complaint and decide themselves what action should be taken, if any. How exactly 
these complaints are to be investigated is not covered by any set procedural guidelines; they 
are not required to respond to complaints within a specified timeframe, nor publicly provide a 
list of the complaints that they have received and how they were dealt with185. It should also 
be noted that whilst IPs have the right to appeal against a decision of a disciplinary action, the 
complainant has no such right. This enhances the perception that the regulating bodies are 
seen to protect their own interests against any possible threat which may bring the profession 
into disrepute, or lead to a campaign to change the law, which ultimately may risk an 
overhaul of the practice186.  
 
                                                            
181 B. G. Carruthers and T. C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in 
England and the United States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
182 B. Singleton-Green, ‘Rare Glimpses of Secretive Creatures’, Accountancy, (March 2001), at 18. 
183 There remains limited research regarding post 2002 regime in terms of performance levels regarding 
transparency, accountability or access, something which is required in the near future to fully determine the 
success of the procedure as well as assessing the outcomes it produces. See V. Finch, ‘Corporate rescue 
Processes: the Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, JBL, (2010), 502, at 516. 
184 Insolvency Regulation Working Party, 1997, 1999. 
185 J. Cousins, A. Mitchell, P. Sikka, C. Cooper and P. Arnold, ‘Insolvent Abuse: Regulating the Insolvency 
Industry’, Basildon: Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs, (2000). 
186 P. Arnold, C. Cooper and P. Sikka, ‘Insolvency, Market Professionalism and the Commodification of 
Professional Expertise’, (2003), at 7, see http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/critical/html2/8018arnold.html 
(accessed 11th June 2011).; See also Lathia v Dronsfield (1987) BCLC 321 shows that at best insolvency 
practitioners owe a “duty of care” to the party appointing them i.e. a bank or secured creditor. 
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Some change however was inevitable given the socio-economic fallout of failed companies 
spiralling out of control in the early 1970s which led to mass unemployment. This 
demonstrated that something had to be done with the UK’s outdated insolvency system187. 
The government’s answer was to apply a private sector solution to “problems” like 
insolvency188.  This had important consequences on the regulation of IPs, no longer 
undertaken by the Official Receivers and the Insolvency Service housed in the Department 
for Trade and Industry (DTI), but by the respective RPB of IPs, independent of the 
government189. This move was aimed at reforming the procedural inadequacies by making 
the process more accountable and transparent but additional regulations such as the Code of 
Ethics were deemed equally necessary to ensure that all IPs met certain professional 
requirements190.  
 
It is evident that the regulatory texts are intended to act as guidelines as a breach of these 
rules by the IP does not automatically give rise to disciplinary action, nor does it have the 
force of law to lead to any penalty191. In essence as long as the IPs’ actions can be broadly 
justified, they may perform his/her functions as they see fit192.  
 
3. Opportunity and Professional Fees 
Corporate failure is viewed as a business opportunity for accountancy firms; this forms part 
of its business plan and will contribute to the expansion, reputation and profit success of any 
firm. It would seem that results are not particularly as important as securing the business, and 
so they are content with accepting the likelihood that not all attempted rescues can be 
expected to succeed193. The way in which success is measured within accountancy firms had 
                                                            
187 K. Cork & H. Barty-King, Cork on Cork, (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
188 T. C. Halliday & B. G. Carruthers, ‘The Moral Regulation of Markets: Professions, Privatization and the 
English Insolvency Act 1986’, 21(4) Accounting, Organisations and Society, (1996), pp. 371-413. 
189 The DTI now has a regulatory role. 
190 Insolvency legislation has increasingly become all about checks and balances, ensuring that main issues are 
properly addressed. See J. McQueen, ‘Insolvency Law Reform – a Second Chance’, Journal of International 
Banking Law, (2002), 85, at 87. 
191 S. Frisby, ‘Balancing Interests in Administration: Contributions from the Courts and the Coalface’, 24(4) 
B.J.I.B. & F.L. (2009) 198, at 198. However see Statement of Insolvency Practice 16--Pre-Packaged Sales in 
Administrations (2008), http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/insolvency-regulations-and-
standards/statements-of-insolvency-practice-sips-england  (Accessed 4th July 2012). 
192 Justification for their actions is merely a front as in reality there is no opportunity for creditors to claim an 
independent assessment of the insolvency practitioner's actions, see P. Walton, ‘Pre-packin' in the UK’, 18 Int. 
Insolv. Rev. (2009), 85, at 92. 
193 This outcome can be further enhanced in situations where the administrators do not have the support of an 
appointing debenture-holder, see H. Anderson, ‘Insolvent Insolvencies’, 17(3) Insolvency Law and Practice, 
(2001), 87, at 87. 
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contributed to the way in which corporate rescues are approached. Like most firms they are 
audited, assessed and rated according to their performance. The success of firms is measured 
by a number of factors, including: fees generated, profits, market share and the emphasis is 
“very firmly on being commercial and on performing services for the customer rather than on 
being public spirited”194. This creates a conflict of interest. The social well-being of the 
community and state and the benefit of creditors will be secondary to the maximisation of 
personal gain, as commercially driven targets set by the actors charged with administering the 
insolvency services takes charge195. Whilst there is no doubt that administration will 
generally be a more expensive option for the company than liquidation, the IP must consider 
all possibilities196. Nevertheless, it is submitted that some businesses may be subject to rescue 
proceedings, not because this is the most viable option for the company, but rather it is more 
profitable for accountancy firms than liquidation.  
 
Choosing options based on how profitable they may be is a delicate issue that has not 
received much attention. The reason for this is partially due to the IPs exercising discretion, 
but mainly because of the reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with an IP’s decision197. The 
courts, with a number of exceptions including concerns regarding professional fees, prefer to 
leave insolvency related issues for the IPs to decide198. The courts consider these 
professionals to be properly placed to use their commercial awareness to deal with distressed 
businesses199. This reliance does raise questions as to whether this presumption is misplaced 
and office holders do sometimes act in bad faith. However, establishing this is another matter 
as almost all actions can be justified, and it is only with hindsight and extensive evidence, 
that often does not exist, that a decision can be recognised as erroneous.  
 
Examples that have highlighted serious concerns are few and far between but perhaps the 
most notable case was the collapse of the Maxwell empire where the subsequent report by the 
                                                            
194 G. Hanlon, The Commercialisation of Accountancy, (London: Macmillian, 1994), at 150. 
195 G. Hanlon, The Commercialisation of Accountancy, (London: Macmillian, 1994), at 150. 
196 J. Flood and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research 
Project 43, (1995), at 3. 
197 R. Parry, Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at 102. 
198 In the 1998 Ferris Report on the Remuneration of Office Holders and Certain Related Matters, Judge Ferris 
decided not to force liquidators and their lawyers to fix their fees in advance as a percentage of assets recovered. 
Instead he recommended that "value achieved" by the liquidators should be rewarded, rather than just the time 
recorded. He also recognised that the courts should have regard to several factors including time spent, the 
complexity of the case, the effectiveness of performance and the value and nature of the property dealt with. 
199 The exception tends to be where is it evident that the administrator has erred in law or are notably unfair to 
one or more creditors, see Re CE King Ltd [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 297. 
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Social Security Select Committee, chaired by Frank Field M.P. raised serious concerns about 
the way in which a number of accountancy and legal firms had performed in sorting out the 
affairs of the Maxwell Group’s shareholders, creditors and pensioners, making particular 
reference to the cost of the process and the slow rate of progress200. However, despite the 
criticism, especially in overstating the size of the recoveries to increase the professional fees, 
the RPB, which in this case was the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA), found that no 
wrongdoing had been done to warrant disciplinary action201. It has previously been 
mentioned that a breach does not necessarily mean that any disciplinary action will be taken. 
Notwithstanding this the issue of fees remains a sensitive issue and the courts have no option 
but to investigate such matters as to whether any action should be taken202. That said, this has 
not done anything to restore the confidence or reputation of an already distained insolvency 
system where the conduct of IPs is often frowned upon203. 
 
But the courts should refrain from making their own observations and judgement about what 
the law should be; if the legislation is deficient then it is for Parliament to change it and not 
for the courts to feel inclined to adopt the IP’s preconceptions204. As the law stands, priority 
is given to IPs to secure their expenses before the creditors are paid, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise in the terms of their contract. This process is a development taken from the rules 
that govern liquidation. Despite this, the press is perhaps responsible for conjuring up the 
image of “fat cat professionals”, labelling IPs’ fees as “obscene”205, but the profession will 
suggest that this does not reflect the majority of cases206. In fact what the IPs imply happens 
                                                            
200 See Social Security Committee (UK, Social Security Committee, 1993), at 7. See generally G. Lightman, 
‘Office holder’s Charges – Cost Control and Transparency’, Insolvency Intelligence, (1998), 1, at 3. 
201 Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell and Others [1998] BCC 343, see Mr Justice Ferris. 
202 Following Mawell the Statement of Insolvency Practice 9 was revised in 2002. This was then followed by the 
2004 Practice Statement of Chief Registrar Baister on The Fixing and Approval of the Remuneration of 
Appointees [2004] B.C.C. 912, the provisions of which are now reproduced in Pt Five of the 2012 Practice 
Direction: Insolvency Proceedings (reported in [2012] B.C.C. 265). The importance of adherence to this 
standard was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Brook v Reed [2011] EWCA Civ 331; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 419; 
[2011] B.C.C. 423. Further pro transparency measures were enacted through the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 
2005 (SI 2005/512). When applying these rules the courts do recognise that particularly difficult cases may be 
more expensive to resolve - see for example Re Super Aguri F1 Ltd [2011] B.C.C. 452. 
203 “The success of any insolvency system … is very largely dependent upon those who administer it. If they do 
not have the confidence and respect, not only of the courts and of creditors and debtors, but also of the general 
public, then complaints will multiply and, if remedial action is not taken, the system will fall into disrepute and 
disuse”, Cork Report, para 732. 
204 D. Milman, ‘Judicial Reflections on the Administration Process: a 2010 Perspective’, Company Law 
Newsletter, (2010), at 4. 
205  A. H. Christer, ‘The King’s New Clothes: An Operational Researcher’s look at Corporate Insolvency’, 
Inaugural Lecture, University of Salford, (1992), at 29. 
206 Cork Cully, ‘Insolvency Practitioners’ Fees in Perspective’, Phoenix, (1992), 15:6. 
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is that they justify what has been done, and why so many hours are charged,207 giving a true 
picture of the task and the extent of the work carried out, and charging accordingly.  
 
In some instances a rescue attempt may be nothing more than the reaction of over-cautious 
specialists choosing to demonstrate that they have considered the alternative to liquidation 
and in turn avoid any potential legal action against them if it turns out in hindsight that it was 
the wrong decision to have been made. The initiation of rescue may be a needless expense, 
but the fear of making the wrong decision should not be a reason for acting in a particular 
way as even a company ripe for rescue may afterwards find that it has to be liquidated208. 
Quite simply, making the right decision is difficult, but there will always be an expectation 
by creditors that the most informed decision will be made.  
 
4. Discretion and Secrecy 
As already stated there appears to have been a decisive move away from liquidation, to 
considering rehabilitation. Partially responsible for this was the Enterprise Act 2002, which 
removed the option for floating charge holders to appoint an administrative receiver209. The 
shift in direction has meant more emphasis placed on averting the dangers of financial 
distress and with it a new opportunity for IPs to interpret the law210. Fundamentally, the Act 
made it a duty for the IP to consider the interests of the creditors as a whole, but exactly how 
they are to achieve this and to what extent is within the IP’s discretion211. This discretion as 
noted above operates under a veil of secrecy and as such it has attracted calls to make the 
decision making process more transparent and open212. As they are under no direct obligation 
to provide a full report on what they find, questions are raised regarding the fairness of how 
these administrations are implemented213.  
                                                            
207 J. Flood and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research 
Project 43, (1995), at 23. 
208 S. Mallinson, ‘Banking on a Better Service’, Accountancy Age, (10 April 2000), at 18. 
209 Applicable only to holders of a floating charge created after 15th September 2003. 
210 It has also been described as a shift from “pathology” to “preventive medicine”, see L. Hornan, ‘The 
Changing Face of Insolvency Practice’, International Accountant, (March, 2005), 24, at 24. 
211 The Enterprise Act 2002, with departing from administrative receivership has changed the focus from serving 
one interest – the bank, to multiple interests – the creditors. This balancing exercise is a difficult task, which has 
developed the role of the IP from technician to mediator, see V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 
68(5) Modern Law Review, (2005), 713, at 735.  
212 Particularly if a pre-pack strategy is being proposed. For a discussion regarding the concerns that creditors 
have in not being informed see http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/PressPublications/16SIP  
(Accessed 11th June 2011). 
213 If however the administrator requires guidance as to whether their proposed course is permissible as a matter 
of law, he may apply for an application for directions where a declaration of the legal position is required. See 
Re Lewis’s of Leicester Ltd [1995] B.C.C. 514; Re T & D Industries Plc [2000] 1 W.L.R. 646. 
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It is however possible to imply that this is already in the process of being achieved through 
this “new voice” that creditors – secured and unsecured alike - have been given in which they 
can dictate to the IP what they want, and the IP must not only listen, but give heed to the 
interests when deciding strategy214. It has created a commercially driven relationship whereby 
the client seeks a service providers’ expertise to find the best solution in the circumstances. 
The transition of the IPs role has gone from being a funeral director, eagerly giving out 
liquidations to being a fire fighter, doing what he or she can to save the company215.  
 
Despite the wide discretion, the parameter of this power needs to be put into perspective. It 
must be made clear that an IP inherits the problems of the company and whilst he/she may 
not be initially responsible, they can become liable if the issues remain outstanding after the 
administration ends. However, this predicament is not clear-cut and depends entirely upon 
what protection the IP has afforded themselves, whether that is under legislation, and, or 
supported by the terms of his/her employment contact216. If there are financial liabilities 
outstanding at the point of discharge then this will take priority over any floating charge217. 
The issue surrounding super-priority218 ranking has continued to cause much debate, with 
some suggesting that the IP has room for discretion and if needs be can include all the prior 
payments and future ones that would eventually fall within the scope of the statutory 
discharge219. This useful option provides a safeguard for IPs who wish to protect themselves 
against any future liabilities. Whether they should be afforded such a sweeping right at the 
expense of other interested parties remains contested; and also it remains a concern that they 
have been invested with the judgment to settle any liability as they see fit, with possible self-
serving factors influencing decisions.  
 
4.1. Availability of Information 
Determining how decisions are made will usually mean assessing a vast array of information. 
A single corporate rescue procedure can involve a complex web of multiple transactions 
occurring at the same time. This may involve interacting with a number of other legal 
systems; locating a centre of main interests to establish who has the right to commence 
                                                            
214 Ibid. 
215 The increased awareness of the rescue culture has placed a new emphasis on IPs to avert disaster, see L. 
Hornan, ‘The Changing Face of Insolvency Practice’, International Accountant, (March 2005), 24, at 24. 
216 PAYE is a contractual liability for these purposes: IRC v Lawrence and Anor [2001] 1 BCLC 204 (CA). 
217 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 44 (1). 
218 See Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394 (HL). 
219 Powdrill v Watson [1994] ICR 395 (CA) 
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primary proceedings; determining the price of assets, intellectual property, stock; working out 
the terms of a lease; whether the company owned any land, buildings; and dealing with issues 
surrounding the work force – potential redundancies, settling wages and perhaps most 
critically prevent any theft which would prove detrimental to the overall realisation of funds.  
 
Having accurate, updated information is therefore critical given the intensity of corporate 
rescue. Occasionally, whether it is oversight or selling, the assets may be sold at a loss, which 
brings the process into question, especially the legality, policy and ethics of the IP220. For 
now the IP is often able to rebut accusations of misconduct by controlling the flow of 
information and justifying his/her decision based on the interpretation of the available data. 
Whilst he/she may have a number of options to chose from: liquidation, administration, and 
voluntary arrangements, the selection process is entirely reliant on the value that is placed on 
the data at the time of the IP making that decision. This value is inevitably provided 
according to what the IP decides and it is a mechanism that allows some flexibility at least by 
offering three possible outcomes – liquidation, dissolution or rescue. The IP should not feel 
restricted with the available options, but equipped with the tools to do the job.  
 
4.2. Management Displacement  
Whatever the option taken, the IP has the full power to trade, dismantle businesses and make 
decisions on company affairs in the pursuit of his/her ends221. It is from the preceding context 
of possible abuse of administration that a “manager-displacing insolvency regime” seems 
justifiable and it should be noted that this concept is not peculiar to the UK222. The old law 
governing Germany223 and the current Australian law project stricter views on the matter, 
portraying the idea of leaving existing management in charge of an ailing business is like 
                                                            
220 It is interesting to note that the expectations on IP’s are consistent with the values of professionalism, see D. 
Milman, ‘Governance, Stewardship and the Insolvency Practitioner’, Company law Newsletter, (2012), 1, at 2. 
The premise for this finds support in Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch. 86; [1999] B.C.C. 771 when the Court of 
Appeal held that Receivers owe a duty not merely to act in good faith but also to take reasonable care. This has 
been confirmed in McAteer v Lismore [2012] NI Ch 7 where it was held by Deeny J. that trustees in bankruptcy 
owe a duty to take reasonable care to obtain the best possible price in realising assets included in the estate.  
221 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 14 and Sch. B1. 
222 P. Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, 
International Company and Commercial Law Review, (2012), at 61, 63. 
223 Prior to the recent changes German law dictated that all proceedings begin as a liquidation but can be 
converted with organisation proceedings. See G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue - an Anglo-
American Evaluation’, 56(3) I.C.L.Q. (2007), 523. For an overview on how the German law has changed see F. 
B. Herding, ‘Germany is on the Move: the New Insolvency Law Survives its First Test’, 6(3) Corporate Rescue 
and Insolvency, (2013), at 95-98.; F. Tschentscher, ‘The Modern German Insolvency Regime: Process, Reform, 
Financing and Creditor Ranking’, 10(3) International Corporate Rescue, (2013), at 167-171. 
127 
 
“leaving the fox in charge of a henhouse”224 As the IP effectively replaces the management of 
the company as the prime decision maker there are concerns regarding the suitability and the 
level of quality control in place to ensure that the IP can fairly and efficiently deal with the 
affairs of a distressed company225. However, in most situations an IP rarely has the chance to 
exercise any management skills, in the real sense of the word, as the “ship has sailed” by the 
time they are appointed226. It is likely that the available options will be restricted by the 
actions of the managers227; in particular the task will be made much harder from the loss of 
the valuable experience and knowledge that the existing management had to offer. It is for 
this reason that the action of displacing management has contributed to the stunted growth of 
a rescue culture as external personnel have to instigate its own conclusions, some of which 
might not be so obvious from cold print228. It is therefore often recommended that the 
directors should be left in place so the administrator can rely on their advice. If this does not 
occur, given the amount of time that is often required to determine the true financial position 
of the company it is frequently the case that the course of direction that the IPs must take the 
company has already been determined long before they were appointed. 
 
With this in mind, it could be said that a more accurate description of what occurs is not 
management replacement but an insertion of professional insolvency crisis management229; 
the difference being the former involves an almost passive take over where the IP aims to 
salvage a position other than liquidation, with the latter referring to a more proactive 
involvement that is geared towards assessing the extent of the failure and determining what 
would be the most effective solution. Nevertheless, it is apparent that most of the provisions 
that govern IPs focus on the exercise of his/her powers as opposed to the performance of their 
duties230. Although results have important repercussions for the local economy, welfare and 
of course the creditors, the validity of the eventual outcome would be nothing without being 
implemented in accordance with a set of principles that brings respect to the process.  
                                                            
224 G. McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue’, 56(3) I.C.L.Q. (2007), 523, at 524. 
225 The duties are not too dissimilar to that of a director as he is able to ‘step into the shoes of the board and 
bring actions on behalf of the company’, see A. Keay, ‘Office-holders and the Duty of Directors to Promote the 
Success of the Company’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2010), 129, at 130. 
226 S. Frith and S. Davies, ‘Clearing up the Mess: Applying the Basic Principle of Insolvency Law – A Review 
of Cases Decided in 2008 on the Theme of Administrators – Part 1’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2009), 117, at 
117. 
227 This is taken to mean the board of directors’ who previously controlled the company.  
228 P. Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, 
International Company and Commercial Law Review, (2012), at 61, 63. 
229 See V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 68 Modern Law Review, (2005), 713. 
230 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 14 (5). See generally H. Anderson, ‘Insolvent Insolvencies’, 17(3) Insolvency Law 
and Practice, (2001). 
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4.3. Protection 
It is suggested that the IP, in order to fully exercise his/her powers, must be afforded some 
protection and one way to achieve this was to make sure that he/she would not be personally 
liable on any contract entered into or adopted231, unless of course this was an explicit term of 
the contract. There has however been literature to suggest that the role of the IP is not that 
different from a director of a company, but traditionally it has only been the latter that has 
been held personally liable in tort, not the former232. It would seem that the difference in 
treatment is a conscious policy decision by the government and the judiciary to maintain 
confidence in the market and to allow the IP to do the job to the best of his/her ability without 
the fear of making difficult decisions, which could make them prone to civil action.  
 
4.4. Professional Conduct 
It was intended that the legislation enacted in the UK would promote a level of 
professionalism233 at a time when mass privatisation234 was occurring. Within this 
environment however there were real concerns regarding the level of corruption and abuse 
within insolvency proceedings235. To address this matter a way was devised to monitor the 
conduct of IPs, and as mentioned above the RPBs collectively agreed that the best way 
forward was to produce a standard set of rules and obligations across the profession that 
governed the way in which insolvency proceedings are implemented. One such way to 
achieve this goal was to introduce a number of codes and regulations that the members of the 
regulatory body had to follow. One such code was the Ethical Code. This has been revised 
over the years with each refreshed version slightly clarifying rather than modifying the 
existing guidance236. Within the Code there are a number of principles and safeguards that 
must be upheld and maintained; this responsibility does not just rest on the IP, but they must 
                                                            
231 Gregory v Wallace [1998] IRLR 387 (CA). 
232 Williams and Anor v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. and Anor [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL); C Evans and Sons 
ltd v Spritebrand Ltd. and Anor [1985] BCLC 105 (CA).  
233 P. Arnold, C. Cooper and P. Sikka, ‘Insolvency, Market Professionalism and the Commodification of 
Professional Expertise’, (2003), at 19. 
234 Particularly under the Thatcher government in the 1980’s. 
235 T. C. Halliday & B. G. Carruthers, ‘The Moral Regulation of Markets: Professions, Privatization and the 
English Insolvency Act 1986’, 21(4) Accounting, Organisations and Society, (1996), at 371; B. G. Carruthers 
and T. C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United 
States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
236 The Insolvency Ethical Guide was adopted in 2004, and was altered in 2006 to align the ethical principles in 
line with a model adopted by the International Federation of Accounting Bodies (The IFAC Code). It was 
subsequently agreed that the Insolvency Ethical Guide should be reviewed and redrafted to align it more closely 
to the IFAC Code. A draft Code was produced in 2007 by the Joint Insolvency Committee (The JIC) and after 
various meetings a substantially revised draft of the Code was produced, which brings us to the current 2008 
Code of Ethics.  
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ensure that others in the team are also working within the set parameters. The Code is not 
intended to be exhaustive; invariably there will be circumstances not covered by the Code 
and so the emphasis must be on the spirit of the Code rather than the actual wording237. 
Understanding the importance attached to the Code of Ethics238 will contribute to a greater 
understanding of how this regulation has given IPs the flexibility to conduct their duties in a 
fashion best suited to their own personal needs, which does not necessarily mean following a 
corporate rescue model recognised in the UK. 
 
5. The Code of Ethics 
The Code specifies five fundamental principles that govern the conduct of an IP: integrity, 
objectivity, professional competence and care, confidentiality and professional conduct. 
These principles are not extensive, but are intended to offer general guidance and reassurance 
that the work undertaken is done so with the highest standards and professionalism239. For a 
more specific area like rescue proceedings it is necessary to consider additional principles 
and values that should be fostered. The previous chapter covered these aspects in detail and it 
is something that will be discussed in the next chapter in relation to efficiency, but for ease of 
exposition it is best to reiterate here. Collectively, it is understood that the substantive aims of 
rescue are: rescuing viable companies (what this thesis construes as pure rescue); preserving 
businesses that are viable even if the company is not (what this thesis construes as 
rehabilitation and therefore not strictly rescue); protecting the rights of creditors and 
employment and balancing interests fairly (socio-economic interest). It is also accepted that 
the procedure should be carried out by IPs with reference to a number of key virtues, such as: 
openness, transparency and accountability, procedural fairness and the basing of decisions on 
sound evidence and not mere assertions240. In addition to these virtues, further assistance can 
be drawn from government papers, which shed light onto the key aims of corporate rescue. It 
is when these papers are viewed together with existing legislation that an overall list of 
objectives can be determined. For the purposes of this section the Insolvency Service’s 2009 
                                                            
237 Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics: Background and Overview’, (November 
2008), para 8.  
238 Insolvency Practitioners’ Association, Ethics Code for Members (London: IPA, November 2008). IPs 
authorised by the Secretary of State are, however, subject to the separate Guidance to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics (London: Insolvency Service, undated). 
239 It is often assumed that the Code of Ethics lacks teeth, but this is a misconception. The insolvency Service 
publishes an Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation detailing the sanctions visited against errant 
office-holders. See D. Milman, ‘Governance, Stewardship and the Insolvency Practitioner’, Company law 
Newsletter, (2012), 1, at 2. 
240 See The Insolvency Code of Ethics, November 2008; see also V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: The 
Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal of Business Law, (2010), 502, at 511. 
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consultation, Encouraging Company Rescue241, the Enterprise Act 2002 and the House of 
Commons Business and Enterprise Committee242 in 2009 will be used. The list is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but aims to provide an overview. The objectives that can be 
derived are243: 
 
 Making the United Kingdom the best place in the world to start a business; 
 Making the United Kingdom the best place in the world to grow a business; 
 Supporting viable companies when they struggle; 
 Promoting the rescue of viable businesses; 
 Preserving jobs and livelihoods; 
 Producing an international competitive insolvency regime; 
 Balancing debtor and creditor interests fairly (in procedures and outcomes); 
 Balancing different creditors’ interests fairly (in procedures and outcomes); 
 Producing rescue processes that are transparent and free from abuse244; 
 Making insolvency proceedings collective and inclusive245; 
 Maximising the economic value that is rescued from troubled companies, and  
providing better returns for creditors; 
 Balancing help for distressed companies with the wider effect of the rescue regime on 
lending for all companies, troubled or not; 
 Protecting against the systemic risk that corporate failures will produce ‘knock-on’ 
failures that, inter alia, reduce economic performance and tax revenues246; 
 Ensuring that public confidence in the UK insolvency regime and the reputations of 
its practitioners; 
 Minimising the transaction costs that are incurred in rescue processes; 
 Making rescue processes as speedy as feasible; 
                                                            
241 Insolvency Service, ‘Encouraging Company Rescue’, (London: 2009). 
242 House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, The Insolvency Service – Sixth Report of Session 
2008-2009, (2009), HC 198, at 11. 
243 See V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal of 
Business Law, (2010), 502, at 511, 512. 
244 See also the Insolvency Service, Report on the First Six Months Operation of Statement of Insolvency 
Practice 16 (IS, 2009); In March 2010 the Government announced it would consult on a range of new measures 
to boost the confidence in pre-packs: see further R. Install, ‘Pre-Packaged Administration: Misguided or 
Misunderstood?’, 99 Corporate Rescue & Insolvency, (2010). 
245 Proceedings in which all creditors participate, under which a duty is owed to all creditors and in which all 
creditors may look to an office holder for an account of his dealings’, see White Paper, Productivity and 
Enterprise (2001), discussed in S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime’, 67 M.L.R, (2004), 247, at 250. 
246 See Insolvency Service, Impact Assessment of Encouraging Company Rescue, (London: 2009) 
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 Preserving market confidence by promoting enforcement of the rules governing 
insolvency and rescue. 
 
The list provides a daunting insight into the responsibility that has been placed on IPs. Instead 
of analysing each objective individually the five fundamental principles contained within the 
Code of Ethics will be used as benchmarks to categorise the list. It is hoped that this approach 
will not only keep this section concise, but also draw attention to how the principles and 
objectives when combined together dictate not only how an IP should act, but also highlight 
the extent of their power. In essence, the question will be asked: do the Code of Ethics and 
the related legislation prevent the IP from abusing his power to pursue his own interests? 
 
6. Fundamental Principles  
In reference to the five key principles that exist within the guidelines produced by the RPBs, 
an Insolvency Practitioner is required to comply with the following fundamental 
principles247:  
 
(a) Integrity  
An Insolvency Practitioner should be straightforward and honest in all professional and 
business relationships.  
 
The correct usage of the integrity concept creates some conflicts as to its exact meaning. At 
best it is ambiguous; left open to the opinion of the IP to infer what is “straightforward and 
honest” which does not always correspond with the expectations of interested parties. There 
is tremendous difficulty in being able to fully assess the manner in which IPs undertake their 
duties. Without simply assuming, and irrationally suggesting ways in which IPs could have 
abused their power, specific empirical research to understand how the integrity principle is 
interpreted within the profession is necessary and in this case goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
 
(b) Objectivity  
An Insolvency Practitioner should not allow bias, conflict of interest or undue influence of 
others to override professional or business judgements.  
                                                            
247 An example of the principles can be obtained from the Insolvency Practitioners Association 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/page.aspx?pageID=221 (accessed 22nd February 2011). 
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It is questionable whether any professional can be free from influence. It would seem that an 
element of bias will always be evident, whether this is in reference to a professional 
judgement or not. Determining the method in which the IPs process key decisions is a 
difficult task given the lack of co-operation and the optional requirement to complete full 
detailed reports. Further ambiguity is raised attempting to decipher what amounts to a 
professional or business judgement? What actually constitutes a judgement? How could these 
judgements stand up to scrutiny? Compliance with the relevant legislation and regulations 
would mean that the technical element could be satisfied with relative ease, but rarely can 
companies be investigated with conclusions drawn from cold facts without having at least 
some consideration for the implications that it will have on the workforce and people who 
rely on that company for their livelihood. It will also be evident in some cases that invested 
interests from powerful creditors (large investment from financial institutions such as banks) 
and IPs safeguarding their personal interests (with perhaps the interests of its accountancy 
firm also in mind) will dictate the course of action to be taken with the distressed company.  
 
(c) Professional Competence and Due Care  
An Insolvency Practitioner has a continuing duty to maintain professional knowledge and 
skill at the level required to ensure that a client or employer receives competent professional 
service based on current developments in practice, legislation and techniques. An Insolvency 
Practitioner should act diligently and in accordance with applicable technical and 
professional standards when providing professional services.  
 
A distinction should be drawn between professional knowledge and how a particular business 
operates. Not all businesses can be treated in the same manner and specialist knowledge will 
be required to determine whether it is possible that the company can be rescued. An IP will 
be required to consider all options, which would include the sale of unique assets. However, 
an IP and his or her team do not have unlimited resources and knowledge, and do not have 
the luxury to investigate in leisure, given the fact that most of the work will be conducted 
within a limited time frame248. Acting in a professional manner with the emphasis on 
courtesy will satisfy customer care and relations, but will do nothing in the pursuit of 
rescuing companies. Logically, professional services need to be correctly applied to ensure 
                                                            
248 J. Flood and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: Research 
Project 43, (1995), at 25. 
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the correct measures are taken. But there is rarely a check up by any regulating body, 
partially because of the way the complaints have to be made, substantiated and self funded, 
and in some way because the whole process is carried out behind a veil of secrecy249. As part 
of exerting his/her professional competence, it will be necessary prior to accepting an 
insolvency appointment that the IP should ensure that he/she is satisfied that a number of 
matters have been thoroughly investigated. It is expected that this must involve:  
 
 Obtaining knowledge and understanding of the entity, its owners, managers and those 
responsible for its governance and business activities. 
 Acquiring an appropriate understanding of the nature of the entity’s business, the 
complexity of its operations, the specific requirements of the engagement and the 
purpose, nature and scope of the work performed. 
 Acquiring knowledge of relevant industries or subject matter. 
 Possessing or obtaining experience with relevant regulatory or reporting requirements. 
 Assigning sufficient staff with the necessary competencies to jobs. 
 Using experts where necessary. 
 Complying with quality control policies and procedures designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that specific engagements are accepted only when they can be 
preformed competently250.  
 
The general list ensures that an IP is fully prepared for the task ahead and is in a position to 
clearly state whether he/she is competent enough to conduct the role. This section is probably 
intended to act as a safeguard to protect the IP against possible liabilities that may arise from 
falling short of fulfilling what was necessary, and what should have been done for the 
distressed company. Possible incompetence arising out of such a case also affords interested 
parties some protection as well, but it is unclear given the way IPs are regulated how a bad 
example of professional conduct would ever publicly materialise. 
 
 
 
                                                            
249 B. Singleton-Green, ‘Rare Glimpses of Secretive Creatures’, Accountancy, (March 2001), at 18. 
250 See ICAEW website, Code of Ethics for Insolvency Practitioners, 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner, at 400.37, 
(accessed 17th March 2011). 
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(d) Confidentiality  
An Insolvency Practitioner should respect the confidentiality of information acquired as a 
result of professional and business relationships and should not disclose any such 
information to third parties without proper and specific authority unless there is a legal or 
professional right or duty to disclose. Confidential information acquired as a result of 
professional and business relationships should not be used for the personal advantage of the 
Insolvency Practitioner or third parties.  
 
In relation to confidentiality, the IPA has provided a document designed to be read in 
conjunction with the Code251. It provides an invaluable insight into the way the 
confidentiality principle should be interpreted. It must be stressed that in the light of any 
conflict between the contents of the Code and the supplementary document, the Code will 
prevail. The document goes into great detail explaining the importance of the role that 
confidentiality and transparency plays within the actions of the IP. Para 36 of the Code 
provides that an IP in his/her role as an office holder:  
 
…has a professional duty to report openly to those with an interest in the outcome of the 
insolvency. An Insolvency Practitioner should always report on his acts and dealings as fully 
as possible given the circumstances of the case, in a way that is transparent and 
understandable. An Insolvency Practitioner should bear in mind the expectations of others 
and what a reasonable and informed third party would consider appropriate.252  
 
The provision is central to the duties that are carried out by the IP, insofar that it promotes the 
other fundamental principles without conflicting with any legal or professional obligation. It 
should be the case that their actions are able to be readily determined and if necessary 
transparent to the extent that they may be subject to scrutiny253. Having the decisions of IPs 
readily available ensures that the actions have been fair and that third parties are being dealt 
with in an appropriate manner. This may seem elementary, but it is far from perfect. The 
                                                            
251 Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics, Transparency and Confidentiality: A 
Guidance Note’, 4th November 2008, (accessed 10th January 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Transparency%20Final.pdf  
252 Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics, Transparency and Confidentiality: A 
Guidance Note’, 4th November 2008, (accessed 10th January 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Transparency%20Final.pdf  
253 Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics, Transparency and Confidentiality: A 
Guidance Note’, 4th November 2008, (accessed 10th January 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Transparency%20Final.pdf, para 5. 
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main problem, as will be identified in the next section, is the issue of information having been 
communicated effectively254, or alternatively, critical information being kept from certain 
interested parties. It creates real problems because it affects the flow of information that 
allows actors to act effectively in the outcome of insolvency i.e. make informed decisions 
based on accurate, updated information. The only way that the interested parties can do this is 
to rely on the reports prepared by the IPs who in turn should make sure that the findings are 
not only clear and understandable255, but also that where appropriate a full explanation is 
given for any of the key decisions made and the reason for them.  
 
It will be appreciated that what qualifies as appropriate circumstances is to the discretion of 
the IP.256 This discretion exercised is very rarely challenged and even if it was, despite the 
number of safeguards in place257, it could be readily justifiable on the grounds that it was in 
the commercial interests of the company or more than likely the business. This certainly is 
the case when an approval is sought, for instance in relation to the IP’s fees, but in these cases 
the IP must be particularly mindful of providing sufficient evidence to allow those 
responsible for the approval to form a judgement as to whether the approval is appropriate 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case258. Whilst this creates some duty on the IP 
to provide certain information, IPs are, nevertheless, in control as to what information is 
disclosed and to what extent that information is used. Whether this position is tenable is a 
moot point but it should be noted that the principle of transparency, as emphasised by the 
guidance note,259 stresses the importance of wider disclosure, in particular where the assets 
and business of an insolvent company are sold shortly after appointment on pre-agreed terms.  
 
Naturally creditors in conforming to the above will wish to be kept informed of what is 
occurring by way of detailed reports along with justifications as to why certain decisions 
were made and whether the actions of the IP were the best options for the creditors as a 
                                                            
254 Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics, Transparency and Confidentiality: A 
Guidance Note’, 4th November 2008, (accessed 10th January 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Transparency%20Final.pdf, para 6. 
255 Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics, Transparency and Confidentiality: A 
Guidance Note’, 4th November 2008, (accessed 10th January 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Transparency%20Final.pdf, para 7. 
256 Remarkable discretion is given, or not accounted for by the IA 1986 to IPs in their roles as charges d’affaires 
of businesses, see J. Flood and E. Skordaki, ‘Insolvency Practitioners and Big Corporate Insolvencies’, ACCA: 
Research Project 43, (1995), at 6. 
257 The safeguards in place will be examined later on in this section. 
258 Re Williams and Anor v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. and Anor [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL); C Evans and 
Sons ltd v Spritebrand Ltd. and Anor [1985] BCLC 105 (CA), para 8. 
259 C Evans and Sons ltd v Spritebrand Ltd. and Anor [1985] BCLC 105 (CA), para 9. 
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whole260. Whether the explanations and justifications will satisfy all concerned parties is 
another matter. It is something that has caused problems in the past as it is not easy to extract 
relevant information and this is of course dependent on whether that information exists in the 
first place. The lack of available information covering corporate rescue strategies remains 
controversial especially when decisions have been made that concern selling parts of the 
business or company at what is considered by some creditors to be at either an unreasonable 
discounted price, or simply the wrong strategy decision to have been made. Exactly what 
amounts to a good justification or a full report is difficult to say. One would suggest that it 
must simply be compiled in such a way as to satisfy the aforementioned principles, but even 
with this in mind there is still wide discretion. This is helpful in situations where it may not 
be possible to provide certain information relating to a particular matter because of a 
conflicting legal or professional obligation. It must be remembered that whilst the IP is privy 
to confidential material, some aspects may not be intended to become public knowledge 
especially if it is commercially sensitive and the distribution of that information could be 
detrimental to the well-being of that company. There are legal obligations still to be followed 
despite the financial predicament the company may be facing; it is a question of balancing 
interests and ensuring that no one party is unfairly treated in the course of a corporate rescue 
attempt.  
 
Returning to the guidance, paragraph 4 states that the fundamental principle of confidentiality 
requires that:  
 
An Insolvency Practitioner should respect the confidentiality of information acquired as a 
result of professional and business relationships and should not disclose any such information 
to third parties without proper and specific authority unless there is a legal or professional 
right or duty to disclose. Confidential information acquired as a result of professional and 
business relationships should not be used for the personal advantage of the Insolvency 
Practitioner or third parties.  
 
Substantiating any misconduct, in particular holding an IP liable for a breach of confidence it 
must be shown that: (1) the material communicated to him had the necessary quality of 
confidence; (2) it was communicated or became known to him in circumstances entailing an 
                                                            
260 The position is likely to be based on a subjective review of the facts. If a creditor has been compensated to an 
agreeable degree then it is unrealistic to assume that he will care about the fortune of others.  
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obligation of confidence; and (3) there was an unauthorised use of that material. The 
guidance provided is stern, but has every reason to be. What amounts to confidential material 
has briefly been discussed, but it is not always conclusive, nor is the controlling of the flow 
of that sensitive information. For material to be protected as confidential its availability to the 
public must be restricted. It also follows that occasionally it is a possibility that sensitive 
information could inadvertently be disclosed and this is something that the IP must be aware 
of. As previously stated, whilst an IP has to perform his duties in compliance with the 
principles, the Code is not impregnable and occasionally some pieces of information may go 
astray. It is also true that any sensitive information that an IP may come across, cannot be 
used for his or her benefit other than in the course of performing professional duties. There 
has been some concerns raised about the confidential principle existing as a duty for IPs – is 
it not the case that IPs should disclose all information and that they should not act as gate 
keepers? Whilst this was the view of previous Insolvency Codes, most notable by the fact that 
they omitted the confidentiality principle261, opinion has gradually changed and now provides 
that the above it is no longer viewed as inconsistent with an IP’s duty, which one has to 
suspect, is the correct way to proceed.  
 
(e) Professional Behaviour  
An Insolvency Practitioner should comply with relevant laws and regulations and should 
avoid any action that discredits the profession. Insolvency Practitioners should conduct 
themselves with courtesy and consideration towards all with whom they come into contact 
when performing their work.  
 
A professional’s reputation secures contracts as well as earning recognition within a field; it 
will be therefore be of no surprise that a principle ensuring that this is maintained is contained 
within most professions charters. In regard to IPs, whilst the IFAC Code262 did not cover this 
principle, it was covered by the Insolvency Ethical Guide, and was considered important 
enough to remain unchanged in the transition between the Guide and the Code. The difficulty 
with this principle is that it is not the actions and breaches being committed outside of the 
                                                            
261 The fundamental principle of confidentiality did not appear in the Insolvency Ethical Guide as there were 
some concerns that the inclusion of this fundamental principle may be inconsistent with an IPs duty or 
obligation, in certain circumstances to disclose confidential material. However this was dismissed by the JIC as 
the principle makes it clear that where an IP has a legal or professional right to disclose he may do so. See 
Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics: Background and Overview’, (November 
2008), para 12. 
262 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. 
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Code that is causing unwanted attention and bringing discredit to the profession, but it is the 
fact that the Code is been followed and it allows IPs to act in this way. The actions of an IP 
during the course of a corporate rescue attempt will be under much scrutiny; his/her decision 
will decide the fate of many. For an IP to conclude the procedure with a substantial fee for 
his/her services, consequently rendering the payment that the creditors will receive as 
nominal is a “bitter pill to swallow”. Whilst there is little dispute that the IPs are complying 
with the relevant legislation and regulations, the Code can be manipulated to the advantage of 
IPs and the chance of appeal against the actions is at best minimal. The question that remains 
is not can a complaint be made about the conduct of an IP, but how likely is it that a breach 
will be found and disciplinary action taken against the IP? 
 
7. The Complaint Procedure 
As already stated every IP is a member of one of the RPBs. The bodies are authorised by the 
Secretary of State to issue insolvency licences and regulate IPs. It has been agreed that the 
RPB which issued the insolvency license will deal with that particular complaint that arises 
about his/her conduct. The licence is issued to individuals and not companies, and so if a 
complaint arises about the conduct of a team member under the supervision of the IP then 
he/she will be responsible. Whilst not all RPBs have the same procedure to deal with 
complaints, it is safe to say that they all follow a similar procedure. It is interesting to note 
that one of the RPBs, the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA), states that a large 
proportion of complaints that they receive are due to a breakdown in communication between 
the IP and the interested party263. It is suggested that before bringing a complaint to one of the 
RPB, that the interested party tries to resolve the issue with the IP, whether that be directly or 
within an internal complaints capacity with the firm that he/she works for. In essence it is 
emphasised that complaints should be mediated and early proactive steps should be taken to 
resolve any outstanding issues. If this is not possible then the relevant RPB will become 
involved. The extent of the RPBs involvement and the authority that they have is something 
that deserves more attention.  
 
The RPB has one primary role: to investigate whether a complaint has grounds and if so 
decide whether any disciplinary action is required against a member. The nature of the work 
                                                            
263 See Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Making a complaint against an Insolvency Practitioner: Licensed 
by the Insolvency Practitioners Association’, (June 2010), (accessed 22nd February 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Technical/June%202010%20complaints%20leaflet.pdf  
139 
 
undertaken by the IP deals with a number of conflicting interests and it is important to stress 
that the RPB will not intervene with disputes that are of a commercial or legal nature. This 
important exception allows IPs in corporate rescue proceedings to rely on this as a way to 
justify their actions and prevent any possible disciplinary action arising from their respective 
RPB. In regards to complaints arising from commercial disputes, these are the responsibility 
of the courts. However, the courts are reluctant to intervene in such matters and prefer to 
leave such decisions in the hands of the IP who they consider to be better placed, given that 
they are equipped with the knowledge and expertise to make those decisions264. Processing a 
complaint through the RPB should not be seen as a substitute for taking action through the 
courts; the two bodies remain distinct and it is clear that the RPB powers are limited in 
comparison. For instance a RPB cannot compel an IP to alter, amend or reverse an action he 
considers is correct. The proper means for controlling, replacing or challenging the actions of 
the IP rests in accordance with the provisions set out in the Insolvency Act 1986. In regards 
to the level of the IPs fees, the RPBs have no power to intervene unless it is in regard to a 
dispute arising over the incorrect approval procedure that has been followed. This therefore 
leaves interested parties relying on the Insolvency Act and asking the courts to reduce the 
fees, which they consider to be excessive.  
 
In respect of a case of negligence being made against an IP it is made clear that not all errors 
committed by an IP result in disciplinary action. If an interested party wishes to pursue this 
course of action it is a case for the IP’s indemnity insurers, not for the RPBs to assess an 
appropriate level of award265. Where the RPBs can take action is if the dispute arises from 
non-complying with a statute, Statements of Insolvency Practice and the individual RPBs 
Ethics code. Such breaches are factual and need no real assessment making it an easy task for 
                                                            
264 Very often when the exercise of powers is challenged in court the office-holder can seek solace in the 
Wednesbury test (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 K.B. 223). The courts 
traditionally have been disinclined to intervene with a matter of professional judgement unless Wednesbury 
unreasonableness is established. But in Bramston v Haut [2012] EWHC 1279 (Ch) Arnold J. made it clear that 
the Wednesbury test is now viewed as a flexible standard and that each case does turn on its own individual 
facts. See also See D. Milman, ‘Governance, Stewardship and the Insolvency Practitioner’, Company law 
Newsletter, (2012), 1, at 3. 
265 The RPBs are keen to stress that interested parties should consider seeking independent professional advice 
before exercising any recourse to the Court of before bringing a negligence claim. Proving such a case can be 
extremely difficult, expensive and sometimes an imprudent rash reaction to the circumstances.   
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the RPBs to determine whether disciplinary action is required266; the more challenging 
aspects are reserved for the courts267.  
 
8. Threats to the Fundamental Principles 
Before looking at the judiciary it is worth exploring an aspect of the Code that should avert 
any threat to the fundamental principles. This section has taken a framework approach, which 
is a method adopted by the IPs to identity actual or potential threats, evaluate such threats and 
to appropriately respond to such threats. The Code provides a number of scenarios when a 
threat may occur, but it does not intend to provide a comprehensive list. It is interesting to 
note that an IP must not only take reasonable steps to identify the existence of any threats to 
the fundamental principles, but should also look to see whether any threats existed prior to 
the IP’s appointment. The threats may fall into one or more of five categories: 
 
(1) Self-interest threats: which may occur as a result of the financial or other interests of a 
practice or an IP or a close or immediate family member of an individual within the 
practice; 
(a) An individual within a practice having an interest in a creditor or potential creditor 
with a claim, which requires subjective adjudication. 
(b) Concern about the possibility of damaging a business relationship. 
(c) Concerns about potential future employment. 
(2) Self-review threats: which may occur when a previous judgment made by an individual 
within the practice needs to be re-evaluated by the IP; 
(a) The acceptance of an insolvency appointment in respect of an entity where an 
individual within the practice has recently been employed by or seconded to that 
entity. 
                                                            
266 If the Committee decides that there is no prima facie case made out against the IP that brings the matter to an 
end and the complaint will be closed.  
267 Is it time to revisit the Cork Committee's idea of establishing an Insolvency Ombudsman (Cmnd 8558, para 
1772). The profession appears to be in two minds on such a move and, in fairness, there is little to suggest that 
the current system is failing, but public perceptions do matter. The Office of Fair Trading report (The Market for 
Corporate Insolvency Practitioners) (OFT 1245, June 2010) favoured moves in this direction with the setting up 
of an independent complaints body (see paras 1.26-1.29), but it is clear as a result of the Insolvency Service’s 
Consultation on reforms to the Regulation of Insolvency Practitioners, published on December 20, 2011 (at pp. 
7-9), that there is a lack of consensus on the form and financing of the independent complaints mechanism. See 
D. Milman, ‘Governance, Stewardship and the Insolvency Practitioner’, Company Law Newsletter, (2012), 1 at 
4. 
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(b) An insolvency practitioner or the practice has carried out professional work of any 
description, including sequential insolvency appointments, for that entity. These 
threats may diminish over time.  
(3) Advocacy threats: which may occur when an individual within the practice promotes a 
position or opinion to the point that subsequently objectivity may be compromised; 
(a) Acting in an advisory capacity for a creditor of an entity 
(b) Acting as an advocate for a client in litigation or dispute with an entity. 
(4) Familiarity threats: which may occur when, because of a close relationship, an individual 
within the practice becomes too sympathetic or antagonistic to the interests of others; and 
(a) An individual within the practice having a close relationship with any individual 
having a financial interest in the insolvent entity. 
(b) An individual within the practice having a close relationship with a potential 
purchaser of an insolvent’s assets and/or business268.  
(5) Intimidation threats: which may occur when an IP may be deterred from acting 
objectively by threats, actual or perceived.  
 (a) The threat of dismissal or replacement being used to: 
(i) Apply pressure not to follow regulations, this Code, or other applicable code, 
technical or professional standards 
(ii) Exert influence over an insolvency appointment where the Insolvency 
Practitioner is an employee rather than a principal in practice. 
 (b) Being threatened with litigation. 
     (c) The threat of a complaint being made to the IP’s authorising body. 
 
Having identified and evaluated threats to the fundamental principles an IP should consider 
whether there are any safeguards available that could reduce the threat to an acceptable level. 
The relevant safeguards will vary depending on the circumstances. Generally safeguards fall 
into two categories; the first covers safeguards created by the profession, legislation or 
regulation, and the second covers safeguards in the work environment. The safeguards in 
place were hoped to encouraged a proactive attitude - complying with the fundamental 
principles, legislation and policies, and ensuring that responsibility and transparency is 
achieved in the implementation of the IP’s work. It would perhaps be more accurate to 
                                                            
268 In this regard a close relationship includes both professional and personal; see Code of Ethics for Insolvency 
Practitioners, http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-
practitioner, at 400.42, (accessed 22nd March 2011). 
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describe the safeguards as offering professional protection for IPs, but they can, if they 
require, use their discretion to discard this. This has had the effect of deviating from the 
formal corporate rescue model in the UK to applying an improvised informal model like pre-
packs that fits more comfortably with the IP’s agenda. Although the Code tries to ensure that 
the fundamental principles are complied with, there is only an obligation to follow the 
guidelines and act in the spirit of the Code. On this basis an IP can control the company and 
justify almost any decision on the basis that it made more commercial sense than the 
alternatives. Subject to substantiating a claim against an IP it will also be seen that enforcing 
action through the RPB or the court is a troublesome affair.  
 
8.1. Safeguards 
To counteract these concerns there are some possible safeguards that could be adopted, which 
include: 
a) Leadership that stresses the importance of compliance with the fundamental principles. 
b) Policies and procedures to implement and monitor quality control of engagements. 
c) Documented policies regarding the identification of threats to compliance with the 
fundamental principles, the evaluation of the significance of these threats and the 
identification and the application of safeguards to eliminate or reduce the threats, other than 
those that are trivial, to an acceptable level.  
d) Documented internal policies and procedures requiring compliance with the fundamental 
principles. 
e) Policies and procedures to consider the fundamental principles of this Code before the 
acceptance of an insolvency appointment. 
f) Policies and procedures regarding the identification of interests or relationships between 
individuals within the practice and third parties. 
g) Policies and procedures to prohibit individuals who are not members of the insolvency 
team from inappropriately influencing the outcome of an insolvency appointment. 
h) Timely communication of practice’s policies and procedures, including any changes to 
them, to all individuals within the practice, and appropriate training and education on such 
policies and procedures.  
i) Designating a member of senior management to be responsible for overseeing the adequate 
functioning of the safeguarding system. 
j) A disciplinary mechanism to promote compliance with policies and procedures. 
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k) Published policies and procedures to encourage and empower individuals within the 
practice to communicate to senior levels within the practice and/ or the Insolvency 
Practitioner and issue relating to compliance with the fundamental principles that concerns 
them269.  
 
In all cases the IP will need to exercise his/her judgment to determine how best to deal with 
an identified threat270. In determining this threat an IP should consider what a reasonable and 
informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information, including the significance 
of the threat and the safeguards applied, would conclude to be acceptable271. Determining 
what is acceptable involves IPs using their discretion and an awareness that threats may 
appear as the work developments. Whilst there should be quality control policies and 
procedures in place to deal with new issues as they arise, in some circumstances the only 
available option will be to follow the wishes of the creditors who after full disclosure has 
been given, have the right to decide whether to retain or replace him or her272. In essence the 
task is twofold. Firstly, whether the threat can be eradicated; and secondly, can a threat be at 
least reduced to an acceptable level? If the answer to the latter is no, then an IP will have to 
conclude that it is not appropriate to accept an insolvency appointment. This in theory should 
ensure that no conflicts arise and a rescue procedure can be carried out, free from influence 
and not in showing preference to any individual, unless that happens to be the creditors as a 
whole. 
 
9. Judicial Intervention  
It is now worth returning to the role of the courts. Failure to abide by the provisions set out 
above can lead to the judiciary intervening to rectify any misdemeanours that the IP has been 
alleged to have committed. Whilst this right is very rarely used, it is nevertheless a tool that 
                                                            
269 See ICAEW website, Code of Ethics for Insolvency Practitioners, 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner, at 400.25, 
(accessed 22nd March 2011). 
270 Ibid See ICAEW website, Code of Ethics for Insolvency Practitioners, 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner, at 400.30, 
(accessed 22nd March 2011). 
271 See ICAEW website, Code of Ethics for Insolvency Practitioners, 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner, at 400.25, 
(accessed 22nd March 2011). 
272 See ICAEW website, Code of Ethics for Insolvency Practitioners, 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner, at 400.29, 
(accessed 22nd March 2011). 
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can be used by a company’s creditors or members alleging unfair harm273. The problem with 
intervention is that proving misconduct, or that a certain action implemented by the IP was 
unfair is exceptionally difficult as most decisions will appear to be based on commercial 
judgement, something which the judiciary has openly admitted that IPs are better placed to 
make than judges274. It will also be noted that that the judiciary is reluctant to tell IPs how to 
do their job, choosing to rely on the wide measure of latitude given by the legislature to 
conduct the day-to-day management of the administration275. Having said that, the court will 
not shun exercising, where necessary its wide discretion to order the removal of an 
administrator276 even if this is not a matter of misconduct on the part of the administrator277.  
It is paramount to maintain the confidence in an administration process especially when 
rescue proceedings are being initiated; as such the court has a duty to aid the smooth running 
of the procedure and where possible enhance the success of corporate rescue where 
possible278. This has however created some disparities, particularly in cases where the 
procedure adopted endorses principles that are not recognised within the UK’s corporate 
rescue model. The development of the pre-packs culture will be something that will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Five, but suffice to mention that the controversial topic 
of IP’s expenses has had a bearing on the type and the way in which corporate rescue 
proceedings are conducted. 
 
10. Summary 
Insolvency practitioners are no longer simply the practitioners, but the architects of corporate 
rescue. Whilst it is commendable that IPs have used their experience and knowledge to create 
a pragmatic solution to help distressed, yet viable companies, there is a trend occurring which 
                                                            
273 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para 74. 
274 Re Zegna III Holdings Inc. [2009] EWHC 2994 (Ch). 
275 See Re Lehman Bros International (Europe); Four Private Investment Funds v Lomas [2008] EWHC 2869 
(Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 632. 
276 See Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, para 88, but it must be stressed that cause has to be shown. In addition the 
IP may wish to resign, which is governed by s. 87, Insolvency Act 1986. This can only be achieved if it is done 
in compliance with the giving of notice in writing in the circumstances prescribed in para 87(2). If the reasons 
for resignation fall outside of the scope mention in s.87 then the administrator may apply for permission from 
the court, see r.2.119(2). It should however be noted that the IP cannot simply resign from his position because 
he does not wish to continue in office; reasons must relate to a valid reason, see S. A. Frieze, ‘Resignation and 
removal of an Office Holder’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2010), 157, at 157. 
277 Clydesdale Financial Services v Smailes [2009] EWHC 1745 (Ch) [2009] B.C.C. 810; see also D. Milman, 
‘Judicial Reflections on the Administration Process: a 2010 Perspective’, Company Law Newsletter, (2010), at 
4. 
278 The Court will foremost ensure to avoid assisting to such an extent that it prejudices the interests of creditors 
who are not procedurally involved, see V. Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’, 68(5) Modern Law 
Review, (2005), 713, at 735.  
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shows that there is an increased tendency to operate outside the principles dictated within the 
UK’s insolvency law. However, it will be seen that the profession has been given a privileged 
footing, endorsed by the lack of available alternatives. It was stated in Chapter two that 
corporate rescue is an option available to a company that can prove it can be rescued as a 
going concern. But there are growing concerns as to whether practitioners are equipped with 
the knowledge to make decisions that may not necessarily fall within their field of expertise. 
In essence it has raised questions whether a corporate rescue model in the UK exists, as these 
professionals seem to have the discretion to apply their own rules and interpretations as to 
what they think the law should be. This position has been further strengthened by the lack of 
intervention from the courts demonstrating that they prefer to leave the commercial decisions 
to those better placed within the business world. There are a number of fundamental 
principles and safeguards in place designed to prevent or at least restrict potential abuses. 
This however is dependent on the action taken by RPBs and whether the response is 
reflective of the act committed. The lack of transparency and accountability remains a 
problem which ultimately contributes to suspicion around the conduct of those who work 
within the rescue process. This has had the effect of shrouding corporate rescue in an air of 
secrecy leaving little information to analyse exactly how rescue procedures are implemented.  
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Chapter 4 
Determining the Existence of a Corporate Rescue Model - an Efficiency 
Approach 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The last chapter identified how some insolvency practitioners (IPs) were able, to a certain 
degree, manipulate the circumstances that were presented to them in a distressed company. It 
was seen that by using their wide discretion they could turn the situation to their own 
advantage, and by doing so extract a greater fee for their work. It was suggested that this 
practice has been allowed to flourish because the current law in dealing with corporate 
insolvency is inadequate. These faults have presented an opportunity to IPs to develop a new 
mechanism that could do the job more in line with what they consider to be more appropriate. 
It is on this premise that pre-packaged administrations were developed and are steadily 
increasing in popularity. In terms of how pre-packs are being advanced as an alternative to a 
formal process like full administration requires further examination.  
 
This chapter takes into account the research discussed in Chapters Two and Three and 
assesses whether the corporate rescue model adopted in the UK (administration) is an 
efficient process. Specifically, it must be asked whether the formal rescue model as contained 
within administration is consonant with the fundamental principles as discussed in Chapter 
Two, and does it implement policy as set out in Chapter Three in a way that is considered 
efficient and fair, taking into account the appropriate fundamental principles? Of particular 
relevance, previous research will be drawn upon to assess whether the process of rescuing a 
company as stated in schedule B1, para 3(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 19861 is efficient in its 
purpose, and whether any other interpretation such as that implied by IPs implementing pre-
packs has led to the law that is applied being different from what was intended2. Whilst it will 
                                                            
1 The purpose of administration as set out by paragraph 3(1)(a) states that the Administrator of a company must 
perform his functions with the objective of rescuing the company as a going concern. This is the primary 
purpose of administration and if this objective cannot be achieved then an alternative purpose may be selected. 
It will be noted that in Chapter Three it was suggested that para 3(1)(a) is the only true objective that can be 
referred to as corporate rescue; the alternatives within para 3 can be more associated with rehabilitation with the 
focus on the distribution of wealth to creditors. 
2 Reference will be made to The Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005, which aims to assist practitioners on 
issues of policy. Attention will also be drawn on the Statement of Insolvency Practice (SIPs), which proactively 
aims to bridge the gap between knowledge and practice, harmonising the approach taken by members when 
questioning insolvency practice. 
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be reiterated from Chapter Three, that some IPs have resorted to adopting a more pragmatic 
response to the needs of a distressed company and have done so by taking a more commercial 
realism view of how troubled companies should be dealt with, it remains to be seen whether 
the efficiency rule has played a role in ensuring that corporate rescue in the conventional 
sense has increasingly been overlooked. 
 
A number of values are to be used as benchmarks that will help determine not only the 
legitimacy of the corporate rescue model in the UK, but also highlight how effective the 
corporate rescue model has been. To achieve this end this chapter will commence with 
establishing the core values – namely efficiency and fairness - and how they have become 
integral to any discussion wishing to test a models’ capabilities. It will be seen that it is often 
the case that there will have to be a trade off between the differing values as each naturally 
competes to become the most dominate in any discussion. In addition to efficiency and 
fairness, accountability and expertise will also be considered as they are all concepts that may 
be aims (in their own right) that are pursued as individual strands or as combinations. It is 
therefore important to note that not all need to be satisfied for something to be efficient. As 
already noted above, it will be seen that efficiency can be an aim in itself – a factor that is 
realised in the manner it pursues the intended outcome, which in this case is the pure rescue 
of a distressed company. A number of concepts will be discussed, namely Pareto efficiency; 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; technical efficiency; and dynamic efficiency. With a debate 
surrounding the notions of efficiency the value of fairness will be reintroduced and explored 
in greater detail. The question will be asked: what makes an efficient framework? This 
presents the opportunity to observe the substantive aims and procedural goals of corporate 
rescue and what is expected of such a model. Finally the tensions between the values will be 
explored to illustrate the difficulties involved in attempting to determine how best to measure 
an efficient model.  
 
2. Overview 
Corporate rescue has taken on a format that could be best described as subscribing to an 
“evolving philosophy” that is conscious of its theoretical underpinnings, whilst at the same 
time showing a willingness to be flexible with its principles to reflect contemporary issues 
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that may be considered of significance3. The principles which form the foundations for 
corporate rescue supply it with its history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and 
purpose4. The legal rules are not intended to be arbitrary interventions, but forming part of 
stories, and tending towards the achievement of the desired outcomes5. Ultimately, 
transformation is permitted and should be expected. This can be supported by case law; 
whilst there is perhaps no clear indication to demonstrate any division amongst policy 
decisions, they are nevertheless characterised by the development within the field and with it 
provide the necessary persuasion and confidence to insert these new found principles into the 
decision-making process6. By identifying these dominant principles within a body of law 
permits these assumptions to be assessed and, if appropriate, reformed. Fundamental 
principles like attitudes evolve over time, as notions in one legal measure are repeated and 
developed in another, until they command widespread, immediate and largely unchallenged 
assent7. With this in mind, the first main challenge that faces legal concepts is determining 
their purpose, which in this case translates to determining: what does corporate rescue aim to 
do? Once the objectives have been established, it must then be assessed whether the purpose 
of the law has been achieved. If it has not then the law must provide a solution to enable the 
purpose to be fulfilled.  
 
3. Establishing the Values 
Formulating the aspirations of corporate rescue allows for the evaluation of its procedure to 
take place. Critically, it will be remembered in the previous chapters that rescue operates in 
an environment that is full of tension between those who have the various interests in a 
distressed company. Assessing the effectiveness of corporate rescue within the current 
economic climate involves selecting a number of values that will be used to determine 
whether the law delivers on the promises it makes8. The adopted values in this instance will 
be efficiency and fairness, but whilst these have been chosen it is also important to note and 
provide a rationale as to why these values are used at the expense of others. In order to 
                                                            
3 See further, V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 
2009), who describes insolvency law developing in accordance to a ‘guiding philosophy’.  
4 R. Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’, 97 Harvard Law Review, (1983), 4, at 5. 
5 J. Benjamin, ‘The Narratives of Financial Law’, 30(4) OJLS, (2010), 787, at 788. 
6 For example see the discussions that have occurred for calling on greater transparency of office holders’ 
remuneration and expenses, see V. Finch, ‘Insolvency Practitioners: the Avenues of Accountability’, Journal of 
Business Law, (2012), 645, at 656. 
7 J. Benjamin, ‘The Narratives of Financial Law’, 30(4) OJLS, (2010), 787, at 788. 
8 Effectiveness in this context will be used to determine whether the correct method has been adopted to allow 
the purpose of the law to be fulfilled. 
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thoroughly consider the reasons why these two values are more prominent it is necessary to 
revisit the critical aspects that make up the unique character of insolvency law.  
 
3.1. Integral Concepts 
Insolvency proceedings rest upon two profound, integral concepts: namely its role to enforce 
private rights (of creditors), and secondly to consider the “public issues” that such 
proceedings may have9. Combined, the concepts are so strong that they have helped to justify 
and secure respect for individual rights10. This in turn acts as a legitimacy tool11 to suggest 
that insolvency law has embraced a vision that is both communitarian in nature as well as 
expressive of the notion that the creditors’ interests are to be protected12. The tensions and 
how the differences can be resolved have been previously discussed in Chapter Three under 
the examination of policy, but it remains to be examined how the analysis of these different 
approaches can contribute to measuring the success of rescue. It is important to note that with 
the aforementioned issue, insolvency law is undoubtedly concerned with monitoring and 
restraining the actions of certain key actors within the rescue procedure (directors, insolvency 
practitioners and certain creditors)13, whilst permitting the necessary space for these actors to 
fulfil their normative duties with the skill and expertise that the law demands. The discretion 
afforded to IPs, even if conducted in a rational and reasonable way, plays a key role in 
shaping the direction of corporate rescue14. This is something which in turn will help form 
part of the analysis in explaining how efficient and fair corporate rescue is in the UK.  
 
3.2. Trade-offs Between Differing Values 
The focus invariably turns to the method, or more specifically the effectiveness in which the 
identified principles (substantive goals of corporate rescue) are achieved (with focus on the 
procedural model adopted). The competing values used to measure just how responsive the 
                                                            
9 See generally, V. Finch, ‘Re-invigorating Corporate Rescue’, Journal of Business Law, (2003), 527, at 540. 
10 See S. Wheeler, ‘Directors’ Disqualification: Insolvency Practitioners and the Decision-making Process’, 15 
Legal Studies, (1995), 283. 
11 This term will be discussed later on. 
12 This approach recognises the existing interests in society and looks to regulate companies in such a way to 
satisfy public interest. This has allowed a framework in which allows social changes can occur. See L. Sealy, ‘A 
Company Law for Tomorrow's World’, 2 Company Lawyer (1981), 195, at 195; D. Millon, ‘Communitarians, 
Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 Washington & Lee Law Review, (1993) 1373, at 1386. 
13 Caution should be applied with treating these interests as entirely separate concerns. Whilst tensions will exist 
between the competing interests, they should be valued on an individual basis but only for the purpose of 
determining factors that can be used in the trade-off process.   
14 For further reading see G. Lightman and G. Moss, The Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies, 
4th edn, (London: Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), at 246; R. Mokal and J. Armour, ‘The New UK Rescue 
Procedure - the Administrator's Duty to Act Rationally’, 1 Int. Corp. Rescue 136, (2004), 137-138. 
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law is to the issues of concern involves a process whereby “trade-offs” between differing 
values are deemed a necessity15. There have been a number of insightful academic articles 
that have captured the inconsistencies and tension that befalls deciding which value should be 
chosen to assess the legitimacy of a process or mechanism. The research conducted within 
this thesis will tend to focus on the relationship between law and economics, adopting a 
theoretical approach to the debate, whereby the aim is to explore not just what the law is, but 
what also underpins and inspires it16.   
 
Assessing the viability of corporate rescue invites a rethink in the way it is interpreted and 
how its success is measured. It is to be noted that success is a subjective notion that can be 
measured in many forms17. However, for the purposes of this thesis determining success will 
involve carefully examining the principles at the heart of rescue and forming a framework 
that employs an identified, but limited, collection of values18 that could be used to “reassure 
ourselves” about the exercise of powers19. 
 
It has been highlighted in the previous chapters how insolvency law is highly dependent not 
only on the efficient pursuit of the “rescue principles”, but also, as Chapter Three highlighted, 
the degree of expertise exercised by relevant actors, the level of supervision, monitoring and 
accountability within the process and the extent of procedural fairness that is shown in 
dealing with affected parties’ interests. With this in mind, measuring the legitimacy of each 
goal/objective faces a challenge as to whether a group of values or an individual element 
should be employed. Finch has argued, contrary to the classical approach adopted by Frug, 
that the individual justificatory arguments may prove contentious and possess limitations, but 
                                                            
15 Where certain objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously this presents a “hard card” scenario, where trade-
offs will have to be made. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: G. Duckworth, 1977), at 85. 
16 For some of the interdisciplinary work on the subject see, J. Armour and S. Deakin, ‘Norms in Private 
Insolvency Procedures: The “London Approach” to the Resolution of Financial Distress’, JCLS, (2001), 21; J. 
Armour and S. Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership, OJLS, (2001), 21; A. Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: 
Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection to Creditors’, 66 Modern Law Review, 
(2003), 665. 
17 Determining what would be a successful rescue is mostly dependant on when the question is asked; see A. 
Belcher, ‘The Economic Implications of Attempting to Rescue Companies’, in H. Rajak (ed.), Insolvency Law 
Theory and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), at 237. Because a company may seem successful soon 
after restructuring but may end up operating rather skeletally; P.Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: 
Realities and the need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, ICCLR, (2012), 61, at 62. 
18 See M. Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W. Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); G. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, 97 Harvard LR, (1984), 
1277; B. Sutton, The Legitimate Corporation, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
19 See G. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, 97 Harvard LR, (1984), 1277, at 1281 
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they may nevertheless possess force and may be combined with other arguments20. The 
values that are often referred to as benchmarks can, and have been, used to test the legitimacy 
of a particular process or principle within disciplines of the law. Reference will be made to 
Finch’s four values, but it must be noted that this is not intended to be in anyway 
representative of an exhaustive list as to what values should be evident. The values referred to 
are: Efficiency which looks to the securing of desired intended outcomes at lowest costs; 
expertise which refers to the proper exercise of judgement by specialists; accountability looks 
to control of insolvency participants by democratic bodies or courts or through openness of 
processes and their amenability to representations; and fairness considers the issues of 
substantive justice and distribution21 (which does not and should not imply equality). Whilst 
Finch’s approach can be best described as endorsing a framework that involves “paraphrasing 
and reorganising”22, and “building on, but repackaging”23 the views of Frug24, it is best to 
advance this model as an entirely separate way of considering the issue of legitimacy. Frug’s 
rationale draws on the four elements mentioned (efficiency, expertise, accountability, and 
fairness), but argues that they fail to address the issue of legitimacy in a meaningful way and 
that combining them “only shifts the problem of making a subjective/objective distinction 
away from any particular model and locates it, instead, on the boundaries between the 
different models”25. Endorsing a collective approach ignores the immediate tensions and 
inconsistencies evident in the individual strands and creates a false impression that these 
internal difficulties are unimportant26. It should be noted that establishing the method which 
should be adopted to determine the legitimacy of a model faces a number of difficulties. The 
critical limitation that has been identified is the task of providing an objective justification for 
rendering one value more dominant than another, otherwise it would lack force27. However, it 
has been suggested that this limitation can be overcome and that the exercise of power can be 
supported by a thread of different arguments based on a limited number of identifiable 
rationales that are invoked on a collective basis28. 
                                                            
20 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), at 55. 
21 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), at 56. 
22 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), at 49. 
23 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), at 50. 
24 G. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, 97 Harvard LR, (1984), 1277. 
25 G. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, 97 Harvard LR, (1984), at 1378. 
26 G. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, 97 Harvard LR, (1984), at 1379. 
27 G. Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law’, 97 Harvard LR, (1984), at 1380. 
28 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), at 55. 
Also note D. R. Korobkin, ‘The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates’, Iowa L Rev., (1996-7), 82, 
at 108-9, who states that there are no ‘clear winners’ in arguments based on competing values, but: “much of the 
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4. Legitimacy: Reasonable Expectations 
The rationale of legitimacy has a critical relationship with efficiency. It will be remembered 
in Chapter Two that it is important to emphasise and grasp the importance of the relationship 
between contractual obligations and the expectations it can produce. The concept of 
reasonable and legitimate expectations29 is the substance that fuses the principles together. It 
is within this premise that enables us to consider what we would reasonably wish to see in a 
contract if we drafted it30. The concept has a bearing on the efficiency of the agreement and 
the terms it produces, having the effect of creating a consensual obligation that brings an 
element of fairness to all reasonable parties concerned. In terms of enforcing reasonable and 
legitimate expectations, given that all contracts are in their very nature incomplete31, it can 
have an efficiency benefit as well as providing for fairness in that it enables parties to engage 
in agreeing complicated contracts without incurring high transaction costs32.  
 
In terms of the relationship between creditors and IPs and what the former can expect from 
office holders, it would be reasonable and legitimate of creditors to expect a certain level of 
professionalism and that IPs comply with all relevant legislation and codes of conduct when 
dealing with their interests, where the company is, or is potentially, in financial distress, as 
the creditors have the residual claim over the company. If these expectations are not met, then 
the creditors can reasonably expect that they would be held accountable and potentially 
directly responsible for any loss. 
 
Whilst a fully comprehensive discussion surrounding the legitimacy of the values chosen is 
beyond the scope of this research, the rationale of legitimacy is critical to evaluating the UK’s 
corporate rescue model in light of its effectiveness and in turn its efficiency. As such, the 
focus will turn to examining the values that enjoy a broad acceptance within the field. It will 
be on this premise that it will determined whether a collective approach is required whereby a 
number of different values support each other, or whether it is possible to assert that there are 
some values so prominent that they can stand individually? Part of the answer to this question 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
purpose of a full debate is to compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of plausible arguments, not to find a 
clear winner”. 
29 See A. Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-
Protection of Creditors’, 66 Modern Law Review, (2003), 665, at 679. 
30 L. Mitchell, ‘The Fairness Rights of Bondholders’, 65 New York University Law Review, (1990), at 1225. 
31 This notion will be discussed later. 
32 See A. Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-
Protection of Creditors’, 66 Modern Law Review, (2003), 665, at 679. 
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rests with, and depends on which procedural goals are affirmed and in turn what substantive 
goals have been chosen in order to achieve the aims. Providing justifications as to why 
different substantive goals should be pursued at the expense of another is not easily 
determinable. Assessing whether creditors’ interests should carry more weight against that of 
employees depends upon the inherent theoretical, cultural and social dispositions evident 
within the jurisdiction in question. Various arguments can be employed to adopt different 
values dependent on the purpose and aims identified by the policy makers. It seems inevitable 
that in order to measure an instrument to establish the level of success it generates, it 
invariably means that the substantive and procedural goals will have to embrace a certain 
level of influence that would manipulate the direction the decision making process takes. 
Such is the influence of these values that they may be accorded currency in debates on 
insolvency law. Furthermore, the rationales formulated from such discussions may offer an 
insight as to how different values interact and what factors are considered more important33. 
It therefore follows that these selected values are not chosen just on how well they integrate, 
but on the ability to show distinctions and how certain characteristics within them can be 
traded off. The selection, which presupposes an elimination process, should be seen as 
natural, with due attention being drawn to the Darwinian approach mentioned in Chapter 
Two. In order to decide what trade-offs would be necessary it is presupposed that there would 
be a set of questions framed which would highlight the values at work. Whether or not this 
can operate in reality is a different matter as the visions we have regarding the distribution of 
rights within the corporate rescue model vary considerably34. The trade-offs between 
competing values provide for an environment where the different characteristics of each are 
discussed and debated, which in turn allows each value to be properly assessed on its own 
merits. The practice by which the values are chosen involves an elimination process that 
discards values based on a number of factors; including the suitability of a particular value to 
successfully measure a mechanism that is to be tested. By adopting this method, this process 
permits the value which has the most persuasion in the circumstances to prevail35.  
 
                                                            
33 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), at 57. 
34 See L. M. LoPucki, ‘Reorganisation Realities, Methodological Realities, and the Paradigm Dominance 
Game’, 72 Wash. ULQ, (1994), 72, 1307, 1310, which involves the aim of not looking to solve a problem but to 
get everyone thinking about the problem on one’s own frame of reference and taking about it in one’s own 
language.  
35 Whilst a theory in general can offer guidance for resolving problems of competing values inherent in 
corporate insolvency, see D. R. Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy 
Law’, 71 Texas Law Review, (1993), 98, at 111. It may never fully provide solutions to specific insolvency 
questions; see E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev., (1987), 775, at 797. 
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5. Determining what Value to Measure? 
This brings us to the next point – do the values identified intend to measure corporate rescue 
as a procedure or the law that governs it?36 The two components offer separate lines of 
enquiry, but the latter cannot be scrutinised without a benchmark to measure it against. The 
former however can be assessed to reveal the extent to which its substantive objectives have 
been implemented. The analysis will consider how corporate rescue has developed and 
whether the mandate contained within its foundational principles correspond with that 
endorsed and enacted by the IPs when they have carried out their duties37. It follows that the 
discretion afforded to IPs has raised concerns surrounding the appropriateness of the 
expertise required of them, the accountability of their actions, and the overall fairness of the 
procedure38. Attention should be drawn to the Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005, 
which provides assistance to IPs when considering the legitimacy of their actions39. Of 
particular interest is regulation 6 which covers the matters for determining whether an 
applicant for an authorisation is a fit and proper person. Whilst the majority of this has 
already been discussed in Chapter Three, it suffices to mention regulation 6(d) given its 
association with providing an adequate system. It states that “...there were established 
adequate systems of control of the practice and adequate records relating to the practice, 
including accounting records, and whether such systems of control and records have been or 
were maintained on an adequate basis”40. This should be read in conjunction with subsection 
(e), which states that in the process of an IP conducting his or her work “...such a practice, 
will be, carried on with the independence, integrity and the professional skills appropriate to 
the range and scale of the practice and the proper performance of the duties of an insolvency 
practitioner and in accordance with generally accepted professional standards, practices and 
principles”41. Together the sections formulate a level of acceptable practice and that anything 
falling short of this standard would be deemed to be rendering the practice as inadequate, 
                                                            
36 A normative theory of insolvency law dictates that it is critical to establish values that underlie current law; 
see D.R. Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’, 71 Texas Law Rev. 
(1993), 98. 
37 See D. J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), pp. 34-7. 
38 It is worth noting that in regards to the level of competence required, acting as an IP in any designated 
proceeding when not qualified to do so constitutes a criminal offence: Insolvency Act 1986, s.389. See also 
generally, V. Finch, ‘Insolvency Practitioners: The Avenues of Accountability’, JBL, (2012), 645, at 658. 
39 See generally Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 524, The Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/524/contents/made (accessed 12th November 2012). 
40 See Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 524, The Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/524/regulation/6/made (accessed 12th November 2012). 
41 Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 524, The Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/524/regulation/6/made (accessed 12th November 2012). 
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inferring that the system is falling short of what an efficient insolvency procedure should 
achieve. It is accepted that having a level of professionalism in itself could be classed as 
endorsing an efficient framework as it eradicates poor performance at an early stage and 
reduces the extent along with the risk of damage42. This submission however relies on a 
system that it transparent and accountable for its actions. Whilst subsection (e) clarifies what 
the untenable position would be, paragraph (f) provides where an IP “...has failed to disclose 
fully to such persons as might reasonably be expected to be affected thereby circumstances 
where there is or appears to be a conflict of interest between his so acting and any interest of 
his own, whether personal, financial or otherwise, without having received such consent as 
might be appropriate to his acting or continuing to act despite the existence of such 
circumstances”43. This provides for an element within the sphere of insolvency law that can 
be assessed, but it is not as clear cut as the section makes it out to be44. To address these 
issues whereby the system can be judged collectively as opposed to being treated as 
individual strands, principles are adopted that can be applicable to the system as a whole.  For 
instance, adopting a basic principle that can be applied as a general tool, such as 
transparency, can allow the system to be viewed as a whole.  
 
6. Transparency 
Transparency is a universal value that can be applied to any area of law. The principle has a 
number of meanings but in this context it implies openness, communication, and 
accountability. Transparency is a principle that aims to remove all barriers to – and the 
facilitating of – accessible (available) corporate information to determine the reliability of a 
process. This process often includes verifying the level of protection that the procedure 
affords individuals and associated bodies involved, and whether the regulations and rules in 
                                                            
42 Collectively by observing the relevant insolvency legislation such as Sch. B1 para 4, Insolvency Act 1986 and 
regulations such as the Code of Ethics, a general trend is clear and promotes a view entirely consistent with the 
expectations of professionalism. See D. Milman, ‘Governance, stewardship and the Insolvency Practitioner’, 
Company Law Newsletter, (2012), 1, at 3. 
43 See Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 524, The Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/524/regulation/6/made (accessed 12th November 2012). 
44 As expressed in Chapter Three, a closer look at the way in which IPs operate reveals great difficulty in 
assessing with any accuracy the extent IPs protect rights that is in line with the rules and regulations. Structured 
bias within the profession in favour of the company or certain creditors may never be fully eradicated. This has 
found support in the fact that the Insolvency Act 1986 does not expressly prevent an IP from acting where there 
is a conflict, but at the same time in considering whether a person is fit and proper to act as an IP, the Secretary 
of State must take into account whether, in any case, the applicant has acted as an IP but has failed fully to 
disclose to persons who might reasonably be expected to be affected circumstances where there is, or appears to 
be, a conflict of interest between his so acting and any interest of his own (personal, financial or otherwise); see 
Insolvency Practitioner Regulations 2005 reg.4(f); V. Finch, ‘Insolvency Practitioners: the Avenues of 
Accountability’, Journal of Business Law, (2012), 645, at 658. 
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place are adequate. The transparency principle attempts to operate in such a way that it makes 
it easy for others to see what actions are performed. For example, how a rescue strategy has 
been developed by an IP. The purpose of increasing transparency is to determine whether, 
after all the available information is known, the decision that was made by the IP was based 
on reasonable justifications and not one based on prejudicial information that would be 
erroneously beneficial to one interested party over another. Transparency, which is 
understood to aid the rationales of accountability and fairness would go a long way to 
reassuring the general public and the interested parties of a distressed company, that despite 
the discretion IPs possess a consideration of their interests would be represented through the 
principle of transparency as it would allow the affected parties some input into how the 
decisions were to be applied45. In other words by ensuring that transparency is evident within 
transactions and the decision making process, it can be shown what issues were considered, 
what was omitted and in turn allow accountability for actions taken and input where 
necessary. This of course is not free from criticism, particularly when the focus turns to 
interpreting the notion of procedural fairness – exactly how can we be expected to measure 
this when there are so many differing notions involved? Whilst some would suggest assessing 
the concept broadly, it is more appropriate to apply a method that suits the content of the 
subject matter46. Referring back to the values, with the above in mind it reaches a point where 
establishing the benchmarks and how they should be utilised has been described as “elastic 
yardsticks”47, something that should not be too rigid whilst at the same time provide the 
necessary degree of flexibility to avoid insurmountable tension.  
 
In this case, the issue of discretion forms the foundation for challenging and evaluating the 
purpose of corporate rescue with reference made to the rationales of legitimacy. Essentially, 
measuring rescue involves assessing whether it can be achieved in an effective manner whilst 
adhering to conduct which may be described as fair48. Exactly what these terms mean 
remains to be explored. 
                                                            
45 See further V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 
2009), at 59. 
46 D. R. Korobkin, ‘The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates’, Iowa L Rev., (1996-7), 82, at 96, 
who argues that different types of insolvency theory can be thought of as doing different jobs. 
47 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), at 60. 
48 Issues surrounding transparency and pre-packs is something that will be discussed in Chapter Five, but it 
suffices to mention that the problems associated with independent review has led to a loss of public confidence 
– a factor that is ultimately affecting the perception of corporate rescue in general. See generally P. Okoli, 
‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the need for a Delicate Balancing Act’, ICCLR, (2012), 
61, at 64. 
157 
 
7. Concepts of Efficiency  
Whilst the rationales would provide a guided direction to assessing the corporate rescue 
framework, there remains one more, albeit troublesome concept - efficiency49. There are 
variations as to what efficiency should achieve and in a world where differences are more 
common than homogeneous concepts it is of no surprise that a notion like efficiency has 
attracted much attention50. Not all notions of efficiency will be discussed. Reference will only 
be made to the ones that are applicable to this type of law51. Efficiency in general terms has 
been described as the relationship between the aggregate benefit of a legal rule and the 
aggregate costs of a legal rule52. The concept most commonly relied upon is the Kaldor-Hicks 
principle53, which is to be distinguished from Pareto efficiency54. These two principles, which 
are known as allocative efficiency notions have been used by both legal and economics 
scholars for many decades55.  
 
7.1 Pareto Efficiency 
Something is Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient) if in the process of distribution (resources, 
opportunities or entitlements) any further change would not make even one person better off 
and would make at least one person worse off, and judged in both instances by the persons 
own standards. Amongst the concerns however with this process is that it does not make any 
enquiry into the desirability of the initial allotment of resources56; it therefore merely acts as a 
tool to measure the act of transformation from one point to another and not whether it was the 
correct choice to commit to the process of distribution in the first place. 
 
                                                            
49 However, other values may be used, see R. A. Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm 
in Common Law Adjudication’, 8 Hofstra Law Review, (1980), 487, 494. 
50 The concept has been described as “[t]he bedrock of gold that has carried economic analysis of law”, see G. 
Hadfield, The Second Wave of Law and Economics: Learning to Surf, in M. Richardson and G. Hadfield, 
(Sydney: Federation Press, 1999), at 56. 
51 S. Deakin and A. Hughes, ‘Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law’, 3 CifiLR, 
(1999), 169, 173-175. 
52 A. M. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1989), 7. 
53 N. Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility’, The Economic 
Journal, (1939), 549; J. R. Hicks, ‘The Valuation of the Social Income’, Economica, (1940), 105. 
54 V. Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, edn, A. Schwier and A. Page, Eng tr A. Schwier, (New York; A. M. 
Kelly, 1971), 261; R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th edn, (New York: Aspen, 2007), 14, and G. 
Lawson, ‘Efficiency and Individualism’, Duke LJ, (1992), 53, at 85. 
55 See generally on different measures of economic efficiency, B. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure 
and Operation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.14-15; and R. Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Theory and Application, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.20-26. 
56 R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th edn, (New York: Aspen, 2007) 
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Conversely, something is Pareto superior where at least the lot of one person is improved 
while not making anyone else worse off. Whilst the notion is appealing, the principle has 
received a lack of support due to its failure to properly address situations that arise in 
reality57, not to mention that such situations hardly ever occur. In respect to corporate rescue 
it is inevitable that the actions undertaken will affect countless parties, at least some of whom 
will be made worse off because of a transaction. It therefore follows that just about every 
transaction that does occur can be categorised as satisfying the Pareto optimal criterion to 
some degree. Applying this notion to corporate rescue, if (a) represented the company and (b) 
represented the creditors, the contractual relationship may demonstrate Pareto efficiency in 
that group (b) may look to enforce their entitlements, but refrain from doing so on the 
premise that they are compensated by potentially greater returns in the future (given real 
incentives to enhance their prospects), and (a) may gain from this as they are given the space 
to plan a potential rescue and give more to creditors (potentially through more credit) as well 
as benefiting other interests such as the employees. Fulfilling this exchange may be mutually 
beneficial if it has been fully exhausted, and the distribution may in this case be correctly 
referred to as Pareto superior as one position has been improved whilst the other remains 
static, but not made worse. It is recognised that if the official avenue of administration under 
Schedule B1were pursued this may defeat Pareto efficiency as the bargaining power of one 
party would be substantially increased, namely the company, at the expense of the other 
party, namely the creditors. In other words the lack of entitlement for creditors to enforce 
their rights against a company that has entered administration (thus bringing a moratorium 
into effect) interferes with the distribution of resources and restricts the extent of transactions 
taking place between the groups58. The implications associated with the restriction of 
transactions within this twofold relationship changes the pattern of demand, which in turn 
affects the market price of that resource. Whether it is the price of security for lending further 
credit (terms of contract dictating higher interest because of a deemed higher risk), or the lack 
of agreement amongst creditors to allow debt subordination to secure new finance, the 
increase of this resource (opportunity) adversely affects the ability to carry out corporate 
rescue procedures59. It follows that if those who have been compensated are unhappy or if the 
compensation distributed is greater than what the distributors of the compensation have 
gained then the theory is soundly defeated. As noted above, the notion lacks coherence when 
                                                            
57 R. Mokal, ‘Review Article on Fairness and Efficiency’, 66 Modern Law Review, (2003), 452, at 454. 
58 See G. McCormack, ‘Rescuing small Businesses: Designing an ‘Efficient’ Legal Regime’, JBL, (2009), 299, 
pp. 300-306. 
59 See R. Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies, (1980), 191, at 193. 
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applied to a scenario in practice, but as suggested if the notion was applied in a more 
restrictive way i.e. the proposed relationship in question was eliminated and only elements 
were analysed, it may be possible to satisfy aspects of Pareto efficiency. This of course begs 
the question whether the notion can only be applied in its entirety without any compromises 
to its form, and that any attempt to use the mechanism in a restrictive sense leads to incorrect 
usage. 
 
7.2. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
An alternative notion that is often referred to as potential Pareto efficiency, albeit with 
concerns as to whether the former can be classed as a notion at all given its lack of credibility 
as a working theory, is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (also referred to as cost-benefit analysis, 
wealth maximisation, or allocative efficiency). The difference between this version of 
efficiency and Pareto is that there is no actual requirement for the winners to compensate the 
losers60, and in fact they very rarely do61. The critical aspect of the notion requires that the 
gains to the winner are larger than the losses incurred by the losers62. Exactly how this is to 
be determined concerns observing whether there is consent for the losses that have occurred. 
In other words, if the compensation does not satisfy the grievance and as such the amount of 
compensation must be increased then there is an escalating chance that the model’s delicate 
balancing point will be disrupted to such an extent that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency notion 
may be defeated63. Applying the notion to corporate rescue, the difficulty rests with the 
knowledge that if one party cannot be bought (consents to the compensation for the losses) 
then the notion is entirely defeated64. In respect to corporate rescue proceedings, it is highly 
unlikely that the company would be able to compensate the creditors to such a degree that the 
grievances were satisfied. To compensate on a level that would put the creditor back into a 
position that existed prior to the distress to the company, and as if it never occurred, would be 
to disregard the risky nature of business. This includes the acts to suppress/reduce risk by 
implementing audit risk assessments and observing market forces, but at the same time it 
acknowledges that obligations must be fulfilled in accordance with the clauses in contacts.  
                                                            
60 The only requirement is that gains to the winners are larger than are the losses to the losers; see R. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, 5th edn, (New York: Aspen 1998), at 14. 
61 M. J. Whincop, ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’, OJLS, 
(1999), 19, at 33.  
62 R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th edn, (New York: Aspen, 1998), at 14. 
63 It requires one person who sincerely cannot be bought, a person who values autonomy highly enough that no 
amount of compensation could leave them as well off as he would have been had the loss never been inflicted in 
the first place; see G. Lawson, ‘Efficiency and Individualism’, 42 Duke LJ , (1992), at 84. 
64 G. Lawson, ‘Efficiency and Individualism’, 42 Duke LJ, (1992), at 91-92. 
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Enforcing the specific performance of contracts, or perhaps more aptly put, the effective 
collection of debt owed, in some ways prevents efficiency being achieved as it does not 
consider all parties to be equal. However, despite one of the primary aims of administration 
us that an IP should consider the interests of the creditors as a whole, and equally, is not the 
same as stating that all claims for debt owed are to be treated as equal. Nevertheless, to 
restrict conflicts amongst creditors, this could be overcome if the objectives are not identified 
and only the end product is considered of relevance, not its means65. Logically, if this is taken 
into consideration, then the majority of a single group gain at the expense of a smaller group 
could be said to be enough to satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks test. The critical issue here is that the 
value of the gain is susceptible to an individual’s own wealth and so it depends upon whether 
in the scheme of things he or she places a value upon a resource at such a level that it could 
be classed as satisfying the requisite level of compensation for the distributor to be said to 
have offered an amount that assures Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. However, if there has been 
prior distribution of wealth amongst the parties in the contractual relationship and this turned 
out to be unjust, it makes the objective of efficiently allocating resources meaningless since 
that action would be no more desirable from an ethical viewpoint than if it were inefficient66.  
 
Applying this notion to maximising social wealth (as this is the objective of all commercial 
activity and as such is one of the key factors that dictate the actions of a company), it is 
possible that this could be achieved by pursuing a policy of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency67. There 
is a tendency to rely on the efficiency model as a means to provide a given framework some 
practical application; allowing theoretical principles to be applied in practice68. The difficulty 
with the model is if the goal is to increase social wealth, then there is a presumption that it 
must be shown why a society with more wealth is better, or better off than a society with less 
wealth. If social wealth is a component of social value, an incremental improvement in social 
wealth must also be an improvement in value. If not, then the claim that social wealth is a 
component of value fails69. 
 
 
                                                            
65 See C. Korsgaard, ‘Kant’s Formula of humanity’, in her book, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1996), 106-132. 
66 R, Mokal, ‘Review Article on Fairness and Efficiency’, 66 Modern Law Review, (2003), 452, at 456. 
67 T. Bose, ‘Resolving Financial Distress: Justice as Fairness and Reciprocity’, UCL Jurisprudence Review, 
(2004), 230, at 235. 
68 G. Lawson, ‘Efficiency and Individualism’ 42 Duke Law Journal, (1992), 53, at 92. 
69 R. Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies, (1980), 191, at 194. 
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7.3. Technical Efficiency (Transaction Cost Efficiency) 
Moving away from the allocative efficiency notions, another notion that is worth exploring is 
that of technical efficiency (or transaction cost efficiency), which is aimed at “achieving 
desired results with the minimal use of resources and costs and the minimal wastage of 
effort”70. Attention should be drawn to the work of Coase and Hart, with the former 
considering the definition of the firm (company71) and in turn what its purpose is, and what it 
should be72, whilst the latter focused on the sources of transaction costs73. Coase suggested 
that any mechanism that actively interacts with the economy, such as a company, is subjected 
to and co-ordinated by the price mechanism and because of this society should be viewed as 
not an organisation but an organism74. In this capacity the “price mechanism” is to be defined 
and set by the human need (demand for a product) and the supply is “adjusted to demand and 
production to consumption by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive”75. In other 
words the market in which products are bought and sold should be flexible and responsive 
enough to adapt to changes at short notice to fulfil the demand that exists, or to encourage an 
increase in the demand by reducing the price of the product. However, this theory implies 
that the economic system somehow works itself and that any attempt at individual input to 
plan a course of action is disregarded, despite this group exercising foresight and choice 
between alternatives76. There are some concerns regarding this suggestion as it implies that 
the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism; thereby suggesting 
that economic planning merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism77. 
However this general description cannot be applied to all. Whilst it may be applied 
comfortably in theory, in practice different variables exist which are not always foreseen. Of 
particular interest is the “organisation” factor which has been referred to as “islands of 
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating 
                                                            
70 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Principles and Perspectives, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), at 56. 
It should be also noted that transaction costs can be reduced by the organisational design of the company, 
specifically the way a company governs itself and this in turn may make the operations of the company more 
efficient, see O. E. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’, 22 
Journal of Law and Economics, (1979), 233. 
71 For an overview of the economic theory of the company, as opposed to its definition see E. Fama, ‘Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, 88 Journal of Political Economy, (1990), 288, at 290. 
72 R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, (November, 1937), at 386-405. 
73 O. Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
74 See F. A. Hayek, ‘The Trend of Economic Thinking’, Economica, (May, 1933). 
75 J. A. Slater, Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1921), at 16-17. 
76 See C R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, (November, 1937), at 387. 
77 See F. A. Hayek, ‘The Trend of Economic Thinking’, Economica, (May, 1933). 
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in a pail of buttermilk”78. This description has been used to demonstrate how price 
movements direct production, particularly outside the firm with the purpose of co-ordinating 
a series of transactions on the market79. In essence, the purpose of the firm is to become a 
vehicle whereby multiple transactions may be carried out within its organisation 
(entrepreneur-co-ordinated)80 to eliminate any complicated market structure and reduce 
transactional costs that would otherwise be applicable if they operated on the open market81. 
The costs of negotiating and concluding separate contracts for each exchange transaction 
would conflict with the purpose of fulfilling transaction cost efficiency as the desired results 
would not be achieved within the limits of what was considered as the minimal use of 
resources and costs and the minimal wastage of effort to achieve this goal would be viewed 
as undesirable.  
 
Hart takes a look at the sources of transaction costs and chooses to focus on what happens in 
reality rather than limiting his scope to theory. He states that contracts are not comprehensive 
and are revised and renegotiated all the time82, reinforcing the view that contracts are always 
incomplete83. Four reasons as to why this occurs are provided. Firstly, the unpredictability of 
world affairs can have an effect on the original plan as it is difficult to account for all the 
contingencies that may arise84. The ability to foresee future events is limited85, which may in 
turn lead to inadequate contractual provisions being exerted. This limitation is the problem of 
                                                            
78 D. H, Robertson, Control of Industry, (Nisbet & Co Ltd: 1923), at 85. 
79 Contacts are developed as part of a mass co-ordinated process whereby association with a company will 
produce many relations, of different kinds (express or implied), at different times, see F. H. Easterbrook and D. 
R. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’, 89 Columbia Law Review, (1989), 1416, at 1426. 
80 Further to this, some commentators have suggested that the company is nothing more than a number of 
complex, private, consensual contact-based relations, see M. Klausner, ‘Corporations, Corporate Law, and 
Networks of Contract’, 81 Virginia Law Review, (1995), 757, at 759. However, note that referring to the 
relations as contacts is probably incorrect as not all relations constitute contracts and should as a matter of 
caution be referred to as bargains, see M. A. Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’, 89 Columbia Law 
Review, (1989), 1461, 1487-8; see also A. Keay, and H. Zhang, ‘Incomplete Contracts, contingent Fiduciaries 
and Director’s Duty to Creditors’, 32 Melbourne University Law Review, (2008), 141, at 151. 
81 See C R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, (November, 1937), 388, at 392. 
82 According to the law and economics theory, corporate law should be seen as a body of default rules which the 
parties are entitled to choose to vary or omit, see I. Ayers and R. Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An economic Theory of default Rules’, 99 Yale Law Journal, (1989), 87. 
83 This is now a generally recognised notion. Attempting to formulate a complete contact can only exist as a 
theoretical exercise, such as Arrow-Debreu contingent claims contacts. This notion supposes that perfect 
foresight and complete information can be obtained. The two opposites should be considered as extremes to 
highlight the differences, see I. MacNeil, ‘Company Law Rules: As Assessment from the Perspective of 
Incomplete Contract Theory’, 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2001), 107. 
84 The economic perspective of incomplete contracting is based on the idea that the human mind is a scarce 
resource, see O. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, (Free Press, new 
York, 1975). 
85 F. H. Easterbrook and D. F. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), at 90. 
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bounded rationality, or in other words – people are rational as opposed to hyper-rational86. 
Secondly, negotiations may take place with individuals and plans being devised (such as 
opportunistic behaviour of self-interest seeking parties), but they may face difficulties in 
covering these aspects and previous experience may not be available to guide them through 
where conflicts arise87. Thirdly, the plans even if have been agreed must be written down in 
such a format that it could be deciphered by outside parties (courts and other arbitration 
bodies) as to what exactly was agreed88. Fourthly, the high transaction costs involved in 
developing contracts and rectifying terms to cover all possible circumstances renders them 
unworkable89.  As such, it would be considered more prudent to factor into the contract the 
basic terms that can be agreed without too much difficulty and leave the other non-essential, 
or non-specific issues to be resolved by some other means90. Because of these problems, 
contracting parties (who are inherently self-interest seeking) cannot account for every 
eventuality and therefore a complete contact cannot be created.  
 
However it is possible to eradicate significant costs, thereby minimising resources required to 
fulfil an objective if the parties could easily switch to new trading partners at the 
renegotiation stage91. More specifically in relation to corporate rescue, there are various 
different interests amongst the parties involved and because of this reaching an efficient 
agreement is made all the more difficult92. But any breakdown in a working relationship does 
not have to be a costly event, as the process may be started again with new factors 
                                                            
86 See A. Keay, and H. Zhang, ‘Incomplete Contracts, contingent Fiduciaries and Director’s Duty to Creditors’, 
32 Melbourne University Law Review, (2008), 141, at 154. See also D. B. Tauke, ‘Should Bonds have more 
Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights’, 1 Columbia Business Law Review, 
(1989) at 16, where it is said: ‘the ability of contracting parties to enter into complete contingent claims 
contracts in the face of complex and uncertain contingencies is limited by the ‘bounded rationality’ of the parties 
– the limits of the human mind in comprehending and solving complex problems’. 
87 See O. Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), at 23. 
88 For further discussion see C R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, (November, 1937), 388; O. 
E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (New York: Free Press: 1985); B. Klein, R. Crawford, 
and A. Alchian, ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process’, 4(1) 
Journal of Law and Economic and Organization, (1988), 199-213. 
89 G. S. Crespi, ‘Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm’, 55 
Southern Methodist University Law Review, (2002), 141, at 141. 
90 See I. MacNeil, ‘Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory’, 
1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2001), 107, at 113. 
91 I. MacNeil, ‘Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory’, 1 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2001), 107, at 113. 
92 This scheme is often referred to as “a nexus of contacts”. For an overview on the subject see S. M. 
Bainbridge, ‘In Defence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximisation Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’, 50 
Washington and Lee law Review, (1993), 1423; S. Deakin and A. Hughes, ‘Economic Efficiency and the 
Proceduralisation of Company Law’, 3 Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, (1999), 169; I. 
MacNeil, ‘Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory’, 1 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2001), 107. 
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considered, including additional unforeseen variables93. The fundamental thing to grasp is 
that successful businesses cannot solely be the result of well thought out clauses in contracts, 
but rather its ability to forward plan and act when action is required. In the same way, 
corporate rescue is not a predicable mechanism that can be controlled; it is a concept that tries 
to accommodate all four of the above scenarios associated with incomplete contracts and 
offer a solution that addresses each one. How well it achieves this entirely depends on 
individual cases. 
 
The ultimate aim is about reaching optimum results with little input and its characteristics are 
very similar to that with administrative efficiency94. The underlying principle of the latter is 
to let the stronger competitor, principle or result dictate the flow95. To adopt this notion alone 
does not explain why something should act in a certain way, but it may nevertheless influence 
the entitlements or opportunities that are available if there are two options in conflict, or even 
if they are not so indifferent, and one option may be preferred over another because it is the 
more cost effective96. This justification can also be applicable to situations where the goal is 
to reduce the duration of proceedings (in this case the time it takes for a distressed company 
to find a solution, if any, to its financial problems) or to increase the gain for interested 
parties (creditors, and not to forget IPs fees as noted in Chapter Three)97. Taking both points 
into consideration, there is some support for the suggestion that corporate rescue is in fact an 
inefficient process and it is in fact better to liquidate a distressed company. Some 
commentators have argued that the only concern that insolvency proceedings should have is 
to maximise returns to creditors and it is not the function of insolvency law to alter relative 
pre-insolvency entitlements98 and to allow other measures, such as rescue to prevail. They 
                                                            
93 This can include finding lower cost supplies; considering costs that have/will be incurred due to wider 
financial events external to that of the company (i.e. change in economic climate such as a recession), and even 
a change in partnerships where mutual objectives are more likely to be achieved.  
94 Here there is a particular emphasis on the company needing to change its company structure in order to 
streamline the business. For further reading on the need to reduce transaction costs so as to improve efficiency, 
see O. E. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’, 22 Journal of 
Law and Economics, (1979), 233.  
95 See G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’, 85 Harvard Law Review, (1972), 1089, at 1093. 
96 G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’, 85 Harvard Law Review, (1972), 1089, at 1093. 
97 The parties involved in these contracts are regarded as rational economic actors, and it is accepted that each of 
these actors will endeavour to maximise their own positions with the intention of gaining benefits for 
themselves, see H. N. Butler, ‘The Contractual Theory of the Corporation’, 11(4) George Mason University law 
Review, (1989), 99; C. A. Riley, ‘Understanding and Regulating the Corporation’, 58 Modern Law Review, 
(1995), 595, 598. 
98 E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, 54 University of Chicago Law Review, (1987), at 775. 
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believe that rescue is in fact a separate goal to that of insolvency law99; reinforcing the view 
that insolvency law has one overriding goal: to allocate the common pool of assets in such a 
way as to maximise benefits for creditors as a whole100. However, adopting this approach in 
the UK would be contrary to the “rescue culture” that has emerged over recent years. The 
solution was therefore to divert attention away from getting “bogged down” in debates 
regarding fundamental principles and develop an alternative rescue device that focused on 
speeding up the process and maximising returns. This alternative mechanism is referred to as 
pre-packaged administrations. Whilst the current model reflects objectives endorsed by the 
Enterprise Act 2002, namely for the IP to consider the interests of the creditors as a whole, it 
does not provide for a basis in which pre-packed administrations can be justified.  
 
7.4. Dynamic Efficiency  
Following on from this, attention should now be drawn to Dynamic efficiency, which whilst 
central to the analyses of capital accumulation and economic growth, will in this instance be 
used to describe the ability of a given system to evolve and ultimately adapt according to the 
changing needs and wants of a particular market. The critical factor that must be evident to 
satisfy this test is firmly on the ability of a given process, over time and through 
implementing innovative measures to successfully survive in a changing and uncertain 
environment101. The question of what characteristics should be central to determining 
whether a mechanism is economically efficient remains unresolved102. Nevertheless, it is 
suggested that by looking at the conventional methods that have been adopted to analyse the 
relationship between economic growth and the distribution of capital wealth, a process can be 
deducted which can be applied to other situations. It is through this process that a set of 
                                                            
99 T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 
Ch 9; D. G. Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies, (1986), at 
127. 
100 See T.H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy and the Creditors’ Bargain’, 91 Yale Law Journal, (1982), at 
857; T.H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law; D.G. Baird and T.H. Jackson, ‘Corporate 
Reorganisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of 
Secured Creditors,’, 51 Chicago Law Review, (1984), at 97; T.H. Jackson and R.E. Scott, ‘On the Nature of 
Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’, 75 Virginia Law Review, (1989), at 
155.  
101 See A. B. Abel, N. G. Mankiw, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Zeckhauser, ‘Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: 
Theory and Evidence’, 56 Review of Economic Studies, (1989), 1-20, see 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/40_Assessing_Dynamic_Efficiency.pdf (accessed 3rd August 
2011). 
102 For instance see E. S. Phelps, Golden Rules of Economic Growth, (New York: Norton and Amsterdam: North 
Holland: 1966); P. Weil, ‘Love Thy Children: Reflections on the Barro Debt-Neutrality Theorem’, 19 Journal of 
Monetary Economics, (1987), 377-391; S. M. Feldstein, ‘Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social Security. A 
Comment’, 84 Journal of Political Economy, (1976), 331-336. 
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criteria can be established, which if satisfied may substantiate whether a given mechanism 
can be classed as dynamically efficient. It is the intention to adopt this method and make it 
applicable to corporate rescue.  
 
In rudimentary terms dynamic efficiency when applied in economic terms has been said to 
demonstrate an act whereby due to an intervening event, an imbalance occurs between 
competing interests and as a result one interest must look to support the other to its 
detriment103. To demonstrate this, a clear example would be to visualise a situation where a 
given economy was steady (stabilised) with plenty of capital at its disposal. If an influx 
occurred, such as a growth in the population which exceeds the steady marginal rate of 
capital, or if the state was investing more than it was earning, this would be deemed as 
dynamically inefficient104. Interestingly, however there is a possibility of making a Pareto 
improvement to the dynamic inefficient outcome, even if the actual implementation of such is 
not credible. To create the improvement, making sure that the ceiling of “best result” has 
been reached, the current generation would have to consume a portion of the capital stock and 
dictate that the level remains constant perpetually, binding future generations in the process. 
In essence, to apply the rule generally, dynamic efficiency seems to dictate that if a system, 
mechanism or principle gains more (opportunity or entitlement) than it outputs (greater than 
the distribution of resources) it satisfies the concept; if on the other hand the output is greater 
than the return it will be referred to as an inefficient process. 
 
The concept adopted in this case will reflect a model sensitive to fluctuations in risk (distress 
within a company) and its ability to embrace change as a means to survive. If the factors 
within a particular exposure can be captured and the values within can be said to maximise 
social welfare for some set of positive weights, it can be said that the model in question is 
dynamically efficient, but only on the basis that a Pareto improvement is impossible105. On 
this basis if an original model could be changed and that this transition would be Pareto 
improving, depending upon the feasibility, it could be concluded that the initial model was 
inefficient. Applying this notion to corporate rescue and the options that are made available 
to a distressed company, namely administration and the increasingly popular pre-packed 
                                                            
103 P. Diamond, ‘National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model’, 55 American Economic Review, (1965), 1126-
1150. 
104 A. B. Abel, N. G. Mankiw, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Zeckhauser, ‘Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory 
and Evidence’, 56 Review of Economic Studies, (1989), at 1. 
105 A. B. Abel, N. G. Mankiw, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Zeckhauser, ‘Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory 
and Evidence’, 56 Review of Economic Studies, (1989), at 5. 
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administrations, it begs the question whether the growing preference of the latter by IPs has 
by default rendered the former as inefficient and the pre-pack option as its Pareto-
improvement. 
 
7.5. Summary: Types of Efficiency  
Exploring the different notions of efficiency has raised some complex issues that would 
benefit from a brief summary.  
 
In a Pareto efficient economic allocation no one can be made better off without making at 
least one individual worse off. An allocation is defined as “Pareto optimal” when no further 
Pareto improvements can be made. 
 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency represents an outcome that is considered more efficient if a Pareto 
optimal outcome can be reached by arranging sufficient compensation from those that are 
made better off to those that are made worse off so that all would end up no worse off than 
before.  
 
Technical efficiency is concerned with achieving desired results with the minimal use of 
resources and costs, and the minimal wastage of effort. 
 
Dynamic efficiency describes the ability of a given system/process to evolve and through 
implementing innovative measures to successfully survive in a changing and uncertain 
environment.  
 
8. Notion of Efficiency  
Despite the importance placed upon the notion of efficiency, it is a value, best described as 
“an abstract concept” concerned with the “the outcome of a theoretical model of how 
resources can be best allocated in society”106. The objective of the notion disregards the wider 
social/ cultural perspective and chooses to lead policy astray with its own integrated, albeit 
secluded concerns107; away from values that if adhered to may prove beneficial to society. 
The debate surrounding why/whether one notion should be chosen over another, or why 
                                                            
106 C. W. Maughen and S. F. Copp, ‘The Law Commission and Economic Methodology: Values, Efficiency and 
Directors’ Duties’, 20 Co Law, (1999), 109, at 112. 
107 See M. J. Whincop, ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’, 19 
OJLS, (1999), 19, at 19-20. 
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efficiency should be the sole determinant remains a matter of debate108, with commentators 
justifying their arguments based on personal interpretations of what they consider to be the 
core values (whether that be social norms or within a contract theme), which is usually 
heavily influenced by their associated discipline (school of thought) and the desired aim of 
the concept in question. It remains that whilst efficiency serves a valuable role in determining 
what the law should be, it is as suggested above, one of a few that deserve consideration. 
Whether efficiency should be treated in the same manner as the other values is a moot point, 
but one thing that is clear is that it should not be seen as an end in itself109; it does not in itself 
provide a goal that any area of the law should aim to achieve as it creates no sufficient reason 
for the law to be one way or another110. Despite this caution, it does however appear that 
efficiency dominates analytic discussions on the law, certainly among law and economics 
scholars111 and with this prognosis it led to what can only be described as satisfying the 
modern obsession with producing multiple visual aids (usually in the form of colour 
coordinated graphs) to harshly criticise what in real terms is oversimplified technical data112. 
 
With this in mind, the real difficulty with analysing an aspect of the law is that one must 
endeavour to accommodate the other values within a world that is dominated by efficiency113. 
What is critical regarding this predicament is that it has to be justified why another value and 
efficiency are not ejusdem generis. On this premise the value that deserves to be singled out 
and treated as a key value that helps determine the direction of a piece of law is that of 
fairness as most people will agree that this should form the basis for most legal concepts114. 
Addressing the question of fairness requires a distancing process whereby the detail is 
                                                            
108 See S. Deakin and A. Hughes, ‘Economics and Company Law Reform: a Fruitful Partnership’, 20 Co Law, 
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Law and Regulation, (2011), 151, at 152. 
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examined as a whole, rather than as a single element (refraining from extracting and 
analysing individual strands that form the characteristics of the mechanism as a whole)115. 
Given the apparent tension between efficiency and fairness it is critical that the differences 
are set aside if normative economic analysis is to be accepted as a legitimate tool of public 
policy116. But it cannot through its analysis provide justification for weighing efficiency 
against any social interests that may be evident117. Exactly what the notion of efficiency 
should apply to depends upon the strain of law under the microscope, but there does appear to 
be some support for suggesting that efficiency should only be defined and applied to 
transactions that are voluntary as opposed to involuntary118. Adopting this method permits 
some control to be asserted over when a particular aspect should be measured and whether 
the obtained results are to be relied upon for further analysis. Unlike efficiency (whose main 
concern rests with choosing which notion of efficiency should be endorsed), fairness suffers 
from some terminological issues119. Defining fairness, as it will be seen, is not easy as it is an 
intrinsic term embedded so deeply in almost all basic legal principles that it could be best 
described as endorsing evolving characteristics operating in multiple dimensions that is 
incapable of precise definition120. Exploring this notion with reference to corporate rescue in 
its entirety is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, one critical component that features 
regularly in any analysis with this notion is how wealth is distributed in society121. Whilst this 
element will be explored, the key aspect of the research is concerned with examining the role 
that IPs have in this transaction and whether their conduct with reference to the notions of 
efficiency and fairness have contravened and in turn altered the characteristics of corporate 
rescue.  
 
9. Fairness 
Defining fairness to a certain degree suffers from the same difficulties as defining efficiency. 
Ultimately, it comes down to subjectively selecting one theory over another. It is expected 
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that a reasonable justification can be provided to demonstrate why an alternative theory is not 
as adequate as the one chosen. After all there must be a reason why it was favoured, even if 
this was because it complemented the authors’ way of thinking, or it fundamentally provided 
a premise upon which the core argument may be properly addressed. With this in mind this 
thesis will adopt John Rawls Justice as Fairness theory as it is a well-respected and often 
used approach, and it will allow the wider aims of this thesis to be examined and explored122.  
 
According to Rawls, fairness is a term that is associated with neutrality, a task of deciding 
what is just independently of any vested interest, bias or partiality. Developed further it can 
be understood that the fairness principles of justice must be “publicly reasonable”, i.e. 
arguable from a diversity of particular social stakes or values123. To demonstrate what this 
exactly means it is worth taking a moment to illustrate. Imagine the familiar experience of 
distributing pieces of birthday cake at a children’s’ party124. The diplomacy involved to 
ensure that no one received a larger slice than another is fraught with danger. To adopt a 
method that would reduce, but not eliminate the risk is to separate the slicing and choosing. If 
one child cuts the cake, and another distributes them, the slicer has every incentive to make 
each piece as close to equal as possible, as the slicer would not know which was his or 
hers125. Rawls fairness principle adopts a procedure which operates behind a “veil of 
ignorance” to ensure that decisions are fair and not as a result of vested interest. In other 
words their choice is constrained by the fact that they are deprived of certain types of 
knowledge about themselves126; encouraging an environment where you interact with others 
in a way that you would like to be treated yourself. Essentially, the veil of ignorance excludes 
the identity of parties being revealed by preventing any distinguishable feature being known 
to other persons. Because of this feature, no one can measure the position that they are in. 
They cannot determine what they do for a living, nor how intelligent they are, or what their 
abilities may be. Critically however the parties themselves cannot assess a concept, despite 
knowing themselves as individuals that they have their own definition of such a concept (and 
                                                            
122 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
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that it may be different from the other concepts held by others), and they do not know what 
that concept is (what their personal ideals and values may be)127.  
 
The fundamental point to grasp is that this “ignorance” principle is to be applied to the choice 
of principles of justice to ensure that the process and outcome are defined from an impartial 
point of view rather than determined on personal interests. As stated, to achieve these aims 
individual interests must be eradicated from the equation and the theory of justice which aims 
to promote neutrality tries to ensure that the different interests are all considered equally. It 
therefore follows that if each party in the “original position” do not know what their concept 
of good is they are naturally more inclined to choose principles that does not reflect or infer 
preference for any one particular concept128. What does occur is a mixture of various ideals in 
a single framework which tries to satisfy a broad range of interests.  
 
The discussion on Justice as Fairness offers an interesting insight into the way in which 
conflicts may be addressed and solutions found to satisfy a group in dispute as a whole. But it 
should be approached with caution as Rawls acknowledges that this idea of imposing 
conditions on the “original position” is only one point that is advanced to support his theory 
of fairness129.  
 
10. The Relationship between Corporate Rescue, Efficiency and Fairness 
Understanding the relationship between corporate rescue and the values adopted to analyse 
the legitimacy of its underlying principles involves taking a look back at Chapter Two where 
people’s reasonable and legitimate expectations were discussed. It will be remembered that 
these expectations form the substance that fuses other principles together. It is within this line 
of thinking that enables us to consider what would we reasonably wish to see in a contract if 
we drafted it130. The concept has a bearing on the efficiency of the agreement and the terms it 
produces, having the effect of creating a consensual obligation that brings an element of 
fairness to all reasonable parties concerned. Exactly what factors should be evident within 
this bargaining transaction all too often highlights a vulnerable party not represented within 
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the relationship. It appears the norm that one party will often not have the necessary 
information, knowledge or position within the relationship to protect their interests to a 
satisfactory level. Chapter Three brought into sharp contrast the relationship between the 
creditor and the IP and how the former party is left vulnerable to further risk after a company 
entered administration as there is a considerable lack of information that can be secured 
outside of the privileged position occupied by the IP. It was seen that IPs have been invested 
with wide discretion to enable them to act as they choose and free from any influence that the 
creditors may try to exert to recover debts. Fairness in this capacity can be diluted to imply 
that as long as the IP has considered the creditors’ interest as a whole, it does not matter that 
the goal of satisfying the creditors is not fulfilled. Consideration of interests and taking action 
to secure interests are two very different aims; the decision of which selection to take is 
usually determined by the amount of wealth that remains in the distressed company and the 
justifications that are evident to support any transaction/ transfer of wealth. The only option 
that is left for creditors to ensure that fairness (being treated fairly in the proceedings) has 
been actively considered is that the RPBs that govern IPs monitor the actions of their 
members to ensure that the relevant regulations and Codes have been complied with. It is 
acknowledged that this review process seeks to address imbalances after the “wrong” has 
been committed, but assessing whether an act was fair tends to be an act that can only be 
properly determined when a matter has been concluded. It is perhaps not surprising that an 
increasing number of R3 members stated that the regime for regulation did not work 
efficiently131. The findings are understood to make the distinction between efficiency and 
effectiveness, with the former term being used to describe a process that works well, and the 
latter referring to situations where the right tools have been selected to complete the task in 
mind. It appears to be the case that simply labelling this as an administrative problem is only 
partially true as the reason for ineffective information gathering and a monitoring system that 
is incapable of effective regulation appears to result in insufficient time, money, organisation, 
coordination and clarity of objectives132. This can be read in conjunction with the 
shortcomings and concerns associated with the behaviour of accountants, particularly in large 
insolvency cases where the professional fees charged tended to be not proportional and in 
most cases appeared to fail to consider interested creditors133. 
 
                                                            
131 L. Verrill, ‘The R3 Regulation Survey’, Recovery, (Autumn, 2004), at 27. 
132 G. Rummney and R. Smith, ‘Sorting Out the bad Apples’, Recovery, (Winter 2005), at 36. 
133 See Chapter Three.  
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10.1. Efficient Framework 
Taking this observation into consideration it is paramount to determine what is an “efficient 
framework”? Specifically, it should be asked by what benchmark should the outcome of a 
corporate insolvency procedure be measured? A framework of this nature requires a starting 
point (when an action qualifies to be audited by the criteria agreed) and a “critical point” 
whereby if a result hits an optimal point then it can be classed as not applying the efficiency 
value. Determining when an action qualifies as being inefficient depends entirely on the deed 
and the objective set. If a company enters liquidation then it could be said that the company 
was inefficient in what it did. There may be issues of poor management or external factors 
which have affected the operations of the said company. But it should be mentioned again 
that failure should not be seen as something that can always be avoided; it is a natural process 
and in some ways essential to the development of the business world and the economy134. If 
on the other hand a company has incorrectly entered administration, when the best course of 
action would have been to liquidate the company, then it may be said that the process in 
identifying the correct procedure has been inefficient. Pursuing the wrong procedure has 
important repercussions as it increases the professional chargeable fees as well as the costs 
associated with the procedures. Conversely, can it not be said that liquidation is an efficient 
process? This returns to the point of questioning the reasons why the company entered a 
rescue procedure in the first place. Issues that may be raised concern the behaviour of 
insolvency practitioners and how their actions may be influenced by potential personal 
financial gain in the insolvency proceedings135. Despite these reservations, in real terms the 
only way that corporate rescue can be measured is to determine how successful it has fulfilled 
a number of factors i.e. secures jobs, maintained the structure of the company, but it must be 
remembered that rescuing a company as a whole, unchanged, poses the risk of not addressing 
the issues that caused the distress in the first place. It follows that a method should not be 
adopted whereby only certain expectations that would prove fruitful to providing an efficient 
model should be chosen; expectations should be reasonable and aim to enhance and promote 
the strands that are used to measure legitimacy136. 
 
 
 
                                                            
134 For further discussion see the Darwinian approach in Chapter Two. 
135 See Chapter Three. 
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10.2. Substantive Aims and Procedural Goals 
Much reference has been made in previous chapters concerning the substantive aims of 
corporate rescue and what the procedural goals were to achieve these aims. For instance, 
when a company is found to be distressed it is natural to assume that certain expectations 
should be fulfilled such as new finance being sought, whether that is from existing creditors 
extending credit or new investors. It is equally expected that during the course of a rescue 
attempt the operations and transactions are not done contrary to any insolvency legislation, 
the regulations or conduct code that governs the professional actors in the implementation of 
their duties. Following on from this, it was examined in Chapter Three that the majority of 
decisions made on behalf of a company when it was distressed are made by an IP. Therefore 
it is intended that this will form the main point for analysis in order to determine whether 
their role and duties contravene the values to such a degree that it precludes corporate rescue 
from being a legitimate mechanism. 
 
Firstly, it should be remembered that expectations are reserved for parties privy to a 
contractual relationship, which in this case may refer to the company and its creditors. On 
this basis it could be said that the primary function for rescue in relation to the creditors, is to 
consider their interests as a whole. When defining ‘interests’ it is often done so in an isolated 
way, choosing to focus on actions that would produce the best financial return for the 
creditors (aggregate profit), when the task of minimising loses can also be seen to be just as 
beneficial. So in regards to this objective, what happens if expectations are not met? Based on 
a contractual relationship this would mean that someone would be accountable; if this was 
not the case then the lack of reasonable enforcement of expectations would create an 
unacceptable amount of uncertainty whereby agreements and actions would go unfulfilled. 
However, given the discretionary powers invested in IPs along with the way that they are 
governed and monitored, serious questions must be asked as to whether this apparent lack of 
duty based on an utilitarian approach, disregards a number of key values such as fairness and 
would make transactions almost impossible, rendering entire business networks (companies 
that are chain-linked and therefore dependent on each other, either for finance, employment 
or for parts to enable them to produce their product) at the mercy of becoming insolvent (the 
so called “ripple effect”)137. IPs are entrusted with the discretionary power to implement the 
law within the boundaries set, but when these confinements are “elasticated” it brings into 
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question whether any reasonable expectation can be considered at all. In fact it begs the 
question whether it is unreasonable even in contractual relationships to have reasonable 
expectations.  
 
10.3. Tensions between Values 
Part of explaining this dilemma rests with acknowledging the tensions that exist between the 
values; it cannot be ignored that trade-offs, particularly between the concepts of fairness and 
efficiency that are in a constant state of conflict, where compromise often takes precedence as 
the only means to reach some agreement between the various parties in question. The nature 
of rescue as discussed in Chapter Two revealed a mechanism that accepts that it has to evolve 
and adapt to the unique circumstances that are present when dealing with a company. With 
short time frames, complex company structures and business models to understand, it is of no 
surprise that the actions of IPs will always receive some criticism given that they are in a 
constant state of having to consider the interests of multiple parties. Despite this, decisions 
are made and it will rarely be the case that all the values can receive the same careful 
attention as each other. With this in mind it is suggested that given the definition of economic 
efficiency, corporate rescue cannot satisfactorily fulfil the requirements; the substantive and 
procedural goals of rescue are not compatible, and in some respects appear to be in conflict 
with each other. However, it is possible that the rescue model in the UK could fulfil one 
notion of efficiency, namely the dynamic efficiency test which the next chapter will examine. 
The concept of corporate rescue has shown a great ability to innovate, modify and survive in 
a changing and uncertain environment to suit the needs of its audience. The dissection of pre-
packs and whether it could fulfil the description of a legitimate process will be reserved for 
the next chapter, but what will now take place is a closer analysis of the relationship between 
fairness and efficiency.  
 
Departing from Mokal’s thinking that the efficiency rule cannot be a goal in itself because it 
does not determine why something should be one way or the other, one nevertheless cannot 
disregard core elements within a particular framework138 that are fixed (have an end result), 
for example in insolvency law the termination of the company i.e. liquidation139 or in relation 
to corporate rescue - completing a “pure rescue” strategy. It is suggested that if there is a 
thread that must run in one direction, whilst it may not be possible to determine the route, the 
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destination can be. In essence, as it can be determined that pure rescue has an ultimate end 
efficiency can be measured in three ways. Firstly, by how effective the procedure adopted is 
at rescuing the company (with reference to how intact the company remains); secondly, how 
effective is the procedure at dealing with a distressed company (the correlation between 
theory and practical application and whether this is in harmony); and thirdly, the way in 
which IPs implement rescue. This last measure takes a look at the process, the inherent 
characteristics and whether given the above, inefficiency has led to the use of professional 
discretion to modify the law so it is in tune with the needs of the market, but divergent when 
compared with the theme endorsed by current legislation.   
 
10.4. Fairness 
But what of fairness -can this be traded off against the concept of efficiency? This has caused 
some debate, with Finch stating that fairness may sometimes have to be traded off at the 
expense of efficiency140 and Mokal suggesting to the contrary141. The basis for the latter’s 
view is that substantive and procedural goals, which represent ends and means, do not 
compete. Reiterating, the objective of economic efficiency is to fulfil a contractual obligation 
“at minimal cost and without waste whatever social and distributional goals are set by 
society”142. So it is natural that the substantive goals must be set before the procedural goals 
can be approved. In essence, efficiency cannot be measured/ quantified until it has been 
decided what the end and means of rescue are.  
 
It has been briefly noted what some of these substantive goals of corporate insolvency law 
should be. The economic theory provides the scope for corporate insolvency law to provide a 
framework which eliminates inefficiency and in turn take the necessary action against 
uneconomic enterprises that cannot operate in a competitive market. It is in the understanding 
that resources are limited and could be better used in some other activity143; but whilst the 
process of transferring valuable resources to credible projects is not only sensible, it is 
efficient to do so. But it must also be remembered that whilst limiting and reserving risk and 
funds alike is an important factor in the business world, a corporate rescue framework should 
also provide a workable option where a distressed, yet salvageable company can be saved. In 
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essence the design of a rescue regime should incorporate various considerations which would 
ultimately provide for its purpose. There have been many attempts to provide a definition 
which would encapsulate the very meaning of corporate rescue; that would enhance its 
understanding in the wider context within a social, moral and economic environment. What 
will be emphasised here is that given the substantive goal of corporate rescue as being to save 
companies as a going concern, as opposed to the option of liquidation, the procedural goal to 
achieve this is flawed as rescue depends upon cost efficiency. Whilst noted above that some 
academics have suggested that efficiency cannot be a goal in itself, this thesis argues to the 
contrary in line with the argument made by Easterbrook who states that not only that “legal 
rules endure because they are efficient...”144, but also that it is “not good design which 
produces economic efficiency, but economic efficiency which explains the changes in the 
law”145. This harbours the suggestion that corporate rescue is flawed as a mechanism as the 
procedural goal which contains the efficiency rule has made it not cost efficient. However, is 
it not possible for something to be efficient just for the sake of being efficient? Can efficiency 
not be a goal in itself? The problem with this line of thought is that efficiency cannot be 
assessed on its own merits; it has to have some benchmark that enables it to determine 
exactly what is efficient. To be measured, efficiency must be used in conjunction with 
another value, which in this case is fairness. Fairness, whilst it offers a way of measuring 
efficiency, should be used with caution as it is after all still a subjective value that depends 
entirely on the interests being measured.  
 
Whilst it has been argued that corporate rescue in the way that it is structured in the UK is an 
inefficient, inadequate mechanism that does not reconcile with the commercial realities 
evident in the business world and does not provide a satisfying model that can be utilised 
with ease and confidence, a theory that requires more attention is the link that corporate 
rescue has with the concept of dynamic efficiency. Although the issue of dynamic efficiency 
is central to analyses of capital accumulation and economic growth, it may be applicable to 
cross-reference the term to models that are aware of, and recognise, the need to transform in 
order to survive in a changing and uncertain environment. The requirement to adjust to new 
challenges is understood to be critical to ensure the objectives of a particular model can be 
achieved. But if it tried to continue without addressing the concerns of the market, it would 
not only be considered detrimental to its existence as it would fail to justify its ability to be 
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economic efficient (i.e. wasteful), but it would also encourage alternative routes to be sought 
with the inadequate procedure being disregarded.  
 
Whilst fairness is predominately assessed within a contractual relationship with the focal 
point firmly being on measuring creditors’ expectations against the result, another aspect that 
should not be overlooked is the public interest factor. It was stated in Chapter Two that there 
is a general acceptance amongst the insolvency profession that a system dedicated to rescuing 
companies must do so with consideration to other interested parties, besides that of the 
creditors. In many cases companies operate within “dependent networks”, all providing some 
assistance to the other by way of finance, parts, labour or goods. When there is any disruption 
to the network it affects the entire group, meaning that some creditors will not be able to pay 
their own creditors – the so called “ripple effect” which leads to an overall downturn within 
the collective welfare of society. It is therefore of no surprise that questions are raised as to 
whether the present regime of implementing insolvency processes ensures fairness to affected 
parties146. Given the multi-dimensional capacity of insolvency related work, the actions of IPs 
will usually present conflicts of interests, therefore potential acts which could be deemed as 
unfair are persistent and are particularly rife when the duty and inherent behaviour of IPs are 
considered. Of special note, an aspect mentioned in Chapter Three, is the concern regarding 
the office holders and their respective firms, drawing attention to the relationship that some 
firms have with creditors and the influence that the latter have over the former; personal 
interests and other appointments may be relevant.  IPs firm may have financial interests 
present or future that are potentially affected by advice or decisions relating to a troubled 
company, and the quantity of the work or remuneration that an IP receives may be affected 
by actions or recommendations made. Exactly how the present legal system controls conflicts 
and endeavours to resolve discrepancies amongst interested parties in a distressed company is 
far from clear and is often conducted in a tense environment.  
 
11. Conclusion 
A critical way to measure how well something is doing is to ask how effective does a model 
achieve its intended goal? Given the vast array of goals that can be pursued, not all can be 
assessed in the same way. Different benchmarks are set according to the nature of the goal 
and not all models can endorse the same fundamental principles as each will be different. 
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Beside cultural influences, the overall model is subjected to wider issues which may be 
general in nature, such as economic downturn, or specific to the market in which the 
company operates.  In essence the contents of a model must be put in context and assessed 
accordingly.  
 
Subjecting corporate rescue to this framework involves identifying dominant principles 
within the current insolvency legislation that are presumed to be of significance due to the 
historical importance that they possess. Once these principles have been sought they may 
form the basis for assessment; providing a foundation in which they may reveal how one 
model compares to another in terms of how efficient they are in producing a desired outcome.  
 
To reduce conflict basic principles must be applied which may act as general tools. Values 
such as transparency and fairness are important as they allow a system to be viewed as a 
whole. Transparency is a universal value that can be discussed in conjunction with 
accountability; both aid to reassure the general public and interested parties that a model is 
doing what it is meant to do. Corporate rescue however does not satisfy the test satisfactorily 
as the process is not accessible and IPs are not accountable enough for the actions that they 
take.  
 
Applying the four main notions of efficiency to corporate rescue has revealed some 
interesting findings. The main difficulty identified when applying Pareto efficiency to a 
corporate rescue model is whether the notion can truly be applied to a functioning principle 
that operates in the “real world”? Based on this concern, the preference is to use the 
alternative notion known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. This notion has benefits as unlike the 
former notion there is no actual requirement to compensate the losers. The only requirement 
is that the winners must gain more than the losses to the losers. Applying this notion to 
corporate rescue it is highly unlikely that the company would be able to compensate the 
creditors to such a degree that their grievances were satisfied. Furthermore, should this be 
done at all? Why should the risk element of investment be disregarded? Whilst contractual 
obligations play a key role in determining how debt is divided, it does so with the knowledge 
that not all parties or debts are equal. Satisfying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency means that the value 
of the compensation provided must be at such a level to be sufficient to the affected party. 
But since this depends entirely on the individual’s wealth the notion is susceptible to many 
possibilities and cannot be applied with any certainty.  
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In reference to practical application, technical costs are often applied which realises that the 
stronger competitor, principle or result should dictate the flow. The notion believes that the 
market provides the answers to the problems that exist in a particular area. As explored in 
Chapter Three, IPs have heavily influenced how administration is to be interpreted and in 
turn have been responsible for the rise in alternative rescue strategies such as pre-packs being 
deployed. This can be read in conjunction with dynamic efficiency which describes the 
ability of a given system to evolve and ultimately adapt the changing needs of a given 
market. It will be suggested that corporate rescue methods have evolved to the needs of the 
business world. 
 
In terms of the actors who participate in a company there are legitimate expectations exerted 
that controls how the company is run as well as how potential financial distress is dealt with. 
Can administration be said to offer the best deal for a distressed company? The research 
completed in this chapter inclines us to conclude that it does not fully capture commercial 
practice, and survives only by categorising inconsistent elements as exogenous147. Whilst the 
legal uncertainty cannot be eliminated; it can only be managed148 and this has created a two-
tier system whereby an informal approach has been taken. The next chapter will now explore 
pre-packed administration.  
                                                            
147 P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), at 714. 
148 J. Benjamin, ‘The Narratives of Financial Law’, 40(3) OJLS, (2010), 787, at 807. 
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Chapter 5 
The Pragmatic Response (The Compromise): Pre-Packaged Administration 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The previous chapters have highlighted the difficulty in assessing the United Kingdom’s 
rescue regime, primarily because the basis of assessment is unclear1. It has been seen that the 
boundaries of “the rescue process” vary according to the subjective opinion of each 
commentator and the situation that this presents. Whilst Chapter Two examined the fact that 
rescue can be seen as “a major intervention necessary to avert eventual failure of the 
company”, the definition is fraught with terminological deficiencies. What is clear is that 
rescues may operate through informal mechanisms as well as formal legal processes. But it is 
with the former process that most rescues are achieved as informal actions do not require any 
resort to statutory insolvency procedures2. Moreover, in addition to choosing one procedure 
over another, it is also possible to have a hybrid model that has a formal and informal stage. 
This is where the pre-packaged administration (“pre-packs”) is involved as it has elements 
that can be found within a formal insolvency procedure (the administration process) but the 
actual substance of pre-packs comprises an array of negotiations and undertakings that take 
place prior to the company entering administration and are, therefore, informal. As such, it 
will be necessary to re-examine the role of the Insolvency Practitioner (IP) in this chapter and 
build on the research conducted in Chapter Three. As noted earlier, the discretion afforded to 
IPs often places the entire rescue process behind a veil of secrecy and the fundamental 
difference here when considering a pre-pack is that most of the negotiations and potential 
contracts have been drawn up before administration has been entered into. In addition to this 
it will be seen that a UK pre-pack frequently, but not always, takes the form not of a 
reorganisation and rescue of the company, but of a management buyout of the company’s 
business3. With this in mind, there will be questions surrounding the legitimacy of pre-packs 
and whether they can be regarded as a true corporate rescue procedure. There will be some 
expected difficulties in assessing pre-packs as they lack a true identity, given that there is no 
                                                            
1 This concern is also raised by Finch, see V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and 
the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal of Business Law, (2010), 502. 
2 See S. Frisby, ‘Report to the Insolvency Service: Insolvency Outcomes’, (Insolvency Service, London, June 
2006). For informal rescues, see S. Slatter, D. Lovett and L. Barlow, ‘Leading Corporate Turnaround’, (John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2006). 
3 J. Moulton, ‘The Uncomfortable Edge of Property – Pre-Packs or Just Stitch ups?’, Recovery, (Autumn 2005), 
2; M. Ellis, ‘The Thin Line in the Sand Pre-Packs and Phoenixes’, Recovery, (Spring 2006), 3. 
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legal definition of the “pre-pack” as with other rescue processes4. Nevertheless, the key 
questions remain: do pre-packaged administrations offer a viable and legitimate solution to 
the inadequacies of the current law governing corporate rescue? Given the nature of pre-
packs and the increasing preference for them5, can the trend be said to be contributing to a 
change in the corporate rescue regime in the UK? And lastly, does this change constitute a 
shift so fundamentally different to the corporate rescue model that exists in the UK that it 
could be said to render the current law partly redundant and in turn mean that the UK is 
lacking an effective corporate rescue model? 
 
2. Background: Pre-Packaged Administration  
Before an examination of what a pre-pack actually is and what this procedure involves, it is 
imperative to reiterate aspects of Chapter Two and Three which analysed the development of 
the corporate rescue process when the Enterprise Act 2002 was enacted. The original 
administration procedure was substantially altered by section 248 of EA 2002, which 
substituted a new Part II of the 1986 Act, now compromising a single section, section 8, 
which provides that “Schedule B1 to this Act should have effect”. Paragraphs 3 and 4, headed 
‘Purpose of administration’ set out the objectives of administration: 
 
(3)(1) The administrator of a company must perform his functions with the objective of –  
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be 
likely if the company were wound up (without first being in administration), or 
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.  
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the administrator of a company must perform his functions 
in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole. 
                                                            
4 However, despite the lack of legal input, attention will be drawn to the Statement of Insolvency Practice (SIP) 
16, which offers guidance on pre-packaged sales in administration and in particular provides a non-legal 
definition of pre-packs. Whilst this will be discussed in greater detail, it suffices to note that the purpose of SIPs 
is to set out basic principles and essential procedures with which insolvency practitioners are required to 
comply. Departure from the standard(s) set out in the SIP(s) is a matter that may be considered by a 
practitioner’s regulatory authority for the purposes of possible disciplinary or regulatory action. It is therefore 
important to understand that SIPs should not be relied upon as definitive statements of the law. For reference see 
the website for the Institute of Chartered Accountants (in England and Wales) 
http://www.icaew.com/~/media/files/technical/insolvency/regulations-and-standards/sips/england/sip-16-e-and-
w-pre-packaged-sales-in-administrations (accessed 17th January 2012). 
5 It has been estimated that at least 50% of all UL administrations are pre-packaged. See S. Davies, ‘Pre-packs: 
He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune’, Recovery, (2006), 16.  
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(3) The administrator must perform his functions with the objective specified in sub-
paragraph (1)(a) unless he thinks either –  
(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective, or 
(b) that the objective specified in sub-paragraph (1)(b) would achieve a better result 
for the company’s creditors as a whole 
(4) The administrator may perform his functions with the objective specified in sub-
paragraph (1)(c) only if –  
(a) he thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve either of the objectives 
specified in sub-paragraph 1(a) and (b), and 
(b) he does not unnecessarily harm any of the interests of the creditors of the company 
as a whole. 
 
Whilst it is stated that there is now a single purpose to administration, it comprises three 
objectives that are ranked in order of priority. In addition to these objectives it is paramount 
that the administrator performs his or her functions “in the interests of the creditors as a 
whole”. As previously suggested, the primary objective of an administration appointment is 
the rescuing of the company as a going concern. It is apparent that in accepting such an 
objective, a high proportion of appointments of administrators have been made and will be 
made in cases where a rescue of the company in this sense is not reasonably practical and the 
alternative objective under paragraph 3(1)(b) is the more achievable6. Under this objective 
the sale of the company’s business or undertakings as a whole or in parts would proceed. It is 
important to note that even if the administrator considers that it is practically possible to 
rescue the company, objective 3(1)(b) would be pursued if it would achieve a better result for 
the company’s creditors as a whole. Determining which objective is achieved is entirely 
dependent on the administrator and is something that is often unknown until the 
administration appointment has been made. Whilst it is clear that the court will only make an 
appointment if it is satisfied that the purpose of administration is likely to be achieved (this 
should be distinguished from out of court appointments), the evidence adduced must contain 
an opinion from the proposed administrator on whether the objective is achievable7.  
 
                                                            
6 See Key2law (Surrey) LLP v Gaynor De’Antiquis (Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
intervening) [2011] EWCA Civ. 1567, para 32. 
7 See Insolvency Rules 1986, rule 2.3(5). 
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With the basic outline of administration covered, the question is: where do pre-packaged 
administrations fit in? Because in most cases the idea of rescuing a company is rejected as an 
unachievable objective, the focus is instead on the objective of achieving a better result for 
the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely evident if the company were wound 
up (without first being in administration). If the court is satisfied that this objective can 
reasonably be achieved, then the condition set out in para 3(1)(b) will be satisfied.  
 
A pre-pack involves a pre-arranged sale of all or part of a distressed business or assets of the 
company, which will be executed immediately, or shortly, after the appointment of an 
administrator8. It will be remembered in Chapter Two that a detailed discussion took place 
regarding the sale of the business and the sale of the company and how the two differ. It 
remains that administration is closely associated with a business sale9. The difference 
between a classic administration and pre-packs however brings a new dimension, as a pre-
pack sale is arranged prior to the appointment of the administrator and the creditors get no 
say in relation to the sale10. At the time of entering into administration there is effectively “a 
done deal”. From an unsecured creditors’ perspective the pre-pack is a mechanism that is not 
only potentially prejudicial to their interests, but also causes questions to be asked concerning 
the legitimacy of a model that can be completed without all the interested parties knowing 
about the existence of the transaction, and which often is designed to benefit those inside the 
company. 
 
Turning to the efficiency of pre-packs and drawing on the research considered in Chapter 
Four, there is a growing consensus amongst IPs that it is best and most beneficial if the 
business of a distressed company can be sold as a going concern at the optimum time. It 
should be noted that pre-packs are often conceived weeks or even months before the 
appointment of an administrator. The justification for having such early intervention is often 
cited as being the result of adopting a prudent commercial judgement, as it is accepted that 
                                                            
8 Insolvency Service, ‘Report on the First Six Months’, Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16’, 
(2009), para 2.1. 
9 It appears that Frisby’s research shows that between 2004-2006 on a database of 2,063 companies which 
entered into administration or administrative receivership between September 2001 and September 2004, 32% 
of the post Enterprise Act 2002 administration case samples are as a going concern sale of the company’s 
business, while 56% are asset sale where a company’s assets were sold on a break up basis. See S. Frisby, 
‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’, (Insolvency Service, 2006), at 61. 
10 The distinction between pre-packs and business sale within administration should not be understated as the 
latter is driven by considerations and assessments raised post appointment of an administrator, see S. Frisby, ‘A 
Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business Recovery Professionals, 
2007), at 9. 
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the conduct of modern business is complex in nature. The complexity allows administrators 
to go about their business knowing full well that there are expectations placed upon them 
from stakeholders to do the necessary preparatory work before an administration takes place, 
without which the potential value from the proposed sale of all or part of a distressed business 
or assets of the company would be reduced, and hence make the purpose of the process less 
effective11. Despite the main justification provided for allowing pre-packs there are concerns, 
which have now been recognised by professional regulators, that pre-packs are capable of 
being abused by those intent on doing so12. Exactly how these abuses may materialise, and to 
what extent might they occur, is something that will be discussed shortly. What must now be 
examined are the theoretical and practical reasons behind pre-packs. 
 
3. Pre-Packs and Legitimacy 
As previously stated, any attempt made to find a comprehensive definition of a pre-pack, or 
what the process involves may prove to be a fruitless task. But that is not to say that no 
guidance exists. On the contrary, little by little assistance is being provided to those who wish 
to understand more about the pre-pack strategy. In recent years much attention has been 
drawn to the case of Kayley Vending Limited13, which, as will be seen, has not been 
unwarranted. It should be made clear from the outset that this case was completed in two 
halves, with the first consideration merely occurring to allow the court to make the 
administration order, and the second stage materialising on the premise that the court 
accepted the invitation (from the applicant) to provide the profession with some guidance as 
to the approach of the Court to what had become known as pre-pack administration 
applications. The details of the case itself will not be recited as the circumstances were 
largely unremarkable and would not contribute anything to the overall discussion. Nor will it 
be necessary to recall every matter that was discussed in the judgment as various aspects will 
be analysed throughout this chapter at points where it is more appropriate to do so. That said, 
the first main point worth highlighting from the deliberations is that the court was keen to 
remind the profession that the purpose of the Insolvency Act 2000 and the Enterprise Act 
2002 were in fact to reduce the involvement of the court in the initiation of insolvency 
processes. In cases where an application to the court was still required the process would be 
                                                            
11 R. Robinson, ‘President’s Column’, Recovery, (Winter 2005), at 34. 
12 Insolvency Service, ‘Report on the First Six Months’, Operation of Statement if Insolvency Practice 16’, 
(2009), para 2.3. 
13 Re Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 578. 
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streamlined with a greater clarity concerning the information required for that purpose14. 
However, determining exactly what information is required is far from clear and remains an 
issue that has still not properly been addressed despite the introduction of SIP 16. SIP 16 will 
be discussed in detail later in this chapter. But it suffices to mention that despite efforts made 
to make the process more transparent a concern that has not been fully addressed is how, or 
what, the courts will or should do when faced with a possible clear case of abuse within a 
pre-pack? Should they address the issue and try to rectify the wrong, or is the issue a matter 
for the legislature? This challenge clearly weighed heavily in the mind of the presiding judge, 
HHJ David Cooke (sitting as a High Court judge) in Re Kayley Vending Ltd, who made it 
clear that he did not want his judgment to be construed as being anything like a practice 
direction15. Nevertheless, his findings, in conjunction with assessing the legality issue, are 
worth exploring, in particular the concerns and positives regarding pre-packs. 
 
Starting on a positive note, it is common knowledge that the main advantage of a pre-pack 
process is that it enables the business to be sold quickly, with the minimum possible adverse 
impact from either public knowledge of its insolvency or the restrictions imposed by the 
insolvency process itself16. In some cases this may mean that employees can be retained who 
may have left, or have to be dismissed once a formal insolvency process commences. This 
continuity of the business, even if it only exists on an external front can encourage the 
customer and supply contracts to be maintained. Of course, this depends on a lot of factors, 
namely the ability of the financially distressed company to continue to trade whilst 
negotiations are ongoing to secure a sale of business. Inevitably attempts to sustain value may 
result in the company suffering some damage to its value, despite best efforts to maintain the 
company’s value. Reasons for this vary from the general stigma associated with failed 
businesses as discussed in Chapter Two, to the perception that bad management is to be 
blamed and investors wish to protect their interests.  
 
Whilst there is a clear advantage to be gained from concealing the troubles of a company 
from the general public, a pre-packaged proposed sale has not been subjected to the 
competitive forces of the market, which ultimately may lead to the company or assets within 
the business being sold at a value below what would ordinarily have been the case if it had 
                                                            
14 Re Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 578, para 3. 
15 Re Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 578, para 3. 
16 Re Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 578, para 6. 
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been exposed to the market for an appropriate period17. In addition to the rights of 
stakeholders to participate in the decision making process, effectively by-passed in a pre-
pack, something which is a central principle in the administration process, it becomes clear as 
mentioned above that the lack of transparency within the pre-pack process renders it difficult 
for most creditors to determine how the deal was struck and whether the administrator has 
properly conducted all the necessary enquiries as well as completed his or her duties in a 
manner that complies with the legislation and does not prejudice the creditors’ interests18. It 
appears that the lack of transparency has eradicated any attempt to question accountability, 
especially in regards to any creditor wishing to challenge the practitioner’s conduct, as 
retrieving the correct information in the first place will be very difficult19.  
 
It is in relation to the lack of transparency and finding a potential purchaser that leads us on to 
perhaps the most troublesome issue associated with pre-packs, that of selling the business to a 
party previously connected with the company. This process by its very nature raises some 
immediate questions, ranging from why is the process not advertised, given the profound 
assumption that these meetings to negotiate the sale, if they can be classed as meetings, are 
held in private and with haste, to questioning the soundness and legality in giving the 
ownership to what appears to be the same people who controlled the company at the time the 
company became distressed20.  
 
Explaining the justifications behind these decisions will for the majority of the time “falls on 
deaf ears” as far as the creditors are concerned. Why should previous managers of failed 
businesses be given a second chance by buying and controlling the same company at a 
discounted price? Granted it is not always this clear cut. The business may be restructured 
and as a result of this it may not technically be the same, the managers may not be fully to 
blame for the insolvency of the company, and in fact the ones that remain, if anything, are 
showing that they still believe that the business can be profitable. But the problem, or perhaps 
                                                            
17 The debate around pre-packs essentially centres upon whether or not the pre-pack is an appropriate and 
effective method of selling a business, see S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, 
Report to the Association of Business Recovery Professionals, (August 2007), at 8. 
18 S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, (August 2007), at 8 
19 S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, (August 2007), at 8. 
20 Cf Chapter 11 bankruptcies whereby the bankruptcy estate vests in the “debtor in possession” and so the 
company’s management may remain in place during the reorganisation period. See generally R. Parry, 
Corporate Rescue, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at pp. 262-265. 
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more aptly put – the suspicion – is how quickly these deals are undertaken. How to remove 
this suspicion will not be easy as there is no guidance note as to “what represents a good pre-
pack” and in turn “what represents a bad pre-pack”21. Whether such a list could be compiled 
is another matter as it can be appreciated that all variables when placed together produce 
unique circumstances. From the type of business to the speed in which a deal must be done, 
all this has a bearing on how such a procedure should be carried out; and even when the 
circumstances of companies share similar characteristics there will be no shortage of differing 
opinions as to the best method to employ and indeed whether the procedure is infringing the 
legislation. Whether the parameters have been overstepped depends often on whose 
perspective is offered. Questions surrounding potential areas susceptible to being abused will 
only be quashed or at least quietened if there is a genuine effort by the regulating authorities 
or the Department of BIS to provide a framework which can be used as a “best practice” 
model.  
 
What needs to be assessed before suggesting any factors which could produce a model of bad 
practice is to fully assess the charges that are laid against pre-packs. However it must be 
stressed that prejudices and assumptions are prevalent as the nature of pre-packs affects a 
sensitive issue – the distribution of wealth and control. Therefore it is imperative that the 
arguments are supported by data and research. There is already one report conducted by Dr 
Sandra Frisby entitled ‘Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packed Administrations’, but this 
chooses to focus on the debatable factors surrounding what makes a good pre-pack and the 
report also provides a comprehensive data analysis illustrating the various success rates of 
pre-packs at different stages of being initiated rather than questioning the fundamentals of the 
legality of pre-packs.  
 
What now needs to be looked at again is the objective of corporate rescue, as mentioned in 
Chapter three and whether pre-packs can be correctly associated with rescue or is it simply a 
process that allows management buy outs? 
 
4. Insolvency Practitioner’s Discretion and the Objective of Rescue 
The administration procedure, as reformulated by the Enterprise Act 2002 has provided IPs 
with a three-tier hierarchy list of objectives which should be considered in order of 
                                                            
21 S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, (August 2007), at 7. 
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preference, commencing with the rescue of the company as a going concern. As submitted 
earlier, whilst administration will very rarely lead to a genuine company rescue22, there are 
serious questions raised as to what is the purpose of the procedure? The IP is duty bound to 
consider the first objective contained within paragraph 3(a) and be seen to make efforts 
towards rehabilitating the company. However, the difficulty with pre-packs is that the IP is 
usually involved prior to his or her formal appointment and will often have already settled a 
price for sale with a prospective buyer; upon his or her formal appointment the transfer of the 
business is swiftly, undertaken. The process does perhaps offer a pragmatic solution to a 
distressed company whose board and shareholders desire it to be saved, but fears that any 
publicity of its financial troubles may further contribute to the company’s demise23. 
Furthermore the option is favourable to secured creditors as it allows them to participate in 
the process and ensures that they negotiate a secured return. However, the position is entirely 
different with unsecured creditors. Despite financially supporting the company in providing 
services or other necessities, they share the risk that comes with distress, but it is questionable 
whether their interests are considered on the same level regardless of being susceptible to the 
same challenges that face secured creditors. Pursuing one option at the expense of another, 
which is a fundamental characteristic associated with a pre-pack strategy, there is a danger 
that the company is developing a single way forward without fully consulting all of the 
interested creditors24. It could be argued that this process neglects the important principle of 
ensuring that any potential action by the company is fair and transparent25. Essentially, given 
that most ‘new’ purchasers are in fact members of the existing management of the distressed 
company, there is a question as to whether there is a breach of duty committed by the IP i.e. a 
conflict caused by the threat of familiarity26. It follows that since a pre-packed sale does not 
achieve the first (primary) objective of administration, the IP has potentially failed to 
consider the statutory duty of rescuing the company as a going concern. Thus, it appears that 
pre-packs have been designed with objective two and three in mind, which causes one to 
                                                            
22 Reference should be made to the empirical research obtained by Frisby ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’, 
(2006): whole or part company rescues among the post-EA administrations sample are 2.4% and in the pre-EA 
sample 4.7%. 
23 This is particularly relevant in companies that rely on public perception, such as a business that is focused on 
services or those that have many intangible assets like a strong brand or intellectual property. See M. Ellis, the 
Thin Line in the Sand Pre-Packs and Phoenixes’, Recovery, (Spring 2006), at 3. 
24 V. Finch, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations: Bargains in the Shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy Bargains’, 
Journal of Business Law, (2006), 568. See A. Katz and M. Mumford, ‘Study of Administration Cases’, 
Insolvency Service, (October 2006), at 50. 
25 However, for a different view to these concerns see S. Frisby, ‘The Pre-pack Promise: Signs of Fulfilment?’, 
Recovery, (Spring 2010), 30. 
26 A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’, Company 
Lawyer, (2008), 259, at 260. See also Chapter Three, Part II – Section 9: Breach to the Fundamental Principles. 
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question whether pre-packs can be associated with corporate rescue; but at the same time it 
should also be assessed whether, given the characteristics of pre-packs, they should be 
seriously considered as a true alternative to the administration process?27  
 
4.1. Making the Right Decision – when to Sell? 
A serious headache that is often given to IPs is the conflicting strategies: whether to turn a 
company around, or to sell the business as a going concern. The distinction is absolutely 
critical. Whilst it has been noted that administration is concerned with the attempt to 
rehabilitate the company, the intention behind pre-packs is not to be concerned with such a 
matter. The debate that has surrounded the use of this procedure by practitioners has been 
well documented, with proponents of the procedure providing commercial common sense as 
a justification for offering this option, as a means of extracting value for creditors from the 
distressed corporate estate28. This is true to a certain extent, and particularly true if the 
company has retained part of its business that is worth salvaging29. It therefore remains that 
instead of selling off the assets belonging to a distressed company in the hope that the value 
holds, it will often be the case that selling a business as a going concern will reap better 
rewards for the creditors. But this should not be read as merely selfishly maximising the 
surplus for creditors, for it may also assist in saving employment, and supplier and customer 
relationships, as well as affording the business a second chance30. This wider consideration 
often acts as a justification for initiating a pre-pack strategy, stating that the second objective 
contained within the administration procedure aims to achieve a better result for creditors as a 
whole31 than would be achieved in liquidation. Support for this stems from the premise that 
the administrator must pursue his or her functions in the interests of the company’s creditors 
                                                            
27 It seems to be the case that it is the ability under para 68 of Sch. B1 to appoint an administrator out of court (a 
clear difference in comparison to the original administration regime) with minimal formality which has led to 
the recent widespread adoption of the pre-pack version of administration. See S. Harris, ‘The Decision to Pre-
Pack’, Recovery, (Winter 2004), 26, at 27. See also A. Zacaroli, ‘The Powers of Administration Under Schedule 
B1 Prior To The Creditors’ Meeting – Transbus International Limited’, 1(4) International Corporate Rescue, 
(2004), 208, who suggests that the administrator may now enter into an immediate sale of the company’s assets 
after being appointed by the company managers, without any court involvement or scrutiny from the courts.  
28 V. Finch, ‘Pre-packaged Administrations: Bargains in the Shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy Bargains?’, 
Journal of Business Law, (2006), 568; P. Walton, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations: Trick or Treat?’, 19 
Insolvency Intelligence, (2006), 113; J. Moulton, ‘The Uncomfortable edge of property – Pre-Packs or Just 
Stitch ups?’, Recovery, (Autumn, 2005), 2; S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged 
Administrations’, Report to The Association of Business Recovery Professionals, (August, 2007). 
29 B. Xie, ‘Protecting the interests of General Unsecured Creditors in Pre-Packs: the Implication and 
Implementation of SIP 16’, Company Lawyer, (2010), 189, at 189. 
30 A. Bloom and S. Harris, ‘Pre-packaged Administrations What should be Done Given the Current Disquiet’, 
19 Insolvency Intelligence, (2006), 122, at 122. 
31 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 3(2). 
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as a whole. Therefore it is clear that the administrator is not compelled to rescue the company 
at all costs; there has to be an unbiased assessment to determine the value to be gained from 
the various options available. Needless to say that the tension between protecting the 
company and protecting the business is something that was expected and hence catered for 
within the legislation32. The result of this foresight within the law means that rescuing the 
company gives way to arrangements that would provide a better result for the creditors as 
whole. Thus the priority of rescue is weighed in favour of saving the business where this 
leads to a better result for the creditors33. Nevertheless, whilst this may appear straight 
forward a word of caution should be applied as this should be read in conjunction with the 
explanatory notes contained within the Enterprise Act 2002, which state that rescuing the 
company as a going concern should mean “the company and as much of the business as 
possible”34. As such, rescuing parts of the company will not satisfy the objective, the focus 
should be on the company and its ability to operate as a going concern35. 
 
4.2. Is a Pre-pack really Corporate Rescue? 
The recurring theme however draws us back to the question: is the pre-pack really a corporate 
rescue procedure? Or to put it another way: does the disregard of the primary objective 
negate the entire legacy of corporate rescue? To answer this question attention should be 
drawn to the accountability of IPs and the participation of creditors within the process. Whilst 
most of this was discussed in Chapter Three, there are some aspects which are particularly 
noteworthy and warrant further consideration. As regards administration it is necessary for 
IPs to provide a framework as to how they are to achieve the purpose of administration, and 
within eight weeks of taking office they must send notice of the proposal to the company’s 
creditors36. In addition to this framework, it also a requirement that within 10 weeks of taking 
office the IP must call a creditors’ meeting in order to vote on the plan37. So whilst it is clear 
that the IP must perform his or her functions in the interests of the creditors as a whole38 and 
as quickly and efficiently is possible39, this does not necessarily mean that what the creditors 
                                                            
32 Whilst the primary objective is to save the company as set out in para 3(1), the secondary objectives focus on 
the salvaging of the business, see para 3(3) and 3(3)(b). 
33 See V. Finch, Corporate Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal of 
Business Law, (2010), 502, at 509. 
34 Enterprise Act 2002, para 647. 
35 See S. Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime’, 67 Modern Law Review, (2004), 247, 262-263. 
36 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 49. 
37 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 51. 
38 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 3(2). 
39 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 4. 
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would see as the most desirable outcome will be achieved. Part of the issue rests with the 
significant powers of discretion that have been afforded to the IP. Ultimately the IP is the 
architect rather than a guardian of the administration process and it is this perception that has 
been fortified by the Enterprise Act 2002 which permits them to perform their functions as 
they see fit. In addition it is interesting to note that the courts are aware of their own 
limitation (expertise and commercial knowledge) and because of this place a great reliance on 
the expertise and experience of impartial IPs40. Because of the reluctance demonstrated by the 
courts to interfere with the decisions and commercial judgement of the administrators41, IPs 
have been afforded wide discretion42. A clear example that exemplifies the extent of this 
discretion can be seen when an administrator reviews the primary objective (the only true 
objective that promotes corporate rescue) and may override this if he or she “thinks” that it is 
not reasonably practicable to rescue the company as a going concern43. What constitutes an 
acceptable level of “thinking” can hardly be tested apart from perhaps making sure that the 
administrator complies with the relevant guidelines and regulations such as SIP 16, which 
requires the administrator to demonstrate his or her reasons for the actions taken and that they 
have considered alternative financial options44. But even this is subjected to his or her 
discretion and despite the somewhat unequivocal directions on how complete the reports 
                                                            
40 See DKLL Solicitors v HM Revenue & Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch), [2007] B.C.C. 908. Earlier support 
can be drawn from Re T & D Industries Plc [2000] 1 All E.R. 333, where the court held that administrators have 
the power to sell the whole of the assets and business of the company in advance of convening a creditors’ 
meeting and without the need to go to the court for directions. Reference should also be made to the Insolvency 
Act 1986 s.17 (2) states: “...[T]he administrator shall mange the affairs, business and property of the company 
(a) at any time before proposals have been approved (with or without modifications), in accordance with any 
directions given by the court, and (b) at any time after the proposals have been so approved, in accordance with 
those proposals as from time to time revised, whether by him or a predecessor of his”. 
41 C. Swain, ‘A Move towards A Stakeholder Society?’, 19 Insolvency law and Practice, (2003), 7. 
42 Further support can be drawn from Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] 2 All E. R. 911, in which the court 
accepted that in many cases the administrator will be called to reach an urgent and important decision in his 
attempt to preserve the value in a viable business which would otherwise be lost. See A. Lockerbie and P. 
Godfrey. ‘Pre-packaged Administration: The Legal Framework’, Recovery, (Summer, 2006). 
43 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 3(3) a-b 
44 On the scope and meaning of the word ‘think’ in this context see J. Armour and R. J. Mokal, ‘Reforming the 
Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002’, LMCLQ, (2005), 28. In particular it is worth 
referring to their reference to Hansard,10 April 2002 : Columns 569-70 (“The word ‘thinks’ in those paragraphs 
means that the administrator will have to reach a considered view [about which objective to pursue]. In such 
situations, the administrator’s decision would be subject to a rationality test by which it would be challenged if it 
could be shown that no reasonable administrator would have acted in such a way in those circumstances”); 29 
July 2002 : Column 768 (“The present wording would mean that if the administrator’s view were then to be 
tested, it would be subject to a ‘rationality’ test — that is, his decisions would be subject to successful challenge 
if it could be shown that no reasonable administrator would have acted in such a way in the particular 
circumstances of a case”), and 21 October 2002 : Column 1105 (“If necessary, we would expect the courts to 
assess whether the office holder, in this case the administrator, has been rational in his decision. We are not 
seeking to apply any other test”).   
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should be, this is not always done45. As such it leaves the administrator with considerable 
room for manoeuvre to dismiss the primary objective and to then consider the secondary 
options46.  
 
However, notwithstanding the three objectives open to the IP, complying with the provision 
that requires a creditors’ meeting to be held is conditional upon a number of points. There are 
four exceptions to the requirement to hold a meeting, with one that is central to the 
development of pre-packs. The three non central exceptions cover (1) where the IP considers 
that the company has sufficient property to enable each creditor of the company to be paid in 
full47; (2) that the company has insufficient property to enable a distribution to be made to 
unsecured creditors48; or (3) it is not feasible to achieve a result better than winding up49. The 
fourth and critical exception relevant to this thesis is where the rescue of the company as a 
going concern cannot be achieved then this renders a creditors’ meeting unnecessary50. In 
effect this sanctions the action for the IP to take measures that will bring about a pre-pack 
prior to a creditors’ meeting. However, it should be stressed that the IP will prior to a 
creditors’ meeting usually consult any secured creditors (particularly banks), but it is unlikely 
that all creditors will be afforded the same treatment, in particular if they happen to be less 
powerful and with little resources to make their interests known when compared to others51.   
 
It is often noted that the speed in which a business sale under a pre-pack may be completed is 
something that has an advantage over a purer form of administration. The differences 
between the two also continue when the focus is placed upon the extent that a distressed 
company is exposed to the market in which it operates. In a pre-pack the business is often 
subjected to investigations that are done in secret and hence hardly subjected to the market, 
                                                            
45 It appears to be a reoccurring theme that there is virtually no opportunity for any independent assessment of 
the insolvency practitioner’s actions, see also P. Walton, ‘Pre-packin’ in the UK’, 18 International Insolvency 
Review, (2009), 85, at 92. 
46 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 3(1)b-c. 
47 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 52(1)a. 
48 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 52(1)b. Other than by virtue of section 176A (2)a, which covers the action 
of the liquidator, administrator or receiver to make a prescribed part of the company’s net property available for 
the satisfaction of unsecured debts. 
49 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1 para 52(1)c. 
50 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch.B1 para 52(1). However, see para 52 (2)-(4), which states that the administrator 
shall summon an initial creditors’ meeting if it is requested by creditors of the company whose debts amount to 
at least 10 per cent of the total debts of the company. 
51 A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’, Company 
Lawyer, (2008), 259, at 260; see also Re Trident Fashions Limited (No2) [2004] 2 BCLC 35 per Lewison J, at 
para 39 who states that it appears an insolvency practitioner can legitimately disenfranchise unsecured creditors, 
if the IP believes the best result for the creditors in general can be achieved via the pre-pack.  
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which might give the impression that minimal effort was made to attract potential purchasers 
other than those already identified as members of the existing management. This begs the 
question: how could the best price have been obtained under such circumstances? 52 The issue 
here returns to the valuation process and the suggestion that pre-packs may not involve a 
sufficiently robust valuation exercise53. Frisby who has provided much empirical research on 
the subject has concluded that it is perhaps safe to conclude that no marketing of the business 
had occurred prior to the eventual sale unless the IP’s administration reports expressly 
indicates otherwise. Whilst Frisby remains open to any challenges that can rebut this 
presumption she goes on to provide some statistics to validate her opinions. The research, 
aimed at illustrating the way pre-packs operate in practice ambitiously provides, for perhaps 
the first time, a comprehensive overview of what really happens with a growing number of 
distressed companies. Amongst the findings the report suggests that only 18 of the 227 
businesses (7.9%) of the whole pre-pack database were marketed in the appropriate way54. 
The report went on to state that effective and reasonable marketing by IPs were not often 
implemented which in turn failed to identify the interested purchasers55. In addition it is 
interesting to note the tactics adopted to ensure that the distressed company’s situation did not 
become public knowledge56, thereby having a potential impact on the value of the company. 
It may be inferred, given the lack of transparency evident within a pre-pack process, that 
practitioners operating under a cloak goes against the very integrity of the principles 
highlighted through the thesis, whether that is the principles identified with the law in general 
or the duties associated with the IPs when they administer their duties. For completeness and 
to highlight the disparity, the overall business sale cases compared to pre-packs indicated a 
more positive picture with a greater number of marketing strategies being undertaken. Out of 
                                                            
52 See S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, 2007), at 49. 
53 It should be made clear that “testing the market” and exposing the company to the “open market” is about 
identifying the market and making it aware of the opportunities – it is not about exposing the proposal to the 
word, see M. Ellis, ‘The Thin Line in the Sand: Pre-packs and Phoenixes’, 3 Recovery, (Summer 2008). 
54 S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals, 2007), at 30, 49. 
55 The nature of the database attempted to address whether any form of marketing has taken place or not. The 
author however concedes that the best that could be done was to answer the question in the positive where 
reports indicated that this was the case. The second aim of the research was to determine whether a valuation 
had taken place prior to the sale. This was not conclusive in most cases, as some reports made no mention of 
whether the services or valuers had been engaged or not. See S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-
Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business Recovery Professionals, 2007), at 30, 49. 
56 For instance practitioners may conduct preliminary investigations into a company’s affairs without formally 
being appointed to that position, thereby not attracting unwanted attention to the fragile company. Or 
alternatively they might target specific purchasers with a set agenda (with an attempt to retain some bargaining 
power within any deal) with the intention of preventing the company being exposed to the market.  
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the 412 business sale cases on the database, 229 (55.6%) gave some account of a marketing 
campaign57. 
 
Returning to the issue concerning the efforts taken by the IP to find the best market value for 
the business, whilst reasonable efforts will be taken to ensure that potential purchasers are 
identified and brought in to negotiate possible prices58, this action is extremely complex and 
can, if neglected, cause the business further distress. As noted above, Frisby’s research 
implies that the fate of most companies is not subjected to the market for fear that it may 
diminish the business value. What is clear is that even if a company was this way inclined (to 
be exposed to the market), the period for which potential buyers are willing to make good 
offers for the business as a going concern will be very short59. It therefore follows that IPs 
will often see it as the logical conclusion that in order to extract the value of the business and 
prevent it from further diminishing in value, a pre-pack sale would be the best course of 
action60. 
 
Before examining a collection of recent cases to identify how pre-packs are dealt with in 
reality, it is paramount to take a closer look at the relationship between the creditors and the 
duty that is imposed on IPs and determine whether pre-packs are compatible with the relevant 
guidelines. 
 
5. Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16) 
Given the confusion surrounding pre-packs, including technical compliance and potential 
breaches of duties by the administrator, it was only a matter of time before some guidance 
was deemed essential for the survival of the procedure as well as the reputation of the IPs. 
The Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 goes some way to clarifying the procedure, 
attempting to ensure that any pre-pack is carried out in a more transparent way than was 
perhaps done in the past, whilst at the same time addressing the issue surrounding unsecured 
creditors having no voice in the proceedings by requiring a detailed explanation and 
                                                            
57 See S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, 2007), at 49. 
58 M. Crystal QC and R. J. Mokal, ‘The Valuation of Distressed Companies a Conceptual Framework’, 
(Insolvency Service, 2006), at 2. 
59 B. Xie, ‘Protecting the Interests of General Unsecured Creditors in Pre-Packs: The Implication and 
Implementation of SIP 16’, Company Lawyer, (2010), 189, at 190. 
60 This is also supported by the fact that there will usually be a failure of any party to fund the administration 
period, and lengthy large-scale marketing would further reduce the value of the business, see P. Walton, ‘Pre-
Packaged Administrations - Trick or Treat?’,  19 Insolvency Intelligence, (2006), 113, at 115. 
196 
 
justification as to why a pre-pack sale was undertaken61. It is important to refresh our 
memories and understanding concerning the relationship (if any) that pre-packs have with the 
formal administration process. As stated in the previous chapters, pre-packs have been 
endorsed as a mechanism that works around the administration process, something which can 
be viewed as addressing the real issues that face distressed companies, whilst at the same 
time being able to offer more relevant, pragmatic solutions that are flexible and not so 
restrictive as if carried out within the administration process. What we seem to be witnessing 
is the general acceptance of pre-packs as a necessary tool in the administrators’ armoury, but 
also recognising that it is not regulated or currently legislated for within the Insolvency Act. 
In order to address this concern, the Joint Insolvency Committee (JIC)62 approved SIP16 
which was issued by the RPBs and The Insolvency Service and came into force on 1 January 
2009. SIP16 requires administrators to explain in detail to creditors the background to their 
appointment and the reasons for any transaction undertaken through a pre-pack 
administration63. Because of its importance it is worth exploring the SIP 16 in full.  
 
5.1. Contents  
First the following attempts to define the term “pre-packaged sale” (or “pre-pack”), referring 
to it as an arrangement under which the sale of all or part of a company’s business or assets is 
negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an administrator, and the 
administrator effects the sale immediately on, or shortly after, his or her appointment. It is an 
incomplete definition, but one that sheds light on the intentions of the procedure, namely that 
the focus is fixed on business rescue (dealing in assets) as opposed to “pure” company rescue. 
In the interests of bringing clarity to the process it is important to note that in any given 
situation the interested parties will have different perceptions about quality, even if they 
broadly agree on the relevant benchmarks64. What parties want and expect from a potential 
pre-pack will vary considerably. Therefore, any attempt to tie down a definitive description 
                                                            
61 S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to The Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, (August 2007), at 31. 
62 The Joint Insolvency Committee (JIC) is a Committee on which all of the RPBs are represented together with 
The Insolvency Service, and was formed in 1999. It is concerned with professional and ethical standard setting 
across the profession, which it achieves through the approval of an Ethical Code, Statements of Insolvency 
Practice3 (SIPs) which are binding on insolvency practitioners, and Insolvency Guidance Papers. The JIC meets 
quarterly, with sub groups taking forward specific issues between meetings, and publishes a report each year. 
63 It is often said that SIP 16 codified what has been the best practice in handling pre-packs. For a judicial 
consideration of the main concerns surrounding the main issues in pre-packs see Re Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] 
EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] B.C.C. 578. 
64 Values and divergences play an important role in the shaping of processes, see V. Finch, Corporate Rescue 
Processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’, Journal of Business Law, (2010), 502, at 517.  
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that does not take into account the tensions that exist amongst the creditors fails to consider 
the delicate balance that is required to make a pre-pack workable, which in this context 
means reaching an agreeable outcome without the need to over-indulge in compromises. The 
position regarding negotiations and permitting these to take place before the formal stage has 
commenced, is a decisive action that separates pre-packs from the other rescue processes. 
Best described as offering a pragmatic solution to companies that are in financial distress, 
pre-packs strategies have no tangible characteristics that link them with either a formal or 
informal process. Negotiations may commence in an informal way (outside administration), 
but the company needs to enter administration, albeit if only for a moment, for the “deal” to 
be implemented. Questions surrounding the “legality” of pre-packs have ensured that it is 
necessary for the proposed strategy to be given formal legal status. Entering administration 
provides these “informal negotiations” with the legal certainty and approval that is required 
to ensure that the strategy is binding on all interested parties. It appears that pre-packs suffer 
from something of an identity crisis that makes it difficult to confirm what principles, aims or 
values it embraces and in turn how it may be integrated into the existing legal framework. 
 
5.2. The Conduct of the Insolvency Practitioner 
Moving on to examining the conduct that is expected of practitioners, whether as adviser to 
the company before the appointment, or as the appointed administrator, or both, the SIP 16 
makes it imperative that the administrator is aware of his responsibilities. In particular it is 
noted that they should bear in mind their duties for those who act on their advice, what he or 
she owes to parties who might be affected by the arrangement, and should take into 
consideration the risks associated with his or her decisions (that will affect all parties – the so 
called “ripple effect”) 65. Following on from this it is now expected that administrators should 
be able to provide justifiable reasoning behind the decision to undertake a pre-packaged sale, 
and why such a course of action was considered appropriate66. By introducing such measures 
it is hoped that this will contribute, in time, to making the decision process more transparent 
than previously existed, and in turn more accountable to interested parties. How this change 
will make a difference remains to be seen, but it already faces challenges in the form of 
administrators’ “discretion” and “commercial judgement” which is often endorsed by the 
courts as acceptable best practice. It may be argued that administrators instead of viewing SIP 
                                                            
65 SIP 16, para. 2, see http://www.icaew.com/~/media/files/technical/insolvency/regulations-and-
standards/sips/england/sip-16-e-and-w-pre-packaged-sales-in-administrations  (accessed 17th February 2012) 
66 See S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’, (R3: Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals, 2007), at 31-32. 
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16 as a regulatory requirement actually see it as endorsing what has already been the practice 
for some years. Non-compliance with SIP 16 is a grey area, with clear breaches being dealt 
with by the relevant RPB. It should be stressed that whilst every effort will be made to ensure 
that disclosure is complied with as there is an obligation on administrators to follow a number 
of objectives67 to ensure that the process takes into account as far as possible the different 
interests extant in a company68, the list is not conclusive.  Of particular interest, SIP 16 
provides an exemption to disclosure, permitted under the Insolvency Act for various reasons 
which ultimately allow the administrator the flexibility to plan strategies as he or she sees 
fit69. The “exceptional circumstances” contained within paragraph 10 of the SIP 16 is 
conditional on the basis that the reason why particular information is not disclosed should be 
clearly stated. It goes on to say that if the sale is to a connected party then it is unlikely that 
considerations of commercial confidentiality would outweigh the need for creditors to be 
provided with this information. Note the term “unlikely”, leaving open the window of 
opportunity for administrators to combine, if necessary, their discretion and commercial 
expertise to justify their actions not to disclose. It is usually the case, as noted above that pre-
pack strategies rely heavily on discreetness to allow the deal to work to its full potential. 
Limiting the exposure of the distressed company to the market for the consideration of a 
selected few, aids the company’s business prospects as suppliers etc. will not be aware of the 
                                                            
67 SIP 16, para 9 of the SIP 16 provide for a number of examples where information should be disclosed to 
creditors. In relation to all cases where there is a pre-packaged sale, as far as the administrator is aware after 
making appropriate enquiries: the source of the administrator’s initial introduction; the extent of the 
administrator’s involvement prior to appointment; any marketing activities conducted by the company and/or 
the administrator; any valuations obtained of the business or the underlying assets; the alternative courses of 
action that were considered by the administrator, with an explanation of possible financial outcomes; why it was 
not appropriate to trade the business, and offer it for sale as a going concern, during the administration; details 
of requests made to potential funders to fund working capital requirements; whether efforts were made to 
consult with major creditors; the date of the transaction; details of the assets involved and the nature of the 
transaction; the consideration for the transaction, terms of payment, and any condition of the contract that could 
materially affect the consideration; if the sale is part of a wider transaction, a description of the other aspects of 
the transaction; the identity of the purchaser; any connection between the purchaser and the directors, 
shareholders or secured creditors of the company; the names of any directors, or former directors, of the 
company who are involved in the management or ownership of the purchaser, or of any other entity into which 
any of the assets are transferred; whether any directors had given guarantees for amounts due from the company 
to a prior financier, and whether that financier is financing the new business; any options, buy-back 
arrangements or similar conditions attached to the contract of sale. 
68 It is in the nature of a pre-packaged sale in an administration that unsecured creditors are not given the 
opportunity to consider the sale of the business or assets before it takes place. It is important, therefore, that they 
are provided with a detailed explanation and justification of why a pre-packaged sale was undertaken, so that 
they can be satisfied that the administrator has acted with due regard for their interests. See T&D Industries Plc 
[2001] 1 WLR 646; Transbus International Ltd [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch), [2004] All ER 911; DKLL Solicitors 
[2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch). 
69 SIP 16, para. 12 provide that The Insolvency Act 1986 permits an administrator not to disclose information in 
certain limited circumstances. This Statement of Insolvency Practice will not restrict the effect of those statutory 
provisions. 
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company’s predicament and will not therefore “pull the plug”. By discreetly operating behind 
the scenes to forge a deal, administrators are attempting to get the best out of a bad situation. 
That said, some of the methods employed, as submitted elsewhere in the Chapter are 
questionable and contrary to the principles, aims and values evident in the relevant 
legislation, case law, guidelines and regulations. 
 
5.3. Guidance  
Looking at the guidance offered on the initial stages when an administrator is instructed, it 
was discussed at the beginning of this chapter the duty that is imposed on administrators and 
their responsibility in informing creditors. Unless it is impracticable to do so, the information 
contained within paragraph 970 should be provided along with the first notification to 
creditors71. It has already been explored, that in some instances creditors’ meetings may not 
be convened where a pre-packaged sale has been undertaken. If this is the case the 
administrator should as soon as it is practicable after his appointment provide the statement of 
proposal which states what he or she intends to do with the distressed company. This of 
course is conditional on a number of factors, and if the administrator thinks that disclosing 
certain information to creditors may jeopardise a deal then they may decide to refrain from 
taking such action72. A concern that arises is the effect that the administrators’ discretion may 
have on the principle of transparency73. Transparency as explained in Chapter Three is one of 
the fundamental principles contained within the Code of Ethics that an administrator is 
expected to abide by and promote whilst carrying out his or her duties74. Whilst there are 
grounds to suggest that the law does not leave it entirely to the administrator’s commercial 
judgement (which is correct for cases involving administration) 75, the lack of anything but 
                                                            
70 See A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’, Company 
Lawyer, (2008), 259, at 260; see also Re Trident Fashions Limited (No2) [2004] 2 BCLC 35 per Lewison J, at 
para 39 who states that it appears an insolvency practitioner can legitimately disenfranchise unsecured creditors, 
if the IP believes the best result for the creditors in general can be achieved via the pre-pack. 
71 SIP 16, para 11. 
72 Insolvency Rules 1986, rule 2.33(2)(m). The rule permits that the administrator may apply to the court for 
limited disclosure with regards to statement of affairs. See also rule 2.33(2)(n), which allows for the non-
disclosure in the statement of the administrator’s proposals of information “which could seriously prejudice the 
commercial interests of the company”. 
73 Creditors often feel that they are presented with a done deal, which can lead to a lack of confidence in the 
openness of the procedure. See The Association Of Business Recovery Professionals (R3). ‘Briefing on Pre-
Packs’, http://www.r3.org.uk/search/default.asp?search_query=pre-packs (accessed 19th June 2010). 
74 See para 36, Insolvency Practitioners Association, ‘Insolvency Code of Ethics, Transparency and 
Confidentiality: A Guidance Note’, 4th November 2008, (accessed on 10th January 2011) 
http://www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/uploads/Transparency%20Final.pdf 
75 See Insolvency Rules 1986, rule 2.33(2), which specifies that that an IPs statement shall include a number of 
matters covering, details relating to his appointment as administrator (; how it is envisaged that the purpose of 
the administration will be achieved and how it is proposed that the administration should end; where the 
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total compliance with this principle (particularly in regards to pre-packs) poses serious 
questions regarding the legality of the process and whether it can address the imbalance 
between the creditors as a whole (maintaining the commercial interests of the company) and 
the perceived advantage that connected parties may have in a management buy-out strategy 
(this will be discussed shortly)76. In regards to recent developments on pre-packs and the 
proposal statement required under SIP16, empirical research conducted by Frisby has 
highlighted a number of concerns. 
 
In an attempt to provide some guidance to the pre-pack process, the courts have held that, 
where the circumstances of the case warrant it, an administrator has the power to sell assets 
without the prior approval of the creditors or the permission of the court77. However, it 
should be borne in mind that reliance on such authority does not protect administrators from 
potential challenges to their conduct78, or claims for misfeasance79 . But as noted above, in 
real terms the likelihood that the RPB or the court will take action is minimal. It would seem 
that the commercial awareness (technical knowledge) that is expected of administrators has 
provided them, to a large degree, with a protective blanket to allow them to operate how they 
see fit. Whilst the Code of Ethics and similar guidelines aim to persuade them to make 
decisions so as to reflect an endorsed philosophy, there are questions as to what really is the 
rationale of pre-packs and corporate rescue in general. 
 
5.4. Legality 
The difficulties surrounding pre-packs, and the main issue concerning the legality of the 
process, are highlighted in the preparatory work carried out by the administrator80. SIP 16 
does provide some rough guidance to practitioners, suggesting that they should be clear about 
the nature and extent of their role and their relationship with the directors in the pre-
                                                                                                                                                                                        
administrator has decided not to call a meeting of creditors, including his reasons; and the manner in which his 
affairs and business of the company have been managed and financed.  
76 In regards to recent developments on pre-packs and the proposal statement required under SIP16, empirical 
research conducted by Frisby has highlighted a number of concerns with the standard of information provided 
on the statement. For instance whilst the justification and background to the deal should be provided, it is often 
the case that the identity of the purchaser of the business and the date in which sale negotiations started is 
missing. See S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to The Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals, August 2007, at 31. 
77 SIP 16, para. 3. 
78 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1, para 74. 
79 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1, para 75. 
80 SIP, para 4 suggests that given the nature of pre-packs it has the effect of bringing other issues (variables) that 
are evident within the circumstances into sharper focus. 
201 
 
appointment period81. Understandably, it is critical at the earliest stage possible that when 
they are instructed to advise the company, they should make it clear that their role is to advise 
the company and not to advise the directors on their personal position. Particular attention 
should be drawn to Chapter Three, Part II which highlighted a number of scenarios that had 
the potential to threaten the fundamental principles82. These fundamental principles will now 
be examined again to demonstrate how they apply to a pre-pack procedure and at the same 
time highlight the flaws evident within the process. 
 
6. Revisiting the Five Threats to the Fundamental Principles: a Review of IPs and Pre-
Packs 
To briefly reiterate aspects contained within Chapter Two, the Cork Report made a number of 
suggestions regarding the regulation and licensing of insolvency practitioners that were 
incorporated into the Insolvency Act 198683. The suggestions provided that the IP be 
licensed, either directly by the Secretary of State for BIS, or by the Recognised Professional 
Bodies (RPB). There are seven RPBs who have agreed a joint ethical code to be applied to its 
insolvency practitioner members. The Code of Ethics sets out five fundamental principles of 
integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional 
behaviour. Whilst a breach of the Code may not lead to the removal of the administrator, it 
may lead to professional disciplinary action taking place. A key aspect of the Code is that it 
sets out a framework that allows IPs to identify actual or potential threats to any of the 
fundamental principles. If a threat is identified the IP must assess whether an appropriate 
safeguard can be used to neutralise the threat. If this is not possible then he must not act or 
continue to act in the same manner. 
 
6.1. The Self-Interest Threat 
In regards to pre-packs there are concerns that the process is open to serving potential self 
interests. Given the transactions that may arise in the course of the IP’s functions, it is notable 
that the IP (or his or her accountancy practice) would deal with an interest (financial or 
otherwise), in which he or she has a significant interest. The most obvious example would 
focus on the practitioner’s fees in relation to the preparatory work that he or she has 
completed before the company had entered administration. It becomes apparent that the 
                                                            
81 SIP, para 5. 
82 Those being: integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, and professional 
behaviour. 
83 The Cork Report at para 735. 
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administrator who has a stake in the funds yet to be realised from the sale of the business, is 
in fact a creditor of the company and the extent of his or her pre-appointment work would 
require subjective adjudication84.  
 
6.2. The Self-Review Threat 
This threat prevails when a previous judgment made by an individual within the practice and 
in relation to the insolvent company needs to be re-evaluated by the IP. It therefore means 
that when a practitioner has carried out his or her professional work, whether that be pre-pack 
related or not, if the administrator is called in by the directors of the company to advise either 
or both the company and its directors on a possible pre-pack, the carrying out of such a work 
would possibly cause a self-review threat85. There should be a clear separation of roles 
between those who carry out the insolvency related work pre-appointment and those who 
deal with the company at a later date. If a practitioner is a position where he or she has to 
review previous decisions there are questions as to whether this would be done with their full 
attention and whether they would be so willing to rectify their own work. 
 
6.3 The Advocacy Threat 
This threat may occur when an individual within the practice promotes a position or opinion 
to the point that subsequently the ability to be neutral on a point concerning the company may 
be compromised. In regards to pre-packs this may occur in situations where the practitioner 
advises a creditor of the company. The integrity of the practitioner’s advice provided pre and 
post administration may vary and accordingly it would seem probable that any advice given 
to a main creditor prior to the company entering administration will have an impact on his or 
her objectivity with other creditors at a later stage. Providing advice on potential issues that 
may arise within a company is based on a prediction that may be amended each time further 
information is gathered and confirmed accurate. The timing and to whom this advice is given 
will have a bearing on how the company is perceived and whether that information has been 
distributed fairly amongst the creditors as a whole. In these circumstances it is reasonable to 
foresee that there will be cases where the main creditors prior to a company entering a pre-
pack strategy will gain an unfair advantage by having possession of information that other 
creditors do not have.  
                                                            
84 See P. Walton, ‘Pre-Packin’ in the UK’, 18 International Insolvency Review, (2009), 85, at 95. 
85 P. Walton, ‘Pre-Packin’ in the UK’, 18 International Insolvency Review, (2009), 85, at 96 
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6.4. The Familiarity Threat 
This threat covers situations where a close relationship, usually an individual within the 
practice becomes too sympathetic with, or antagonistic to, the interests of others. In a pre-
pack this may occur where the practitioner has formed a close relationship with either the 
directors of the company or the main secured lender86. The result of which infers that this 
relationship appears to be, or is influencing and ultimately favouring the position of directors 
over the general body of creditors.  
 
6.5. The Intimidation Threat 
The last threat may occur when an IP may be deterred from acting objectively by threats, 
actual or perceived. This aspect was covered in Chapter Three where it was suggested that the 
insolvency administrator is influenced by the source from where there are financial gains to 
be had. If a secured lender can provide repetitive business for a practitioner he or she may 
well be inclined to act in a certain way, otherwise face the risk or actual threat of the lender 
making his or her wishes known, of losing potential future business.  
 
Without venturing too far into speculation, rather than basing conclusions on actual instances 
of abuse it is not too far removed to suggest that whilst the profession has done a lot to ensure 
the professional integrity of the administrators by introducing measures such as the 
fundamental principles, it cannot control how the public (often influenced by the press) view 
them. Whilst in some respects one may say that this does not really matter, the profession has 
clearly taken steps to ensure that their collective image coincides with the principles that they 
abide by. They want to be seen in the way that they desire. That said, even with IPs conscious 
that their every move will be scrutinised by potentially dissatisfied creditors87, it may be 
sometimes difficult not to breach one of the fundamental principles given the involuntarily 
relationship that the IP will have through the normal course of business with individuals (who 
have a financial interest) in the distressed company. Furthermore, pre-pack strategies usually 
mean that a relationship will also be formed with a potential purchaser of the insolvent’s 
assets and/or business88.  
 
                                                            
86 P. Walton, ‘Pre-Packin’ in the UK’, 18 International Insolvency Review, (2009), 85, at 96. 
87 This is particularly the case if there is a possibility of the directors acquiring an interest in the assets in the 
pre-packaged sale. 
88 In this regard a close relationship includes both professional and personal; see Code of Ethics for Insolvency 
Practitioners, http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-
practitioner, at 400.42, (accessed 22nd March 2011). 
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7. Safeguards to Potential Threats that may occur during a Pre-Pack 
Addressing these issues, there are a number of safeguards that may be put in place to identify 
threats to compliance with the fundamental principles, the evaluation of the significance of 
these threats and the identification and the application of safeguards to eliminate or reduce 
the threats, other than those that are trivial. But applying them to a given situation is a 
delicate act that highlights the tension between administrators pursuing their set objective 
(which may be rescue or not) and keeping interested parties informed. Chapter Three 
highlighted a number that may be of particular relevance to pre-packs. The full list will not be 
reiterated here, but options like offering leadership that stresses the importance of compliance 
with the fundamental principles; identifying the interests or relationships between individuals 
within the IP’s practice and third parties; ensuring that appropriate training and education on 
such policies and procedures are provided to individuals within the practice; ensure that there 
is a continuous monitoring process controlling the quality of engagements undertaken, and 
that there is a disciplinary mechanism to promote compliance with policies and procedures, 
are a few worth mentioning89.  
 
Following on from the compliance obligation, practitioners should bear in mind the duties 
and responsibilities which are owed to creditors in the pre- appointment period. In Chapter 
Three it was examined how IPs in certain circumstances may be personally liable for actions 
which contribute to enhancing the financial distress of the company in addition to allowing 
the company to incur further credit knowing that there is no good reason to believe it will be 
repaid. Whilst such liability is not restricted to the directors, and comparisons have been 
made about the fiduciary duties owed by both groups, in reality the IPs are treated differently 
due to their position of trust (external, independent help) and responsibility when entering the 
company. Given this perception, it is envisioned that action would only be taken against a 
practitioner if it was clear that their actions were so critical to contributing to the financial 
problems of the company and that further unrecoverable losses that were accumulated could 
have been foreseen and prevented. This position remains the same whether the act was 
carried out within administration or under a pre-pack strategy, but the crucial difference 
perhaps lies in the process and the relevant standards that apply. As already noted pre-packs 
follow an informal process and so are not as regulated as pure administration. It will therefore 
                                                            
89 See ICAEW website, Code of Ethics for Insolvency Practitioners, 
http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/becoming-an-icaew-insolvency-licensed-practitioner, at 400.25, 
(accessed 22nd March 2011). 
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be more difficult to bring action against a practitioner for any wrongful conduct under the 
former process as the standards will be deemed to be not as high. But what practitioners 
engaged in a pre-packaged sale should be able to demonstrate is that they have considered the 
objectives covered by paragraphs 3(2) and 3(4) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Failing to consider this may lead to action being taken by creditors whose interests have been 
unjustly harmed.  
 
8. Reflections on SIP 16 
It remains to be said that the guidance provided by SIP 16 does provide some assistance90, 
but it should be viewed as an exercise that has codified the current practice rather than adding 
anything new. Examining the figures that have been obtained by the Insolvency Service 
regarding the level of compliance, one must approach the data with some reservation as the 
monitoring which took place during the evaluation is almost certainly a subjective matter. 
Whilst available information suggests that the vast majority of IPs are complying with SIP 
16, the focus should be on those who are not and what, if any are the consequences for 
breaches that occur. The Insolvency Services figures for the first half of 2009 shows that 65% 
of pre-packs were compliant and that this dropped to 62% in the last six months of the same 
year91. This differs somewhat from the findings of R3 (the Association of Business recovery 
Professionals), which shows that when SIP 16 went operational only 3% of cases were 
referred back to the relevant RPBs92. This in itself does not provide any conclusive evidence 
that the regulations in place are successful in controlling: those who work within the 
profession; that the manner in which the profession is monitored is capable of identifying all 
potential breaches; or that even if there were breaches would the RPB take action? Would 
they consider it justifiable given the reason provided by the IP? Or would the situation arise 
where the affected party did not have the means (financial or time) to take action, or failed to 
realise that he could have taken action? All these questions cannot be addressed in a report as 
it would prove nearly impossible to extract the relevant information and show that a possible 
omission could have led to a potential breach that would in turn have required action to 
                                                            
90 It was recognised by the Insolvency Service that the SIP 16 requirements were open to some interpretative 
uncertainty, therefore it would be useful to read this in conjunction with the further guidance that was issued in 
October 2009 (Dear IP letter 42), at 
http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/dearip/dearipmill/hardcopy.htm 
(accessed 22nd March 2012). 
91 Further assessment will be required to determine whether this trend has continued.  
92See R3, ‘Pre-Packs and SIP 16’, (22nd March 2010), 
http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/Pre_packs_and_SIP_16_Ma
rch_2010.pdf (accessed 4th April 2012). 
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rectify the wrong. But this does not mean that the concerns should be disregarded, on the 
contrary the statistics that will continue to flow from such reports will provide a useful 
resource in highlighting how SIP 16 is working in practice, and from this it will draw out any 
shortcomings in the process that may need to be addressed. 
 
The R3 Report has stopped short of stating in any definitive terms whether the process should 
be recognised as a legitimate procedure that offers a viable alternative to formal rescue 
processes93. Discussing the legitimacy of a pre-pack strategy remains a technical argument, 
one that this thesis has aimed to utilise to demonstrate that the informal procedure operates in 
a fashion that is not in compliance or within the boundaries of the current corporate rescue 
legislation. The insolvency market led by IPs has created their own pragmatic solution to 
dealing with the needs of distressed companies in the current financial climate. They have 
moved faster (in some cases dictated by the flow of the business/financial market) than the 
law could have regulated and so we have found ourselves in a position where the courts 
cannot/will not override their decisions as they have minimal case law/guidelines to do a 
better job. In some ways this acts as a justification for suggesting that the courts would rather 
remove themselves from the arena and let the IPs, who use (regularly) and have a better 
understanding of the process receive the praise and more often than not the backlash for any 
action that is called into question.  
 
9. IPs and Professional Fees with Pre-Packs  
It was discussed in Chapter Three that when a company enters administration there are likely 
to be substantial fees and other expenses accumulated by the insolvency practitioner. This is 
also the case for a company entering a pre-pack strategy except the only difference is that 
with the latter the expenses will have been incurred in the period leading up to the 
administration. Given the substantial fees to be gained it was previously suggested that this 
may have a bearing on how the company’s problems are approached and dealt with. Different 
methods endorsed by the IP may produce greater profits at the end of the process and it is 
clear from the examples mentioned in Chapter Three that tactics have been employed to this 
end. Whilst that line of enquiry has been explored, what needs to be addressed here is how 
pre-appointment administration fees work in practice. 
                                                            
93 See generally, R3, ‘Pre-Packs and SIP 16’, (22nd March 2010), 
http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/Pre_packs_and_SIP_16_Ma
rch_2010.pdf (accessed 4th April 2012). 
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From information gathered by IPs, it is clear that extensive pre-appointment work is being 
undertaken94. But there appears to be quite a divergence between different practitioners as to 
how exactly the fees are being processed. There appears to be no logical conclusion why 
some, for instance, rely completely on rule 2.67(1)(c) to recover their costs, whilst others do 
not use it at all95. It must however be stressed that certain rules tend to apply only to 
administration and adopting this for pre-appointment work in relation to a pre-pack may not 
be possible96. Whether this is merely a limitation based on the current legislation, there 
appears to be some potential scope for change on this matter97. However there are concerns 
that if the ability of the administrators to recover pre-appointment costs from the insolvent 
estate is increased, it would reduce the confidence in the mechanism as it would be seen as an 
additional financial incentive for practitioners to incur additional fees98. Again, the perception 
of abuse plays a key role in tarnishing such strategies, especially in situations where 
unsecured creditors have been left ‘in the dark’ about the deal99.  
 
Given the divergence within the profession it is probably due to the lack of transparency 
within the process that has allowed the differences to go unchallenged100. That said, it is 
possible to suspect that payments can be made in a number of forms and this may cover 
separate payments by the company (directors) to the IP before the formal process of 
administration is entered into. Any concerns that the administrator may not get paid for work 
completed should probably be dismissed, as it is likely to be the case that even if there was a 
                                                            
94 See P. Walton, ‘Pre-appointment Administration Fees – papering over the cracks in pre-packs’, Insolvency 
Intelligence, (2008), 72, at 73. 
95 See Insolvency Rules 1986. The rule sets out that the costs (including expenses) may be claimed if they have 
been incurred ‘in connection with the making of the appointment’. 
96 Beyond the relatively limited costs of putting into effect the formal mechanism for the appointment. See Re 
Cablelel Installations Ltd [2005] BPIR 28; S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged 
Administrations’, Report to The Association of Business Recovery Professionals, (August 2007); P. Walton, 
Pre-packaged administrations – trick or treat’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2006), 113, at 119. 
97 Whilst draft proposals are still not finalised it was proposed that any amendment to the rules should allow pre-
pack administrators to claim the cost of their pre-appointment work as administration expenses subject to the 
approval of the company’s creditors, see The Insolvency Service Consultation, (June 2007). 
98 See The Insolvency Service report entitled ‘Improving the Transparency of, and Confidence in, Pre-packaged 
Sales in Administration’, Summary of Consultation Responses, (March 2011), at para 4.14, 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/insolvency%20profession/consultations/prepack/responses/final%
20pre-packs%20summary%20of%20responses.pdf (accessed 3rd April 2012). 
99 This issue has been a major concern for some time, See the Insolvency Service, ‘Annual Review of Insolvency 
Practitioner Regulation’, (June 2009), at 11, 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/insolvency%20profession/ip%20regulation%20reports/annual%2
0review%20of%20ip%20regulation%20report%20march%202010.pdf (accessed 3rd April 2012). 
100 P. Walton, ‘Pre-Packin’ in the UK’, 18 International Insolvency Review, (2009), 85, at 102. 
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lack of payment in the informal process, this would only mean that IPs would take this factor 
into consideration when setting their fees for post-appointment work101. 
 
It should be further noted that in recent monitoring visits, the RPBs have identified a number 
of cases where the responsible insolvency practitioner’s pre-appointment administration fees 
and expenses have been paid directly by the purchaser of the insolvent business.  While there 
is no specific regulation which prohibits this practice, they were of the opinion that such 
payments may represent a conflict of interest which threatens the objectivity of the IP, and so 
constitute a breach of the Ethical Code102. The concern arises when an agreement has taken 
place for the purchaser to pay pre-appointment fees as this might effectively reduces the total 
consideration payable in the transaction by a similar or equivalent amount.  Additionally, if 
the purchaser was in fact a connected party (to the company) it may be the case that the 
directors of the distressed company may spend company funds on pre-appointment fees at a 
time when it is apparent that the company is insolvent. If it turns out that the insolvency 
practitioner whose fees have been met is later appointed the administrator, it is unlikely that 
this would ever be scrutinised. This is not withstanding the fact that this could represent a 
self-review threat to the IP’s objectivity, one of the fundamental principles of the Ethical 
Code103. Naturally all of this poses questions whether the IP is a “gun for hire” and can be 
influenced to act in a certain way to secure the lucrative position later on.  
 
It is worth reiterating that any arrangement for the purchaser to directly pay pre-appointment 
fees and expenses may lead to a reduction in the funds available for creditors. To address this 
concern the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010 was introduced which intended to ensure 
that creditors would have the opportunity to review the pre-appointment expenses, to 
consider whether they are reasonable in the circumstances of the case, whether they were 
incurred in support of the objective of the administration and ultimately to approve their 
payment. Therefore any arrangement to pay fees would be contrary to this statutory 
mechanism and place creditors in a vulnerable position. Whilst this move demonstrates a step 
in the right direction, it is susceptible to reliance on the transparency of the IP’s and/or 
                                                            
101 This has also been noted by See P. Walton, ‘Pre-appointment Administration Fees – Papering over the 
Cracks in Pre-Packs’, Insolvency Intelligence, (2008), 72, at 73. 
102 See Insolvency Service, Dear IP letter 50, (2010), at 
http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/dearip/dearipmill/hardcopy.htm 
(accessed 22nd March 2012). 
103 See Chapter Three. 
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administrator’s report. If the information is not there to fully review whether the fees can be 
justified, then the power invested in the creditors is as good as redundant.  
 
The extent of the information provided, as already noted above, depends entirely on the IP. 
Where IPs are considering entering into such an arrangement with a proposed purchaser, it is 
expected that the practitioner would recognise the potential conflict of interest and retain 
written evidence that the matter had been considered and appropriate safeguards put in place 
to reduce any perceived or actual threat to his objectivity104.Again there needs to be more 
transparency surrounding professional fees and appointments.  
 
10. Phoenix Pre-packs (Sales to Connected Parties – Management Buyouts) 
A concern regarding pre-packs was contained in the 2009 report of the House of Commons 
Business and Enterprise Committee in which it stated that there was too much emphasis on 
rescuing collapsed businesses and too little attention paid to the damage that “phoenix pre-
packs” do to supplier companies and the wider economy105. As noted, whilst pre-packs have 
some legitimate reasons for operating as they do, permitting “phoenix trading” by offering 
company directors ways to start again could be seen as a way of encouraging entrepreneurial 
behaviour, but at the same time there is considerable discontent as it is viewed primarily as an 
opportunity for existing management to bypass the creditors and buy back the business at a 
low cost106. It is difficult to contemplate an area of law in recent years that has attracted so 
much attention; but part of the reason for this is the apparent unfairness that results from a 
pre-pack procedure107. One commentator has provided a sceptical view of the process 
whereby a company is heading into trouble. Its directors and shareholders “are introduced to 
an appealing fellow who drives a very nice BWM, who explains that if they work with him 
they will get rid of most of their creditors and will be able to buy the business back pretty 
                                                            
104 See Insolvency Service, Dear IP letter 50, (2010), at 
http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/dearip/dearipmill/hardcopy.htm 
(accessed 22nd March 2012). 
105 House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, The Insolvency Service: Sixth report of Session 
2008-9, (May 6, 2009), HC 198, at 11. 
106 There has been some empirical research gathered to suggest that a larger proportion of pre-packs do involve 
selling a company to a connected person, see S. Frisby, ‘The Second Chance Culture and Beyond: Some 
Observations on the Pre-Pack Contribution’, Law and Financial Markets Review, (2009), 242. 
107 Creditors suspicions can result in believing the whole deal was a “stitch-up” job, see S. Davies, ‘Pre-Pack: 
He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune’, 16 Recovery, (2006), 16. See also S. Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency 
Outcomes’, 19 Recovery, (2006), at 70, available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionalandlegislation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf 
(accessed 17th February 2012). 
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well immediately at a very modest cost”108. This underlines a concern shared by some 
creditors who consider pre-packs resembling phoenix trading, in that the distressed company 
continues to operate with the same or some of the same directors and the same name. The fact 
is that pre-packs can cause confusion amongst creditors, in the sense that who they are in fact 
dealing with is a new company and the debts owed to them by the failed company are no 
longer recoverable109.  
 
The major concern, however, for the Government, backed up by some creditors, is the sale to 
connected parties, typically the existing management or owners of the insolvent company 
(minus the debts of course). In 2010 it was revealed that 72% of pre-pack sales to date were 
to individuals and companies associated with the failed company110. As such the issue of 
accountability becomes a focal point with management buyouts111. There will be reservations 
from creditors as to whether the best value for the business has been obtained, when the pre-
pack was sold to the existing management. In particular there will be questions asked as to 
whether the business was properly exposed to the market112. With this in mind there are 
questions as to whether pre-packs are an efficient mechanism. Although they should be 
subject to the notion of fairness and accountability113, there is a considerable lack of 
transparency in the way pre-packs are implemented. Whilst there is an almost unquestioned 
presumption that a legal procedure should produce behaviour in a certain way, possessing 
certain characteristics that are typical of acknowledging the wider social considerations and 
are construed to comply with the relevant guidelines, regulations and legislation, it is not 
always possible to balance the interests whilst at the same time pursuing the aim. To put it 
another way, complying with the principles that were primarily designed to ensure that the 
actions of the administrator were fair, may now be counterproductive to that course. Some 
distressed companies require a quick sale to ensure that the value of the business remains 
                                                            
108 J. Moulton, ‘The Uncomfortable edge of property – pre-packs or just stitch ups?’, Recovery, (Autumn 2005), 
2; see also S. Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations’, Report to The Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals, (August 2007). 
109 Reference should be made to the Insolvency Act 1986 s.216 which was designed to deal with the issue of 
‘phoenix trading’ by imposing restrictions on the re-use of a failed company name. See also I. Fletcher, 
‘Phoenix Companies: Exceptions from the restriction on the Re-use of Company names’, Journal of Business 
Law, (1987), 395, 395. 
110 See data compiled by the Insolvency service (IS), part of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS). 
111 See Statement of Insolvency Practice 13, ‘Acquisitions of Assets of Insolvent Companies by Directors’, 
(1997), para 1.2 at 1. 
112 S. Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’, 19 Recovery, (2006), at 71, available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionalandlegislation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf 
(accessed 17th February 2012). 
113 See Chapter Four. 
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intact. Any restriction on this may be considered harmful to the company’s potential future. 
The entire purpose of a pre-pack is to allow the administrator to make full use of his 
discretionary powers and act swiftly if he so wishes as long as he can reasonably justify his 
actions (within reason). It is this combination of allowing a quick sale and to existing 
management that rests uncomfortably with the creditors. The criticism therefore seems to 
focus on not what pre-packs aim to achieve, but rather the way in which it proceeds. 
 
Attention should be drawn to the directors of a company and how it is perceived that they 
may abuse the process to financially gain a ‘discounted’ interest in a distressed company114. 
When an administrator needs to obtain certain information within a restricted time frame it is 
acceptable to assume that they will often rely on the knowledge and expertise of the directors. 
The main concern with relying on this form of investigation to obtain information is that it is 
more than likely that the directors may have a vested interest in the company and a skewed 
view about the company’s affairs, and may want to participate in a management buyout. It 
would therefore be in their interests if they became economical with the truth, or rather 
simply restricted what information they provided to ensure that the lack of interest within the 
market would allow the company to be bought at a considerable lower price115. Of course 
there is a chance that this “opportunity” may turn on its head as the lack of information may 
result in the company being grossly undervalued, which may attract rival bidders who sense a 
good deal116. Whether or not anyone would hear about such a deal is unlikely, but it has to be 
accepted that in business there are always some people who specialise in making other 
people’s business their own and have a skill in making it their business to find out 
information that may not necessarily be public knowledge. It cannot be denied that the pre-
pack process is open to abuse. A process of this kind that potentially allows for the sale to 
take place back to the old management, whether they were dishonest or incompetent, serves 
as a warning to creditors that they may with little or no consultation have new unfair terms 
forced upon them117. Objectivity therefore remains a cause of concern but given the way in 
which pre-packs are implemented changes to this would have to be carefully weighed against 
the benefits to be had. That aside, determining the level of abuse that occurs within the 
process is difficult to substantiate. Not only does the term “abuse” attract different 
                                                            
114 See D. Milman, ‘Strategies for Regulating Managerial Performance in the ‘Twilight Zone’ Familiar 
Dilemmas: New Considerations’, Journal of Business Law, (2004), 493. 
115 Mason, ‘Pre-packs for the Valuer’s Perspective’, 19 Recovery, (2006). 
116 A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’, Company 
Lawyer, (2008), 259, at 261. 
117 See A. Katz and M. Mumford, ‘Study of Administration Cases’, Insolvency Service, (October 2006), at 51. 
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definitions, there is the more pertinent question to ask: “we talking about the scope of abuse, 
or actual evidence of abuse?”118 The distinction is critical as previously noted above, but it 
should also be noted that the abuse associated with pre-packs is not unique to pre-packs; it is 
a wide ranging problem that can be found within many legal disciplines. Putting speculation 
to one side, it would appear, given one leading study, that actual abuse is minimal and that 
directors often will pay a higher price for a company (special value) than that would be 
achieved in the open market119. But in reality there is no conclusive way to determine the 
extent of the abuse prevalent with pre-packs, and so whilst the offers from connected parties 
may on the face of it amount to the best deal at the time, it is not always possible to say with 
any certainty if this actually is the case or whether the deals have in some way been 
manipulated to the advantage of the former management of the company.  
 
11. Case study 
No two businesses are alike. Some are sought after in a general capacity whilst others are so 
unique that finding potential investors is a very difficult process.  Whilst it will usually be the 
aim to sell the company as a going concern at the best market value, it is not necessarily the 
most viable option. To achieve the correct level of exposure within the relevant markets can 
be lengthy and expensive with no guarantee of success. Recently there have been a number of 
pre-packaged administrations that have grabbed the headlines. Retailers Habitat UK, Alexon 
Group and Jane Norman are a few worthy of mention. But it must be stressed that pre-packs 
are by no means restricted to a particular sector as assets of the top 50 law firm Halliwells 
were purchased by Hill Dickinson, HBJ Gateley Wareing and Barlow Lyde & Gilbert as part 
of a pre-pack in 2010120. More recently Cobbetts, a leading law firm in the North of England, 
was set to be acquired by rival practice DWF in a pre-pack deal after revealing on the 30th 
January 2013 that it had gone into administration121. Before proceeding with a more in depth 
examination into the Halliwells case, as a note of caution it should be observed that some of 
the earlier cases mentioned such as Re T & D Industries Plc122 and Transbus International 
                                                            
118 A. Katz and M. Mumford, ‘Study of Administration Cases’, Insolvency Service, (October 2006), at 22. 
119 S. Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’, 19 Recovery, (2006), at 71, available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionalandlegislation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf 
(accessed 24th February 2012). 
120 See Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch). 
121 Details regarding the exact arrangements to be put in place are yet to be revealed, see 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/supportservices/article3674763.ece (accessed 1st March 
2013). 
122 [2000] B.C.C. 956. 
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Ltd123 were not pre-pack cases as such, but in fact cases that concerned an accelerated sale of 
business. The distinction is critical as the latter sale is not something that is pre-arranged124.  
 
11.1. Halliwells LLP125   
I. Background 
Halliwells LLP (“Halliwells”) was a national law firm providing a range of legal services, 
with 116 partners and over 600 employees and with offices in Manchester, Sheffield, 
Liverpool and London. Halliwells had entered into a number of historical occupational leases 
which had left it with onerous payment obligations to landlords. The burden of these 
payments, a fall in revenue caused by the departure of several partners and a drop in turnover 
occasioned by the economic climate left Halliwells unable to pay its debts as they fell due. 
The financial difficulties led Halliwells to engage X and Y (later to become the 
Administrators) on 6th May 2010 in order to assist with the management of the sale of its 
business. X and Y  were of the opinion that Halliwells could not be rescued as a going 
concern and that it would not be reasonably practicable to achieve the objective of a better 
result for Halliwells’ creditors as a whole than would be likely if it were wound up without 
first being in administration. From this it was deemed that the best course of action would be 
to realise the assets of Halliwells by means of various sales in order to make a distribution to 
one or more secured or preferential creditors.  
 
Given the size of Halliwells it quickly became apparent in the three months prior to the firm 
entering the administration process that there were not many potential purchasers to take on 
the business. Negotiations were conducted with eight different firms and these generated four 
proposed sales, which in the opinion of the administrators represented the best return for the 
creditors. It was decided that an administration order would be sought due to: the potential 
purchasers’ desire for it, the protracted nature of the negotiations, and the need for the 
administrators to seek the approval of the court for the proposed sales.  
 
In regards to the creditors, the largest single creditor was the Royal Bank of Scotland plc to 
which Halliwells owed £18 million and this debt was increasing each month. This debt was 
                                                            
123 [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch). 
124 See A. Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’, Company 
Lawyer, (2008), 259, at 261. 
125 It should be noted that whilst Halliwells was not a company but an LLP, the rules on administration for LLPs 
is the same as for companies. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s. 14. 
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secured by way of a debenture. A calculation based on the projected return of funds from the 
sale of the relevant parts of Halliwells’ business alone revealed that Halliwells was insolvent 
on a balance sheet basis. In addition to the bank, special attention should also be drawn to the 
partners of Halliwells (“the members”). This aspect is what makes an insolvent law firm 
more complex. In this particular case it was necessary for negotiations to take place to ensure 
that the Members who had nearly £13 million of capital invested in Halliwells, funded mostly 
through Partnership Practice Loans (PPLs), would not find themselves unable to practice 
again. The issue became apparent because Halliwells had undertaken, through Halliwells 
LLP Deed to repay each Member’s PPL when such Member ceased to be a member. Because 
Halliwells had now become insolvent, Members were potentially left personally liable for the 
amount as Halliwells would be unable to honour its undertakings126. The implication that this 
would have had would have been critical, especially if the Members were transferred to the 
purchasing businesses only to find that they could no longer practice as solicitors due to 
being made personally insolvent.  
 
II. Proposed Sale Agreements 
In this case four asset sale agreements were identified127, allowing the purchase price to 
consist wholly or partly of the proceeds of Halliwells’ own debtors and work in progress, 
which the purchaser would endeavour to collect and pay over to the Administrators. Various 
technical agreements were worked out with the four purchasing businesses to ensure that the 
transferring Members would have the benefit of a trust fund which would be for the benefit of 
the PPL providers or a covenant from the purchaser that the loans would be taken over128. 
These agreements were forged with the intention of the purchasers to make it clear that if the 
deals were to proceed they wished the transferring Members not to become personally 
insolvent by reason of their obligations under the PPL in circumstances where Halliwells 
were unable to honour its undertakings129. These agreements showed considerable flexibility 
by allowing the deals to be tailored to cater for the needs of the purchasing businesses. By 
allowing their concerns to be addressed to ensure that there was no risk that some or all of the 
                                                            
126 In relation to the Bank, the relevant part of Halliwells' undertaking reads: “ We [Halliwells] irrevocably 
undertake:(i) that if the Customer [the Member] ceases to be a member of the LLP for whatever reason, 
sufficient of the monies standing to the credit of the Capital Account shall be remitted immediately to the Bank's 
office… for repayment of the Loan…”. See Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), at para 11. 
127 The asset sale agreements will not be recited here, but the full details can be found within the Halliwells case, 
see para 13. 
128 Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), at para 10. 
129 Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), at para 13. 
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transferring Members were no longer able to practice as solicitors, a financially distressed 
legal business was able to present itself in a light that allowed at least some of its business to 
be sold. 
 
III. Position of the Creditors 
The administrator stated prior to this application for administration, loss making and those 
losses were projected to increase if it went into administration, significantly eroding asset 
value and having a knock-on effect for the funds available for distribution to all categories of 
creditors. The administrators considered that the intended pre-packaged sales of the business 
represented the best deal available and would result in a higher level of recoveries for the 
secured, preferential and unsecured creditors than if Halliwells were allowed to proceed into 
a traded administration130. As stated the bank, as a secured creditor was owed approximately 
£18 million and so the suggested deals rested on whether the bank was content with the deal 
brokered, in that some of the monies should be used for the purpose of repaying the PPLs of 
the relevant transferring Members. Critically the administrators within their draft sale 
agreements, attached to their witness statements contained the acknowledgement from the 
bank (letter dated 19th July 2010) that this was satisfactory.  
 
In regards to the preferential creditors, this class was made up of employees of Halliwells 
who were not required by the purchasers. The estimated value within this claim was between 
£68,000 and £100,000, which was paid in full. The unsecured creditors received the 
maximum statutory prescribed part payment of £600,000 under section 176A. It is interesting 
to note that the pre-pack deal enabled the distribution of this sum to all unsecured creditors, 
which resulted in a dividend of £2.63p in the pound. If the four sales had not gone ahead and 
the business entered administration as a whole, the number of preferential and unsecured 
creditors would have greatly increased, and the dividend for unsecured creditors was 
forecasted at around the £1.60p in the pound131.  
 
IV. Approval of the Proposed Pre-Pack Sales 
On 20 July 2010 the court heard an application by Halliwells and Mr Shay Bannon and Mr 
Dermot Power (“the Administrators”), both Licensed Insolvency Practitioners and members 
of BDO LLP, for an administration order in respect of Halliwells and to seek the court’s 
                                                            
130 See Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), see para 16. 
131 Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), see para 19. 
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approval of four pre-packaged sales of parts of the business of Halliwells. Reference was 
made in the Halliwells case to the significant case of Re Kayley Vending Limited132.  In that 
case HH Judge Cooke summarised the concerns about the use of pre-packs as being that they 
may too easily lead the directors and the insolvency practitioner to arrive at a solution which 
is convenient for both of them and their interests133 (perhaps also satisfying a secured creditor 
who might be in a position to appoint his own receiver or administrator) but which harms the 
interests of the general creditors. it was also noted that in exercising its discretion in pre-pack 
cases, the court must be alert to see, so far as it can, the procedure is at least not being 
obviously abused to the disadvantage of creditors and that for that purpose the court was 
likely to be assisted by the provision of (at least) the information required by SIP 16, in so far 
as known or ascertainable at the date of the application134. Whilst the requirements of SIP 16 
is not legally binding, and should be viewed as providing guidance only to IPs, especially in 
relation to the disclosure of information by the IP to creditors, and reminds IPs of the duties 
they owe to those affected by the arrangement they are effecting135, there is now case law 
which suggests that the courts do not question the legitimacy of pre-packs136. Returning to the 
Halliwells case, the administrator for the purposes of complying with the guidance contained 
with SIP 16 did inform the creditors of his intended actions by letter. Importantly it contains a 
detailed exposition of why it is not appropriate to trade Halliwells and offer the business for 
sale as a going concern in the administration, full details of the marketing process and a 
complete explanation of the terms materially affecting the consideration paid. Based on this 
information the court was satisfied that the proposals were SIP 16 compliant and that there 
was no evidence of any abuse of the process137. The perception, as opposed to actual abuse 
will be discussed later on, but it is worth highlighting that the court in this case had no 
qualms about suggesting that the pre-packs (based on these facts) are the only way forward 
(for this particular case). On this evidence it seems that the courts are likely to endorse pre-
packs if the administrator can sufficiently prove that he has carried out his duties whilst 
heeding the interests of the creditors. Of course there will always be issues regarding the 
completeness of the information provided and what was disclosed to the court, but this will 
have to be assessed on an individual basis. Attending to questions surrounding the 
controversial nature of the procedure does not feature in the judgment; the courts are likely to 
                                                            
132 [2009] BCC 578. 
133 See Chapter Three, insolvency practitioners and their desire for personal gain. 
134 Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), at para 21. 
135 See (2009) 243 Co. L.N. 7. 
136 See DKLL Solicitors v HM Revenue & Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch), [2007] B.C.C. 908.  
137 Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), at para 22. 
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refrain from inquiring into the legality of pre-packs in favour of determining whether the 
relevant legislation and guidance has been followed. In this particular case, the court found 
that because the administrators’ justification was so compelling, in that the alternative to the 
pre-pack would have meant a reduced figure being made payable to the preferential and 
unsecured creditors and that the PPL’s would have not been satisfied leaving solicitors 
personally insolvent, they conceded that the pre-packs were the only way forward138.  
 
12. Proposals for Change: An Overview  
Given the controversial nature of pre-packs and the increasing usage of such a procedure it 
was announced in March 2010 by the Insolvency Service (IS) that a call for evidence on 
“improving the transparency of, and confidence in, pre-packaged sales in administration” 
would take place. As aforementioned, some measures have being taken to address the issue of 
improving transparency of pre-packs, notably SIP 16, but the Government had felt that a joint 
effort involving the practitioners was required to attempt to improve the overall effectiveness 
of the pre-packs as a process. The Government published draft regulations in June 2011, after 
much consultation with trade association, legal and insolvency firms and professional bodies, 
creditors and others in 2010. The draft proposals fell considerably short in obtaining a general 
consensus amongst the representatives and so in September 2011 the Government announced 
that it would be revisiting the drawing board and propose new draft regulations in January 
2012. After some deliberations the Government in March 2013 announced an independent 
review into pre-pack administration during a Parliamentary debate on pre-packs. A timescale 
will be announced at the time the review is launched in late spring 2013139. 
 
But before the draft rules are examined in greater detail it is worth remembering the reason 
why these problems have arisen. As noted above there is currently no legislation on pre-
packs, although some assistance may be gained from case law. Whilst limited, it does provide 
that a sale can be agreed in advance with the administrator140. It is possible to conclude that 
the reason why these draft rules have come to light, as discussed in Chapter Three, is because 
pre-packs have been developed by insolvency practitioners in their role as administrators and 
so now the Government feels the need to regulate this informal procedure which currently 
                                                            
138 Halliwells LLP v Bannon [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), at para 22. 
139 See the Insolvency Service website,  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/news/news-stories/2013/Mar/PrePackStatement (accessed 12th March 2013). 
140 See Re T&D Industries Plc [2000] B.C.C 956; and Re Transbus International Ltd. [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch). 
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operates outside of current insolvency legislation141. It therefore appears that the desire of the 
Government and creditors alike is to bring pre-packs from out of the shadows and openly 
discuss the qualities and nature of this procedure, which according to some commentators all 
too often adopts a defensive role brought on by the fact that it usually has to address matters 
(and concerns) that were only evident in perception, rather than focusing on the actual 
evidence of abuse. Changing perception and making people more aware of the true 
characteristics of pre-packs is probably a task too great given the negative attention that the 
procedure has received in the news. The only option that remains is to reform aspects of the 
procedure which are considered to have contributed to the overall damage to its reputation. It 
was therefore necessary to examine administration and determine how cases were routinely 
being implemented142, why pre-packs were on the increase, and what were the issues that 
needed to be clarified and amended.  
 
12.1. Four Concerns 
Attempting to make pre-packs a more viable option and addressing some of the concerns 
surrounding its legitimacy as a rescue model, four major points needed to be examined. One, 
as mentioned above, the transparency aspect of the process needs to be improved to allow the 
creditors’ greater access to information, in particular the reasons why a company undertakes a 
pre-pack. Secondly, there needs to be a stronger identification between pre-packs and 
accountability, namely the report of an independent review committee that can improve the 
image of pre-packs publicly and provide a more open environment in which practitioners are 
more willing to provide information that can shed light onto the reasoning behind their 
decisions. This concern has particularly relevance to situations where a company is sold to 
connected parties. Thirdly, the discretionary power invested in the practitioner needs to be 
made transparent and accessible to interested parties. Whilst discretion may be necessary to 
ensure that the optimal outcome can be reached, it should be regulated and reviewed before 
the decisions are taken. Whilst this may cause delays and potentially contribute to expensive 
review boards, this role could be taken up by the RPBs’ internal model structure which would 
increase knowledge and understanding of what their members are doing in such 
circumstances. This potential reform has not pleased all with some IPs arguing that this could 
                                                            
141 Ruth Jordan an insolvency barrister at Serle Court has also raised these concerns, see M. Taddia, ‘Pre-packs 
administrations rule changes face trouble’, Law Gazette, (November 2011), 
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/pre-pack-administrations-rule-changes-face-trouble (assessed 2nd January 
2012) 
142 For example see A. Katz and M. Mumford, ‘Study of Administration Cases’, Report to the Insolvency 
Service, (October 2006). 
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be the death knell of rescue. They state that the Government’s intention to lengthen the time 
by requiring creditors to be given notice could effectively defeat the purpose of pre-packs. 
Lastly, effort needs to be made to bring pre-packs from out of the shadows and attempts need 
to be made to categorise the process and if appropriate decide whether it should be associated 
with formal rescue procedures such as administration.  
 
12.2. Three Days Notice 
In relation to the consultation on pre-packs, one of the key aspects of the draft rules, and by 
far the most controversial, is the proposition to require administrators to give creditors three 
days’ notice of the pre-pack where a sale to a connected party is proposed and where the 
business or assets have not been exposed to the market. This proposed amendment aimed to 
address a number of concerns, namely that creditors were not given enough notice to 
potentially apply to the court for injunctive relief to prevent a pre-pack occurring on the 
grounds of suspected abuse, and secondly no chance was given to allow other creditors to 
express concerns or assess whether a better offer for the assets could be achieved143. It has 
been reported that this proposal came as something of a surprise, as this notice period was not 
in the original consultation. How exactly this aspect materialised is unimportant compared to 
the tension that it has created between the various interested parties. There are concerns that 
the three day period may not be enough time for the creditors to object. Conversely it is 
ample time to derail a potential rescue, especially if this includes three working days. 
 
It will be remembered that a major advantage that is often put forward by administrators as a 
justification for using pre-packs is due to the speed it can be implemented and hence its 
ability to maintain the best value of a particular asset. Having a three day ‘deliberation 
period’ permits suppliers the chance to disrupt a pre-pack (usually with malicious intentions) 
by acting in a way that ensures the potential agreement falters. Whether action is taken or not 
is irrelevant as it appears that a mere threat to do so would suffice in varying terms. But the 
range of actions that could be taken or threatened vary considerably such as increasing the 
costs of materials, supplies or services, and reducing returns to creditors, all in which would 
prove effective. In addition to this disruption a critical aspect that must be considered is the 
way in which this knowledge (a company in financial distress) may be used and manipulated 
                                                            
143 The proposed amendments appear to be some attempt to address the lack of rights that unsecured creditors 
currently enjoy, but stops short of allowing them to vote on the pre-pack deal itself. See P. Walton, ‘Pre-packin’ 
in the UK’, 18 International Insolvency Review, (2009), 85, at 104. 
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by rival firms. Staff may be poached and others may choose to leave on their own accord, all 
in which would contribute to a demise in the key skills within a workforce necessary to 
successfully run a business (this is of course taking into account that the company suffered 
hardship as a result of an exogenous shock, as opposed to internal management failure). It 
would seem that the introduction of a three day notice period would negate the very purpose 
of a pre-pack, and would pose interesting questions as to how different the outcome of cases 
like Halliwells would be if this became normal practice.  
 
The proposed notice period also has another intended purpose, to deal with the issue of a 
company being sold to a connected party and how this is considered unfair, in particular the 
potential this has in preventing the best price for the assets being obtained as it has not been 
fully exposed to the market. Obtaining competitive prices would satisfy creditors as it 
would/could result in increased returns. However, the decision to expose the company to the 
market should ultimately rest with the administrator as it will be by his or her judgment and 
calculation whether such a move would prejudice the value and hence prove detrimental to 
the creditors as a whole. As previously discussed there are already guidelines in place, 
notably SIP 16 which requires IPs to justify their decisions – why it was not appropriate to 
trade, why selling a company as a going concern would be more beneficial; detail what 
efforts were made during the process of negotiations with major creditors; provide details of 
valuations obtained and provide an account of other alternative measures that were 
considered and why they were not viable options. It should be stressed however that the 
proposals for encouraging wider exposure does not necessarily mean that higher valuations 
will be obtained, or that the deliberation period will add anything positive to the procedure. 
Despite the worries surrounding the three day, there has been a call for this to be extended to 
seven days to give creditors a sufficient amount of time to raise their own finance and make 
their own bid. Whether three or seven days is finally adopted, or if no amendment occurs it is 
clear that there is considerable tension between the creditors on the one hand and genuine 
interested parties who wish to invest in a company without the danger of its value being lost 
on the other.  
 
13. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was not to question the validity of the procedure itself, but rather 
consider the legitimacy of the pre-pack strategy being portrayed as a true rescue process like 
administration. It is evident within the research conducted in this field that pre-packs are and 
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will remain controversial. The procedure suffers from something of an identity crisis, having 
being developed outside of any formal rescue process currently recognised by UK Insolvency 
law. Practitioners who wish to use a pre-pack strategy have been assigned a number of 
regulations and rules to observe, some of which may be wilfully overlooked using their 
discretion if they think compliance with certain aspects may prove detrimental to a 
commercial judgement that may in turn affect the value of a proposed deal. It is apparent that 
the courts place a heavy reliance on the commercial and technical knowledge of practitioners 
and have shown great reluctance to intervene in cases where the dispute arises from a 
business decision as opposed to a statutory or other regulatory breach by the administrator. 
Whilst there are RPBs in place to ensure that professional conduct remains high and the core 
principles are being followed, failure to ensure that safeguards are adhered does not 
automatically warrant action to be taken by the governing body against one of its members. 
Indeed it seems that disciplinary action by RPBs is a rare occurrence not to mention the 
difficult that the process has on creditors seeking relief. Following this, it is without question 
that the biggest problem facing pre-packs is the lack of transparency throughout the process. 
This, along with the lack of accountability placed on practitioners has helped to provide pre-
packs with a reputation that it perhaps does not fully deserve. But it has not been helped by 
the fact that at the centre of its operations conducting informal work in secrecy before the 
formal administration process is the norm and has been justified on the grounds that this 
helps to sustain the value of assets. Whilst creditors have shown considerable distaste for the 
pre-pack strategy that has been struck with the former management of a particular company, 
in most cases the only interested parties that will be willing to offer a good deal are those who 
have connections with the company.  
 
Ultimately the emergence of pre pack strategies as an increasingly popular way to manage 
distressed companies has allowed for a pragmatic solution to surface, which offers an 
alternative to the formal administration process. But as an alternative measure, its 
characteristics are not found in conventional rescue philosophy in the UK and as such cannot 
be correctly labelled as a corporate rescue procedure recognised under the UK insolvency 
laws.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
The research that is the subject of this thesis has raised and addressed a number of issues. 
Given the nature of corporate insolvency law this has meant that discussions have often 
involved bringing together a number of concepts. The interdisciplinary character of corporate 
rescue has allowed for a truly broad approach to be taken regarding the extent of the research 
undertaken. The aims as iterated in Chapter One formed a platform, setting out the 
boundaries of the research and how this was to develop throughout the thesis. One of the 
critical factors was to establish whether the UK’s corporate rescue model complies with the 
theoretical principles of rescue in general. In other words do the characteristics evident in the 
practical application of corporate rescue correspond with the fundamental principles that the 
rescue concept is founded upon? 
 
1. Characteristics Evident within the UK’s Corporate Rescue Model  
To address this first question a closer examination of the historical development of corporate 
rescue was required. The features evident within the UK’s corporate rescue model have been 
significantly shaped by the Cork Report which above all aimed to define the characteristics of 
what made a good modern insolvency system. The report remains so influential that to gain a 
full understanding of the UK’s insolvency regime its reading is fundamental. The extensive 
research carried out within the report revealed a perception held by those who did not work or 
deal with insolvent or troubled companies that failure was something associated with errors, 
mistakes or mismanagement, not something that could be due to other, sometimes 
uncontrollable, factors like a change in the financial climate that affects the whole economy. 
Taking this into consideration there are also problems which could be subsequently rectified. 
The mere mention of financial distress has become heavily linked with failure and the report 
wanted to introduce a new philosophy – an alternative, promoting the rescue of corporations 
rather than immediate liquidation. This change in attitude was encouraged by the lack of clear 
guidelines as to how distress should be dealt with, in addition to wanting to limit the extent of 
the troubles from spreading beyond the company into the wider community. Whilst not all of 
the provisions within the report made it into the Insolvency Act 1986, it did represent the first 
real movement that allowed the rescue culture to emerge.  
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Notwithstanding that the concept of rescue has evolved and such changes have been noted in 
the subsequent Enterprise Act 2002, it remains an issue that the customs and general practices 
that were evident before the Acts continued to exist, causing conflicts with any progressive 
legislation. The “path dependency” concept goes some way to explain this phenomenon, 
suggesting that despite the natural and expected progression of corporate practices, a 
jurisdiction will refrain from adopting change to certain key principles if it presents any risk 
of diluting the existence of its own model. In essence it is commonplace to find with some 
old legal systems that the historical differences that separate one model from another are now 
so embedded in certain legal regimes that they have become fundamental to its identity. 
Therefore any change to the character/main body of the existing law would not simply amend 
the way in which rescue is implemented but it may imply that the current system was 
inefficient in producing its desired outcome. Rendering one system better than another is not 
so problematic if it stands in isolation. But since this is rarely the case, the change may 
interfere with years of customs and practices and strike at the heart of its philosophy. As this 
would be unacceptable to most legal systems, a pragmatic solution to this situation that has 
gained favour has been to relax the endorsement of formal rescue procedures. There has been 
a notable adjustment within the profession from applying the more formal route and taking a 
less stringent path, such as endorsing the informal pre-packs.  
 
The combination of adopting rules from old customs and taking piecemeal aspects from 
various regulations has meant that certain terms such as ‘financial distress’ and the point at 
which ‘insolvency’ occurs remains disputable. It has been acknowledged that the lack of 
clarification on such matters has allowed some much needed flexibility in an area that is 
surrounded by ambiguity and rife in tension between the various interested parties within a 
distressed company. This elasticity has provided insolvency practitioners with a huge amount 
of scope to decide the affairs of a company in the way that they see fit. The extent of this 
discretion has raised some serious concerns. They can use the ambiguity of the concepts 
along with their discretion to formulate an opinion that may, in some instances, reinterpret 
aspects of the law beyond what was intended by Parliament. There is a case to be made that 
IPs are the architects of corporate rescue proceedings and will on occasions, intended or not, 
administer beyond their powers as set out in the 1986 and 2002 Acts and act in breach of 
Codes set out by the RPBs such as the Code of Ethics.  
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Inevitably it appears that corporate rescue unfortunately suffers from something that is best 
described as an identity crisis. Whilst a hierarchy of objectives have been provided within 
Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, it produces mixed intentions. The primary objective 
as set out in paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule is to rescue the company as a going concern. This 
thesis categorises this as an attempt to complete a ‘pure’ corporate rescue process whereby 
the distressed company remains intact as much as it was before the troubles occurred. The 
secondary objectives should only be considered if the primary objective has been eliminated 
because it would not prove to be viable in achieving its aim. These other objectives are not 
concerned with protecting the company as a corporate entity but rather appeasing the 
creditors as a whole by attempting to achieve a better result than what would be realised 
through either pursing the primary aim as noted above or through the immediate winding up 
of the company. The concern regarding this objective is whether the primary aim is rejected 
as a matter of course and whether this is in reality viewed as the true primary objective.  
 
The research certainly indicates that there is a pattern emerging whereby corporate rescue 
procedures have simply been used as substitutes for liquidation. Whilst this may have not 
been intentional, given the listed objectives set out, which aim to provide real alternatives, 
adhering to the hierarchy as set out in paragraph 3 seems to have created a new mechanism 
which ultimately does lead to liquidation, certainly in effect. The pertinent question is not 
whether administration is the new liquidation (which this thesis concludes it is) but whether 
pre-packs has become the new rescue process, albeit not one recognised within the UK’s 
current insolvency legislation.  
 
The corporate rescue process as noted above is largely controlled by IPs who use their 
discretion to interpret the various insolvency legislation, rules and regulations to arrive at an 
outcome that they consider reflects the optimal result for the distressed company. How 
decisions are reached often highlights a preference between company and business rescue, 
with the former associated with corporate rescue and the latter with reorganisation. It is with 
the reorganisation strategy that results in the sale of parts of the business (this can range from 
physical assets such as machinery or to land or to intellectual property covering designs for 
new or existing products). Implementing this would naturally result in the downsizing of the 
company and streamlining what will be the eventual remaining business. This can be seen 
with respect to ‘rescues’ such as Blacks Leisure being bought by JD Sports early last year. 
For all intents and purposes when the task has been completed the company that remains will 
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often not reflect what it once was. If it is the case that the mere shell of the company remains 
intact then this cannot be said to have been a successful rescue (the process being more akin 
to reorganisation) and certainly not a rescue that enabled the company to continue as a going 
concern. 
 
The extent of the IP’s involvement will depend on the company and the troubles that are 
evident. In general corporate rescue has been defined as an act which involves a major 
intervention to prevent eventual failure in a financially distressed company. However, the key 
to increasing the possibility of a rescue is not only down to ensuring that an IP is notified of 
the company’s troubles at the earliest opportunity, but it is the ability of the IP to present the 
company as a viable business with a future. Administration has the advantage of being able to 
grant a moratorium to provide a ‘breathing space’ for the company to turn around its fortunes 
without having to worry about creditors demanding their money. But it is still a public 
process that will advertise the woes of the company. Competitors, investors and purchasers of 
the company’s products are all reliant to news regarding the well-being of the company. The 
general stigma associated with failure can enhance the original distress that a company faces 
and in some cases render the primary objective of rescuing a company as a going concern 
obsolete from the start. It was noted above that perception is everything with a company and 
this is where a pre-pack has the advantage as a buyer for the company can be sought without 
having to make it public that the company is having troubles. This in turn might help prevent 
the ‘ripple effect,’ with the distress spreading further than the company. It also critically 
prevents the value of the company from plummeting, making the company more appealing 
(retains value within the market it operates) and as such a rescue of the company more likely. 
 
2. The Relationship between Theory and Policy  
Turning attention towards the relationship between corporate rescue theory and government 
policy, the research demonstrates how they have developed at a different pace. The current 
economic environment has provided an environment to test the existing law. This has brought 
into sharp contrast the theoretical principles that the UK’s insolvency regime is based on and 
what a distressed company requires to have a realistic chance of survival. Historically the UK 
has adopted a policy that has followed a Credit Bargain Theory approach, developing policies 
to reflect a more socio-economic stance. This has allowed the UK to follow a traditionalist 
philosophy, which supports the view above that there should be a move away from 
liquidation in favour of supporting the preservation of distressed companies. This again bring 
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us back to what is the exact nature of rescue and how should Schedule B(1), paragraph 3(1) 
of the IA 1986 be interpreted? Since the idea of pure rescue will only happen on rare 
occasions, can it be said to have any practical application? On a basic level of what a 
corporate rescue model should achieve this thesis introduced eight principles derived from 
the Cork Report designed to cover a broad range of considerations that should be evident 
within a corporate rescue strategy. The principles covered a number of factors such as 
fairness, adaptability, simplicity, cost, efficiency, timelessness, transparency, and 
accountability. By following these eight principles a rescue model could be examined and 
quality checked on its substance to reveal whether it would be compatible with the cultural 
and economic aspects of the jurisdiction in question. Despite the changes contained within 
the Enterprise Act 2002, such as reiterating the importance of taking pre-emptive measures to 
tackle and counter financial distress, risk management, even if monitored, does not prevent 
failure and it is only often with the help from IPs when all of the relevant information is 
gathered that the extent of the situation can be fully determined. With a new emphasis on IPs 
to assess the situation and to consider the interests of the creditors as a whole,  it is now seen 
that collective proceedings is a deliberate move away from the pursuit of individual interests 
as existed  with receivership.  
 
The amendments enacted in the EA 2002 intended to make strides to enhance the reputation 
of insolvency law, but many aspects of the old law remain. The actions of directors remain to 
influence the outcome heavily as the extent of the financial distress depends upon them acting 
proactively to report the problems and their ability to provide the correct information when 
required by an IP. This, along with securing finance to aid a rescue attempt, particularly the 
ability to negotiate a debt-subordination scheme, proves critical and not always successful. 
Despite these concerns, the main factor that has contributed to the questioning of the 
existence and efficiency of rescue has been the involvement of the IPs and the wide 
discretion that they have been afforded under the Code and principles contained within the 
legislation.  
 
IPs, as it has already been submitted, are no longer simply the practitioners, but the architects 
of corporate rescue. Whilst it is commendable that IPs have used their experience and 
knowledge to create a pragmatic solution to help distressed, yet viable companies, there is a 
trend occurring which shows that there is an increased tendency to operate outside the 
principles dictated by the UK’s insolvency law. However, it will be seen that the profession 
227 
 
has been given a privileged footing, endorsed by the lack of available alternatives. Corporate 
rescue is only an option available to a company that can prove it can be rescued as a going 
concern. But there are growing concerns as to whether IPs are equipped with the knowledge 
to make decisions that may not necessarily fall within their field of expertise.  
 
In essence it has raised questions whether a corporate rescue model in the UK exists, as these 
professionals seem to have the discretion to apply their own rules and interpretations as to 
what they think the law should be. This position has been further strengthened by the lack of 
intervention from the courts demonstrating that they prefer to leave the commercial decisions 
to those better placed within the business world. There are a number of fundamental 
principles and safeguards in place designed to prevent or at least restrict potential abuses. 
This, however, is dependent on the action taken by RPBs and whether the response is 
reflective of the act committed. The lack of transparency and accountability remains a 
problem which ultimately contributes to suspicion around the conduct of those who work 
within the rescue process. This has had the effect of shrouding corporate rescue in an air of 
secrecy leaving little information available in order to analyse exactly how rescue procedures 
are implemented. As a result this thesis considered the possibility that the choice to liquidate 
or rescue the company is influenced by how lucrative the process may be to office holders 
who have been charged to administer the company’s affairs. The conduct of some has been so 
astounding that this has gone some way to support this submission, but the act of a few 
should not be used to hold the profession in contempt. Further analysis needs to be conducted 
within this area to substantiate this claim. 
 
Given the importance of rescue procedures, there has to be a way to assess how effective they 
operate. A critical way to measure how well something is doing is to ask how effective does a 
model achieve its intended goal? Given the vast array of goals, not all can be assessed in the 
same way. Different benchmarks are set according to the nature of the aim and not all can 
endorse the same fundamental principles as part of its identity. Besides cultural influences, 
the overall model is subjected to wider issues which may be general in nature, such as 
economic downturn, or matters that are specific to the market in which the company operates.  
 
In essence the contents of a model must be put in context and assessed accordingly.  
Subjecting corporate rescue to this framework involves identifying dominant principles 
within the current insolvency legislation that are presumed to be of significance due to the 
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historical importance that they possess. Once these principles have been identified they may 
form the basis for assessment, providing a foundation in which they may reveal how one 
model compares to another in terms of how efficient they are in producing a desired outcome.  
 
To reduce conflict, basic principles must be applied and these are able to act as general tools. 
Values such as transparency and fairness are important as they allow a system to be viewed 
as a whole. Transparency is a universal value that can be discussed in conjunction with 
accountability. Both aid to reassure the general public and interested parties that a model is 
doing what it is meant to do. Corporate rescue however does not satisfy the test satisfactorily 
as the process is not accessible and IPs are not accountable enough for the actions they take.  
 
3. Determining an Efficiency Model 
The law like most things is about producing desirable results. For who does the law of 
insolvency serve remains a contentious issue beyond the scope of this thesis. What this thesis 
concerned itself with was have the characteristics contained within the UK’s corporate rescue 
model become redundant so far as its capability to provide a framework that can efficiently 
produce a viable rescue package that could save a company? Applying the four main notions 
of efficiency to corporate rescue has revealed some interesting findings. The main difficulty 
identified when applying Pareto efficiency to a corporate rescue model is whether the notion 
can truly be applied to a functioning principle that operates in the ‘real world’. Based on this 
concern, the preference is to use the alternative notion known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
This approach is beneficial as unlike the former notion there is no actual requirement to 
compensate the losers. The only requirement is that the winners must gain more than the 
losses to the losers. Applying this notion to corporate rescue it is highly unlikely that the 
company would be able to compensate the creditors to such a degree that their grievances 
were satisfied. Furthermore, should this be done at all? Why should the risk element of 
investment be disregarded? Whilst contractual obligations play a key role in determining how 
debt is divided, it does so with the knowledge that not all parties or debts are equal. 
Satisfying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency means that the value of the compensation provided must 
be at such a level to be sufficient to the affected party. But since this depends entirely on the 
individual’s wealth, the notion is susceptible to many possibilities and cannot be applied with 
any certainty.  
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In reference to practical application, technical costs are often applied which realises that the 
stronger competitor, principle or result should dictate the flow. The notion believes that the 
market provides the answers to the problems that exist in a particular area. As explored in 
Chapter Three, IPs have heavily influenced how administration is to be interpreted and in 
turn have been responsible for the rise in alternative rescue strategies such as pre-packs being 
deployed. This can be read in conjunction with dynamic efficiency which describes the 
ability of a given system to evolve and ultimately adapt the changing needs of a given 
market. It will be suggested that corporate rescue methods has evolved to the needs of the 
business world. 
 
In terms of the actors who participate in a company their legitimate expectations should 
control how the company is run as well as how potential financial distress is dealt with. 
Concerns surrounding the legitimacy of corporate rescue have posed some interesting 
questions, not all of which could be covered within the scope of this thesis. However, even 
with the self imposed limitations that were necessary to keep the thesis focused, the research 
does highlight the lack of any claim that the concept of corporate rescue in the UK may make 
to fulfil the needs of companies in today’s financial climate. Can administration be said to 
offer the best deal for a distressed company? Or has corporate rescue been modified so that a 
strategy has developed, which better suits the needs of businesses? The research completed in 
this thesis inclines us to lean against the latter and conclude that the current formal 
administration process does not fully capture commercial practice, and survives only by 
categorising inconsistent elements as exogenous. Whilst the legal uncertainty cannot be 
eliminated, it can only be managed and this has created a two-tier system whereby an 
informal approach has been taken.  
 
4. The Pragmatic Response 
Pre-packaged administrations have proven to be a controversial tool employed by IPs to 
tackle troubled companies. There are many questions as to whether the pre-pack can offer a 
legitimate solution to the inadequacies of the current law governing corporate rescue. Given 
the direction of the existing research conducted in this thesis it was necessary that a limit was 
placed on the extent pre-packs were to be examined. The purpose of this thesis was not to 
question the validity of the procedure itself, but rather consider the legitimacy of the pre-pack 
strategy inventing itself as a true rescue process like administration. Administration is a 
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process that is embedded in the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002, with a 
tangible framework how it goes about dealing with distressed companies. Pre-packs on the 
other hand do not share this. The procedure suffers from something of an identity crisis, 
having being developed outside of any formal rescue process that is currently recognised by 
UK Insolvency law. Despite this shortcoming pre-packs appear to be loosely based on 
elements of the Cork Report, such as the communitarian approach as it tries to limit the 
extent that the distress spreads beyond the company, and to, in some regards, safeguard jobs. 
But this does not always happen. The lack of legislation regulating pre-packs has resulted in a 
number of issues, most notably the inability to enforce a uniform approach to how pre-packs 
should operate.  
 
This vacuum, whilst urgently needs addressing by the government, has for the time being 
presented as a golden opportunity for IPs. Practitioners have realised that this informal 
process can be beneficial not only to providing profit for the accountancy firm they work for 
but also a means of not having to adhere to the strict timeframe and provisions with the 1986 
and 2002 Acts. That said, this does not mean than pre-packs are entirely unregulated. IPs are 
collectively members of professional bodies that amongst other things monitor the actions of 
their group. Within these RPBs, the bodies have recognised that some sort of guidance was 
needed as well as some regulation in order to ensure monitoring, since it was apparent that 
this strategy was common practice amongst its members across the profession. The RPBs in 
some respects have plugged the gap, dealing with issues arising out of practice where the 
government have failed to take responsibility.  
 
Notwithstanding this arrangement, this does not mean the pre-packs are tightly controlled. 
Whilst each of the professional bodies have formulated a number of regulations and rules to 
keep the practice in check, the permitted use of discretion afforded to IPs allows them to 
conduct the affairs of the company how they see fit without having to provide clear and 
concise justifications for their actions. The only real test that has to be satisfied is whether a 
certain act would prove detrimental to a commercial judgement which may in turn affect the 
value of a proposed deal (the company) to a purchaser. Commercial judgement has proved a 
key concept as it is apparent that the courts place a heavy reliance on the commercial and 
technical knowledge of practitioners and have shown great reluctance to intervene in cases 
where the dispute arises from a business decision as opposed to a statutory or regulation 
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breach by the administrator. This is, of course, consistent with the courts’ traditional 
approach in dealing with the judgments of liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy. 
 
Whilst it is part of the RPBs role to ensure that professional conduct remains high and the 
core principles are being followed, failure to ensure that safeguards are adhered to does not 
automatically warrant action to be taken by the governing body against one of its members. 
Indeed it seems that disciplinary action by RPBs is a rare occurrence not to mention the 
difficult that the process has on creditors seeking relief. In some ways this has encouraged 
alternative rescue models to arise as the potential consequences arising from a breach is 
nominal compared to the benefits that are on offer if the pre-pack works out. In conjunction 
with this it is difficult for RPBs to be in a position where they are certain after reviewing all 
of the relevant documentation that some action should be taken against its members. The data 
compiled in the cases does not always truly reflect all of the circumstances, nor is it often the 
case that the information obtained is accurate.  
 
It follows that the biggest problem facing pre-packs is the lack of transparency throughout the 
process. This, along with the lack of accountability required of practitioners has helped to 
provide pre-packs with a reputation that it perhaps does not fully deserve. But it has not been 
helped by the fact that informal negotiations are commenced in secrecy before the company 
enters any formal administration process. This is not only the norm but it is a practice that has 
been justified on the grounds that this helps to sustain the value of the company. Sustaining 
the value is a critical objective of a rescue procedure as it allows the company to be valuable 
as a whole rather than merely its assets. If it was just the assets that had any value then the 
rescue of the company would be fruitless. Whilst creditors have shown considerable distaste 
for a pre-pack strategy that has been struck with the former management of a particular 
company, in most cases the only interested parties that will be willing to offer a good deal are 
those who do actually have connections with the company. However to establish such deals 
means operating outside the administration process and this could prove the ‘tipping point’ 
for how corporate rescue operates in the future.  
 
Ultimately the emergence of pre pack strategies as an increasingly popular way to manage 
distressed companies has allowed for a pragmatic solution to surface, which offers an 
alternative to the formal administration process. The difficulty with pre-packs is that whilst 
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they may reflect current trends in practice it is not something that is endorsed in either the 
Insolvency Act 1986 or the Enterprise Act 2002. Since there appears to be a legal vacuum 
whereby the realities evident in practice are not accommodated for within the law can the 
model referred to as corporate rescue in the UK be accurately described as corporate rescue? 
There are various regulations and codes from the RPBs which provide guidance on how pre-
packs should operate but this is only to offer some uniform approach to be taken throughout 
the profession. The required level of change is not yet reflected in legislation. It is with this 
thought that makes it plausible to conclude that if this trend continues and the pre-pack 
continues to operate in a vacuum between various statutes without officially displacing 
administration it may reasonably be suggested that the UK does not have a legislated 
corporate rescue procedure. 
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